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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Setting their sights on the splash thrown up by Leviathan in chapters 3 and 41, 
many interpreters have argued that the conflict between chaos and order, as embodied in 
combat mythology, is a theme in the Book of Job.  Although I agree that issues related to 
chaos and order are central to the book, the assumption that any discussion of chaos and 
order must be related to combat mythology does not stand up to scrutiny.  Order and chaos, 
I maintain, are broader terms.  I define them as “how the world ought to be,” and “how the 
world ought not to be,” respectively.  Using these broader, and, I think, more accurate 
definitions, the Book of Job can be read as a long discussion about chaos and order, 
without requiring that we identify characters as forces embodying chaos or order who fight 
each other for control of the world, an interpretation which is an over-simplification of 
what is going on in the book.   
As “how the world ought/ought not to be,” order and chaos are container terms, 
capable of being filled in a number of different ways.  That is to say, we cannot look at 
Leviathan (or Tiamat) and extrapolate characteristics of chaos that are applicable across 
the board.  Rather, what constitutes chaos or order will depend on the particular 
circumstances and point of view of the person doing the labeling.  In this thesis, I identify 
three pairs of concepts around which chaos and order are commonly conceived: 
singularity/multiplicity, stasis/change, and inside/outside.  Taking these pairs one at a time, 
I examine how the various characters in the Book of Job describe order and chaos.  What 
emerges is not a dictum as to what constitutes order or chaos, but a number of possible 
visions of how the world ought and ought not to be, none of which is definitive. 
At the end of the “conversation about chaos and order” that is the Book of Job, 
both God and Job make strong bids for their right to “make the world,” by deciding how it 
ought and ought not to be.  In his speeches from the whirlwind, God identifies himself as 
the world’s creator, presenting an ordered world that is vastly different from what Job 
presumes order to be.  Regardless of how Job’s response to God in 42:6 is understood—
and it is interpreted in a great number of ways—in the epilogue Job can be seen to make 
his own bid for creator status, as he proceeds to inhabit a world that bears no similarity to 
the world God has just described.  Job’s epilogue-world denies the ultimate reality of 
God’s whirlwind-world, but God’s whirlwind-world casts doubt upon the reality of Job’s 
epilogue-world.  In this way, the book ends ambiguously;  it curves back on itself, and the 
discussion about the nature of chaos and order continues, both within the book and beyond. 
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PREFACE: 
SOME METAPHORS TOWARD A METHODOLOGY 
 
“Verbs Slowed to a Standstill” 
 
 “It’s not so much A Sunday Afternoon/ on the Island of La Grande Jatte as the 
point/ of order according to Seurat—/ that bits of light and color, oil paints/ aligned in dots 
become the moment caught,/ verbs stilled to a standstill, the life examined./ We step back 
wide-eyed for a better look” (Lynch, 1-7).  So writes Thomas Lynch about Georges 
Seurat’s pointillist painting in his poem “Art History, Chicago.”  In this preface I  want to 
think about the way I work with biblical texts, and, in particular, with the Book of Job.  
What Lynch describes in the lines quoted above might serve as a metaphor for what I do.   
I want to say that there is something of a pointillist aesthetic to the way I approach the 
Joban text, or, at least, pointillism as mediated by Lynch, without whose mediation it 
would not occur to me to compare my writing with Seurat’s painting.  It is Lynch’s claim 
that Seurat’s technique causes verbs to be slowed to a standstill, allowing life to be 
examined in a way that it could not if its regular speed were maintained that prompts me to 
suggest a connection between what I am doing and Seurat’s work.  In my writing I attempt 
to slow the text and ideas about it down so that they can be more carefully examined.  
What is really happening as the story passes by?  Are there things that can be seen in slow-
motion that would not otherwise be noticed?  Can we learn something new by thinking 
about the individual, component parts of the whole that we would never learn by looking at 
the whole on its own?  I am not, however, talking about a reading that relies on an 
examination of technical details to the exclusion of the whole.  It is the whole that interests 
me, but I want to know how that whole has been put together and whether, if dismantled, it 
might be put together in a different way. 
 
Fiction and the Book of Job 
 
 This dismantling and rebuilding is a never-ending process, at least where the Book 
of Job is concerned.  Peggy Day observes, “The book of Job seeks to inspire thought, to 
endorse complexity, ambiguity, and paradox…and because of this very dialogue between 
the work itself and its audience it is in the final analysis multivalent” (Day 1988, 70).  
Whoever I may be, I approach the book from my particular situation, with my peculiar 
brain and the spirals along which my thoughts move, and the book, in its ambiguity and 
complexity, opens itself up to my particular peculiarities.  What a pair we make: it my 
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fantasy text and I its dream reader.  Can our interaction be anything other than imaginary, 
and, because imaginary, illicit? 
Whenever I stop taking apart what I have put together, I have, in a sense, decided 
to create a fiction.  In this thesis, I do make claims about what the Book of Job means.  I 
haven’t finished thinking about Job, however, and, in the future, I will no doubt take apart 
at least some of what I have claimed here.  In this thesis, then, I do not profess to offer 
“unequivocal answers” (Clines 1990, 106)  to the meaning of the Book of Job, but, rather, 
to suggest possibilities.  It is possible to interpret the book the way I have here, but this 
interpretation is also something of a fiction.  It hangs in the air, seemingly substantial, but 
it is really a mirage, the way all possibility—because it is only what might be and not 
necessarily what is—is a mirage.  But while it shimmers in the air, there is something 
worthwhile about it.  It deserves its moment.  
 
“Playing Dostoevsky” 
 
 Carol Newsom, in her article “Bakhtin, the Bible, and Dialogic Truth,” 
recommends an enterprise which she terms “‘playing Dostoevsky to the Bible’” (Newsom 
1996, 305), by which she means bringing the various worldviews contained within the 
Bible into contact to allow them to quarrel and dialogue with each other.  Newsom has 
already played a version of this game in her book The Book of Job: A Contest of Moral 
Imaginations, in which she takes seriously the positions represented by each of the 
characters and examines how they interact.  In this thesis, I play another version of the 
game.  In a way, my version is more structured.  I listen in on the conversation around a 
particular topic—that of order and chaos, or, as I will define them in my introductory 
chapter, “how the world ought to be” and “how the world ought not to be”—viewing the 
topic from several different angles.  I impose a kind of grid, into which the conversation 
can be fit and then try viewing the grid through different lenses.  For this reason, the thesis 
circles around on several of the same passages, approaching them from different angles 
which yield differing interpretations. 
 To play Dostoevsky is not, however, only to allow different points of view to 
converse with each other.  Rather, it is to write fiction.  Dostoevsky was a novelist, after 
all—a creator of fictions.  Newsom writes, “as the model…suggests, it would be a project 
which would self-consciously go beyond what the texts explicitly say to draw out the 
implications of their ideas as they can be revealed in dialogue with other perspectives” 
(Ibid.).  To go beyond what the text actually says is to write a kind of fiction, to stretch out 
the mirage of possibility.  In her own book, Newsom does not take her Bakhtinian analysis 
 6
of Job to this level.  She is more accountable to the text, which is, of course, an entirely 
admirable approach.  I do not mean to suggest that her book is defective.  I only mean to 
say that it does not go where even she has suggested “playing Dostoevsky” might take an 
interpreter, a direction in which this thesis, by contrast, does go.   
Reading the Book of Job, I take ideas apart to generate new possibilities, which are, 
by nature, fictional.  This is a work of imagination.  Imagination, compared with objective 
truth, does have an illicit tinge.  I suspect, however, that it is where most of us live.  
Perhaps we ought to accustom ourselves to the squalor. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: DEFINING CHAOS AND ORDER 
 
 Job as Chaos to God’s Order 
 
 The Book of Job has a history of being read as a locus of the interaction between 
chaos and order in the Bible.  This is primarily because of the book’s mention of 
Leviathan, generally understood to be a chaos monster.  It is Job who first names the 
monster when, in his first speech of the poetic section, he calls for the eradication of the 
day of his birth, proclaiming, “Let those curse it who curse the Sea, those who are skilled 
to rouse up Leviathan” (3:8).1  Then, God devotes the entire second chapter of his second 
speech to describing the power and glory of the water-dwelling beast which “has no equal” 
on earth (41:33a).  In this way, the central poetic section of the book begins and ends with 
the splashing of Leviathan, leading some scholars to the certainty that chaos swims 
through its pages and provides a key to understanding its meaning. 
 Michael Fishbane sees in Job’s call for the rousing of Leviathan a clear indication 
that Job himself is an agent of chaos.  One who calls for the chaos monster to subsume 
creation must himself become a chaos monster—this is the logic of Fishbane’s argument.  
He writes, “Job, in the process of cursing the day of his birth (v. 1), binds spell to spell in 
his articulation of an…unrestrained death wish for himself and the entire creation” 
(Fishbane 1971, 153).  It may be Leviathan who has the real chaotic power, but Job, 
casting a spell with his speech, seeks to unleash that power from the bonds set for it by 
God and harness it for his own destructive purposes. 
Leo Perdue, too, identifies Job as a chaos monster, claiming that in chapter 3, “Job 
has attempted to deconstruct the metaphor of creation by word with his own linguistic 
assault, thereby returning the world to the darkness of night” (Perdue 1991, 204).  God’s 
naming of Leviathan in chapter 41 serves as a combative response to the chaotic behavior 
and speech in which Job has engaged throughout the book.  God speaks about Leviathan in 
order to reassert his control over Job, the most recent chaos monster who has challenged 
his authority.  Perdue writes, “Those who challenge Yahweh’s rule include Behemoth, 
Leviathan, the wicked, and now Job….Yahweh has come to engage chaos in battle, 
reassert divine sovereignty, and issue judgment leading to the ordering of the world” (Ibid., 
202). 
                                                 
1 All Bible translations are from the NRSV, unless otherwise noted. 
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Similarly, for Norman Habel, God chooses to speak about Leviathan precisely 
because Job’s behavior has been characterized by a Leviathan-like chaos.  Habel writes, 
“As in a mirror, Job is shown Leviathan stirring up chaos.  Yahweh is hinting that Job has 
taken on heroic proportions and that like a chaos figure he has roused Yahweh to appear in 
a whirlwind and challenge him” (Habel 1985, 574).  That is, although Job describes 
himself as allied with God, using his righteous power to “break the fangs of the 
unrighteous” (29:17a), God’s description of Leviathan shows that Job is actually allied 
with chaos and must be subdued if order is to be upheld. 
For these interpreters,2 that the Book of Job has to do with issues of chaos and 
order is indicated by the naming of Leviathan.  What the book says about chaos and order 
is that God has defeated chaos and holds it in check to maintain order, whatever the 
appearances to the contrary.  Whoever accuses God of perpetuating chaos must himself be 
a force of chaos, for God is the unquestionable source of order. 
 
Gunkel and the Comparative Method 
 
Why, though, should this interpretation arise from the mention of Leviathan?  Why 
is Leviathan equated with chaos, a chaos in which Job participates and against which God 
fights?  The Book of Job does not, after all, tell us that Leviathan equals chaos.  Rather, 
this is an assumption which scholars bring to the text, a key which they use to unlock its 
meaning.  To understand why Leviathan is viewed as chaos, we must turn to the 
comparative method and the work of Hermann Gunkel.  In the comparative method, other 
ancient Near Eastern texts are used to elucidate the meaning of biblical passages by setting 
them in their larger cultural contexts, allowing scholars to glimpse the suppositions which 
may have been in the minds of the writers and which, therefore, form the background of 
the text even if they do not appear on its surface. 
Chaos and order, as themes in the biblical text, were first brought to the attention of 
biblical scholarship through the work of Gunkel, who, in his 1895 book Schöpfung und 
Chaos in Urzeit und Endzeit, drew lines of comparison between certain biblical texts and 
the Babylonian epic Enuma elish, claiming that the Bible had been influenced by the 
Babylonian myth.  Gunkel’s comparative reading of Genesis 1 links tehom, the entity 
which is covered with darkness and over which a wind from God hovers at the time of 
                                                 
2 These three are not alone in viewing the Book of Job as a telling of the story of the Chaoskampf, with Job 
as a representative of chaos.  I have simply chosen them as emblematic of this perspective.  I might also 
include John Day who, notes that “The number of allusions to the Chaoskampf  in the book of Job is most 
striking,” and asks, “How are we to account for this fact?”  He responds, as Fishbane, Perdue, and Habel do, 
“the imagery is employed because the conflict between the dragon and God provided an apt parallel to the 
book’s theme of Job’s conflict with God” (Day 1985, 49). 
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creation, with Tiamat, the monster which is defeated by Marduk as a prelude to the 
creation of the world in Enuma elish.  Believing that tehom was a demythologized 
derivative of Tiamat, Gunkel applied the characteristics of Tiamat to tehom, even though 
tehom does not exhibit those characteristics outright, and concluded that Genesis 1 and 
Enuma elish are telling the same story, even though, on the face of it, the accounts are not 
the same.  
In Enuma elish Tiamat is a pre-creation, watery being, existing before any part of 
the known world has been brought into being.  She is the mother of the gods, who are 
conceived through her commingling with her consort, Apsu, also a watery being.  The 
young gods born from Tiamat bother Apsu with their noise, and he hatches a plan to kill 
them.  He tries to enlist Tiamat’s help, but she refuses, citing the fact that it would be 
wrong to destroy what they have created.  Before Apsu can carry out his plan, however, he 
himself is killed by one of his children, the god Ea.  Later, the gods turn against Tiamat, 
and she girds herself to do battle against them.  Seeing Tiamat arrayed for battle, the gods 
are afraid to face her.  But Marduk, the youngest of the gods, offers to fight her on the 
other gods’ behalf, on the condition that the gods will proclaim him supreme god after the 
battle.  The gods agree to this proposal.  Marduk fights Tiamat and wins, after which he 
splits her body in two, fixing one half above as heaven, and establishes his temple in 
Babylon.  This, in brief, is the story told by Enuma elish.  Tiamat figures as a central 
character throughout the epic, the climax of which is her battle with Marduk and the 
resultant creation of the ordered world, with Marduk’s temple city at its center.  For this 
reason, Enuma elish has been identified as a type of myth called the “combat myth” or 
Chaoskampf.  In Genesis 1:1-2, by contrast, tehom does not figure as a character, but as 
something which exists in the background.  It has no role to play in any drama which 
results in the creation of the world.  It shares with Tiamat only the characteristic of being 
some sort of pre-creation water.  That, and a potentially etymologically-related name are 
all the two seem to have in common. 
 In his study, though, Gunkel used these similarities to argue that what lay behind 
the vague description of tehom in Genesis 1 was the sharp description of Tiamat in Enuma 
elish.  What exactly tehom is, though left ambiguous in the biblical text, could be made 
clear by referring the reader to Tiamat.  Behind the single verse allotted to tehom in 
Genesis 1, lay a complete backstory.  In that story, tehom, like Tiamat, was the matrix out 
of which the first acts of creation were born.  More importantly, tehom, like Tiamat, was 
the chaos monster which had to be defeated so that the supreme god could create the 
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world.3  Having made this link, Gunkel went on to argue that the theme of combat between 
chaos and order is present throughout the Bible, lying just below surface of the text.  
Having discovered Tiamat in tehom, Gunkel opened the way for scholars to discover 
references to the combat myth in other biblical passages.  That is, wherever any aspect of 
the myth appeared in the Bible, Gunkel and others were encouraged, by the link between 
tehom and Tiamat, to posit the existence of the entire myth as a hidden backstory which 
could be used to resolve any ambiguities in the surface text.  This is how, in the Book of 
Job,  the water-dwelling Leviathan has come to be identified as the embodiment of chaos 
and God’s mention of Leviathan has been understood to refer to his initial and ongoing 
order-creating battle with the monster. 
 
Describing Chaos and Order Through the Application of the Comparative Method 
  
 Through Gunkel’s comparative work, the tehom of Genesis 1:2 was identified as 
chaos, and the struggle between chaos and order was identified as a regularly-appearing 
theme in the biblical narrative.  It remained necessary, however, to define chaos and order 
at a more abstract level.  To do this, scholars have studied chaos and order as they appear 
in Enuma elish and other ancient Near Eastern myths and have drawn conclusions based 
on the similarities between them.  For those doing this work, it has been taken as a given 
that the term “chaos” should be applied to whatever existed prior to the creation, while the 
creation itself is properly designated “order.”  Susan Niditch, for example, beginning from 
the given that chaos is whatever existed in the pre-creation time, concludes that chaos is 
the state in which “all is vague and amorphous, darkness, nothing” (Niditch 1985, 15).  
She continues,  
Like the Enuma elish, [Hesiod’s] Theogony, and so many other cultures’ 
creation myths, Genesis 1 and Genesis 2 tell of a progression from chaos to 
order, from stasis to movement and change, from timelessness to time, from 
formlessness to form, from a blob without man or other living things to a 
cosmos containing a world teeming with plant, animal, and human life.  (Ibid.) 
                                                 
3 More recently, Bernard Batto has used other biblical texts to argue for the identification of tehom as a 
combative chaos monster.  He writes, “Some scholars have tried to downplay the presence of mythic themes 
in Genesis 1:1-2:3, saying that any hint of a battle between the creator and primeval sea has been thoroughly 
suppressed in this biblical passage.  It is true that the more blatant polytheistic notions have been suppressed, 
in keeping with the norms of Israelite religion and its emphasis upon the exclusive worship of Yahweh.  But 
the image of creation as victory over an unruly primeval sea is still clearly visible.  Confirmation may be 
found in Psalm 8, which is generally acknowledged to have close affinities with the P creation 
account….Behind Genesis 1:1-2:3 lies the same conception of the victorious divine warrior who retires to his 
palace to a leisurely kingship after subduing the foe” (Batto 1992, 79).  Although Batto argues that “the 
image of creation as victory over an unruly primeval sea is still clearly visible” in Genesis 1, it seems to me 
that it is only visible by making comparisons, whether from within the biblical text or without.  On its own, 
tehom is not combative; it is not even overtly contrary. 
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Niditch defines chaos as vague and amorphous, even to the degree of being 
nothingness.  Chaos is timeless, formless, and simple in its lack of the multiplicity of 
life.  Order, by contrast, has form and is characterized by multiplicity and the 
changeability which goes along with existence in time. 
Norman Cohn, examining Enuma elish specifically, describes chaos and order in 
terms similar to those arrived at by Niditch.  He writes, 
Enuma elish…explains how primordial chaos was mastered, how the ordered 
world was created, how kingly rule was established to maintain cosmos.  And 
all these achievements are portrayed as achievements of youthful energy and 
enterprise.  It is the vital young storm-god who sets everything in 
motion….This would have been impossible without killing…Tiamat [who] has 
to be killed because she stands for inertia, the dead weight of the past: 
if…[she] had [her] way the gods would remain for ever inactive, nothing 
would ever change, and there would be no differentiation, indeed nothing 
would ever happen at all.  (Cohn 1993, 48) 
As in Niditch’s assessment, chaos is here presented as undifferentiated, inactive and 
unchanging, while order differentiates things from each other and sets them in motion.  
The same picture is presented by Frank Moore Cross, who writes, “In the Babylonian 
creation epic…the conflict emerges from a clash between the primordial gods and the 
young gods….The struggle reflects the duality of reality: stagnation, sterility, death, chaos 
are ranged against life, violence, fertility in the cosmos” (Cross 1976, 332).  Turning from 
Enuma elish to an examination of the primordial ocean of Egyptian mythology, the Nun, 
Cohn finds the same basic traits.  He explains, “The Nun…was not an active force….The 
original chaos was an undifferentiated, unitary state, and the demiurge embodied the 
process of differentiation and definition.  Whereas the original chaos was boundless, there 
were bounds to the ordered world” (Cohn 1993, 6).  Mary K. Wakeman, surveying combat 
mythology across a variety of cultures comes to similar conclusions.  She writes,  
I would like to review the ways of defining the monster: (1) He is the 
devourer…that holds within himself water, the sun, children etc., preventing 
their differentiation….(2) He is the separator…that keeps apart death from life, 
dark from light, dry from wet, the father from the child, preventing intercourse 
and continuity….What makes ‘the separator’ such a villain is that he opposes 
change.  He is as much a reactionary as ‘the devourer’ is a radical, denying all 
distinctions to affirm fundamental, underived being....To deny existence form 
is just as incapacitating as to deny form change.  (Wakeman 1973, 39) 
Across these examples, chaos is described as simple, unitary, formless, and changeless.  
By whatever means he creates, the creator god inaugurates an order which is characterized 
by multiplicity, differentiation, form, and change. 
 
Identifying Chaos and Order 
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 Based on these scholarly presentations, chaos and order seem to be clearly defined 
terms, such that anyone equipped with these definitions should be able to identify chaos or 
order in any given situation.  Chaos is the thing that is one, simple thing. It is the shapeless 
blob.  It is the thing that doesn’t move.  It is what doesn’t change.  Order, by contrast, is 
the thing or space which contains many things.  It has a definite shape, and the things 
which inhabit it also possess form.  It is the thing which moves and changes.  That is to 
say, if I spy something simple and static, I ought to be able to be sure that is chaos.  
Likewise, if I see something complex and changeable, I ought to be able to designate it 
order, with no second thoughts.  In practice, however, chaos and order are not quite so easy 
to identify.  Or, if they can be identified, it is generally not because of the characteristics 
detailed above.  These characteristics may allow us to recognize chaos in the moments 
leading up to creation and to pinpoint order in the moment of creation, but they do not 
permit us to recognize them in any other situation, where, in fact, they may show quite 
different characteristics, even to the point of “trading places.”  The question to be asked, 
then, is whether the time surrounding creation is when chaos and order make their 
definitive appearances, allowing them to be characterized based on what they are like in 
those particular moments, or whether they might be better examined in some other 
situation.   
To begin to answer this question, it is necessary to ask why creation has been 
selected as the definitive moment for the examination of chaos and order.  It is also 
necessary to ask why it is taken as a given that the pre-creation state is chaotic and that the 
moment of creation represents an ordering move.  It is very well to say that tehom is 
Tiamat and that both can be equated with chaos, but the question remains as to what makes 
them chaotic.  Why is the battle between Tiamat and Marduk a battle between chaos and 
order specifically, and not just between two opposing sides, neither one more chaotic or 
orderly than the other?  It is, of course, perfectly “scientific” to take something identified 
as chaos, examine it, and then proclaim the characteristics of chaos based on the 
examination of the specimen.  This kind of approach runs into problems, however, when 
we cannot be sure that the specimen examined is actually chaos.  How do we know that 
whatever existed in the pre-creation time and space is chaos?  The scholars quoted above 
simply assume that the pre-creation being or state is chaos, and proceed to extrapolate the 
characteristics of chaos by examining it.  It is not asked, however, what makes it chaotic in 
the first place; it simply serves as the model, and that it is chaotic is confirmed, albeit in a 
circular way, when it matches its own characteristics.  So, let us return to these questions: 
Why is it assumed that whatever existed prior to the creation is chaos and that what 
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replaced chaos in the moment of creation is order?  And why is it taken for granted that 
chaos and order are at their most definitive when described in relation to creation? 
 
Gunkel’s Focus on Creation 
 
To answer these questions we need to return to Gunkel and his work on tehom and 
Tiamat, which is, as noted above, the origin of the discussion of chaos and order in 
Biblical Studies.  Gunkel’s work began with the link he perceived between tehom and 
Tiamat, both of which appear in creation stories.  The other instances of chaos he noted in 
the Bible were based on the link between tehom and Tiamat: because tehom was actually 
Tiamat, other watery beings appearing in the Bible could also be identified as Tiamat.  
Even if these other beings did not participate in creation stories, they were linked with 
creation because Tiamat and tehom were linked with creation and provided the means by 
which Gunkel identified chaos in the Bible in the first place.  Because Gunkel began with 
creation stories and used those stories as the benchmark by which he identified chaos in 
other texts, the moments around creation came to be accepted as the definitive appearance 
of chaos and order.  Once someone has laid groundwork in a certain way, subsequent work 
builds on that groundwork and its assumptions can come to be taken for granted.  It is not, 
however, clear that this needs necessarily have been the case.  It seems entirely possible 
that if Gunkel had started somewhere else—with some other occurrence of chaos in the 
Bible—that would be taken as the definitive instance instead and the characteristics 
attributed to chaos and order might have been quite different. 
 
Problems with the Link Between Tiamat and tehom 
 
 Even if the definitiveness assigned to the moments around creation can be seen to 
stem from Gunkel’s having chosen those moments as the basis for his study, can it still be 
safely assumed that whatever existed before creation was chaos, and that the creation of 
the world necessarily entailed a movement from chaos to order?  To answer this question, 
it needs to be asked whether, without the Tiamat connection, Gunkel would have viewed 
tehom as chaos.  Is the Tiamat connection necessary to the identification of tehom as 
chaos, or is it simply incidental?  Without the Tiamat connection, tehom is still something 
which existed prior to the creation of the world (even if it only existed as a void), and 
which the creation of the world displaced or destroyed, but can tehom on its own, without 
reference to Tiamat, really be called chaos?  David Tsumura has argued that, although the 
words tehom and Tiamat are related, they are related not through one having derived from 
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the other, but as variant derivations of “the Common Semitic term *tiham- ‘ocean’” 
(Tsumura 1989, 65).4  Having severed the derivational relationship between the two, 
Tsumura, who assumes that chaos is a thing like Tiamat, concludes that tehom is not chaos.  
For Tsumura, then, it is not enough to say that whatever existed before creation is chaos.  
Chaos must possess other characteristics, which he sees manifested in Tiamat, but not in 
tehom, once tehom is no longer assumed to be Tiamat incognito.   
If Gunkel were to accept Tsumura’s claim that tehom is not related to Tiamat, 
would he also agree that tehom is not chaos?  It seems possible.  That he begins his 
discussion of chaos and order by linking tehom with Tiamat suggests as much.  If it were 
not necessary to link the two before beginning the discussion of chaos in the Bible, why 
would Gunkel bother doing so?  If tehom, on its own, is clearly chaos, why bring Tiamat 
into the discussion at all?  Why not just start with tehom and leave it at that?  For Gunkel, 
though, tehom on its own does not seem to be enough to justify a discussion of chaos.  It is 
only by establishing the connection between tehom and Tiamat that Gunkel is able to speak 
about chaos.5 
 The link between tehom and Tiamat is further challenged by J. Gerald Janzen who 
argues that the political statement made by Genesis 1 is deliberately at odds with that made 
by Enuma elish. He writes, “The Israelite and Babylonian creation stories represent not 
merely two different claimants for world rule, Yahweh and Marduk, but, by their differing 
accounts of the way the divine creator has brought the cosmos into existence, represent 
two different conceptions of life-giving and community-building power” (Janzen 1994, 
464).  For Janzen, whatever tehom and Tiamat may seem to have in common, it is no 
indication that the two are identical.  Indeed, their similarities are intended to highlight 
what is more important, namely their differences.  It is not only that tehom is not Tiamat, 
                                                 
4  David Clines simply takes for granted that tehom and Tiamat are not identical.  He writes, “There is 
nothing in the OT to suggest that the battle was a stage in or precondition for creation (the reference to 
Tehom, the ‘deep,’ in Gen 1:2 is not to Tiamat, and does not indicate conflict)” (Clines 1989, 233). 
5 In Gunkel’s view Tiamat’s cosmogonic battle with Marduk provides the hidden backstory for tehom.  Yet, 
as Janzen points out, Tiamat has a half-hidden backstory of her own: “In Enuma elish…the present account 
of cosmic creation out of divine conflict is preceded by an account of the generation of the deities by the 
intermingling of Apsu and Tiamat….At an earlier stage of the myth, these deities were the fundamental 
powers of nature and society, and the narrative of their birth would itself have provided an account of cosmic 
origins” (Janzen 1994, 462).  In her previous incarnation, it does not seem that Tiamat would have been 
considered chaotic.  There, she is emblematic of generative, rather than destructive, power.  Her status as a 
chaos monster is a superimposed characteristic, just as tehom’s chaotic status has been superimposed by the 
posited link with chaotic Tiamat.  Thorkild Jacobsen, too, points out that a more sympathetic portrayal of 
Tiamat seems to have been deliberately allowed to peek through the text of Enuma elish.  He writes, “The 
onus of initiating hostility is consistently placed on the parents [Tiamat and Apsu]....But…part of this effect 
is countered…by the stress on Tiamat’s motherliness and by presenting her repeatedly in a sympathetic 
light....So odd is this sympathetic treatment of the archenemy, Tiamat, that one can hardly escape feeling that 
the author is here in the grip of conflicting emotions: love, fear, and a sense of guilt that requires palliation” 
(Jacobsen 1976, 187).  It is as if the writer knows—and, at some level, regrets—that he is making of Tiamat 
something she is not, that he is, in effect, framing her.  Perhaps those who want to make tehom into a chaotic 
Tiamat ought to feel similar chagrin at what is, essentially, a double-framing. 
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but that tehom is emphatically “not-Tiamat,” demonstrating that the world created by 
Elohim is not simply Marduk’s world “by another name.”  
Whereas for Gunkel, tehom represents the biblical authors’ appropriation of the 
Babylonian myth, for Janzen tehom stands for their conscious rejection of it.  As he puts it, 
“Enuma elish…would have been the cosmological mandate for Babylonian power at the 
time Genesis 1 was emerging in final form” (Ibid.), a time when it is likely that the biblical 
authors found themselves subjugated by Babylon’s power.  Still other scholars have 
contested the link between Tiamat and tehom on the grounds that it presumes a reliance of 
the Bible’s authors on a Babylonian myth to which their access is only a matter of 
conjecture.  If the biblical authors were not familiar with Enuma elish, it cannot be 
appropriate for scholars to use Enuma elish to fill gaps in the biblical text or to clarify 
obscure points.6  Despite this objection, scholars are often reluctant to relinquish the idea 
that the content of Enuma elish lies behind the biblical texts, even as they  question 
whether Enuma elish itself influenced the biblical authors.  That is, although it may be 
generally agreed that tehom is not Tiamat, it has not been accepted that tehom is tehom; 
what tehom appears to be at face value—a substance which, if it is a substance and not 
merely the absence of substance, is inert and plays no active role in creation—is not taken 
to be what tehom actually is.  
 Scholars who have dismissed Genesis 1’s dependence on Enuma elish  have shifted 
their attention to stories to which the biblical authors would have had access in order to 
determine tehom’s identity. The myths of Canaan have presented themselves as stories 
closer to home, available for adaptation in Israel.  John Day writes, “Since the discovery of 
the Ugaritic texts from 1929 onwards…it has become clear that the immediate background 
of the Old Testament allusions to the sea monster is not Babylonian but Canaanite” (Day 
1985, 4).  The Baal cycle, in which Baal fights and defeats Yam (Sea) and Mot (Death), 
has, in particular, been pointed to as a likely source for the Bible’s Chaoskampf themes.  
Yet, although it is true that Yam, like tehom, is a watery entity, Yam and Mot are not pre-
creation entities nor is Baal a creator-god.7  In Canaanite mythology, El is the creator of 
                                                 
6 Although the majority of contemporary scholars agree that Genesis 1 is not dependent upon Enuma elish 
but is, instead, related to Canaanite mythology, not all hold this position.  Janzen reads Genesis 1 as a 
deliberate rejection of Babylonian ideas about the creation of the cosmos.  Batto, by contrast, argues that “the 
Priestly Writer…knew and utilized the Babylonian myth….Indeed, the conclusion that the Priestly Writer 
wrote out of the experience of the Babylonian exile seems unavoidable….[R]ather than a conscious polemic 
against Enuma elish, it is more likely that the Priestly Writer found the Combat Myth imagery better suited 
than the Eden story to convey his theological agenda” (Batto 1992, 80-81).  But if Genesis 1 represents a 
conscious appropriation of Enuma elish, why is it not more similar?  Why is tehom so unlike Tiamat that it is 
only by reading in details from Enuma elish and other myths that tehom can be seen to be like her?  If the 
writer intended to tell the same story as Enuma elish, why did he not tell that story? 
7 Day discusses the various ways in which biblical scholars have dealt with these problems on pp. 10-18 of 
his 1985 book.  He concludes, “the fact that the Old Testament so frequently uses the imagery of the divine 
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the world, and Baal battles Yam and Mot, not in order to create, but in order to gain 
supremacy and a temple for himself.  It would be difficult to argue that tehom is somehow 
derivative of Yam or Mot, when they seem to have so little in common.  Shared wateriness 
seems like an overly-weak link, unless we are prepared to entertain the possibility that any 
story about water might provide us with details about the identity of tehom.  It might be 
argued that we are not talking about water in general but about personified water 
specifically.  Tehom, though, is not personified.  It is only by comparison with other myths 
about personified water that tehom is assumed to have a personality.8  In addition, the 
argument that what tehom, Yam, and Mot have in common is that they are fought and 
defeated by a god is seriously flawed.  Tehom can be seen as an enemy combatant only by 
being linked with Tiamat.  If, however, tehom is not derived from Tiamat, but from some 
other figure in Canaanite mythology, it cannot be assumed that tehom is combative.9  In 
                                                                                                                                                   
conflict with the dragon and the sea in association with creation, when this imagery is Canaanite, leads one to 
expect that the Canaanites likewise connected the two themes” (Day 1985, 17).  This conclusion, though, 
seems suspect.  To say that the chaos themes in the Old Testament must be based on Canaanite myths and to 
explain the differences between them by reading back into the “original” what is only attested in the “copy” 
is to engage in circular reasoning.  Samuel Loewenstamm makes an argument which can be seen to provide 
something of a corrective to the circularity of this logic.  He writes, “The Biblical passages make us aware of 
the cosmological element in Ugaritic mythology which in the milieu of the Ugaritic court had so weakened 
that we would not have been able to discern its roots were it not for the large number of allusions to the 
cosmological mythology found in the Bible and in its parallels in Mesopotamian literature and the Midrash.  
This forces us to the conclusion that we should not see in Ugaritic mythology an immediate predecessor of 
its Biblical counterpart, but rather look for the origin of the common elements in West-Semitic traditions 
which not only pre-date the Bible, but also the Ugaritic texts” (Loewenstamm 1980, 359-60).  Even so, the 
discovery of “cosmological elements” in the Ugaritic texts which would not have been visible but for 
comparison with the Bible remains a somewhat circular argument, especially when we consider that certain 
combative elements in biblical texts would not have been discovered except for by comparison with Ugaritic 
texts.  Overall, it seems as if the existence of certain similarities between the two has led to the assumption of  
the existence of other similarities, which may not actually be there.  Still, against my reasoning, Cross insists 
that the story of what happened between Baal, Yam, and Mot is a creation story.  He explains, “it bears all 
the traits of the cosmogony.  The conflict between Ba’l and Yamm-Nahar (Sea and River), Mot (Death), and 
Lotan are alloforms reflecting the usual conflict between the old gods and the young gods of the cult….The 
pattern of the cosmogonic myth could not be more evident” (Ibid., 333-34).  Yet, the majority of scholars 
have adopted the view that the battle between Baal and Yam and Mot is not a creation story or would not 
appear to us as a creation story if it were not for the link between cosmogony and Chaoskampf which is 
supposedly attested in the Bible.  In direct opposition to Cross’s view, Dennis McCarthy writes, “The OT 
scholar should be surprised when he finds that Ugaritologists ordinarily deny that anything like a creation 
story has been found at Ras Shamra….Are we so sure that the Chaoskampf with all its attendant themes is 
really a story of creation in any meaningful sense?...for us the word creation in its normal context must mean 
some sort of absolute beginning of our world, or we equivocate.  Can we really say that this is what the 
Chaoskampf and all it implies is usually concerned with?” (McCarthy 1967, 87-88).  I am inclined to agree 
with the majority view that what we have in the Baal cycle is not a creation account, at least not in any 
obvious way.   
8 Day argues that the lack of a definite article attached to tehom “is a remnant of the time long past when the 
term did denote a mythical personality,” while at the same time recognizing that tehom “in Gen. 1:2 is not a 
divine personality hostile to God; rather it is here…the impersonal watery mass which covered the world 
before God brought about the created order” (Day 1985, 50). 
9 According to Day, “The form thm, comparable to Hebrew tehom is…attested in Ugaritic (cf. Ugaritica 
V.7.1, RS 24.244, 1=KTU 1.100.1) thus supporting the view that the Old Testament term is Canaanite” (Day 
1985, 7).  Later, he explains, “both tehom and Tiamat are derived from a common Semitic root.  Moreover, 
the word occurs similarly as thm or thmt in Ugaritic to denote the cosmic waters” (Ibid., 50).  He does not, 
however, describe how these cosmic waters are described in the Ugaritic texts.  Are they personified?  Are 
they combative?  Are they like Enuma elish’s Tiamat, or are they more like Genesis 1’s tehom?  If Genesis 
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any case, tehom clearly cannot be derived from Yam or Mot, when what links them is 
something they only have in common by way of Tiamat. 
 Why should there be all this opposition to taking tehom at face value if tehom on its 
own can be viewed as chaos?  Why is it necessary to find a backstory to clarify tehom’s 
chaotic nature if chaos can be defined, most basically, as whatever existed prior to 
creation?  That the hunt for the backstory is so vigorous indicates that, by itself, tehom 
cannot be shown to be chaos.  This suggests that “whatever existed prior to creation” is not 
an adequate definition of chaos, which in turn shows that it cannot be taken as a given that 
the pre-creation state, as it appears in the creation myths, is chaos.  This means that chaos 
cannot be defined simply by examining whatever existed prior to creation and 
extrapolating the characteristics of chaos from it.   
 
Chaos and Order in the Created World 
 
 We have seen that, following Gunkel’s lead, scholars have studied the various 
ancient Near Eastern creation myths to arrive at a set of characteristics by which chaos and 
order can be identified.  Chaos is said to be characterized by its lack of form, its stasis, and 
its simplicity or unity, while order is said to possess the opposite traits of form, change, 
and complexity or multiplicity.  It is, however, less than certain that the pre-creation 
space/time/being can properly be designated as chaos simply as a matter of course, as is 
evidenced by the search for a backstory for Genesis 1’s tehom.  Yet, despite this objection, 
biblical scholars have not been totally out of line in identifying the moments around 
creation as a point at which chaos and order may be seen to engage with each other.  
Where scholars have been wrong is in identifying those moments as definitive, and in 
taking as a given that whatever existed prior to creation is chaos, when, it seems, pre-
creation existence may not be the most essential characteristic of chaos. 
 Even if the ancient myths do frequently present whatever existed prior to creation 
as chaos, and view the transition from pre-creation to creation as a move from chaos to 
order, the pre-creation time should not be seen as providing the quintessential example of 
what chaos is, from which all other instances of chaos are derived, simply because it was 
not in the pre-creation sphere that chaos was first noticed or experienced.  The myths of 
origin are not original.  In terms of experience, the pre-creation time did not come before 
creation but after.  The writers of the myths, if they wrote chaos into their cosmogonic 
                                                                                                                                                   
1’s tehom is derived from a Ugaritic thm which is only similar to Tiamat in terms of wateriness, then we can 
hardly read traits of combative antagonism into biblical tehom from Ugaritic thm.  It seems likely that if 
Ugaritic thm were like Tiamat, it would be unnecessary to try to link Genesis 1’s tehom to Yam, a link which 
is a stretch, but which is necessary if tehom is to be shown to be a Tiamat-like being. 
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stories, did so because they experienced chaos in the created world.  In this way, it was not 
primordial chaos which gave rise to chaos in the created world, but chaos in the created 
world which gave rise to the idea of pre-creation chaos.  The quintessential example of 
chaos, then, ought to be something which exists in the created world, not something pre-
existent.  If it is described as pre-existent, it is because this characteristic helps describe 
how chaos is experienced in the created world.  We are going backwards if we start with 
chaos in the pre-creation realm and move in the direction of the creation; such a movement 
may be chronological in terms of how the stories are told, but it is not chronological in 
terms of how the stories came to be written. 
If it were correct to take as the quintessential example of chaos whatever existed 
prior to the creation, and if this chaos presented itself as a static, formless, undifferentiated 
blob, how would it be possible for chaos to continue to exist in the created world?  Once 
change, form, and differentiation had been introduced, why wouldn’t their opposites have 
ceased to exist?  Differentiation and non-differentiation can hardly occupy the same place 
simultaneously.  Yet, the ancient texts make clear that chaos was experienced as a living 
reality in the created world.  The question is, within the created world, was chaos 
experienced as stasis, formlessness, and unity (which seems impossible), or was it 
experienced in some other way?  And if it was experienced in some other way, that way of 
describing chaos would seem to be more primary than whatever appears in the cosmogonic 
myths.   
 In the ancient world, enemies and outsiders were frequently experienced as forces 
of chaos, and worldly realms outside “our own” were experienced as chaotic space.  
According to Cohn, “Like all peoples in the Ancient Near East, Mesopotamians took it for 
granted that victorious war…was an affirmation of cosmos” (Ibid., 53) and that “By 
defending his realm and by conquering new territories a king was not only fulfilling the 
original, most basic function of kingship—he was also obeying the will of the gods,” 
understood as extending the ordered realm by converting chaos to order (Ibid., 41).  
Similarly, Bernhard Anderson observes, “The role of the king in both Mesopotamian and 
Egyptian understanding was to destroy the enemies who incarnated the chaotic powers that 
threaten the order of creation…similar claims were made within the Israelite cult in 
connection with the celebration of Yahweh’s kingship” (Anderson 1987, 132).  These 
quotations, it will be noted, are about order and not about chaos.  It is order, and not chaos, 
that is the active force in victorious war.  It is order that is extended when a king conquers 
new territories and people-groups.  Yet, here it is tacitly assumed that chaos is also an 
 19
active force.10  If victory in battle is a sign of the extension of order, then surely loss in 
battle is a sign of the extension of chaos.  And what is a loss in battle other than an enemy 
victory?   
 Thorkild Jacobsen, puzzling over why Marduk’s primordial enemy should have 
taken the form of water when “the sea, the Persian Gulf, lay far to the south behind vast 
marshes and could have played little part in the average Babylonian’s experience of the 
world,” reasons,  
Some quite specific conditioning circumstances would therefore need to have 
been involved, and just such a one is the fact that, historically, Marduk’s and 
Babylon’s main antagonist from shortly after the death of Hammurabi to well 
into the Cassite period was precisely the ‘Land of Ti’amat’ (mat tâmtim), the 
“Sealand,” which covered precisely the territory of ancient Sumer.11  (Jacobsen 
1976, 189-90)   
Here, it can be seen that it was the Babylonians’ experience of chaos in the created world 
which gave rise to their conception of chaos in the pre-creation time.  Jacobsen continues, 
arguing that “In warring with the Sealand, Babylon…waged an upstart’s war with its own 
parent civilization….Understandably, therefore, Babylon might have felt…its victory to be 
in some sense parricidal.  Understandably also it might have sought justification for its 
hostility…in seeing itself as representing…youthful vigor pitted against age and stagnant 
tradition” (Ibid., 190).  If Jacobsen’s interpretation is correct, Tiamat’s stagnancy is not an 
inalienable characteristic of chaos, but only of the particular chaos with which Babylon 
found itself at odds at a certain point in its history.  More than this, Tiamat’s stagnancy is a 
projected characteristic, a justificatory accusation and not, necessarily, an inherent trait. 
Can an enemy victory be understood as an undoing of the form, changeability, and 
multiplicity that previously existed in the ordered world of the group that lost the battle?  
That is, does the description of chaos which we see in the cosmogonic myths apply here?  
In a sense, it does.  By killing members of the losing group, the victors are responsible for 
plunging them into the chaotic realm of death, which itself may be characterized by 
formlessness, stasis, and the erasing of difference.  But apart from being responsible for 
the deaths of members of the losing group, can the enemy victors be seen as responsible 
                                                 
10 In fact, Umberto Cassuto describes the same scenario from the perspective of chaos as the active force.  He 
writes, “Whenever a people or ruler rose up and oppressed Israel it was as though the ancient revolt of the 
waters of the sea and the rivers at the time of the creation of the world was re-enacted” (Cassuto 1975, 98). 
11 Theodor Gaster, however, points out that “The primality of water...is found all over the world, among 
peoples living in the most diverse geographical conditions,” attributing this to the fact that water, like wind, 
is one of the “Two things [which] have no shape or form…[and which] therefore, were regarded as 
primordial—not…as the actual substances out of which all else was brought into being, but as having 
preceded all other things in order of time” (Gaster 1969, 3).  For Gaster, then, formlessness is the essential 
characteristic of whatever preceded the creation, meaning that whatever exhibits such formlessness must be a 
holdover from that time.  But how can formlessness continue to exist once form has been instituted?  Even if 
formlessness exists in a kind of “pocket” within form, it must be given form by the form which surrounds it, 
as the water of a lake is shaped by the shore. 
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for introducing formlessness, stasis, and simplicity, into the lives of the living members of 
the conquered group?  Certainly, the cultural institutions of the losing group can be seen as 
being reduced to formlessness when the group is conquered by an enemy.  Related to this 
disintegration of form is loss of differentiation, if differentiation is indicated by the 
existence of a variety of social institutions.  We can imagine the conquered group saying, 
“We used to have order.  Our society was organized into various social institutions.  These 
institutions had a definite form and they formed the basis for differentiation within our 
society.  Now that our social and cultural institutions are no longer in place, we have chaos 
instead of order.”  Fair enough.  At the same time, though, what the conquered group 
experiences is not only the overthrow of its existing form and differentiation, but the 
imposition of new kinds of form and differentiation.  The old structures are not replaced 
with nothing but with something else.  In addition, we must ask about chaos’s 
characteristic stasis.  How is this aspect of chaos brought to bear on the conquered group?  
It does not seem that it is.  If anything, being conquered must be experienced as change, 
while remaining unconquered would be experienced as stasis. 
 Indeed, in various Egyptian coffin texts, the ordered world is described as “Eternal 
Recurrence and Eternal Sameness” (Allen 1997, 17), which would seem to be a depiction 
of the ordered world as static.  James P. Allen explains, “The word dt ‘Eternal Sameness’ 
denotes eternity as the unchanging pattern of existence, established at the creation.  It is a 
stable concept…exemplified in the concept of m’‘t (Maat) ‘(natural) order’” (Ibid., 11).  
This indicates that, although the pre-creation chaos may be characterized by stasis, and 
although the ordering process may represent change with regard to this stasis, once the 
world is ordered it, too, becomes static.  Niditch claims that “Chaos is not a radical force 
but a conservative one…which calls itself into action to prevent dynamic change” (Niditch 
1985, 17), but it would seem that order is equally conservative.  Order may bring change to 
chaos, but after that change has happened and order has been established, its goal is to 
maintain itself, preventing change.  In the created world, then, it is not chaos that is static, 
but order.  Chaos, in the created world, is represented by change.  When a group is 
conquered, it experiences this loss in battle as a change in the ordered status that it 
previously possessed.  Cohn points out that although “every Near Eastern world-view 
showed an awareness not only of order in the world but of the instability of order.  
Nevertheless the ordered world was imagined as essentially unchanging” (Cohn 1993, 3).  
In this description, chaos is the active force.  It is “restless and threatening” (ibid.) in its 
active antagonism to order and has as its goal the reclamation of order’s territory for its 
own.  With respect to established order, then, it is chaos which is characterized by change.   
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Chaos and Order Trade Places 
 
Of course, if chaos were to overthrow order, it would itself become static; its 
efforts would be directed toward maintaining what it had achieved, in which case it would 
be a conservative force.  In the pre-creation space, where chaos holds sway, it is 
conservative and static.  In the post-creation space, however, chaos is—or at least can be—
an agent of change.  What chaos is shifts in the transition from pre-creation to post-
creation time.  In fact, as far as this characteristic is concerned, chaos and order seem to 
trade places.  That chaos is capable of swapping this characteristic with order ought to give 
us pause in our efforts to define the two terms.  The most we can say, in this instance, is 
that some of the time chaos is characterized by stasis, while order is characterized by 
change, but at other times chaos is characterized by change and order by stasis.  Is the 
same also true of the other characteristics attributed to chaos and order?   
In its pre-creation state, chaos is characterized by being simple, a unity.  Explaining 
the ancient Egyptian phrase “before there were two things,’ which designates the pre-
creation time, Richard J. Clifford writes, “This statement is an explicit expression of the 
Egyptian view that before creation there was a unity, which could not be divided into two 
things….‘Two things’ and ‘millions’ both express the same thing—the diversity of the 
existent—which is denied for nonexistence”  (Clifford 1994, 102).  Is there any sense in 
which, in the context of the post-creation world, chaos becomes not “one and 
undifferentiated” (Ibid.), but the space of multiplicity, while order occupies the space of 
unity?  I think there is.  In the created world, order is what exists within a set of 
boundaries, while chaos designates everything that exists (even if its existence is 
characterized as “nonexistence”) outside of those boundaries.  Mircea Eliade writes,  
One of the outstanding characteristics of traditional societies12 is the opposition 
that they assume between their inhabited territory and the unknown and 
indeterminate space that surrounds it.  The former is the world (more precisely, 
our world), the cosmos; everything outside it is no longer a cosmos but a sort 
of “other world,” a foreign, chaotic space, peopled by ghosts, demons, 
“foreigners.”  (Eliade 1961, 29)  
In this formulation, the ordered world is equal to everything there is minus chaos.  The 
chaotic space and its inhabitants are what are subtracted to make the ordered world.  In this 
way, the ordered world is smaller than the whole.   
                                                 
12 Here, Eliade may be drawing too much of a distinction between “traditional societies” and modern ones.  
Indeed, as I will argue later in this introduction and more fully in chapter 5, the idea that “inside” is the 
domain of order, while chaos belongs “outside” is something we also believe.  Eliade’s observations are 
correct, I think, but may suffer from being too narrowly applied. 
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The question, then, is whether this smallness makes the ordered world simpler than 
the whole.  The answer depends on what the subtracted space contains.  If it contains 
nothing, then the ordered world, though smaller, is not simpler than what is outside the 
ordered world.  Yet, although the inclination of the ancient peoples may have been to 
characterize what lay beyond the boundaries of their own territory as nothingness, it is 
clear that there was something there.  The very fact that war was seen as a means by which 
the outer chaos could be ordered indicates that what was there was not nothing.  There 
were other people out there, inhabiting the space viewed as chaotic from the vantage point 
of “our world.”  Those people, it seems certain, would have viewed their own territory as 
the ordered cosmos, while viewing “our world” as the realm of nonexistence.  Yet, we 
clearly exist—that much is obvious.  And if it is obvious that we exist, it must also be 
obvious that they exist.  Given the fact that the chaotic realm is actually filled with existent 
beings, it must be said that the ordered world is simpler than what is designated as chaos.  
Our world, which we call order, is only one world out of many.13  It is unitary.  And the 
maintenance of order in our world depends on our defending our boundaries against the 
incursion of the many.  Multiplicity is what must be kept out.  When the domain of order is 
extended through our conquering of other people groups and their territories, the 
multiplicity of those others is reduced to the unity of us.  They are eradicated, and what 
was theirs becomes ours; what was two (or more) becomes one.  Chaos, then, in the post-
creation world is not characterized by undifferentiated oneness, but by differentiation and 
multiplicity.  In the post-creation world—where order is one piece cut out of a larger 
whole—it is order that is unitary and simple. 
 
Excursus on Something and Nothing 
 
 This last reversal in the meanings of chaos and order depends on the assumption 
that chaos, in its post-creation setting, is not the realm of nonexistence but is actually 
populated by a variety of existent entities.  In a sense, as I have said, this is obvious.  
Anyone looking beyond the borders of his or her own world can see there is something 
there.  Calling that something nothing is to identify it as a very particular kind of nothing, a 
nothing which, by any other name, is something.  In fact, it seems doubtful whether even 
the chaos of the cosmogonic myths is actually nothing in the purest sense. 
In Enuma elish, for example, Tiamat is the being designated as chaos.  It is fairly 
obvious, even on the surface of the text, that she is not nothing but something.  She figures 
                                                 
13 Although there are times at which “our world” may appear as chaos rather than order, the ordered world 
still presents itself as the world we ought to inhabit.  See chapter 5, footnote 1 for further discussion. 
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as an active character in the story, and it is difficult to see how “nothing” would be capable 
of playing such a role.  Looking beyond what seems obvious, though, there is a certain 
way of thinking about Tiamat which does cast her as nothing. Enuma elish begins with this 
description of the pre-creation world of Tiamat and Apsu: “When on high the heaven had 
not been named,/ Firm ground below had not been called by name,/….No reed hut had 
been matted, no marsh land had appeared…” (Speiser 1955, 60-61).  Here, the primordial 
time is characterized as the time before everything now known came into existence.  
Inasmuch as what existed before has nothing in common with the created world, it can 
plausibly be considered nonexistent.  We can follow this line of reasoning by engaging in a 
simple question-and-answer exercise: 
“Did any of this exist back then?” 
“No.” 
“None of this existed?” 
“No, nothing existed.” 
The point is that because what existed before has no connection to the present order, it can 
safely be called nothing, even though it may have been something.  If we continue with our 
question-and-answer game, however, we find that Tiamat’s equation with nothingness 
quickly wears thin. 
 “Was there really nothing there?  I think I see something!  What about that thing?” 
 “It’s nothing.” 
 “How can it be nothing?  I’m sure I see something.  Look, it’s moving!” 
 “It’s nothing.” 
 “But I see something there.  Why is that thing nothing and not something?” 
 “Okay, you’re right.  It’s not nothing, but it ought to be nothing. It doesn’t have 
anything to do with us or the way we do things here.  Capisce?” 
 “Capisce.  I get it.”  
 In order to see Tiamat as nothing, it is necessary to turn a blind eye and to agree 
that one does “capisce.”  What does it mean to say “capisce”?  Capisce, at least in its 
stereotypical usage by movie Mafiosi, implies a forced acquiescence to a proposal that 
would be denied if the threat of violence were not there to back it up.  For example: “You 
were never here.  You never saw anything.  Capisce?”  Of course, the one being asked to 
capisce was there and did see something.  That’s the whole point of the demand.  The same 
can be said of us in our role as questioner in this question-and-answer game.  We do see 
something in what we’re being asked to accept as nothing.  It is worth asking who our 
interlocutor is here: who is providing us with the answers and asking us to capisce—and 
does he or she have a gun to make sure we do as we’re told?  With regard to Enuma elish, 
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it is Marduk, or someone who works for him, who is telling us what to think about Tiamat.  
And, as supreme god of the Babylonian pantheon, with control of thunder and the winds, it 
is something of an understatement to say that yes, Marduk does have a gun.  As Enuma 
elish tells it, Tiamat is equivalent to nonexistence because, when she existed, nothing 
existed of what we now know as the world.  A tricky little equivocation wipes her from the 
pre-creation slate.  Marduk gets rid of the body by chopping it up and scattering its parts.  
“Body?” he asks.  “There’s no body here.  Nobody, nothing.  Capisce?” 
 If Tiamat is not nothing but something, is the same true of the Egyptian version of 
the pre-creation chaos, the Nun?  The Nun in Clifford’s explanation quoted above, is 
nonexistent because it is only one thing instead of many things.  Surely, though, we must 
protest that one thing, even if it is not the world as we know it, is something not nothing.  
In addition, the Nun was, it seems, conceptualized as a locus of possibility.  Out of its 
“nonexistent” depths came the first stirrings of differentiation and life.  Cohn writes, 
“Within that dark, watery abyss lay, in a latent state, the primal substance out of which the 
world was to be formed.  Also submerged somewhere within it was the demiurge who was 
to do the forming” (Cohn 1994, 6).  Nun, then, though supposedly the site of nonexistence, 
is also something.  It is “the primal substance out of which the world was to be formed.”  If 
this primal substance continued to exist within the created world it would, it seems, 
represent not the threat of nonexistence, but the threat of possibility.  Instead of threatening 
to overwhelm existence with its own non-being, thereby reducing existence to 
nonexistence, it would, rather, threaten to overwhelm what had already been created with 
still more creation, stirred up from its fecund depths, thus posing the threat of multiplicity 
and not of reduction to unity.   
According to Clifford, the pre-creation depicted in Genesis 1 “certainly 
resembles…the Egyptian universe” in its pre-creation state (Clifford 1994, 113-14).  
Indeed, Catherine Keller reads Genesis 1’s tehom as being the same kind of something that 
Nun is—the watery matrix of possibility out of which the creation is shaped—and she calls 
the tehom chaos.  Keller argues for a positive appreciation of this chaos, as that from which 
everything that exists has been formed (Keller 2003, 12, 26-28).  Of course, as already 
discussed, pre-creation existence is not enough to designate a state as chaos.  Tsumura, as 
we have seen, when he severs the derivational link between tehom and Tiamat, concludes 
that, unlike Tiamat, tehom is not chaos, despite their shared identity as pre-creation entities 
(or nonentities).  For Tsumura, it is tehom’s nothingness which differentiates it from chaos, 
which he believes to be something, the kind of something that Tiamat is.  He writes, “the 
phrase tohû wabohû in Gen 1:2 has nothing to do with ‘chaos’ and simply means 
‘emptiness’ and refers to the earth which is an empty place, i.e. ‘an unproductive and 
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uninhabited place’…the earth  is ‘not yet’ the earth as it was known” (Tsumura 1989, 43).  
Ironically, Tsumura’s description of the way in which tehom is nothingness is very similar 
to the way in which Tiamat is argued to be nothingness because the world she embodies is 
not the world as we know it: what was then is not now, and, therefore, was never anything.  
Of course, Tiamat is active in a way that tehom is not, which is what allows Tsumura to 
distinguish between them, calling Tiamat chaos and tehom not-chaos. 
 To return to the point at hand, it seems clear that chaos (a category to which tehom 
may or may not belong), even in its pre-creation incarnation is not nothing, but a particular 
kind of something.  It is a something that is completely unlike the world as we know it.  In 
Enuma elish, what Marduk replaces with the created world is not nothing, but something 
else.  This something else is chaos from Marduk’s perspective, but from its own 
perspective must surely be order.  Indeed, Clifford points out that Enuma elish’s main 
concerns are political—having to do with rival lines of kingship—more than anything else.  
He writes, “[Marduk’s] supremacy is derived from his having wrested primordial power 
from the line of Apsu-Tiamat-Kingu….The epic should thus be entitled The Exaltation of 
Marduk rather than The Creation Epic” (Clifford 1994, 93).  If, even in the cosmogonic 
myths, chaos is not really nothing, it seems fair to conclude that within the created world 
chaos is not really nothing either.  Now, as then, chaos is whatever is other.  And, in the 
created world, there is a lot more of what is other than of what is ours.  Thus, in the created 
world it is chaos and not order that is multiple and diverse. 
 
A Working Definition of Chaos and Order 
 
 We have seen that chaos and order are capable of trading certain characteristics 
depending on the situation.  In certain situations chaos is characterized by stasis and order 
by change, while in others the opposite is true.  In the same way, in certain situations chaos 
is characterized by simplicity and order by multiplicity, and in others, again, the opposite 
is true.  In this regard, chaos and order are slippery terms.  A definition arrived at by 
examining them in one situation alone cannot hope to be accurate, because in another 
situation they may appear quite different.  Are they, then, completely indefinable terms?  
In a sense, yes.  The contents of chaos and order can vary infinitely, and what is contained 
in either one depends largely on the location of the one doing the labeling.  Chaos and 
order can, however, be defined by their relationship to each other, which does remain 
constant.  Chaos and order, no matter what their contents, always figure as opposites.  In 
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addition, chaos is always negative to order’s positive.14  Based on these relational 
characteristics, which do remain constant, I would like to propose a basic, working 
definition of chaos and order: order is the world as it ought to be, while chaos is the world 
as it ought not to be.  Chaos contains whatever the world should not contain, while order 
contains whatever the world should contain, but what the two actually contain is variable.   
Using this definition, we can see how whatever existed prior to the creation can be 
designated chaos and how the moment of creation can be viewed as a moment of ordering.  
What existed prior to the creation was the world as it ought not to have been, and what 
came into being with the creation of the world was the world as it ought to be, the world 
inhabitable by us and our god(s).15  Of course, using this definition we can also see how 
whatever existed before the creation of the world as we know it can be designated as order 
instead of chaos.  From the perspective of whatever existed before, whatever existed 
before was the world as it ought to be, and the advent of “our world” was a chaotic 
disruption of that order.  We can be sure that Tiamat did not experience her own existence 
as chaotic. 
 For this reason, talk about chaos and order can only ever be an ongoing 
conversation.  Because the contents of chaos and order shift depending on the perspective 
of the ones doing the labeling, it is impossible to make any kind of conclusive statement 
about what either term means.  Marduk may have ordered the world by defeating Tiamat, 
but Tiamat remains present, a lingering threat.  What she threatens is not so much an 
incursion of chaos into Marduk’s ordered world, as an undermining of Marduk’s claim that 
what he has established is order, while what she represents is chaos.  If she were to regain 
control, she would call her own world order and would declare that she had vanquished the 
                                                 
14 Keller argues for a positive embrace of chaos, rather than a negative rejection, because, as she sees it, 
chaos is the material from which the world was fashioned by the creator god and, as such, plays an integral 
role in the created world.  It is not certain, however, that the material from which the world was made is 
chaos.  Keller believes that it is because she has accepted the idea that the definitive appearance of chaos is in 
the pre-creation time/space, a claim against which I have argued above.  In addition—again based on the 
assumption that chaos is whatever existed prior to the creation—Keller believes that chaos has a particular 
content that does not vary.  Interestingly, in contrast to Niditch, Cohn, and others, Keller characterizes chaos 
as a substance that embodies fluidity, flux, and change, descriptors she gets from the fact that the pre-
creation entity is often a watery being.  As I have argued above, however, the contents of chaos (and of 
order) are not fixed.  Order and chaos are both equally capable of fluidity, flux, and change.  If these 
particular characteristics are embraced, they become characteristics of order and not of chaos, as I will define 
the terms. 
15 Samuel Balentine links the concepts of order and chaos understood as “the way the world ought/ought not 
to be,” with the time of creation, writing, “When nature convulses with earthquake, flood, or famine, when 
disease strikes unawares, when a child dies, the universal existential response is ‘Why?’…Creation myths, 
couched as primordial descriptions of the way the world works and therefore of how human beings may 
understand and order their lives in this world, are the first and most generative resource for addressing these 
questions” (Balentine 2003, 352-53).  Balentine’s description is consonant with my argument that chaos and 
order are first experienced in the created world and then retrojected into the time of creation.  The time of 
origins is not, therefore, when chaos and order make their quintessential appearance.  Rather, chaos and order 
are as they appear to us now, in the present moment, and the present is explained by referencing an imagined 
past. 
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chaos monster, Marduk.  But then Marduk would remain as the same kind of lingering 
threat, and so it would go on. 
 
Looking for Chaos and Order in the Bible 
 
 In a sense, the focus on the combat myth which has preoccupied biblical scholars 
investigating chaos and order in the Bible has not been misguided.  Chaos and order are in 
conflict, even if the contents of each cannot be fixed.  Various orders vie for the upper 
hand, viewing their opponents as embodiments of chaos.  Where the preoccupation with 
the combat myth has led scholars in the wrong direction, however, is in the myopic focus 
on Tiamat and beings like her that it has engendered.  The search for chaos in the Bible has 
been, in large measure, a hunt for the water-dwelling dragon, and “There she blows!” has 
been cried at every splash in the biblical text.  I am not saying that no splash can be 
attributed to chaos.  Some splashes may indeed be a sign that chaos has passed by, but 
chaos cannot be counted on to splash, nor, for that matter, can order be counted on not to 
splash.  Chaos and order, as I am defining them, are not concrete things, one of which 
makes splashes and the other of which does not.  Instead, they are ideas about how the 
world ought and ought not to be.  For this reason, scholars searching for chaos and order in 
the Bible ought to be looking, not for fins or splashes, but for the expression of ideas about 
how the world ought, or ought not, to work.  Biblical scholars on the lookout for the 
conflict between chaos and order, ought to turn their eyes to the conversations that are 
going on in the Bible.  How do its books and characters talk to each other about the world, 
what it is like, and what it ought and ought not to be like?  In these interactions, the Bible’s 
dealings with chaos and order can be glimpsed. 
 
Chaos and Order in the Book of Job, Revisited 
 
This brings us back to the Book of Job.  As discussed in the first section of this 
chapter, it is Leviathan’s splash that has led some scholars to cry “Chaos!” from their 
crow’s nests and to understand the interaction between Job and God in terms of a battle 
between chaos and order.  Other scholars, countering this view, argue that God does not 
describe Leviathan (or Behemoth) as a chaos monster, but as a natural animal.  Edouard 
Dhorme writes, “To bring the stupefaction of the hearer to its height, Yahweh resumes His 
description of wild beasts, now choosing the most extraordinary specimens.  First the 
hippopotamus…(t)hen the crocodile” (Dhorme 1967, lix).  For Robert Gordis, too, 
although the pictures of Behemoth and Leviathan have “overtones drawn from…Semitic 
 28
mythology,” they are meant to depict the earthly hippopotamus and crocodile (Gordis 
1978, 467).  According to Gordis, “There are two basic implications in the poet’s choice of 
these animals to be glorified.  First, man who is only one of God’s creatures, is not the 
measure of all things and the sole test of the worth of creation.  Second, man’s suffering 
must be seen in its proper perspective within the framework of the cosmos” (Ibid.).  
Likewise, Rebecca Watson points out that “The critical issue is that Leviathan is a creature 
of God which…is presented as possessing a wild beauty…its role sanctioned and 
appointed by God….This is not compatible with the idea of this beast as some form of pre-
creation monster inimical to cosmic order and overcome…by God” (Watson 2005, 348).  
For these scholars and others, when God describes Behemoth and Leviathan he is not 
talking about chaos or about his battle with a chaos monster.  He is simply talking about 
animals which are part of his creation, animals over which Job does not have control and 
which demonstrate that the world is bigger than Job has supposed it to be.  As Watson puts 
it, “The presentation of Behemoth and Leviathan indicates that this is not about beasts 
epitomizing evil which God can or has overcome, but about their positive divinely 
hallowed place in creation, contrary to men’s limited, simplistic and anthropocentric 
perspective and expectations of good and evil and of how the world and God should be” 
(Ibid., 360). 
 
Leviathan as Decoy 
 
 For the most part, I agree with these scholars’ assessments.  I have argued above 
that splashing is a false indication of chaos.  Chaos may splash, but order may also splash, 
so it makes little sense to comb the biblical text for occurrences of splashing, as if such 
occurrences can automatically be taken as evidence that the splashing thing is chaos.  
Leviathan makes a splash, but so what?  This does not automatically mean that Leviathan 
is an embodiment of chaos.  However, contrary to those interpreters who claim that God, 
when he speaks of Leviathan in the Book of Job, is not speaking about chaos, I want to 
argue that God is making a point about chaos.  The point God is making is that Leviathan 
is not chaos. 
According to Robert Alter, Job’s attempt to rouse Leviathan in chapter 3 makes 
reference to the cosmogonic combat myth—Job assumes that God’s act of creation 
involved the defeat and binding of the chaos monster—but God’s own language counters 
this assumption in its failure to make use of the idiom of war (Alter 1985, 100).  God’s 
agency in the binding of the sea, for example, is described as that of a midwife who wraps 
the newborn baby in swaddling bands (38:8-9), not as that of a warrior who imprisons a 
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vanquished enemy.  Similarly, Janzen, referencing Job’s agonized query of chapter 7, “Am 
I the Sea, or the Dragon, that you set a guard over me?” (7:12) points out that “The irony is 
not only that God is not treating Job like Yam-Tannin but that that is not how the God who 
finally answers Job treats Yam-Tannin.  For when, near the beginning of the divine 
speeches, God takes up the figure of Sea (38:8-11), it is not to describe the divine conquest 
of Sea…but the latter’s birth” (Janzen 1989, 113).  Keller, offering a related interpretation, 
writes, 
The roaring two-monster finale…may be read as a recrudescence of the divine 
hero myth, defeating Job’s existential defiance by a performance of the power 
that created order out of chaos and continues to discipline the chaos….Yet 
contrary to these readings, the text implies no conflict of deity with monster.  
On the contrary, God seems to delight in Leviathan’s fitness to defend itself 
against all possible attacks.  But Leviathan is not shown attacking.  (Keller 
2003, 134-34) 
In these interpretations would-be chaos monsters lose their chaotic status because of how 
they are regarded by God.  At issue are not the inherent characteristics of these beings or 
entities—the sea, Leviathan, and Behemoth are as wild as ever—but the nature of their 
relationship to God.  God looks upon them and describes them not as his enemies but as 
his beloved creatures, and therein lies all the difference. 
 God’s mention of Leviathan functions as a kind of decoy for the Chaoskampf.  The 
writer who portrays Leviathan as not-chaos does so in the knowledge that readers—and 
Job himself—upon spotting Leviathan will think that what they are seeing is chaos.  The 
presentation of Leviathan as not-chaos, then becomes a way in which the writer and God, 
as the speaking character in the story, engage with the readers and with Job in a discussion 
about chaos and order, that is, a discussion about how the world ought and ought not to be, 
what it ought and ought not to contain.  When God shows Job Leviathan, he shows him his 
idea of how the world ought to be, his vision, not of chaos, but of order. 
 Leviathan splashes in God’s second speech, and the splash draws the attention of 
those who are looking for chaos.  The splash, however, although it can be understood to 
function as a sign that chaos and order are being discussed, does not tell us what the 
contents of the discussion are, what arguments are being made, or what conclusions are 
being drawn.  It most certainly does not permit us to say that we already know how the 
conversation will go by making reference to Enuma elish or some other myth.  We cannot 
assume that the occurrence of the splash indicates that that same story is being told.  If it is 
the splash of Leviathan that alerts us to the presence of chaos and order as themes in the 
Book of Job, we may be grateful for the sign, but we cannot assume that it encapsulates all 
there is to be said.  We must enter into the details of the discussion. 
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Conversations about Order and Chaos in the Book of Job 
  
To enter into the details of the discussion, as it is carried out in the Book of Job, is 
what I propose to do in this thesis.  The characters’ suppositions about how the world 
ought and ought not to function form the central theme of the long conversation which 
makes up the book.  Although I have argued that chaos and order cannot be defined based 
on their contents, it does seem that the discussion of chaos and order revolves around 
certain pairs of  “content-themes.”  That is to say, there are particular characteristics which 
are often attributed to either chaos or order by those speaking about how the world ought 
and ought not to be.  Looking at the pre-creation time as it is described by the ancient 
cosmogonic myths, the scholars discussed earlier in this chapter concluded that chaos is 
formless, static, and singular or simple, while order has form, permits change, and is 
multiple or complex.  I have argued that these characteristics are not fixed, but move 
between chaos and order depending on the circumstance.  Nevertheless, regardless of 
whether a given trait is understood to belong to order or to chaos,  these pairs of themes are 
characteristic of the discussion about chaos and order.  What should the world be like?  
Should it have a definite form or should it be formless?  Should it be static or changeable?  
Should it be characterized by unity or by multiplicity?  This is the shape that the discussion 
about chaos and order takes; these are the questions that inhere in the topic. 
My aim in this thesis, then, is to follow the shape of the discussion, addressing 
these inherent questions as they are raised and answered by the various characters in the 
Book of Job.  My inquiry will be organized around three pairs of characteristic “content-
themes”: simplicity/multiplicity, stasis/change, and inside/outside.  It will be noted that I 
have not included form/formlessness as one of my chosen pairs, but, seemingly in its 
place, have opted to examine the book’s discussion of inside and outside as related to 
chaos and order.  The reason for this is simply that I did not find the relative merits (or 
demerits) of form and formlessness to be a topic of debate in the Book of Job.  Perhaps, 
after all, the pair form/formlessness is never up for discussion in the way that 
simplicity/multiplicity and stasis/change are.  Perhaps it is true that chaos is always 
formless to order’s form.  It seems unlikely that anyone would argue that the world ought 
to be formless; how could a formless thing even be a world?  The mind boggles, trying to 
imagine it.  At the same time, it is possible to conceive of a debate over relative degrees of 
form—in terms of hierarchies, for example, or social strictures—in which it might be 
argued that relative formlessness would be more desirable, and therefore more orderly, 
than a form that has become overbearing, and therefore chaotic.  In any case, form and 
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formlessness have been left out of this thesis because, though relevant to the discussion of 
chaos and order, they are not relevant to the Book of Job as it participates in the 
discussion. 
The pair inside/outside, which is relevant to Job, is, interestingly, seemingly even 
more inflexible than the pair form/formlessness.  I have not written specifically about 
inside and outside and their relation to chaos and order in this introduction, but I have 
mentioned them in passing as if their allegiance can be taken for granted.  For example, 
discussing the potential simplicity of order and complexity of chaos, I wrote, “Enemies 
and outsiders were frequently experienced as forces of chaos, and worldly realms outside 
‘our own’ were experienced as chaotic space.”  I was making a point about the pair 
simplicity/multiplicity, but to make my point I assumed that inside is order and outside is 
chaos.  Why, then, am I including a discussion of this pair in this thesis?  If inside and 
outside are fixed in relation to order, is there anything left to say about them?  In fact, there 
is.  As will be demonstrated when I examine this pair in detail in chapter 5, in his 
whirlwind speeches God defies all expectations—the characters’ as well as our own—by 
speaking of “outside” as the location of order.  It is a radical move, one which calls into 
question the validity of using the terms chaos and order to designate parts of the world 
over against the world as a whole and the world as it ought to be over against the world as 
it is.  Whether this move is accepted by those who witness it remains to be seen. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ORDER AND CHAOS AS SINGULARITY AND MULTIPLICITY AT THE LEVEL 
OF CHARACTER 
 
Job’s Ordered World 
 
 There are two places in the Book of Job where Job describes, in detail, his vision of 
the world as it ought to be, that is, his idea of what an ordered world is like.  The first of 
these is in the prose tale which begins and ends the book, sandwiching the poetic material 
between its two halves.  The second is in chapter 29, which begins Job’s final long speech 
in which he defends his righteousness, culminating in his dramatic oath of innocence in 
chapter 31.  Although there is debate over how the various pieces of the book, marked out 
by their differences in genre, fit together—that is, should both prose and poetic sections be 
considered the work of one author simply making use of different genres to serve his 
purposes, or should the prose section be understood as a traditional tale which the author of 
the poetic section has used as a kind of “found object” in his artistic creation?16—I intend 
to treat the book as a unitary composition, because, in its final form, it appears as one work 
                                                 
16 The latter position is well stated by Gordis, who writes, “The poet, concerned with the problem of human 
suffering, needed a framework for his work.  He found it in the traditional tale of a sufferer named Job, who 
maintains his faith and integrity, and is triumphantly restored to his former estate.  The poet proceeds to retell 
the story, keeping the main features of the well-known tale intact” (Gordis 1978, 25-26).  Claus Westermann, 
too, views the prologue and epilogue as parts of a traditional tale, arguing that, “The poet of the ‘drama’ 
chose to employ a story already current in the tradition of his people….The poet lets us recognize, and wants 
us to recognize, that he is appropriating an earlier, long since fixed story” (Westermann 1981, 7).  A few 
scholars view the prose section not as a pre-existent tale appropriated by the Job-poet, but as something 
written and appended to the poem by a later author-editor.  Among these is Naphtali Tur-Sinai, who writes, 
“the framework-story is younger than the poem.  A later writer, drawing on a tradition known to him, 
composed a new story instead of the original one, which apparently was not available to him in its entirety” 
(Tur-Sinai 1957, 31).  This view, however, is in the minority.  Finally, still other scholars contend that one 
author is responsible for the book in its entirety.  Habel detects a unity that underlies the book’s apparent 
contradictions, arguing that “analysis of the narrative plot of the book of Job reveals an underlying structure 
which gives coherence to the work as a literary whole….The integrity of the work is evident in its overall 
construction, the setting of its characters, and the interrelationship of its several parts” (Habel 1985, 35).  
Janzen, too, perceives the prose tale as necessary to the poetry, claiming that the poetry “requires the 
prologue to set the scene for its own intense dialogical questioning,” which can only mean that “Either the 
prose sections were composed for specific literary effects by the author of the poetry or, what amounts to the 
same thing, the poet adopted (or adapted) for fresh purposes a story already extant in some form” (Janzen 
1985, 23).  Douglas Lawrie points out that although “The book teems with inconsistencies, discrepancies and 
so forth….Instead of using tensions as evidence of lack of unity, one can interpret them as an important part 
of the author’s strategy….[T]hey are necessary to what we perceive as the greatness of the book” (Lawrie 
2001, 138).  In a similar vein, Peggy Day gives a common-sense reason for accepting the book as a unified 
whole, writing, “In theory I suppose it is possible that the main sections of the book do not really fit together, 
but if the theory is pursued to its logical conclusion, the book of Job in its present form has, and had, no 
meaning.  If the juxtaposition of its parts was haphazard, message is eradicated.  Thus it seems more 
profitable to posit a basic integrity to the book of Job, and try to make sense of the component parts in light 
of the overall composition” (Day 1988, 71).  Even if scholars like Habel and Janzen, are wrong about the 
underlying unity of the book and the necessary presence of the prologue, it seems to me that Day’s argument 
presents an acceptable reason for reading the book as a unified whole.  If there is no whole, there is no book, 
and if there is no book, its meaning cannot be inquired into and discussed. 
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and not as two or more.17  I will assume that it is possible to read the prose section in 
tandem with the poetic section, as if they concern the same characters and as if both 
sections are familiar with each other.  This way of reading means that what Job says in the 
poetic section can be used to elucidate and illuminate what is said in the prose section, and 
vice versa.  I will, therefore, use Job’s speech of chapter 29 together with the prose tale to 
describe Job’s idea of what order looks like.  
 
The Prose Tale as Job’s Daydream 
 
Although Job does not speak the prose tale, I  want to claim that it represents his 
own ideas about the workings of the world, and not the ideas of some anonymous third 
person narrator.  Taking this claim a step further, I want to argue that the prose tale is best 
understood as a fantasy concocted in Job’s mind, a daydream from which he is rudely 
awakened by the intrusion of the poetic section.  Imagine this: Job sits in his garden with 
his head leaning against one hand, staring off into the distance. He has already been out to 
sacrifice on behalf of his children.  Later he will join the elders at the gate.  But for now he 
has a few moments to himself.  He sits in the shade and his mind slips into a daydream.  In 
his mind’s eye he sees the heavenly council.  There is God himself, surrounded by his 
various functionaries.  God speaks, and who should he happen to speak of but Job?  God 
says, “Have you considered my servant Job?  There is no one like him on the earth, a 
blameless and upright man who fears God and turns away from evil?” (1:8).  A smile is 
visible on Job’s face as he dreams these words.  The smile remains when one of the 
functionaries, hassatan, asks, “Does Job fear God for nothing?  Have you not put a fence 
around him and his house and all that he has, on every side?...But stretch out your hand 
now, and touch all that he has, and he will curse you to your face” (1:10a, 11).  The smile 
remains even when God authorizes hassatan to strike at everything Job possesses except 
his own body.  Job’s smile fades, however, when the scene shifts and shows first the theft 
and destruction of his livestock and servants, followed by the death of his children in a 
                                                 
17 Although I will read the book in its final form, in this thesis I will not deal with the Elihu chapters.  Carol 
Newsom, who also reads Job as a unified work written by one author, makes an exception for Elihu’s 
speeches, treating them as the interpolations of a reader who, hearing the debate between Job and his friends, 
could not help but join in (Newsom 2003, 16-17, 30).  I am not qualified to offer any kind of decisive 
judgment as to when and by whom the Elihu speeches were written (and even those who are much more 
qualified tend to disagree with each other).  I do not deal with Elihu in this thesis because, when he interrupts 
Job and the friends to speak his mind, he picks up on aspects of their conversation which are not central to 
my own reading.   Alan Cooper writes, “I would liken the book of Job to a tangram, one of those puzzles 
with pieces that fit together in countless ways…[and] no combination can be said to be ‘right’ or ‘wrong’.  
And the purpose of the exercise is to learn—about shapes, colors, and forms and, of course, about one’s own 
way of handling and responding to them” (Cooper 1990, 74).  In this thesis, then, I will be fitting the book of 
Job together in such a way that Elihu gets left out, not because he doesn’t belong in the book at all, but 
because he doesn’t fit in the book as I am reading it here. 
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freak accident.  Job holds back his tears, setting his jaw as he imagines himself assuming 
the posture of mourning while uttering brave and dignified words: “Naked I came from my 
mother’s womb, and naked shall I return there; the LORD gave, and the LORD has taken 
away; blessed be the name of the LORD” (1:21).  The scene returns to the heavenly 
council.  God and hassatan appear again, and, once again, they speak of Job.  Job watches, 
now with squinting, resolute eyes.  Imagine he looks like George Clooney.  He has a jaw 
that can express determination.   
In the second heavenly scene, God once again praises Job for being blameless and 
upright, but hassatan challenges God to authorize the final test.  “Skin for skin!” (2:5) he 
whispers, and God, barely perceptibly, nods his agreement, only catching hassatan’s 
sleeve to say, “only spare his life” (2:6).  (Imagine, by the way, that God looks like George 
Clooney, too.  It is fitting that Job and God should look alike in Job’s daydream.)  
Hassatan nods.  Turning on his heel, he strides from the room, his cloak billowing behind 
him.  Now Job sees his body covered with sores.  This time, tears do not threaten to fall.  
Job was ready for what was coming.  He sits among ashes, but the look on his face is not 
one of suffering or self-pity.  It is the look of a man who knows what he is about, a man 
who will not back down no matter what.  Suddenly Job’s wife appears in the dream.  He is 
ready for her.  He knows what she will say, she and all the rest of them who do not know 
what it is to be blameless and upright.  “Curse God and die,” she nags (2:9).  He dismisses 
her outright, calling her a foolish woman.18  Then he fixes her with his dark and brooding 
eyes and makes his Oscar-bid speech: “Shall we receive the good at the hand of God, and 
not receive the bad?” (2:10).  He watches her face as he speaks.  He can tell that his words 
have sunk in despite her vapid foolishness.  She has nothing to say in response. 
Job’s friends arrive to comfort him and, seeing himself through their eyes, he does 
allow himself to indulge in self pity.  His friends tear their robes and put ashes on their 
heads and weep aloud.  Job sees how bad he has it.  His eyes fill and a few tears trail down 
his cheeks.  His friends sit on the ground around him.  He is on the ash heap, slightly above 
them.  They watch him, waiting to hear what he will say. But Job has already said what he 
needs to say.  He presses his lips together and waits.  Their eyes are on him, but his eyes 
are on the horizon.  Finally, at just the right moment, God appears again, this time not in 
the heavenly council but directly in front of Job.  Job has passed the test.  His fortunes are 
                                                 
18 For Job to call his wife a fool is no small slight.  In chapter 30, for example, Job calls the group he thinks 
of as the lowest of the low lbn ynb.  Although it might be argued that Job does not actually consider his 
wife to be a fool, given that he accuses her of “speaking as one of the foolish women would speak” 
(yrbdt twlbnh tx) rbdk) and not of being a fool herself, it would be difficult to distinguish one who 
merely speaks like a fool from one who is a fool.  Urging Job to relinquish his integrity, Job’s wife can only 
be a fool, for to be a fool is not only to be stupid but to be morally lacking.  That she offers Job the cursing of 
God as a viable possibility reveals her as one who has failed to understand what integrity means. 
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restored.  Everything that was taken from him comes rushing back in double measure.  He 
is richer than ever before.  His daughters are the most beautiful women in the world and, 
by craftily granting them an inheritance, he arranges for them to stay at his side until he 
dies, as it is unnecessary for them to marry.  His wife is somewhere out of sight, as she 
should be.  Standing on the red carpet with the one of the most beautiful women in the 
world on each arm—(they are taller than he is, but they still make him look good)— Job’s 
face gets a faraway, reflective look, as if he is seeing it all again.  He slowly nods his head 
a few times, as if to affirm everything that has happened.  Then he smiles broadly and 
turns away to survey his great wealth.  The dream ends.  Sitting in the shade, Job stretches, 
satisfied. 
 As I have just demonstrated, the prose tale can be read as a fantasy that unfolds in 
the mind of Job.  What, though, justifies this kind of reading?  Is it supported by the text, 
or is it simply a fantasy in my own mind?  If it is a fantasy in my own mind, it is one that 
overlaps, at least a bit, with someone else’s fantasy.  David Clines also suggests that Job 
can be read as a kind of dream.  He writes,  
The author…has conceived or imagined his story…from much the same 
stuff…as he nightly created his dreams….What kind of dream is the book of 
Job?  Obviously, it is a death-wish, a dream in which the unconscious explores 
the possibility of ceasing to be….In this fantasy, however, the dreamer does 
not only give shape to the death-wish; he also wills the overcoming of the 
death-wish…the restoration of what he has both feared and wished to lose.  
(Clines 1994, 11-12) 
As Clines sees it, the entire book is a fantasy belonging to its author, who is not aware of 
his psychological need to both experience and triumph over his fear of death.  In my view, 
however, the author is aware that the prologue and epilogue are parts of a dream.  The 
prose tale is a dream he has given his character Job to dream.19 
 
                                                 
19 Two other scholars present related understandings of the prose tale.  Meir Weiss, although he does not use 
the terminology of  dreams or fantasy, does regard the world of the prologue as a construct created by Job 
and his peers.  He sees a connection between the sound of the word Cw(, the land in which Job lives and the 
word hc(, “council” or “wisdom.”  At the beginning of the tale, Job lives in a world constructed by his own 
wisdom and governed by the precepts of the wise man.  According to Weiss, the “bet” between God and 
hassatan has, as its goal, the shattering of this fantasy world and the revelation to Job of what the world is 
really like.  Weiss writes, “Satan, on God’s authority, destroys the logical, harmonious, ethical world of ‘the 
Land of Uz’, which being a speculative construction, the creation of the ‘wise’ over-sophisticated man in his 
own image, has no basis in reality.” (Weiss 1983, 82).  Peggy Day argues that the prologue, because it 
belongs to the folktale genre (whether or not it pre-existed the composition of the book), necessarily depicts a 
made-up world, writing, “The folktale, by definition…is believed to be fictitious.  Entering into the world of 
the folktale involves a suspension of disbelief, because…[it] need not operate according to the rules of 
observed reality” (Day 1988, 77).  For Day, the fantasy does not belong specifically to Job or the author, but 
is a way of luring the audience  into letting go of their preconceived notions about the world, so that when 
the poetry begins and the story shifts to the real world they will be more likely to accept its radical claims.  
Although none of these scholars reads the prose tale exactly as I do, they do agree with my claim that there is 
something about the tale which allows it to be pegged as fantasy. 
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 Job as the Only Real Character in the Prose Tale 
 
 My claim that the prose tale is Job’s daydream is supported by the fact that it is a 
one-man show, with Job as its only character.  Even though other characters appear, they 
serve only to bolster Job’s status as the one who really counts.  For example, the tale 
begins with what seems to be a multiplicity of characters.  There are Job’s seven sons and 
three daughters, his “seven thousand sheep, three thousand camels, five hundred yoke of 
oxen, five hundred donkeys, and very many servants” (1:2b-3a).  All of this multiplicity, 
however, adds up to make one.  The humans and animals numbered in these verses are 
Job’s possessions, adding up to make him “the greatest of all the people of the east” (1:3b).  
The word translated as “greatest” in 1:3b is, of course, ldg, which also means big.  Job is 
the biggest man because he is made up of the most material; his possessions attach 
themselves to his body, swelling it in size.  The sons, daughters, servants, and livestock do 
not count for themselves; their existence is really Job’s existence.  James Crenshaw 
supports this inference, writing, “the seven sons and three daughters who perished in the 
rubble…were no more than extras in a biography of God’s favorite.  That is why so little is 
written about the injustice toward them.  The spotlight focuses on Job so intensely that 
others hardly matter at all” (Crenshaw 1984, 58).  When the first round of Job’s affliction 
begins, it is his possessions which bear the brunt of the suffering.  That Job is afflicted 
through them is a clear sign that they do not exist in their own right but are, instead, parts 
of Job.20 
 What, though, about God and hassatan?  Surely they cannot be counted among 
Job’s possessions, such that their separate identities can be rolled up into his.  Yet, 
although God and hassatan do not belong to Job in the way that his children, servants, and 
livestock do, they too can be seen to count for him and not for themselves in that Job is the 
focal point of all their attention.  In the heavenly council they talk of nothing but Job.  As 
the story tells it, Job is not privy to this conversation and so has no idea why he is beset by 
suffering, but, at the same time, the scene seems staged for his benefit.  The point of the 
scene is not to pose, in an abstract way, the question of whether there can be such a thing 
as righteousness unmotivated by the promise of reward and to set up an objective test for 
                                                 
20 In this, Job resembles the capitalist described by Elaine Scarry, who writes, “Capital….[I]t is the 
capitalist’s body.  It is his body…because it bestows its reciprocating power on him….He ‘owns’ it—which 
is to say he exists in such a relation to it that it substitutes for himself in his interactions with the wider world 
of persons.”  When hard times come, the rich man feels them not in his actual human body, as the poor man 
must, but in the surrogate body of his possessions (Scarry1985, 264).  This explains both why Job’s 
possessions are attacked first, as if to attack them is to attack Job and why it becomes necessary for Job to 
suffer affliction in his own, personal body in order for God and hassatan to gauge his true response to the test 
they have set for him. 
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the resolution of this question.  The point of the scene is to witness to Job’s righteousness.  
Job is at the center, and without Job’s presence there the discussion would not happen, 
even though Job is supposedly excluded from the scene.  Job looms large for both God and 
hassatan, filling their field of vision so that they can talk of nothing else. 
The so-called “bet” made between God and hassatan to test Job’s righteousness has 
often been interpreted as sadistic, as harming Job for no good reason.  It might be argued, 
then, that God and hassatan are not so easily reducible to Job, given their ability to harm 
him.  Job may loom large even in heaven, but he is not so big that God and hassatan have 
no power over him.  Instead, his bigness singles him out for torture.  If he were not as big 
as he is, he would not be worth the wager.  Indeed, Hugh Pyper, taking as his cue the detail 
that “bless” is often used in Job to mean its opposite, “curse,”21 argues that if Job had not 
been supremely blessed by God, he would not have found himself also supremely cursed.  
Pyper views this as wholly negative: better not to be blessed than to possess the blessing 
that incurs curse (Pyper 2005, 58-60).  Big as he is, Job is a pawn in the hands of God and 
hassatan; if he were smaller, they would not notice him and he would be better off all 
around, as Pyper sees it. 
 
How Job is the Real Winner of the “Bet” Between God and Hassatan 
  
 Yet, even though the “bet” causes Job’s suffering, the way in which it adds to his 
bigness should not be overlooked.  What Job has to gain by undergoing the test is not only 
validation of his status as one deserving of God’s special focus, but confirmation that he is 
bigger and more righteous than even God.  In the world of the prose tale, God’s taking up 
of hassatan’s challenge is exactly what Job wants.  If God had simply answered, “Yes, I 
think so,” to hassatan’s query, “Does Job fear God for nothing?” hassatan would not have 
                                                 
21 There are four places in the book where the pi’el of Krb, which usually means “bless,” seems to mean its 
opposite, “curse” (or, more accurately, “blaspheme,”  for as Christopher Mitchell points out, curse “denotes 
pronouncement of an imprecation or spell to be effected by God, and God could hardly be invoked against 
himself” [Mitchell 1987, 161]): 1:5, 1:11, 2:5, and 2:9.  This usage is often understood as piously 
euphemistic: the writer, not able to stomach the thought of making God the object of even potential curse, 
has chosen to write “bless” instead, and relies on the context to give his readers the clue that he is really 
talking about blasphemy and not blessing.  Bruce Vawter writes, “Everyone recognizes that we are in the 
presence of a biblical euphemism of pious ‘correction’ of the text” (Vawter 1983, 29).  Yet, although this is 
the dominant explanation of this usage of Krb, some scholars argue that the real explanation is not quite so 
simple.  Tod Linafelt makes a convincing case for “the undecidability of Krb,” proposing that the author, 
rather than intending his readers to immediately recognize that Krb is being used to mean its opposite,  has 
instead created in Krb “the site of conflicted meaning.”  That is, in the author’s use of Krb, both meanings 
are presented as real possibilities, which calls into question what it means to be blessed and what it means to 
be cursed (Linafelt 1996, 162, 168).  Pyper’s reading of the blessing and cursing of Job—in which to have 
been supremely blessed is to be set up for the receipt of supreme curse—shares similarities with Linafelt’s 
view. 
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been satisfied, but neither would Job.  Hassatan, in fact, prevents God from answering 
“Yes, I think so,” by annexing to his question an indictment of God.  He accuses, “Have 
you not put a fence around him?” (1:10a, my italics).22  In order to fully answer hassatan’s 
question, God must not only answer for Job’s behavior but for his own.  “Is it not true,” 
hassatan asks, “that you and Job are in cahoots and that money has traded hands under the 
table?”  In order to clear his own name, God has to allow hassatan to test Job.  It is a case 
of one partner to an illicit agreement handing his partner over to face the music while he 
makes a getaway out the back door.  God hands Job over and beats a hasty retreat.  But if 
God and Job are in cahoots in a money-for-good-behavior scheme, Job and hassatan are 
also in cahoots.  By forcing God to test Job’s loyalty, a situation is set up in which, if Job 
passes the test, God will be in Job’s power.  Testing Job’s loyalty, God becomes the 
disloyal partner when Job’s loyalty is proved.23 
Job passes the first level of the test by worshiping God even when he has been 
stripped of his possessions, and the scene returns to the heavenly council.  Now it is God’s 
turn to accuse the Accuser, saying, “[Job] still persists in his integrity, although you incited 
me against him, to destroy him for no reason” (2:4).  That God puts his complaint in these 
terms is not surprising.  He refers back to hassatan’s original question, “Does Job fear God 
for nothing” (1:9).  The same word—Mnx—is used in both verses.  Job has proven that he 
fears God for no reason, but Job’s passing of the test has rendered God’s justification for 
setting the test in the first place groundless.  That God makes this comment indicates his 
acknowledgment that really one’s actions ought to be backed up by reasons.  God knows 
that he ought not to have caused Job to suffer for no reason.  In order to justify God’s 
testing of him, Job ought not to have passed the test.  The original question, “Does Job fear 
God for nothing?” ought not to have been asked if it could be answered in the affirmative.  
God recognizes that he has been trapped by hassatan, but the one who stands to benefit 
from this entrapment is Job.24    
In reality, God did not expect Job to fear him for nothing, as is shown when he 
acknowledges that he has done wrong by afflicting Job for no reason.  Job and God had an 
arrangement that was working perfectly well, but now the stakes have been raised.  Having 
been drawn into the trap, God must continue on the path laid out by hassatan. He must 
                                                 
22 The italics are mine, but the Hebrew text also emphasizes the “you”: tk# t)-)lh.  
23 David Robertson argues that when the shift from prose to poetry happens, we find ourselves so identified 
with Job that we join him in accusing God of misconduct.  Robertson writes, “[The poet] has… altered what 
began as a test of Job’s loyalty to God into a test of God’s loyalty to Job” (Robertson 1973, 450-51).  It 
seems to me, though, that this apparent reversal is already in place in the prologue.  When Job passes the test, 
God’s having instituted the test is shown to be an act of betrayal. 
24 Roland Murphy, too, identifies the “bet” between God and hassatan as “a trap into which the Lord is 
snookered” (Murphy 2002, 549), though he views hassatan, not Job, as the one finally responsible for the 
snookering.   
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now allow hassatan to do physical harm to Job himself, so that Job can be proven to be 
sinful and God proven to be righteous.  Hassatan acts swiftly, using his newly sanctioned 
power to inflict “loathsome sores on Job from the sole of his foot to the crown of his head” 
(2:7), but Job again passes the test, speaking the magic words, “Shall we receive the good 
at the hand of God, and not receive the bad?” (2:10), and advancing to the next level. 
 But what is the next level?  Is it the final removal of limit from hassatan’s power, 
permission to strike Job dead?  It cannot be.  The terms of the test do not allow for Job’s 
death.  If God allows hassatan to kill Job, then God’s guilt is sealed, because there is no 
way of knowing whether Job has passed or failed.  God must concede that this is as far as 
the test can go, and that Job has passed it.  Job is vindicated and proven to “fear God for 
nothing.”  The one who is vanquished in this exchange is not hassatan, who only seemed 
to be Job’s enemy, but God.  In passing the test, Job has proven himself more righteous 
than God.  James Harding supports this interpretation, writing, “Job must be more 
righteous than YHWH: Job has pursued righteousness within the framework of the moral 
order, whether or not he had an ulterior motive, a question that is never conclusively 
resolved.  YHWH, on the other hand, has willfully and without moral justification, 
disrupted the moral order in allowing Job to be afflicted” (Harding 2005, 164). 
What move can God make?  How can God extricate himself from this check mate?  
He can’t, really.  All that he can do is restore Job to his former position of wealth and 
power, giving him even more, even double, what he had before.  The restoration of Job’s 
wealth is not, however, God’s rewarding Job for passing the test; rather, it is tribute paid 
by the loser to the winner.25  That the bet can be seen as a “set up,” which has, as its goal 
the glorification of Job, so that Job is proven more righteous than God, supports my claim 
that the prose tale is Job’s fantasy, in which he is the only real character.  It is Job who is 
the sole focus of the attention of God and hassatan, and Job himself can be seen to 
motivate their actions.  When the workings of the “bet” are examined, it becomes clear that 
Job has masterminded the whole thing. 
 
Enter More Characters, but Job Alone Remains Real 
 
 Job’s children, servants, and livestock have been shown to exist as mere 
appendages to Job.  God and hassatan have been shown to be Job’s puppets, figuring in 
                                                 
25 Charles Melchert points out that the doubling of Job’s fortunes in the epilogue echoes Exodus 22:9, which 
“pronounces ‘For every breach of trust, whether it is for ox, for ass, for sheep, for clothing, or for any kind of 
lost thing, of which one says, “This is it,” the case of both parties shall come before God; he whom God shall 
condemn shall pay double to his neighbor.’”  Melchert continues, “By paying back double to Job, God 
accepts the legitimacy of Job’s legal suit and implicitly condemns the God to whom Job has yielded” 
(Melchert 1997, 19). 
 40
the story only because of what they can do for him.  A few other characters are mentioned, 
but they, too, are focused entirely on Job and appear in the story for his benefit and not 
their own.  Job’s wife is one of these.  Various commentators note that it is strange that she 
appears only once and then disappears from the narrative, but that she makes even one 
appearance is equally strange.  Why should she have survived the destruction visited on 
the rest of Job’s family in hassatan’s first attack?   
Her identity as the lone survivor matches that of the three servants who survive the 
catastrophes engineered by hassatan and return to report to Job about what has happened.  
Like Job’s wife, those servants speak one line and then disappear completely from the 
story.  In fact, they survive only in order to tell Job what has happened.  If it were not 
necessary for a message to be delivered to Job, they would not have survived, but would 
have met the same fate as the others.  It is for this reason that, having delivered their 
messages, they promptly disappear from the narrative.  In addition, the device of having 
the servants report each disaster to Job allows “the spotlight [to] remain fixed upon Job” 
(Clines 1998a, 736), instead of having the reader’s attention shift to the scene of each 
catastrophe.  Fire may be falling from heaven, marauding hordes may be swooping in, tall 
buildings may be crashing to the ground, but we are blind and deaf to them; we have eyes 
and ears for Job alone, and what we see and hear comes to us through Job.  Job’s wife 
survives, the lone member of Job’s family, like the lone servant from the site of each 
catastrophe, in order to interact with Job.  Like the servants, she has her own message to 
deliver.  She delivers it—“Curse God and die”—presenting Job with the cue that will 
allow him to prove his righteousness, and immediately disappears from the story.  
Job’s three friends, too, when they appear in the prologue, do not detract from 
Job’s status as the tale’s central and only real character.  Rather, he is the absolute center 
of their focus, so much so that their presence serves only to make him even more present.  
We read,  
They met together to go and console and comfort him.  When they saw him 
from a distance, they did not recognize him, and they raised their voices and 
wept aloud; they tore their robes and threw dust in the air upon their heads.  
They sat with him on the ground seven days and seven nights, and no one 
spoke a word to him, for they saw that his suffering was very great.  (2:11b-13) 
There is a curious confluence of knowing and not knowing here.  The Hebrew does not say 
that the friends saw Job as they approached, but that they “lifted their eyes” 
(Mhyny(-t) w)#&yw), indicating that they are actively looking for him.  Lifting their eyes 
from a distance, the friends do not recognize (whrykh )l) the one for whom they are 
looking, and yet, immediately upon not recognizing him, the friends lift their voices 
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(Mlwq w)#&yw) to weep aloud for their friend, showing that, although they have not 
recognized him, they do know that he is the one they are looking for.  That they recognize 
him even as they do not recognize him serves to highlight Job’s centrality.  The one upon 
whom the friends’ eyes alight can only be Job, even if he does not look like Job.  As the 
central, real character of the story, he is the only person whom it is possible for the friends 
to see.  It is for this reason that when they lift their eyes and do not recognize him, they 
immediately recognize him and respond first with tears and then with silence.   
The verbs which describe the friends’ activity in this passage also serve to focus 
attention on Job.  As the friends approach, their eyes and voices are lifted up to Job who 
occupies a higher plane than that on which the friends move.  Reaching Job, the friends 
promptly sit down (b#$y) to allow themselves to continue to look up at him.  Whatever the 
cultural meaning of the friends’ throwing dust (rp() up toward heaven (hmym#$h) upon 
their heads (Mhy#$)r-l(), it too serves to lower the friends in Job’s presence: those who 
have dust upon their heads are lower than the dust.  Job may be sitting among the ashes 
(rp)-Kwtb), but the ashes do not cover his head as the dust covers the heads of his 
friends.  However low he has been brought, the friends are quick to adopt positions of 
deference, raising their eyes to him and lowering their bodies. 
Some commentators have noted that the friends’ behavior represents a fully 
appropriate response to Job’s suffering.  The friends’ silence indicates that they understand 
the depths of Job’s suffering.26  Indeed, that they tear their clothes and join him on the ash 
heap shows that they empathize deeply with him; they are as with him in his suffering as it 
is possible for them to be.27  The friends’ response is, no doubt, appropriate.  Nevertheless, 
we should not overlook the fact that it causes them to lose their status as separate 
characters as they, too, are rolled into the conglomerate of Job’s identity.  Adopting the 
signs of his suffering and grief, they make clear that it is his experience that is of central 
importance.  Although this may be seen as the behavior of true friends faced with the 
extreme suffering of one who is dear to them,28 those who commend this behavior in the 
                                                 
26 Page Kelley, for example, writes that the friends “not only came to visit Job with the best of intentions, but 
they also demonstrated the value of empathetic silence in ministering to one overcome with grief” (Kelley 
1971, 480).  
27 Habel comments effusively on the bond between the friends and Job, as it is revealed in their initial 
response.  He writes, “They weep in empathetic response to his tragic condition; they join him in abject self-
negation by throwing dust on their heads and flinging it heavenward….They identify with Job as a man 
reduced to the dust….They are ideal friends who commiserate with Job as he suffers in perfect submission” 
(Habel 1977, 228).  Elsewhere, Habel suggests that the friends’ gesture of throwing “dust in the air upon 
their heads” (2:12) is “a rite which symbolically calls forth the same sickness on themselves as an act of total 
empathy.  They are one with the dust of death and one with Job in his diseases” (Habel 1985, 97).   
28 It should be noted that not all commentators view the friends’ behavior in this positive light.  Christopher 
Ash suggests that although “It is usual to say that [their silence] was the best thing they did...their silence 
 42
prose tale tend to discount the friends’ speech when they do open their mouths and 
differentiate themselves from Job.  Ward Ewing, for example, writes, “I am convinced that 
the best thing Eliphaz and the friends could have done would have been to continue sitting 
quietly.  All would have been well had they simply been with Job in a quiet, accepting 
manner, a ministry of presence” (Ewing 1976, 49).  Donal O’Connor concurs, writing, 
“Job’s three friends consoled him with their tears and their silent presence….It was only 
when they broke their silence that they failed as comforters” (O’Connor 1995, 129-30).  In 
this view, the friends ought to have remained silent.  Only Job has the right to speak.  If the 
friends must speak, it should be to concur with Job, not to voice dissent.  Such readings, it 
seems, have bought into the vision of the ordered world that is being presented in the prose 
tale, a world in which there is—and ought to be—only one character of any real value. 
 Although in the prologue Job is stripped of his possessions and his health, and 
although he, who was the greatest man in the east, is reduced to sitting on the ash heap, he 
remains the greatest man in the story.  When the friends come to comfort him, they are 
silenced because the man who was  ldg has been overwhelmed by a suffering which is 
ldg.  Yet, even in his suffering—indeed, precisely because of the greatness of his 
suffering—Job remains a towering figure.  The tale, and all its characters are focused 
throughout entirely on Job.  Although Job is reduced for a time, the end of the tale sees 
him restored, not only to his former greatness, but to a greatness double that by which he 
was originally characterized: 
The LORD gave Job twice as much as he had before.  Then there came to him 
all his brothers and sisters and all they who had known him before, and they 
ate bread with him in his house; they showed him sympathy and comforted 
him for all the evil that the LORD had brought upon him29; and each gave him 
                                                                                                                                                   
may not have been as helpful as is often assumed....[I]t may be that their silence is not so much a silence of 
sympathy as a silence of bankruptcy: they are silent because they have nothing to say….[I]t is as if they call 
for the hearse and sit by Job with the coffin open and ready” (Ash 2004, 28).  This reading of the friends’ 
gestures is about as different from Habel’s interpretation (given in the footnote above) as it is possible to be!  
Gordis, too, offers an understanding of the friends’ throwing dust in the air that is the exact opposite of that 
proposed by Habel.  He writes, “When the visitors see Job in his affliction, they throw dust over their heads 
heavenwards…in order to ward off the evil from themselves” (Gordis 1978, 24).  Weiss concurs: “the action 
of Job’s friends…is a magical act of self-defense: in order to ensure that the sores with which Job is 
afflicted...will not fall from heaven on them as well, they throw dust over their heads into the sky as they 
approach Job” (Weiss 1983, 76).  Still, the majority of commentators view the friends’ actions as indicating 
solidarity with Job, even if most are not quite as expansive on the subject as Habel is! 
29 These actions on the part of Job’s family and acquaintances are the same as those the three friends 
intended to perform when they first sought Job out at the ash heap.  In 2:11 we are told that, having heard of 
all this evil that had come upon him (wyl( h)bh t)wh h(rh-lk), the friends set out to console (dwn) 
him and to comfort him (Mxn).  The same verbs are used in 42:11 of Job’s family and friends who show 
sympathy (dwn) and comfort (Mxn) Job for all the evil that the LORD had brought upon him 
(wyl( hwhy )ybh-r#$) h(rh-lk).  The difference between these two instances of consoling and 
comforting is clear: in chapter 2, the friends do not attribute the evil Job suffers to anyone, whereas in 
chapter 42 it is attributed to God.  It is, it would seem, this difference which is at the root of the friends’ 
failure to comfort Job as compared with the successful comforting in chapter 42.  In chapter 2, although the 
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a piece of money and a gold ring.  The LORD blessed the latter days of Job 
more than his beginning.  (42:10b-12a) 
At the end of the story, a multitude of characters comes rushing in, reversing the move of 
the prologue in which Job loses the multitude which once surrounded him.  These 
characters, like those of the prologue, serve only to make Job bigger.  Their focus is 
entirely on him as they comfort him, and they literally contribute to his aggrandizement 
with gifts of money and gold rings.  Job’s suffering is placed in context by his greatness at 
the end of the story.  His being stripped down is shown not to have been a real reduction in 
his status, but a step on the path to further greatness.  Although, as noted above, Pyper 
speaks disparagingly of Job’s blessed status at the beginning of the tale, pointing out that it 
is blessing which singles him out for curse, Job himself, in the prose tale, can be seen to 
welcome the curse, precisely because it is a sign of his supreme blessedness.  The curse, 
though it initially seems to reduce Job’s size, eventually results in an increase in his size; at 
the end of the tale he is bigger than ever before.   
 
Chapter 29: The Ordered World as a One-Man Show 
 
 The prose tale tells a story that is really about Job alone, with none of the other 
characters figuring except as appendages of Job or as pointers to show where all attention 
should be focused.  I have suggested that, given the tale’s unilateral focus, the tale can be 
read as a daydream in Job’s own mind.  I have also said that the tale represents Job’s 
vision of the ordered world, the way the world ought to be.  These claims are corroborated 
by Job’s speech in chapter 29.  In this speech, Job is overtly painting a picture of the world 
as it ought to be, a world that existed, he claims, in the time before his suffering began.  He 
begins his speech by wishing, “O that I were30 as in the months of old” (29:2a), a wish that 
would return him to the realm of the prose tale, both in its pre-suffering beginning and its 
post-suffering conclusion.  The link between chapter 29 and the world of the prose tale is 
highlighted by the word Mdq, which is used both in the description of Job’s former 
status—he was the greatest of all the people of Mdq (“the east”)—and to describe the time 
to which he wants to return—“O that I were as in the months of Mdq (“old,” “earlier 
times”).   
                                                                                                                                                   
friends may defer to Job in general, they do not understand that he is bigger and more righteous than God.  
This is precisely what the friends and relatives of chapter 42—who lay the blame for Job’s suffering squarely 
on God—do understand. 
30 Interestingly, what Job says here is actually “Who will give me…?” (ynnty-ym), which seems to gesture 
toward the connection between what one possesses and what one is.  Job was greatest because of what he 
possessed.  To be what he once was, Job must again have what he had then. 
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The world which Job describes in chapter 29 is a world in which he is the central, 
real character.  Job begins by remembering the special attention which he received from 
God in that world, saying, “God watched over me;…his lamp shone over my head, and by 
his light I walked through darkness;…I was in my prime…the friendship of God was upon 
my tent;…the Almighty was still with me” (29:2b-5a).  Here, as in the prose tale, God’s 
eye is focused on Job, and the result of this focus is blessing: “my steps were washed with 
milk, and the rock poured out for me streams of oil!” (29:6).  Granted, in other speeches of 
the poetic section Job has recognized himself as singled out by God, but for torture instead 
of blessing.  (For example, in chapter 7 Job accuses God of being a “watcher of 
humanity”31 [v. 20a] and implores, “Will you not look away32 from me for a while, let me 
alone until I swallow my spittle?” [v. 19])  A God who can torture Job—really torture him, 
and not just seem to torture him, as in the prose tale33—can be seen to be a separate 
character from Job, capable of actions that do not have as their goal the bolstering of Job.  
In chapter 29, however, Job remembers a time when God was not a real, separate 
character, when God’s gaze was only favorable, and when God could only do to Job what 
Job wanted done, could only bless Job and not curse (or, could curse, but with the intended 
end result of increased blessing).   
After describing himself as the center of God’s benevolent attention, and noting 
that, in those days, “my children were around me” (29:5b), another detail which serves to 
establish his centrality, Job goes on to describe himself as the center of attention for both 
the town’s leaders and its righteous poor.  His portrayal of the way in which he is greeted 
by the important people gathered at the city gate is similar to the prose tale’s depiction of 
the arrival of the three friends.  There, of course, the meeting takes place on the ash heap, 
but the configuration is the same.  In chapter 29, Job says, “When I went out to the gate of 
the city, when I took my seat in the square, the young men saw me and withdrew, and the 
aged rose up and stood; the nobles refrained from talking, and laid their hands on their 
mouths; the voices of princes were hushed, and their tongues stuck to the roof of their 
mouths” (29:7-10).  Newsom comments on this passage, “his entry…causes a 
reconfiguration of those present: Job sits, the young men withdraw, the elders rise and 
                                                 
31 The verbal root used here is rcn, whereas that used in 29:2 is rm#$.  Neither word, though, has 
connotations which are more overtly positive or negative than the other. 
32 The verb used here—h(#$ —is not just plain looking, but seems to connote looking with special attention.  
In  Genesis 4:4, for example, we read, “And the Lord had regard ((#$yw) for Abel and his offering.”  In Isaiah 
17:7 we find, “On that day people will regard (h(#$y) their Maker, and their eyes will look to the Holy One 
of Israel.”  What Job seems to be demanding here is that God make him no longer the center of his attention, 
for to be the center of God’s attention is to be the one who bears the brunt of his overwhelming power.  In 
chapter 29, though, Job imagines God’s attention quite differently. 
33 See discussion on pages 48-49. 
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stand.  Space is made for Job….When he enters, all others fall silent, their hands covering 
their mouths (29:7-10)” (Newsom 1994, 11).  Indeed, the phrase translated “the voices of 
princes were hushed” might also be understood as saying that their voices “went into 
hiding” (a literal translation of the Hebrew w)bxn).  Holding the poetic “were hushed” and 
the literal “went into hiding” together, we find that what is being described is both the 
princes’ self-silencing and space-making; the two go hand-in-hand.   
In the prologue, it is the friends who arrive at the place where Job is already sitting, 
but their seeing him causes a similar reconfiguration. When the friends catch sight of Job 
their behavior changes immediately.  They have been walking together, presumably 
talking amongst themselves, but when they see Job their own conversation stops, and is 
replaced by loud wails of mourning, accompanied by gestures of grief (2:12-13).  
Although the friends’ behavior may be understood as the fitting response to their friend’s 
affliction, there is more going on, which is illuminated by how Job describes his relations 
with his peers in chapter 29. 
In both passages, the sight of Job occasions a complete redirection of attention 
towards Job.  In chapter 29, young and old, nobles and princes, move aside to make room 
for Job at the center of their gathering.  In chapter 2, the friends change their posture and 
their behavior to show that Job is the center of their focus: he is grieving, and so they 
grieve; he is on the ground, so they get down on the ground, too.  In chapter 29, a hush 
falls on the gathering as the group waits to hear what Job will say.  Job places great 
emphasis on this silence, saying, “They listened to me, and waited, and kept silence for my 
counsel.  After I spoke, they did not speak again, and my word dropped upon them like 
dew.  They waited for me as for the rain; they opened their mouths as for the spring rain” 
(29:21-23).  Job presents himself as the only valid speaker.  The important men of the town 
are silenced at the sight of him, because they know that he will speak the definitive word.  
They do not begrudge Job his superior wisdom, but recognize that it nourishes them as the 
rain nourishes the spring flowers.  In the same way, in chapter 2, after the friends have 
changed their posture to show deference to Job, they too fall silent, their eyes on him, 
waiting to hear what he will say.  In both scenarios, Job is at the center, surrounded by 
deferential silence which only he is authorized to break. 
 
Job and the Social Hierarchy 
 
 In chapter 29, a second group surrounds Job, one quite different from that made up 
of the city’s important men.  This is the group of the righteous poor, Job’s help of whom is 
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the guarantee of his own righteousness: Job gives his care for the downtrodden as the 
reason for the deference shown him by the princes and nobles.  The poor, too, show Job 
deference, silently awaiting his sustaining word.  On the surface of it, there is nothing 
wrong with Job’s care for the poor; nothing suggests that he does not do what he says he 
does, or that he does it only for personal gain, and yet, as Newsom points out, there is a 
darker side to Job’s activities, unnoticed by Job himself.  She writes, 
What is troubling is that Job’s identity as a person of righteousness and justice 
is inextricably bound up with the logic of inequality.  There is a binary 
relationship of donor/recipient, dominant/subordinate that undergirds the moral 
thinking of such relationships….[S]uch a moral vision can encompass 
amelioration of suffering but not transformation of the structures that generate 
the inequalities that produce suffering.  (Newsom 1994, 12) 
That is, the poor must exist if Job is to retain his position at the top of the town’s hierarchy.  
Since the deference shown him by the town’s important men is based on his treatment of 
the poor, as Job himself indicates, saying, “When the ear heard, it commended me, and 
when the eye saw, it approved; because I delivered the poor who cried, and the orphan who 
had no helper” (29:11-12), the poor must continue to exist as a group in need of Job’s help.  
Job cannot help them so much that they cease to require his aid.  To do so would be to pull 
the rug of his righteousness out from under his feet.     
Job’s position may depend fundamentally on the existence of the needy, which is 
certainly troubling, but it also depends upon the nobles and princes who must recognize 
Job as deserving of deference.  Though less so, this is also problematic.  The young men, 
elders, nobles, and princes who withdraw and are silent to make room for Job, cannot be 
central as Job is central.  Although they are higher on the social ladder than the widow and 
the orphan, they must always remain lower than Job.  God’s chastisement of the friends 
near the end of the prose tale is a case in point.  God says to them, “My wrath is kindled 
against you…for you have not spoken of me what is right, as my servant Job has” (42:7).  
At first glance, this castigation seems out of place following the poetic section in which the 
friends have upheld the tenets of traditional piety against Job who has flouted them and 
who himself has just been accused by God of speaking “words without knowledge” 
(38:2b).  In fact, God’s discipline of the friends seems doubly misplaced, given that, if the 
poetry is set aside and the focus is shifted to the prose tale alone, we see that the friends are 
silent, waiting for Job to speak as they have always waited, showing him the deference 
they have always shown him, despite his reduced circumstances.   
Some commentators explain the seeming non-sequitur of God’s chastisement of the 
friends as indicating that the part of the prose tale in which the friends did speak has been 
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left out of the finished composition.34  Yet, there is a way of making sense of God’s 
criticism of the friends which does not presuppose a missing passage.  Technically, the 
accusation God brings against the friends is not that they have spoken wrongly, but that 
they have not spoken rightly as Job has.  Perhaps, then, they are chastised not for a sin of 
commission, but for a sin of omission.35  Instead of speaking themselves—whether rightly 
or wrongly—they have always waited for Job to speak.  They are punished, in effect, for 
making room for Job, for showing him the deference he seems to deserve, indeed does 
deserve.  Job’s central position is dependent upon that space being cleared for him by both 
the poor and the important men of the city.  Job is rewarded for being where and what he 
is, but those upon whom his status rests are punished for their lower position, even though 
their position makes Job’s position possible.  The poor are punished with poverty that can 
never be fully alleviated if Job is to remain their righteous benefactor; the important men 
are castigated for their silence, which cannot be broken if Job is to remain at the center of 
attention.  We may deem it unfair of God to chastise the friends for keeping silence when 
their silence allows Job to speak rightly, just as it is unfair for the poor to remain poor 
when they are responsible for Job’s status, but this is how the world works in the prose tale 
and in chapter 29.  The friends’ silence enables Job’s right speech, but this does not 
absolve them from not speaking rightly themselves.  They, like the poor, are playing a no-
win game. 
 
The Chaotic World of Chapter 30: Job Displaced from the Center 
 
In chapter 29, Job describes the world as it ought to be, which, he contends, is the 
way the world used to be, before he began to suffer, and he wishes for the return of this 
world.  For this reason, chapter 29 can be mapped onto the prose tale, which details the 
world as it was before Job’s affliction began and the world as it is after he is relieved from 
his suffering.  For Job, the ordered world is a world in which he is the only real character, 
upon whom all attention is focused.  It is not, however, a world in which he is alone.  
Rather, he is surrounded by other characters, but these characters exist only to be of 
                                                 
34 Marvin Pope summarizes, “Some interpreters see it as an indication that the folk tale originally presented a 
pious and patient Job throughout…who continued to praise God and ignored his wife’s advice to blaspheme 
and die.  It has been suggested that the friends gave similar advice, which would explain the divine censure” 
(Pope 1965, 290). 
35 Donal O’Connor, although he does not link the friends’ silence in the prologue with the silence of the 
townspeople in chapter 29 as I will below, does suggest that the friends are chastised not for anything they 
have said but for what they have not said.  He writes, “The...text may well be interpreted as indicating that 
the friends remained silent…when the Lord would have preferred them to have spoken correctly of his 
providence as Job had done....They expressed no religious attitude to the tragedy of Job....Could it be that 
their very silence, their failure to bless God, as Job had done, is the reason for the divine reproach (43:7)?” 
(O’Connor 1995, 68). 
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service to Job.  It is in this way that Job views the ordered world as a place of singularity 
and simplicity, rather than of multiplicity and complexity.  In chapter 29, Job does not 
wish for relief of his physical suffering—indeed, he does not mention his suffering at all—
but for a renewal of the order of the world, such that he is again at the center.  His focus in 
this chapter is entirely on his former central status, which he contrasts in chapter 30 with 
the way he is treated now by social outcasts whose gaze does not identify him as the 
central character, but as someone who is even more of an outcast than they themselves.  
Job says, “And now they mock me in song; I am a byword to them.  They abhor me, they 
keep aloof from me; they do not hesitate to spit at the sight of me” (30:9-10).  These 
derelicts keep their distance from Job, but when they happen to catch sight of him they spit 
or sing mocking taunts—almost as an aside—before moving on about their own business, 
which is where their focus lies.  When Job says that he has become “as a byword” to these 
lowlifes, he uses the same word he used in 29:22 to describe his life-giving utterance for 
which his community waited in silence, hlm.  Where once Job was the speaker at the 
center of a circle of noble admirers, now he is the one spoken-of, as if his entire existence 
can be summed up by a mocking word casually dropped by men who are lower than dogs.   
It is not his physical suffering that is the worst of Job’s predicament, but the fact 
that the physical suffering has toppled him from his former position as the central figure of 
the world in which he lived.  In the prose tale, Job’s affliction, though it sends him to the 
ash heap, does not represent a chaotic disordering of the world because he remains at the 
center.  There, God and hassatan are waiting to see what he will do and say, because what 
he does and says are of paramount importance.  The friends, too, watch Job, silently 
waiting to see what the central character of the story in which they are supporting cast 
members will do.  In chapter 30, however, Job presents a world overrun by chaos.  Job has 
ceased to be the story’s central figure and has become a member of the supporting cast, 
serving to bolster others’ status by being the object of their mockery and disdain. 
 
Multiplicity in the Form of the Poetic Dialogues 
 
Into the simplicity of Job’s ordered world, where he is the only one who speaks, 
breaks the multiplicity of the poetic dialogues, in which Job’s three formerly silent friends 
also speak.  In the poetic dialogues, the three friends become characters in their own right.  
They have their own opinions to express, because, having heard what Job has to say 
beginning in chapter 3, they are no longer satisfied by his words.  At first, the friends are 
reluctant to speak.  It is as if they are waking up from a dream of nonexistence, as if they 
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are wooden dolls who, having been sprinkled with fairy dust, now find that they have 
turned into real people.  Job, too, begins the poetic dialogues by waking from a dream.  
Stephen Mitchell describes the shift from prose to poetry as signaling “a change in reality.”  
He explains,  
[T]he world of the prologue is two-dimensional….It is like a puppet show.  
The author first brings out the patient Job, his untrusting god, and the chief 
spy/prosecutor, and has the figurines enact the…story in the puppet theater of 
his prose.  Then, behind them, the larger curtain rises, and flesh-and-blood 
actors begin to voice their passions on a life-sized stage.  (Mitchell 1989, ix-x) 
Peggy Day presents a similar account of the transition, writing “in chapter three…[t]he 
cardboard character of Job all at once becomes animated, and he rails against his 
misfortune” (Day 1988, 83).   
I agree with these interpreters that the shift from prose to poetry is significant and 
that the worlds they present are different worlds, the first a fantasy and the second 
“reality.”  I do not agree, however, that Job is on a par with the other puppets in the 
prologue.  Rather, it is Job who is responsible for manipulating the other characters who 
are his puppets in his own personal show.  Job is the one who dreams the scenario and its 
characters, and thus he must be said to be real, even if he also dreams himself, imagining 
how he would react to an anguish which he is not actually experiencing.  With the onset of 
the poetry, it is not Job who has become real, but his suffering.  His words and actions in 
chapter 3 are in direct opposition to what he has said and done in the prologue because he 
has discovered that his dream, in which he both suffers and triumphs over suffering 
without feeling any pain, has translated itself into the real world, and he is shocked to find 
that he is in agony and that he cannot bear it. 
In a sense, when he enters the “real” world of the poetry, Job discovers that he is 
less real, because he is no longer the only real character.  In his new situation, his suffering 
is worse, because it has ceased to be a mark of his central reality, and, by extension, the 
kind of curse that leads inevitably to blessing.  In the new context, Job’s affliction is not a 
blessing masquerading as a curse, but a curse alone.  Whereas in chapter 2 Job has closed 
his mouth insisting that he will never curse God but will hold fast to his integrity 
(something he could do because he recognized that the curse was a sign and promise of 
blessing), in chapter 3, Job’s new situation pries his mouth open and fills it with curses.  
The friends respond to these curses not with reverent silence but with criticism of Job.  
Although at first they are timid in their reprisals, couching them in polite formulas—“If 
one ventures a word with you, will you be offended?” says Eliphaz in the first of the 
friends’ speeches (4:2a)—as time goes on and they gain confidence in themselves while 
losing confidence in Job, they become more directly accusatory.  Job, although he 
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responds to the friends, makes clear in chapter 29 that were the world as it ought to be, the 
conversation in which he is engaged would not be happening, because the friends would 
remain silent in his presence.  The existence of the conversation in itself, regardless of 
what is being said, is a sign that all is not right with the world.   
 
Bakhtin, Vonnegut, and the Dialogic Style of the Book of Job 
 
 Yet, conversation makes up the bulk of the book, and even Job’s depiction of the 
ordered world in which there is no conversation is given as part of the ongoing 
conversation, thus making it only one view among many of the way the world ought to be.  
The friends do not respond to Job’s vision of chapter 29, with its call for a return to the 
time before conversation began, but two chapters later Elihu butts in, adding yet another 
voice to the discussion.  In this way, Job’s call for an end to conversation only serves to 
generate more conversation.  Because the book is structured around conversation, Newsom 
engages literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin’s ideas about the dialogic nature of truth in her 
reading of the book.  For Bakhtin, she explains, there are two types of truth, monologic and 
dialogic.  Whereas monologic truth can be expressed by one person and is objective (in 
that anyone could speak it, whatever her circumstances), dialogic truth can only be arrived 
at in conversation between two or more people, each of whom is speaking from a unique 
perspective.  In addition, because dialogic truth “exists at the point of intersection of 
several unmerged voices” (Newsom 2003, 22 ) it cannot be finalized.  Monologic truths 
are truths which can be established as true for all time.  Dialogic truth cannot be similarly 
fixed, for the simple reason that someone new may join the conversation, thus shifting the 
point of intersection.  In Newsom’s analysis, the Book of Job can be read as expressing 
exactly such a dialogic form of truth.  She takes issue with commentators who read the 
book as if only one of its characters speaks the real and final truth.  Such readings, it 
seems, buy into the vision of order as presented by Job in the prose tale and in chapter 29, 
in which other characters exist simply to bolster his own central reality.  The 
commentators who read the book this way perform what Job is finally incapable of doing, 
that is, silencing the voices that have broken in and interrupted his solitary centrality.36  
Although Newsom takes seriously what Job has to say in the book, she also takes seriously 
what the other characters have to say, accepting that they, too, are real characters whose 
points of view contribute to the truth about the issues under discussion. 
                                                 
36 Or, perhaps, given that the book ends with a return to the prose tale, it seems to these commentators that 
Job does succeed in silencing the other characters who have been speaking “out of turn” in the poetic section. 
I will discuss the implications of the return to the prose tale later and offer an alternative interpretation. 
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 If Newsom is right, the author has set the book up as a conversation in which truth 
cannot be assigned to one single character, as if only one character speaks what is right 
while the others have got it wrong.  Even though in the epilogue God commends Job for 
being the only one to have spoken rightly, these congratulations cannot be taken at face 
value given that, in the poetic section immediately preceding, God has accused Job of 
speaking without knowledge.  In fact, God’s congratulation of Job for speaking rightly 
following on the heels of God’s chastisement of Job for speaking wrongly serves not to 
single Job out as the only character in possession of a valid perspective, but to undermine 
the idea that the valid perspective can belong to one character alone.  God, who seems, at 
one moment, to perceive Job’s speech as wrong and, in the next, as right, cannot be 
deemed a wholly authoritative judge, capable of speaking a monologic truth which will 
hold up in dialogic circumstances.  Instead, God, too, is shown to be an “embodied” 
character who speaks out of particular circumstances, one voice among many instead of 
the voice which transcends the many.   
In Newsom’s view, the Book of Job is similar to Bakhtin’s “polyphonic novel,” in 
which each voice is simply one voice among many, and no voice speaks authoritatively to 
the extent that the other characters’ claims can be discounted.  In a polyphonic novel all 
characters are equally real.  In such a work, even the author cannot be considered more real 
than the characters, at least within the world of the book.  The author does not speak from 
a position which is privileged, nor are those characters privileged who share the views of 
the author.  Bakhtin explains, “The author of a polyphonic novel is not required to 
renounce himself or his own consciousness, but he must to an extraordinary extent 
broaden, deepen and rearrange this consciousness…in order to accommodate the 
autonomous consciousnesses of others” (Bakhtin 1984a, 68).  To relinquish primary 
centrality and reality to allow for the real existence of other characters requires a 
significant effort on the part of the author, for the author of a work, simply by nature of 
being its author, is central to the work.  Without the author, after all, the world 
encapsulated in the book and the characters inhabiting it would not exist.  Because the 
characters exist only because the author exists, they are, naturally, of secondary reality and 
importance.  Most novels are not polyphonic.  Indeed, in Bakhtin’s assessment, it is only 
Dostoevsky who has succeeded in writing novels which are truly polyphonic (Bakhtin 
1984a, 6-7, 12-13). 
 The fact that an author must choose to write a polyphonic book—and the fact that 
most do not do so—raises an important question about the author’s role in such a work.  
On the one hand, a characteristic of novelistic polyphony is that the author’s position of 
privilege is relinquished, as other characters are given the right to speak as real beings.  On 
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the other hand, that the author chooses to allow the world she is creating to function in this 
way, indicates that the author’s point of view is still, at least in this respect, privileged.  
“How ought the world I am creating to work?” we can imagine the writer asking herself.  
The author of a polyphonic work would respond, “It ought to work in such a way that all 
the characters are real characters, as real as I am, who engage in real conversation with 
each other and with me.”  This, though, is only one way in which the question can be 
answered.  It might just as easily be answered, “It ought to work in such a way that the 
character whose views represent my own is shown to be  in the right,” and, indeed, if 
Bakhtin is right about the rarity of polyphonic novels, this is how it is answered more often 
than not.  On the most basic question of how the world of the novel will function, the 
author’s position must be privileged, even if the author chooses that the world will 
function in such a way that no one point of view is privileged, including her own.   
Bakhtin skirts this issue by taking it as a given that life in the real world—the world 
outside of novels—is itself polyphonic.37  The author, in choosing to write a polyphonic 
book is not, then, choosing that the world of his or her creation will work in a particular 
way, but is merely choosing to mirror the way the world does, in fact, work.  Kurt 
Vonnegut, in his novel Breakfast of Champions, makes a similar statement about the 
nature of reality.  There, having inserted himself as a character into the book, he sits in a 
cocktail lounge amongst the other characters, and observes, 
As I approached my fiftieth birthday, I had become more and more enraged 
and mystified by the idiot decisions made by my countrymen.  And then I had 
come suddenly to pity them, for I understood how innocent and natural it was 
for them to behave so abominably, and with such abominable results: They 
were doing their best to live like people invented in story books.  This was the 
reason Americans shot each other so often: It was a convenient literary device 
for ending short stories and books.  Why were so many Americans treated by 
their government as though their lives were as disposable as paper facial 
tissues?  Because that was the way authors customarily treated bit-part players 
in their made-up tales.  And so on.  Once I understood what was making 
America such a dangerous, unhappy nation of people who had nothing to do 
with real life, I resolved to shun storytelling.  I would write about life.  Every 
person would be exactly as important as any other.  All facts would be given 
equal weightiness.  Nothing would be left out.  (Vonnegut 1973, 209-10) 
For Vonnegut, here, to write about “life” is to write, if not in a strictly polyphonic manner 
as defined by Bakhtin, at least in a way that gives equal importance to all characters and all 
details, which is similar to what Bakhtin means by polyphony.  In the same way, 
Vonnegut’s joining his characters in the bar can be read as a gesture by which his authorial 
                                                 
37 Bakhtin writes, “This [the author’s renunciation of his or her own privileged position] was a very difficult 
and unprecedented project… But it was essential if the polyphonic nature of life itself was to be artistically 
recreated” (Bakhtin 1984a, 68). 
 53
privilege is relinquished,38 a requirement of Bakhtin’s polyphonic novel.  Yet, even as 
Vonnegut vows to write about “life,” about the way the world really is, he recognizes that, 
in actuality, characteristics exhibited by the real world do not match his proposed vision of 
reality.  In the world outside of novels, people behave as if a hierarchy of importance does 
exist; in “life” people are not given equal weight and equal say.  Vonnegut blames novels 
for this, claiming that life has begun to imitate art.  His vow to write about “life” is an 
effort to remedy this situation: he will imitate life in his art, so that life, imitating art, will 
actually imitate itself and be as it ought to be.  There is, however, no guarantee that 
Vonnegut is right about what life is really like; his observation of life itself reveals that life 
is not like his idea of what life ought to be.  It seems, then, that he is not merely mirroring 
life in his art; rather, his art represents his own ideas about what life and the world ought to 
be like.  The same can be said of Bakhtin’s polyphonic author.  She is choosing the 
grounds upon which the world of the novel will function, and so, at least at that level, 
retains a privileged position within the book. 
 To return to the Book of Job, the point I am getting at is that the author of the book, 
even if he is writing a polyphonic work, is, in choosing to write how he writes, revealing 
his idea of what the world ought to be like.  He is, therefore, making a statement about 
order and chaos as he sees them.  If, in the prose tale and chapter 29, Job has shown that 
his own idea of an ordered world is a world that is unitary and simple, the author of the 
book, by forcing Job to come in contact with other real characters, shows that his own idea 
of an ordered world is one that is multifarious and complex.  It is in this way that the 
author retains something of a privileged position in relation to the work.   
Yet, at the same time, the structure set up by the author does allow characters other 
than himself to speak about order in ways which contradict his convictions.  Perhaps the 
author’s use of the prose ending for his book, which returns us to a world which is ordered 
on principles of unity and simplicity rather than multiplicity and complexity does gesture 
to the author’s willingness to be one character among others instead of the one character 
who has determined the grounds of existence for all others.  The book ends with Job’s 
ordered world, perhaps indicating that Job has won the argument after all.  At the same 
time, however, the prose ending cannot be read without the memory of what has come 
before, and in this way, it, too, becomes simply one of the voices and not the definitive, 
finalizing voice.  In this way, the author both gives up and retains his privilege, and Job 
                                                 
38 Yet, even as Vonnegut seems to relinquish authorial privilege and to put himself on an equal footing with 
his characters by appearing in the novel, he, at the same time, realizes that he is “on a par with the Creator of 
the Universe there in the dark in the cocktail lounge” and he proceeds to take advantage of his position: “I 
shrunk the Universe to a ball exactly one light-year in diameter.  I had it explode.  I had it disperse again” 
(Vonnegut 1973, 200).  Even though he claims to want to give all characters equal importance, Vonnegut, it 
seems, cannot help but make use of his position of superior power.  
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both wins the argument, and, in winning, annuls the need for any argument at all, and 
loses, because if he has won, he has won by arguing and the other voices in the argument 
cannot be forgotten. 
 
Job’s “Death Wish” as a Wish for Order 
 
 When the poetry breaks in on the prose tale and Job discovers that he is no longer 
living in an ordered world, the first thing he does is to curse the day of his birth, wishing 
that he had never been born but had, instead, made the quick and painless journey from 
womb to tomb.  The realm of the dead, as depicted by Job in chapter 3, ironically fulfills 
Vonnegut’s description of “life” in the passage quoted from Breakfast of Champions 
above.  In death, each person is exactly as important as every other. Job describes this 
world, “I would be at rest with kings and counselors of the earth…or with princes who 
have gold….There the wicked cease from troubling, and there the weary are at rest.  There 
the prisoners are at ease together; they do not hear the voice of the taskmaster.  The small 
and the great are there, and the slaves are free from their masters” (3:13b-14a, 15a, 17-19).  
Job presents death as the great leveler; everyone, whether slave or king in the world of the 
living is rendered equal and alike by death, which draws no distinctions.  Strangely, 
though, the world of the dead, as presented by Job, is not a realm of multiplicity and 
complexity but of unity and simplicity.  This is due to the fact that, although every person 
is exactly as important as every other person, no person is of any importance.  The realm 
of the dead, where all are equal, is marked by its silence, not by the clamor of a 
multiplicity of voices, each one speaking from its own embodied position.   
Dying at birth, Job would have left one place inhabited by him alone, and where he, 
therefore, figured as the only central character (the womb) for another inhabited by a group 
that has been reduced to a unity by the leveling power of death (the tomb).  Although the 
realm of the dead is certainly different from the world of the prose prologue, both are 
grounded in a vision of order as unity and simplicity.  Clines supports the idea that, here, 
Job depicts the world of the dead as the domain of order.  He argues that Job “is 
experiencing a shaking of the foundations of cosmic moral order.  He…longs for Sheol as 
a place where order reigns” (Clines 1989, 105).  For Clines, Job understands Sheol to be 
the refuge of order because it is free from the turmoil which has engulfed his life.  It seems 
to me, though, that Job recognizes Sheol as an ordered world because of its simplicity, a 
simplicity it shares with the world of the prologue. 
In the prologue, as discussed, Job is the only real character.  In Job’s vision of the 
world of the dead, there is also only one “character”—death itself—into which all the other 
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characters—kings, counselors, princes, the wicked, the weary, prisoners, taskmasters, 
slaves, masters, the small, and the great—are rolled, losing their individual identity for the 
sake of the one big character, him with the cloak and the sickle.39  Granted, Job, too, would 
be lost in this conglomeration; he would not be the only character, but would be no 
character.  Yet, having discovered that he is no longer the only character—that God and 
his mother exist and have done him wrong—Job would rather cease to exist than continue 
to live hedged in by others, and it is significant that he wishes he could transition from one 
realm in which there is only one real character to another.  In the trajectory of the book, 
however, things are moving in the opposite direction.  Job’s mother and God have 
distinguished themselves by acting against Job—the one by giving birth to him, the other 
by fencing him in with meaningless suffering—and, following Job’s curse of chapter 3, the 
friends, too, will begin to distinguish themselves by arguing that Job is in the wrong. 
 
Chaos and Order in Chapter 3 
 
 The world of the living has become, in Job’s view, a chaos, characterized by 
multiplicity, and the world of the dead presents itself to him as the refuge of order, 
                                                 
39 Although in chapter 3 death is not personified, death was sometimes conceived of as a personified being in 
the ancient Near East.  Nicholas Tromp explains, “The…tendency [to personify Death] is found 
undisguisedly in Ugaritic literature, e.g. in the Baal cycle, when Sir Death the Divine is the personal 
adversary of Baal….This tendency to personalize death is so universal that it can be labeled ‘archetypal’, i.e. 
corresponding to an innate structure or tendency of the human psyche….For Israel’s neighbours Death was 
an extremely real and concrete reality, a monstrous personal power waylaying fertility and 
life….Consequently the experience of death was not fundamentally changed in Israel and in the light of this 
fact the many occasions where Death is personified acquire a pregnant meaning.  One can hardly wave this 
away with the remark that it is poetical play.  This personification of Death, often reduced to hints and 
allusions, is most likely far from a petrified form of speech....This personification is given expression both 
directly and indirectly: directly where death is described as a person, called the Enemy, King, the Hungry 
One; indirectly, where his hands, feet and mouth, and his instruments are mentioned” (Tromp 1969, 99-100).  
Tromp goes on to point out that even the image of death as the grim reaper, “the now old-fashioned skeleton 
with a scythe on his shoulder” (Ibid., 103) appears in the Bible, in Jeremiah 9:21-22, so I have some 
justification (if tangential) for using it in relation to Job.  Personified Death does make an appearance later in 
the Book of Job, first in Job’s statement “Naked I came from my mother’s womb, and naked shall I return 
there” (1:21a), which “implies a personified death, as mother and womb” (Ibid., 122).  A more fully 
“enfleshed” Death appears later in Bildad’s references to “the firstborn of Death” and “the king of terrors” in 
18:13-14, about which Tromp writes, “The context undoubtedly shows that this ‘King of Terrors’ can be no 
other than Sir Death: he is explicitly mentioned in the preceding verse, where his Firstborn appears” (Ibid., 
119).   Still, it might be argued that Bildad’s personification of death as “the king of terrors,” is decidedly 
different from Job’s non-personified portrayal of death in chapter 3, as indeed it is.  Bildad’s Death, like 
Jeremiah’s Reaper is an active force; he ventures out from Sheol to capture prey and drag them back to his 
kingdom.  For Job in chapter 3, however, death, far from being an invading king intent on filling his coffers 
with bodies, is not even recruiting, not even accepting applications, as if the underworld is a kind of 
exclusive club that no one, not even its members, knows how to get into.  So, perhaps I am wrong to speak of 
death as the only real “character” in the underworld as Job conceives of it.  It might be better to speak of 
death as a kind of centripetal force toward which all the shades in its kingdom are drawn or as a kind of 
heavy body, like a planet, around which the shades are in orbit.  I use the language of character, however, in 
order to make clear that, in the realm of the dead, death itself occupies the position occupied in the prose tale 
by Job, even if death is not a person but only a force or a heavy object or a great big zero.  Even if death is 
not identifiable as having any kind of “self” or “being,” it is still true that all those who occupy the realm of 
the dead are part of death, even if death has no body apart from the bodies of the dead. 
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characterized by simplicity.  Chapter 3 is one of the passages frequently identified as 
having to do with chaos by scholars, who, looking for the splash of the watery chaos 
monster, find it in Leviathan who is mentioned by Job.  Of the day of his birth Job says, 
“Let those curse it who curse the Sea [or the day, depending on which vowel is deemed 
appropriate for My]40, those who are skilled to rouse up Leviathan” (3:8).    Job’s 
description of the effective curse as preventing light from shining upon that day has led 
Fishbane to identify the words Job speaks as a “counter-cosmic incantation” which 
attempts to undo the order set in place by God at creation.  Fishbane writes, 
The whole thrust of the text in Job iii 1-13 is to provide a systematic 
boulversement, or reversal, of the cosmicizing acts of creation described in 
Gen. i-ii 4a.  Job, in the process of cursing the day of his birth (v. 1), binds 
spell to spell in his articulation of an absolute and unrestrained death wish for 
himself and the entire creation.  He assumed that the world both centered 
around and depended upon him.  Consequently, Job utters his incantation in the 
throes of his present plight with the intent to banish the causa materialis of his 
condition.  (Fishbane 1971, 153) 
This interpretation assumes that what Job is calling up is a chaos which will overwhelm 
the order of the world and return it to its pre-creation state.  The mention of the rousing of 
Leviathan, imagined as a pre-creation chaos monster à la Tiamat, is taken as support for 
this interpretation: why would Job mention Leviathan if his cursing of the day of his birth 
was not intended to effect a chaotic upheaval of the ordered world?41  This interpretation, 
                                                 
40 It was Gunkel who first suggested amending yom to yam (Gunkel 2006, 37, 306), a change which has been 
picked up by many translators and commentators.  The NRSV, for example, translates My as Sea (with a 
capital S, indicating reference to the sea as chaos monster, which is paralleled with Leviathan in the second 
half of the verse) instead of day.  Pope, too, agrees with Gunkel’s emendation, writing, “Both this line [3:8a] 
and the following are patent mythological allusions, as Gunkel demonstrated….The cursing of an enemy and 
use of magic and spells as an indispensable part of warfare is well nigh universal” (Pope 1965, 30).  Gordis, 
while agreeing with Gunkel’s suggestion, proposes a second emendation to make the verse more 
comprehensible, rendering 3:8 as “Let them curse it who rouse the Sea, those skilled in stirring up 
Leviathan” (instead of, as in the NRSV, “Let those curse it who curse the Sea…”).  With this change “The 
verse thus receives a clear and appropriate meaning.  Job invokes the creatures of chaos to emerge and 
destroy his ‘day’” (Gordis 1978, 35). 
41 Dhorme insists that the rousing of Leviathan “would mean the return to chaos and the end of the world.  
Such is exactly what those who curse the day desire, those for whom life is nothing  but a series of evils.  
They would like to annihilate the existing order and to plunge into catastrophe.  Instead of using the banal 
expression ‘those who desire the end of the world’, it was customary to say, like a proverb, ‘those who are 
prepared to awaken Leviathan!’ This is the meaning which appears to us the most probable” (Dhorme 1967, 
31).  Yet, Dhorme’s statement, here, can be picked apart in a way that is suggestive for my own argument.  
What kind of ordered world can be said to exist for “those for whom life is nothing but a series of evils”?  
For such people, it seems, the world would not appear as an ordered cosmos, but as a chaos characterized by 
neverending catastrophe.  It may be true that Job desires the end of the world, but he desires it because his 
world has become chaotic; he wishes not for an end to order, but for an end to chaos.  Even though Dhorme 
disagrees with this position, the way he phrases his claim provides inadvertent support for it.  Dermot Cox, 
too, makes claims that perform in a similar way.  He first states that “Job’s curse is…more than a simple 
death-wish.  It amounts to a desire for the total reversion of the order of existence instituted by God at 
creation” (Cox 1978, 43), but goes on to speak critically of the order of the world in which Job finds himself 
living, writing, “Job has escaped from the illusion of the friends that life makes sense, and has finally 
recognized the human condition for what it is.  Such an awareness of the absurd is the experience of a person 
who, on the basis of philosophy or morality, has expected to find a rationally ordered cosmos, but who finds 
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however, is not entirely defensible.  At a textual level, it has been pointed out that the 
apparent “undoing” of the created world described in Job 3 does not actually match up 
with the pattern of creation in Genesis 1.  Clines points out that “although it is true that the 
darkening of day (v. 4a) reverses the act of the first day of creation, there are few other 
genuine correspondences (e.g., the reference to Leviathan in v 8 is not a reversal of the 
creation of sea-monsters on the fifth day, and the rest Job longs for in the grave in v 13 is 
no kind of parallel to God’s rest on the seventh day)” (Clines 1989, 81).  That is, what Job 
allegedly attempts to speak into nonbeing is not exactly what God speaks into being in 
Genesis 1, but only shares certain features with it.  
More importantly, the question of why Job should want to curse the world in such a 
way that chaos overwhelms order begs to be asked in response to Fishbane’s interpretation.  
Fishbane’s argument offers an implicit answer to this question—Job’s certainty of his own 
centrality within the creation means that, in order to remedy his personal situation, it must 
be remedied at the level of creation itself—but this answer is not fully satisfactory.  It is 
not fully satisfactory because it fails to deal with what Job’s suffering must signify in the 
first place.  Job’s suffering does not serve as an indication that world order must be 
undone, but as proof that world order has come undone.  Having lost his central position, 
Job can be sure that chaos has already overwhelmed order; he has no need to call it up.  
What Job needs is a reordering of the world, which suggests that his cursing of the day of 
his birth has order, and not chaos as its goal.  William P. Brown agrees with Fishbane’s 
assessment of Job’s birthday curse and the motivation behind it, writing, “As Job’s very 
life unravels, so must also the world.  The dissolution of the cosmos is a punishment 
designed to fit the crime.”  Yet, at the same time, Brown recognizes that in “the pit of deep 
darkness,” into which Job presumably wants to drag the world “exists a liberating new 
order.”  He continues, “The subversion of creation does not…result in anarchic ruin....He 
imagines a radically different form of existence, one without trouble and fear, as inclusive 
as it is liberating….Life, not death, is the limiting foil.  Chaos is the great liberator” 
(Brown 1999, 322-23).  If what Job is trying to create with his curse is “a liberating new 
order” and “a radically different form of existence,” we should not think of him as calling 
up chaos as much as speaking into being a new kind of order.  He is not uncreating so 
much as he is creating, and, although it might be argued that it is first necessary to uncreate 
in order to create something new, the counterargument can be offered that Job’s desire to 
re-create the world has arisen, in the first place, as a response to his having found his world 
                                                                                                                                                   
instead, on the basis of immediate experience, a chaos impervious to reason” (Ibid., 50).  That is, although 
Job wants to bring an end to the world created by God, he is motivated by his discovery that God’s world is 
not a cosmos but a chaos. 
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already uncreated.  He does not need to demolish what has already been razed; rather, he 
calls for the order of death as a reply to the disorder which has swallowed up the world of 
the living.  
 Thorkild Jacobsen and Kirsten Nielsen argue that the focus of Job’s curse in 
chapter 3 is not the uncreation of the world but the striking of the day of his birth from the 
register of days, because it is a bad day and ought never to be allowed to appear again.42  
They read the Leviathan reference as an indication of the vehemence with which Job 
curses the evil day; he, and others like him who have also been the victims of bad days, are 
“prepared to hurl their execrations at full throat even if they wake up Leviathan” (Jacobsen 
and Nielsen 1992, 200).  Job is not trying to rouse chaos but, rather, trying to curse the day 
of his birth with as much force as he can muster.  This interpretation denies that the 
passage has anything to do with chaos and order at all.  Watson offers a similar reading, 
which also denies the relevance of discussing chaos and order in relation to the chapter.  
She writes, “The most plausible explanation of v. 8a is thus that it refers to the cursing of a 
chosen day in order to make it ill-omened, probably in order to give rise to an 
eclipse….Consonant with this, reference to an eclipse-causing dragon seems likely in v. 
8b, as many have perceived” (Watson 2005, 324-25).  Leviathan, in this reading, is a 
dragon capable of swallowing the sun, who, having swallowed the days of Job’s 
conception and/or birth will make his having been born impossible.  For these 
commentators, there is no need to speak of chaos, but only of a suffering so severe that the 
sufferer must identify the day of his birth as evil and wish, in the strongest possible terms, 
that it and he be struck from the register of life. 
 Yet, commentators who do not wish to talk of chaos and order with regard to this 
chapter are holding to a definition of the terms which sees the combat myth as the only 
possible incarnation of the discussion.  In this understanding, if what appears in chapter 3 
is not a reference to the Chaoskampf no discussion of chaos and order is necessary.  My 
broader—and, I think, more accurate—definition of the terms allows the discussion to 
                                                 
42 John Hartley presents an interpretation which seems to hover halfway between this reading and the reading 
that understands Job as plunging the world into primordial chaos.  For Hartley, it is not the entire world that 
Job hopes to render chaotic, but only the day of his birth.  He writes, “Job wishes that he had never been 
born, but the only way that such a wish could be realized would be to have the day of his birth removed from 
the calendar.  As long as the day of his birth is recreated every year, his existence continues until his death.  
But if that day had never been created, he would never have existed….A counter-cosmic incantation reverses 
the stages God took in creating the world.  It was believed that God created each day in the same way that he 
created the world (Gen 1:1-2:4).  Thus every day, being a new creation, bore witness to God’s lordship and 
his creative powers.  In contrast, chaos is an unorganized and lifeless mass of water overshadowed by total 
darkness (cf. Gen 1:2).  But since the day of Job’s birth had already been created, the only way that Job 
might vanish would be to have that day returned to the primordial chaos.  If no light had shone on that day, 
there would have been no life, no birth, particularly Job’s.  With this spell, Job seeks to become totally 
nonexistent” (Hartley 1988, 91).  In this understanding, then, Job really does want to reverse God’s creation 
and render it chaotic, but he intends his curse to apply only to a very small part of the creation, the day of his 
birth.  His goal is not the undoing of the entire world, but only the undoing of himself. 
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remain pertinent even if Leviathan is not envisaged as a Tiamatesque chaos monster.  That 
is, Watson (and Clines whom she quotes in relation to her argument [and Driver, whom 
Clines quotes!]43) can be right about Leviathan’s identity and role and they, Jacobsen and 
Nielsen can be right that the intention of Job’s curse is to effect the striking of his birthday 
from the calendar, but Job’s speech of chapter 3 can still be read as participating in the 
discussion about chaos and order.   
Beginning with chapter 3, the poetic section reinterprets the prose tale it has 
interrupted.  Job’s suffering which, in the prose tale was meaningful because of his central 
status, becomes, in the poetry, meaningless, as Job is shunted from his central position and 
made into one character among many.44  Whereas previously Job’s suffering was not a 
mark of the disruption of order, this is what it becomes in the poetic section.  In chapter 3, 
Job recognizes that the world is not as it should be.  His curse of the day of his birth is an 
attempt to remedy the situation, not through an increase of chaos, but through an increase 
of order.  He identifies the realm of the dead as the domain of order, as is necessary when 
the realm of the living has been overrun by chaos: if life is chaotic, death must be 
orderly.45  The realm of the dead resembles the ordered land of the living as described in 
the prose tale in that there is only one real central “character”—Death—into whom all 
other characters are absorbed; their existence is not their own and their  presence serves 
only to make Death bigger.  The centrality of Death means, of course, that in this world 
Job is not the central character.  His reality is ceded to Death’s reality.46  Still, in terms of 
their simplicity the world of the dead and the world of the prose tale are alike, and if 
simplicity serves as the marker by which Job identifies order, then the world of the dead is 
an ordered world in a way that the world of the living in the poetic section is not.  For this 
reason, Job’s cursing of the day of his birth can be seen as an order-making activity.  His 
                                                 
43 Clines writes, “It is preferable…to retain the Masoretic reading [instead of changing yom to yam] and see 
those who curse a day as ‘enchanters or magicians reputed to have the power to make days unlucky’ 
(Driver)” (Clines 1989, 86). 
44 Perhaps I should say “one character among several” instead of “among many.”  Yet, in Job’s situation, any 
number greater than one qualifies as many.  The same principle is at work in the ancient Egyptian phrase 
“before there were two things,” in which, according to Clifford “‘Two things’ and ‘millions’ both express the 
same thing—the diversity of the existent—which is denied for nonexistence” (Clifford 1994, 102).  For Job, 
the arrival of any additional real character might as well be the arrival of millions, in that the world has 
ceased to be organized around a single, central point. 
45 Habel notes that the Egyptian text A Dispute Over Suicide, too, presents death as the domain of order.  He 
quotes, “Death is in my sight today/ (Like) the recovery of a sick man,/ Like going out into the open after a 
confinement./  Death is in my sight today/ Like the odor of myrrh,/ Like sitting under an awning on a breezy 
day…/ Death is in my sight today/ Like the longing of a man to see his house (again)/ After he has spent 
many years held in captivity.  (ANET, 406)” (Habel 1985, 105). 
46 Brown writes that, in Job’s chapter 3 vision of the world of the dead, “The topography of patriarchy is 
leveled out.  Gone are Job’s possessions” (Brown 1999, 324).  Although it is true that Job imagines himself 
losing his status and possessions in death, I do not know that “the topography of patriarchy” is quite as 
leveled out as Brown presumes.  Death assumes the role of patriarch formerly played by Job.  Death, it 
should be noted, has plenty of possessions, of which Job is—or longs to be—one. 
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wish is to have remained in the ordered world where he began, to have inhabited first the 
womb and then its analogue the tomb.  He attempts to achieve this through powerful 
words, strong enough to wake the dragon who will, perhaps, swallow up the day of his 
birth and allow him to skirt the chaotic world of the living. 
 There are two questions to be asked at this point.  The first is why, if Job’s curse is 
intended as an ordering activity, he doesn’t simply curse the day he began to suffer and 
attempt to set in motion a return to the way things were before.  Indeed, in chapter 29, Job 
does envisage a return to order that takes place in the land of the living instead of in Sheol.  
The second question is whether, in cursing the day of his birth, Job intends to pull the 
entire creation into the realm of death, to make it as if everything had never been born, or 
whether it is only his own life Job is trying to strike from the register.  The first question 
can be answered by pointing out that even if a return to the order of the prose tale were 
possible, Job’s experience has shown him that such an order is not unassailable.  His wish 
for a return to the months of old in chapter 29 aside, here Job seems aware that such a 
return is impossible. Even if order were to be reasserted, the guarantee of its stability has 
been removed.  The only real way to guarantee order is, Job asserts, to seek it in the realm 
of the unborn and the dead, realms whose ordered stability cannot be assailed.  An order 
that is shot through with the possibility of chaos is, Job might say, no order at all.  Better, 
then, to guarantee one’s experience of order by remaining where order cannot be troubled, 
the realm of the never-born, which merges with the realm of the dead.   
This brings us to the second question: does Job envision the realm of the never-
born as the guarantee of order not only for himself but for all creation, and does his curse, 
in consequence, attempt to render the entire creation never-born, for its own good?  There 
is little indication in the chapter that Job is cursing anything other than the specific day of 
his own birth.  Interpretations which read the combat myth into the chapter based on the 
mention of Leviathan are able to claim that he is cursing the entire creation, simply 
because the Chaoskampf has to do with the fate of the entire creation.  Yet, if the combat 
myth is not relevant here, and I agree with those who do not think it is, then it cannot be 
claimed that Job’s curse is aimed at a target larger than his own life.  As Watson puts it, 
“Job 3:3-10 constitutes not a systematic dismantling of creation but rather expresses the 
much more limited wish never to have been born, uttered by a man undergoing immense 
suffering”47 (Watson 2005, 322).   For the same reasons it can be argued that Job is not 
                                                 
47 Clines, too, argues that “The point of this first stanza is to utter the vain wish that he had never been born.  
It is a vain wish and the curses it includes are inconsequential and ineffective because it is too late to do 
anything about it….The language is fierce, but the curse has no teeth and the wish is hopeless....The form is 
the form of a curse, but the function is to bewail his unhappy lot” (Clines 1989, 79).  Norman Whybray 
concurs, writing, “in realistic terms these verses simply express Job’s futile wish that he had never been 
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trying to undertake an ordering of the world, but only an ordering of his own life, which 
has been overwhelmed by chaos.   
At the same time, however, the chaos in which Job finds himself is not simply a 
personal chaos, but a chaos that affects the whole world.  Job’s former status as the one 
real character at the center of the ordered world would seem to indicate that his personal 
experience of chaos is a sign that the entire world is engulfed in chaos.  In this, Fishbane is 
right to see Job’s sense of his own centrality as grounds for his cursing, not only the day of 
his birth, but the creation in its entirety.  If Job is central to order, a reordering of his own 
life is as good as a reordering of the entire creation.  Yet, the reordering which Job 
proposes is a reordering which snuffs him out from the world of the living and joins him to 
the unity of the kingdom of death.  It makes little sense to say that the fact of his never 
having been born could restore order to the chaotic world of the living.  Given this, and the 
fact that his focus is entirely on his own day of birth, it seem safe to say that his ordering 
curse is intended only for himself and not for the whole creation.  Job curses the day of his 
birth so that he can escape from chaos and rejoin the realm of order, a realm he now 
believes exists only for the unborn and the dead. 
 
Wickedness as Chaos/Righteousness as Order 
 
 Although in chapter 3 Job wishes for death, seeing it as his only way of a return to 
a simple, ordered, world, the friends view death as the ultimate punishment and certain end 
of the wicked, and, therefore, the domain of chaos.  Before inquiring further into the 
friends’ views, it is necessary to establish how wickedness and righteousness are related to 
chaos and order.  Generally speaking, the wicked can be assumed to be allied with chaos 
and the righteous with order.  A righteous person behaves the way he or she ought to 
behave, and thus is a participant in the world as it ought to be, which is order, while a 
wicked person behaves as he or she ought not to behave, and is thus a manifestation of the 
world as it ought not to be, which is chaos.  Ideally, an ordered world would be a world 
                                                                                                                                                   
born....Despite some of the language employed, there is no justification for interpreting these verses literally” 
(Whybray 1998, 37).  Tur-Sinai goes so far as to disavow that Job’s words can even be considered a curse.  
He writes, “Job…does not curse but…expresses wishes, idle wishes, of course: those of a man bemoaning 
his past” (Tur-Sinai 1957, 46-47).  Bruce Zuckerman takes a slightly different tack.  He suggests that Job’s 
words may be seen as belonging to the category of “lament-of-final-resort,” the purpose of which is to attract 
the deity’s attention, not so that death will be granted, but so that the sufferer will be restored to his former 
pre-suffering position.  According to Zuckerman, this is how the friends’ interpret Job’s “curse” of chapter 3, 
as is evidenced by Eliphaz’s  gentle opening words, which do not condemn Job in the least (as they 
presumably would if he saw Job as cursing creation).  Yet, although Zuckerman presents this as a possible 
interpretation of chapter 3, he later concludes that, in fact, Job does intend to utter a curse, and that he has 
taken up the convention of “lament-of-final-resort” only to flout it, as is shown by the accusations he will 
bring against God as his speeches continue (Zuckerman 1991, 125-26). 
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completely purged of the wicked.  Yet, Job and his friends are willing to compromise on 
this point. They are willing to concede that the wicked may continue to occupy the ordered 
world, as long as they are in the process of being driven out. 48  Instead of being a world 
entirely without wickedness, then, the ordered world is a world in which wickedness 
receives its due, that is, in which it is justly punished.  A chaotic world is a world in which 
either wickedness does not receive its due or in which the righteous receive the deserts of 
the wicked.  Even so, when the friends or Job talk about the wicked, they are talking about 
chaos, and when they talk about the righteous they are talking about order.   
 
The Chaos of Being Alone: The Friends’ View of the Fate of the Wicked 
 
 As the friends present it, to be wicked is to be fundamentally alone, a condition 
which becomes evident at death even if it has not been evident in life.  For the wicked, 
death is the absolute end, and, dying, the wicked man is completely erased from the slate 
of the world.  In his first speech, Bildad claims, “If they are destroyed from their place, 
then it will deny them, saying, ‘I have never seen you’” (8:18).  In his second speech he 
expands on the theme, saying, “In their tents nothing remains; sulphur is scattered upon 
their habitations….Their memory perishes from the earth, and they have no name in the 
street….They have no offspring or descendant among their people, and no survivor where 
they used to live” (18:15, 17, 19).  Zophar provides a similar description of the fate of the 
wicked in his own second speech, insisting that  
Even though they mount up high as the heavens, and their head reaches to the 
clouds, they will perish forever like their own dung; those who have seen them 
will say, “Where are they?”  They will fly away like a dream, and not be 
found; they will be chased away like a vision of the night.49  The eye that saw 
them will see them no more, nor will their place behold them any longer…a 
fire fanned by no one will devour them; what is left in their tent will be 
consumed.  (20:6-9, 26b) 
Eliphaz too, claims of the wicked, “They were snatched away before their time; their 
foundation was washed away by a flood…and what they left, the fire has consumed” 
                                                 
48 In fact, it might be argued that the wicked are necessary to the righteous, as those over against whom their 
righteousness is defined, just as the poor are necessary to the status of those higher up the social ladder, as 
Newsom has shown in her article “The Moral Sense of Nature.”  (See the discussion on pages 45-46 of this 
thesis.)  At the same time, it seems unlikely that Job and his friends would recognize that the wicked (or the 
poor) are necessary to their righteousness in this way. 
49  hlyl Nwyzx.  Zophar’s use of this simile is interesting.  In 4:12-21 Eliphaz has described his own “vision 
of the night” (a voice which has spoken to him hlyl twnyzxm) and has used the words spoken by this night 
visitor to condemn Job.  One would think that Zophar would be more careful about using a simile which 
could be seen to call into question authority claimed by one of his friends.  At the same time, although both 
Eliphaz and Bildad use aspects of the spirit messenger’s claims in their arguments against Job, Zophar does 
not.  Perhaps that detail combined with his use of this simile indicates that he is less accepting of the spirit’s 
authority than are his fellows.  See the discussion of the spirit’s message on pages 135-40. 
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(22:16, 20b).50  All three friends view the death of a wicked man as his absolute 
eradication from the land of the living.  No one in the place he used to live remembers him.  
Indeed, even the land itself has forgotten him.  He leaves no descendants, and any 
possessions he might have left behind as lingering reminders that he once lived, are 
consumed by fire.  Zophar’s specification that the fire that devours whatever the wicked 
might have left behind is “fanned by no one” is significant in this context.  If the fire were 
fanned by someone, it would indicate that, actually, the wicked person had been 
remembered, even if by an enemy, instead of being absolutely eradicated by death.  In 
addition, a fire fanned by someone might occasion retaliation against the fire starter, which 
would also show that the wicked person was remembered.  The fire fanned by no one, by 
contrast, is simply part of the procedure by which death erases him from the face of the 
earth.51   
The righteous man, by contrast, meets a death which does not efface his presence 
from the land of the living.  Eliphaz, describing what Job’s life and death will be like if he 
repents of the wickedness Eliphaz believes to be at the root of his suffering says, “You 
shall know that your tent is safe, you shall inspect your fold and miss52 nothing.  You shall 
know that your descendants will be many, and your offspring like the grass of the earth.  
You shall come to your grave in ripe old age, as a shock of grain comes to the threshing-
floor in its season” (5:24-26).  The righteous man, in stark contrast to the wicked man, is 
able to count on the continued security of his tent; no fire “fanned by no one” will assail it 
after he is gone, for its existence is guaranteed, both by the way he has lived his life, and 
by the many descendants he is leaving behind.  The friends, although they do not accuse 
Job outright of being wicked until close to the end of their part in their dialogue,53 imply 
throughout that if Job were to get his wish and die now, he would be met by the fate of the 
                                                 
50 Earlier Eliphaz has claimed of the wicked, “Their tent-cord is plucked up within them, and they die devoid 
of wisdom” (4:21).  Interestingly, the word translated “tent-cord” is rty, which can also mean “remnant” or 
“remainder.”  Eliphaz uses it this way in 22:20 to say “what they left (Mrty), the fire has consumed.”  It is 
possible, then, to see in 4:21 another instance of Eliphaz’s claim that the wicked leave nothing behind.  It is 
not only the tent-cord of the wicked which is plucked up but anything that remains after this first act of 
destruction. 
51 One of the central tenets of René Girard’s theory of the scapegoating mechanism is that the violence 
enacted against the scapegoat is performed “by no one.”  That is to say, because the entire community 
collaborates against the scapegoat, no one member of the community can be singled out as guilty, meaning 
that the scapegoat’s death cannot be avenged.  According to this theory, violence enacted “by no one” really 
means “by everyone.”  Girard reads the Book of Job as a story about scapegoating, in which the community 
attempts to pin its collective guilt on Job.  The book, however, is finally a story about failed scapegoating, 
because Job refuses to agree that he is guilty, despite all indications to the contrary (Girard 1987). 
52 The word translated “miss” is )+x, which usually means to miss in the sense of missing the mark, that is, 
to sin.  Its use here with the sense of “nothing shall be missing from your possessions,” forges a link between 
possession and righteousness.  If one does not sin, one’s possessions shall remain intact, so that one does not 
miss anything. 
53 It is in his third speech that Eliphaz accuses Job outright of intentional wickedness, saying, “Is not your 
wickedness great?  There is no end to your iniquities” (22:5).  
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wicked.  His tent and all his possessions have, after all, already been destroyed in a series 
of freak accidents, not unlike the “fire fanned by no one.”  In addition, any descendants he 
might have left behind have been wiped out.  Job, like the wicked man, is utterly alone, 
and death would confirm both his loneliness and his wickedness. 
 As demonstrated above, the friends believe that to be wicked is to be fundamentally 
alone.  Chaos, in this formulation, is a place of singularity rather than multiplicity.  Even 
though the wicked are many, each wicked person inhabits a cell occupied by him- or 
herself alone, and when he or she dies that cell ceases to exist and leaves no memory of 
itself behind.  The realm of the wicked—chaos—is simple as the friends conceive of it, 
while the realm of the righteous—order—is complex, made up of a multiplicity of people 
and things which are connected by relationship.  The righteous person, instead of 
inhabiting a cell which separates him or her from the people and things with which he or 
she appears to share the world, is a member of an interconnected community.  The 
righteous man is really connected to his tent, and, because of this, it belongs to him even 
after he has died.  In the same way, he is really connected to his offspring, and they bear 
testimony to his existence even when, it would seem, he has ceased to exist.  The righteous 
man does not, in fact, cease to exist, because everything he touches becomes part of him 
and continues to carry his presence in the world even if he is dead. 
 
Order and Chaos as Characterized by the Configuration of Singularity and 
Multiplicity 
 
Although the friends, in their portrayals of the fate of the wicked, envision chaos as 
the realm of unity and simplicity, while for Job it is order that is unitary and simple, the 
fact that the righteous man continues to exist in the world after his death by means of his 
relationships and possessions shows that actually the friends’ and Job’s ideas about the 
natures of chaos and order are not as different as they might at first seem.  For Job, order is 
unitary and simple because the multiplicity of things and beings that seem to inhabit order 
actually belong to one person, the central character around whom the ordered world is 
organized.  Job’s children and possessions are not evidence of a true multiplicity, because 
they fully belong to him.  Order, in Job’s view, is unity composed of complexity, 
simplicity made up of multiplicity.  Although the friends view order as the realm of 
multiplicity and complexity, it is, similarly, a multiplicity that contributes to the continued 
existence of the one.  The righteous man, who continues to exist after he is dead, swallows 
up the multiplicity of objects and beings who are separate from himself; their existence 
bears witness to him, instead of to themselves, just as Job’s possessions and children bear 
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witness to him instead of to themselves.  In the same way, the wicked man who inhabits a 
unitary world devoid of real relationships can also be seen to inhabit a world that is 
characterized by multiplicity, in that no being is subsumed by any other.  The wicked 
man’s son, for example, always remains separate from his father and, as such, is capable of 
being a real character, bearing witness to himself instead of to his father; the righteous 
man’s son, by contrast, is subordinate to his father and his own existence is swallowed up 
by his father’s, as he is responsible for bearing witness to his father. 
The observations made above require a reassessment of the terms in which I have 
described Job’s and the friends’ understandings of chaos and order with regard to ideas of 
multiplicity and singularity.  Although previously I have noted that Job views order as 
singular or simple and chaos as characterized by multiplicity, while the friends view chaos 
as simple and order as complex, these claims are shown to be problematic because of the 
way in which Job’s and the friends’ conceptions of chaos and order overlap.  That is, Job 
and the friends view chaos and order similarly even though they speak differently of how 
they are characterized with regard to singularity and multiplicity.  What the friends 
describe as multiplicity is, in fact, the same situation that Job describes as singularity, and 
what the friends call singularity is what Job calls multiplicity.  Here, we are potentially in 
for trouble.  If it turns out that it is not only chaos and order that reject stable definitions, 
but that the “content-themes” which I am using to explore the way in which chaos and 
order are discussed also trade meanings, then we are in a pickle.  We will need new 
“content-themes” with which to explore the potential meanings of the “content-themes” we 
were using to explore the potential meanings of chaos and order.  And how can we be sure 
that the new “content-themes” will not themselves break down, requiring that we address 
them at a deeper level as well?  If what we mean by simplicity and multiplicity is as 
interchangeable as what we mean by chaos and order, we had best abandon this line of 
inquiry, as it will only lead us into muddle, and not to clarity as is desired.  I do not, 
however, think that this is the situation we are dealing with. 
 Hitherto, I have used one term, either singularity or multiplicity to describe how 
Job and the friends conceptualize chaos and order.  The problems encountered arise from 
this approach, and are solved when we recognize that chaos and order need not be 
characterized as either one or the other (that is, as either singularity or multiplicity) but can 
be described as embodying a particular relationship between the two.  When Job speaks of 
order, he speaks of a single central character surrounded by a multiplicity of characters.  
These surrounding characters are not real characters in the same way that the central 
character is real, but their presence is necessary nonetheless.  The central character 
depends upon the presence of the surrounding characters for his status, and, if the 
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surrounding characters disappear or shift their focus away from the central character, chaos 
ensues.  This is, in fact, what Job describes as having happened to him in chapter 30 and 
which designates the current world as chaos.  In chapter 29 Job expresses his deep longing 
for all eyes to again turn their gaze to him, a situation which would signify that the world 
had returned to its ordered state.  Job may view order as primarily simple, but its simplicity 
relies on the presence of a multiplicity of characters arranged in a very particular 
configuration.   
When the friends say that the fate of the wicked is to be fundamentally alone, they 
may be presenting a view of chaos as the domain of singularity, but this version of 
singularity is completely different from the ordered singularity that Job has described.  For 
the friends, chaos is simple, in that each of its inhabitants exists as his or her own center, 
with no reference or relation to any other inhabitant.  There are a multiplicity of characters, 
but each character possesses his or her own point of singularity.  Whereas in Job’s vision 
of order, the multiplicity of characters are arranged around and focused on the single, 
central character, in the friends’ vision of chaos, each character is focused only on him or 
herself.  In both depictions, both singularity and multiplicity are present, but they are 
configured differently. 
For the friends, each person who inhabits chaos (which one does by being wicked) 
is completely and utterly alone, despite there being a multiplicity of people inhabiting 
chaos.  Although Job believes that order is characterized by having one central character, 
he does not envision the inhabitants of the ordered world as fundamentally alone.  
Although he alone is at the center of the ordered world, his aloneness there is made 
possible by the multiplicity of beings who surround him and bolster the reality of his 
existence with their existence.  Neither are those who contribute to his centrality in the 
ordered world alone; they are joined to him, so much so that they become part of him 
(hence the idea of order as unitary and simple), but this does not render him or them alone 
in the sense that the friends mean when they speak of the wicked as alone and of the realm 
of chaos as the realm of loneliness.  Indeed, Job will show that he agrees with the friends’ 
assessment of chaos and order when, in chapter 19, he asserts “I know that my go’el lives” 
(19:25a). 
 
The Expectation of a Go’el: Job Rejects the Friends’ Assertion that he is 
Fundamentally Alone and, Therefore, a Chaotic Figure 
 
 In chapter 19, Job responds to Bildad’s claim that the wicked “have no offspring or 
descendant among their people, and no survivor where they used to live” (18:19), a 
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description which is surely meant to identify Job as one of the wicked, given that it 
matches his own situation, even though Bildad does not accuse him of wickedness 
outright.54  Job rejects Bildad’s veiled accusation, countering, “know then that God has put 
me in the wrong” (19:6a).  Although he insists that he is not one of the wicked, the 
description of his own situation that Job goes on to give is consonant with the picture of 
the fate of the wicked that Bildad has just painted.  Like the wicked man who dies and is 
not remembered, so Job is not remembered by those who once loved him; he is an alien to 
them, and, in the obliteration of their memory of him, it is as if he is dead and forgotten. 
Job laments, 
He has put my family far from me, and my acquaintances are wholly estranged 
from me.  My relatives and my close friends have failed me; the guests in my 
house have forgotten me; my serving-girls count me as a stranger; I have 
become an alien in their eyes.  I call to my servant, but he gives no 
answer….All my intimate friends abhor me, and those whom I loved have 
turned against me.  (19:13-16a, 19) 
Although Bildad has correctly observed his situation, Job insists that Bildad has incorrectly 
interpreted  the meaning and implications of his suffering.  His loneliness, he claims, stems 
from God’s unwarranted enmity: “know then that God has put me in the wrong, and closed 
his net around me….I call aloud, but there is no justice” (19:6, 7b). 
Although in his vision of the world as it ought to be, Job was alone as the central 
character, his centrality was made possible by  the cast of supporting characters who were 
ranged around him, giving him their full attention.  It is a different thing altogether to be 
alone at the periphery, where one is denied the status of real existence by those who ignore 
one’s presence and one’s words.  Even the lowly members of Job’s household—his 
servants and serving-girls, who, by virtue of their station are required to pay attention to 
him—ignore him, treating him as a stranger, refusing to answer him when he speaks to 
them.  In this aloneness, it is as if Job does not exist.   
 Job, like the friends, recognizes his aloneness as a chaotic situation.  If the world 
were as it ought to be, he would be acknowledged by his family and friends.  Yet, although 
the friends view aloneness as the mark that one is a chaotic figure, and, seeing Job 
                                                 
54 Newsom insists that “the poems describing the fate of the wicked (chaps. 15, 18, 20) should not be 
understood primarily as veiled attacks on Job,” and cites as support the fact that “When he [Job] replies to 
them (chap. 21), Job does not take them as such but assumes that he and the friends are arguing over the 
nature of the world” (Newsom 1999, 249).  Although I agree that, fundamentally, Job and his friends are 
arguing over the nature of the world—over whether it is currently a chaos or a cosmos—I do not see how the 
friends’ descriptions of the fate of the wicked, which also describe Job’s situation, cannot be taken as 
assertions that Job is among the wicked.  Job recognizes that the friends are not on his side; he knows they do 
not believe in his innocence.  In chapter 6, he has lamented, “My companions are treacherous like a torrent-
bed, like freshets that pass away, that run dark with ice, turbid with melting snow” (6:15-16)  and in chapter 
13 he has cried out against them, “As for you, you whitewash with lies; all of you are worthless physicians” 
(13:4). 
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abandoned, identify him with chaos, they contend that it is right that he should be 
abandoned and alone.  In the world as it should be, it is right for the wicked to be 
abandoned even by those whose job it is to serve them.  Thus, for the friends, although Job 
is marked as a chaotic figure by his aloneness, the fact that he is so marked is a sign that 
the world is functioning as it ought to function, that order does, in fact, prevail.  For Job, 
his abandonment means the opposite—all is not right with the world.   
In this chapter, though, Job does not go on to make the argument that the chaotic 
state of the world is evidenced by the prosperity and popularity of the wicked and the 
suffering and loneliness of the righteous, as he does elsewhere.  Instead, Job suddenly 
changes his tack.  Although in the chapter so far he has described himself as abandoned by 
his former intimates, now he claims that he is not, in fact, alone, despite appearances to the 
contrary.  There is someone who stands with Job, and this solidarity will one day become 
apparent.  The one who will stop Job from being erased from memory Job calls “my 
Redeemer.”  He says, “For I know that my Redeemer lives, and that at last he will stand 
upon the earth; and after my skin has been thus destroyed, then in my flesh I shall see God, 
whom I shall see on my side” (19:25-27a). 
 The word translated Redeemer is go’el (l)g), which can mean either an “avenger 
of bloodshed (who by killing the murderer of one’s relatives, clears away the crime)” or 
can refer to the “duty of the male relative of s. one who has died leaving a childless widow 
to deliver her from childlessness by marriage…the man in question being called go’el 
deliverer” (A Concise Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Testament, 52).  Samuel 
Balentine offers a more extended explanation of the term, writing,  
The term l)'Og% comes primarily from the field of family law.  It designates the 
nearest male relative…who is duty bound to protect and preserve the family 
when his kinsman is unable to do so.  The responsibilities of the l)'Og% include 
buying back family property that has fallen into the hands of 
outsiders…redeeming a relative sold into slavery…marrying a widow to 
provide an heir for her dead husband…and avenging the blood of a murdered 
relative….In religious usage God is described as the l)'Og% of those who have 
fallen into distress or bondage….It is noteworthy that God’s responsibilities as 
l)'Og% include pleading the case (byr) for those too helpless or too vulnerable to 
obtain justice for themselves.  (Balentine 1999, 274) 
Given the range of possible roles a go’el might play, it must be determined not only who 
Job believes his go’el to be, but what he expects his go’el to do.  On both these questions, 
scholars are deeply divided, and the literature about these 3 verses (19:25-27) is immense.  
Some scholars (including Clines, Good, Pope, and Terrien) assume that chapter 19’s 
Redeemer is the same figure referred to in chapter 9 as an “umpire” (9:33) and in chapter 
16 as Job’s “witness in heaven” (16:19), whereas others hold that the figures are distinct.   
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This, though, is not the most important point of contention.  There are two main 
camps of opinion on the identity of the go’el into which scholars may be divided.  One 
camp holds that when Job speaks of his go’el he is speaking of God.  Handel, when he 
inserted Job’s claim “I know that my Redeemer liveth” into his Messiah, indicated his 
membership in this camp,55 and many readers of the Book of Job, having heard the line in 
the Messiah, assume that when Job speaks of his Redeemer he is speaking of God.  Indeed, 
this is the traditional scholarly position, and is probably held by the majority of scholars 
today.  Those who identify the go’el as God claim that Job is voicing his belief in the God 
who will redeem him over against the God who has afflicted him.  Job, in effect, believes 
that eventually, God, who has made a mistake in causing Job to suffer, perhaps through an 
attack of temporary insanity, will realize his mistake, come back to his right mind, and 
affirm Job’s innocence, even if Job is dead.56  Gordis provides a compelling representative 
statement of this position, writing, “In all of Job’s speeches two themes have been heard 
setting one another off, like point counterpoint.  Again and again Job has attacked the God 
of power, but with equal frequency he has appealed to the God of justice and love.  Now 
the two themes are united in a great climax as Job appeals ‘from God to God’” (Gordis 
1965, 88).57 
In contrast to those who hold that Job’s go’el is God invoked against God, the 
second camp of scholars argues that this formulation makes no sense.  Samuel Terrien, for 
example, writes,  
Against this prevailing interpretation it may be argued that (a) the go’el cannot 
be God, for Job has heretofore consistently thought of the Deity as an 
implacably hostile being, and (much more important) continues to do so in the 
remaining part of the poetic discussion (cf. 27:2); (b) it is hard, if not 
impossible, to believe that Job, who has just declared that God persecutes him 
(vs. 22), at once would completely reverse his position and declare that God is 
his eternal vindicator (vs. 25).58  (Terrien 1954, 1052) 
                                                 
55 I am not suggesting, of course, that Handel meant to enter into the scholarly argument over the identity of 
the go’el.  He simply assumed that by his Redeemer Job meant God.  
56 When Job’s eventual vindication will take place and what it will look like are also matters of intense 
debate.  Will it happen after he is dead, or sometime during his lifetime?  If he is dead, will he be resurrected 
to experience his vindication, or will he experience it, somehow, while still in Sheol?  The language of verses 
25-27 is difficult, perhaps corrupt, meaning that the debate is unlikely to be settled.  Edwin Good cautions 
against assuming too much certainty for one’s interpretation of these verses, writing, “If only we could 
decipher verses 25-27.  Without rewriting what is written, I cannot, except for the first line: As for me, I 
know that my avenger lives.  Even so, the hazard is to think one can say too much”  (Good 1990, 257).  As 
when, where, and how Job’s redemption will take place are not central to my argument, I will not discuss 
these questions further. 
57 Others in the “God-is-the-go’el” camp include Westermann, Dhorme, Hartley, Whybray, Rowley, Driver, 
Gutierrez, Cox, Kinet, and J. G. Williams.  
58 Terrien offers several additional reasons for rejecting the idea that the go’el is God, but the reasons given 
here are most representative of the position overall. 
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Although commentators in this camp agree that it makes no sense to speak of God as the 
go’el, they disagree as to who the go’el might be, if not God.  Marvin Pope proposes that 
the go’el be thought of as serving “the same function as the personal god of Sumerian 
theology, i.e., act as…advocate and defender in the assembly of the gods” (Pope 1965, 
135).  That is, Pope envisages the go’el as a divine being, a member of the divine council, 
who will intercede with God on Job’s behalf, an interpretation which is shared by Habel.  
Clines, on the other hand, argues that Job has no go’el but himself; his own cry for justice 
must act as his redeemer, as Job has no one else to rely upon.  Clines writes, “This remains 
a fact, whatever happens to Job himself; his words cannot be unspoken, and they indeed go 
on speaking for him as his kinsman-champion” (Clines 1989, 460).  Bruce Vawter presents 
a similar interpretation, writing, “In Job’s understanding, his vindicator may have been 
simply Job himself, or the merits of his case which is Job existentially” (Vawter 1983, 52).  
Peggy Day offers yet another interpretation.  In her view, the three intercessors called up 
by Job, in chapters 9, 16, and 19 are ironic references to the satan.  Job does not know 
what we know, namely that there is someone who stands between him and God and speaks 
to God about him, but this one is his accuser and not his defender.  She writes, “Job may 
be looking forward to intervention by a third party who will prove to be his ultimate 
salvation from the grave, but the audience knows that the only active divine third party is 
seeking to drive Job to his grave, not rescue him from it” (Day 1988, 100-01).  Although 
most commentators assume that the go’el is a heavenly figure of some kind (whether a 
divinity other than Yahweh or the personification of Job’s testimony (which lives on in 
heaven), Raymond Scheindlin suggests that the go’el is simply “an unknown kinsman 
[who] will come forward [sometime in the future], read the record, take up his case again, 
and gain the vindication he has been seeking, even though Job will not live to see it” 
(Scheindlin 1998, 91).   
It seems to me that the arguments against viewing God as the go’el are not fully 
convincing.  I agree with Norman Whybray’s assessment that  
Job vacillates in his attitude towards God.  Although he regards him as his 
enemy and as the one who has deliberately wrecked his life, there remain 
moments when he continues illogically to place some kind of hope and trust in 
him.  Indeed, this fluctuation of belief is an essential aspect of the author’s 
presentation of Job.  It shows Job to be a human being bewildered by what has 
happened to him.  (Whybray 1998, 94-95) 
It seems entirely plausible that Job could conceive of God as both his attacker and his 
Redeemer.  Job knows that he is being attacked by God, but he also knows that, in 
attacking him, God is acting against his own true nature.  It is, therefore, conceivable that 
Job would hope—indeed, would believe—that some day God will be recalled to himself 
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and will then act, if not to end Job’s suffering because it is too late for that, at least to clear 
Job’s name.59   
Although I think that it is possible that when Job speaks of his go’el he is talking 
about God, I agree most fully with Janzen’s suggestion that, even though Job affirms the 
existence of his go’el, he does not actually know who this go’el is.  Janzen writes,  
The point is precisely that, in the face of a universe whose earthly and 
heavenly figures…are all against him, Job imaginatively reaches out into the 
dark and desperately affirms the reality of a witness whose identity is 
completely unknown to him….Faith manifests itself not in allegiance to a 
figure known to be there, but in naked and blind affirmation of what is 
unknown, yet which must be there if one’s own truth ultimately matters. 60  
(Janzen 1985, 125) 
That is to say, Job’s beliefs about himself, about God, and about the world as it ought to be 
lead him to faith in the existence of a go’el.  For Job, such a being must exist, for, if he 
does not exist, then Job must concede that his beliefs are fundamentally misguided, and 
Job is not ready to make that admission.  He insists that the world in which he finds 
himself is not the world as it ought to be, but he also wholeheartedly believes that his 
vision of the way the world ought to be is shared by God, the world’s creator.  The gap that 
exists between the world as it is and the world as it ought to be both makes necessary and 
offers proof for the existence of a go’el.  The work of the go’el, whose existence Job 
affirms, is to bring the world as it is back into line with the world as it ought to be. 
If it is not necessary to determine exactly who the go’el is—if Job does not know 
the identity of his go’el himself, as Janzen posits—then the important question becomes 
what Job expects his go’el to do.  Indeed, it is primarily disagreement over the activity of 
the go’el which seems to be behind the lack of consensus over the go’el’s identity.  Those 
who view the go’el’s job as pleading to God on behalf of Job argue that the go’el cannot be 
                                                 
59 Along these same lines, Dirk Kinet writes, “Job does not want to give up the God he has believed in; yet he 
is reluctantly compelled to recognise the God he has experienced in suffering.  So he hopes, believes and 
demands that the God of his faith will vanquish and again supersede the violent and unjust God of his 
experience.  He claims the restoration of the picture of God he had believed in” (Kinet 1983, 33).  Walter 
Brueggemann, looking beyond the Book of Job, finds throughout the Old Testament situations in which the 
Israelites attempt, through their words, to “mobilize Yahweh to be Yahweh’s best, true self,” an indication 
that there are times in which Yahweh does not act as his “true self.”  Brueggemann continues, “The genre of 
complaint (lamentation) is an expression of candor about the reality of life experience that is incongruent 
with Yahweh; at the same time it is an expression of hopeful insistence that if and when the righteous 
Yahweh is mobilized, the situation will be promptly righted” (Brueggemann 1997, 321).  Job’s belief that 
God-as-God-ought-to-be will redeem him from God-as-God-ought-not-to-be can be seen to belong to this 
tradition. 
60 Crenshaw, too, contends that Job is unaware of the identity of his go’el.   As Crenshaw understands it, 
what Job describes in 19:25-27 is a vision he has had of a time when God is again on his side.  Job’s 
recounting of this vision is deliberately vague, as Job can hardly understand it himself.  Crenshaw writes, 
“As his strength ebbs, Job ponders the meaning of this vision.  Who is this kinsman?  What can it mean that 
someone calls the deity to task for cruelty?  When will all this vindication take place?  And will God actually 
stand alongside Job once more as friend, or will divine anger burn continually against him?  Such reflection 
taxes the mind beyond belief, so Job succumbs to the moment and awaits the end” (Crenshaw 1984, 74). 
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God.  How can God plead with himself?  Someone else must do that job.  However, those 
who think God is the go’el seem to envision the go’el’s work differently.  For these 
interpreters, the go’el is not a witness or an arbiter, but the one who sets Job’s situation 
right, an activity properly undertaken by God.  What, then, does Job expect his go’el to do?  
I have written above that the go’el’s job, as Job understands it, is to transform the world as 
it is into the world as it ought to be.  Is it possible, though, to be more specific about the 
work of the go’el, especially in light of the understanding of the roles played by go’elim 
elsewhere in the Bible? 
Crenshaw supposes that the Redeemer to whom Job refers corresponds to the first 
definition of the term given in the Concise Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon of the Old 
Testament.  Crenshaw writes, the go’el  is “an avenger of blood, who, according to Num 
35:19; Deut 19:6, would vindicate Job’s death by punishing the guilty….The issue here is 
revenge, for Job has abandoned any notion of justice”61 (Crenshaw 1989, 771).  I am not 
sure, though, that the issue is primarily revenge.  Granted, after affirming the existence of 
his Redeemer, Job goes on to warn the friends, “If you say, ‘How we will persecute him!’ 
and, ‘The root of the matter is found in him’; be afraid of the sword, for wrath brings the 
punishment of the sword’” (19:28-29a).  Yet, the one identified as responsible for Job’s 
situation is primarily God, and not the friends.  If vengeance is to be had, it ought to be had 
against God first and foremost and only against the friends secondarily inasmuch as they 
have followed God’s lead.  Some commentators’ rejection of the notion that God is the 
go’el is partially based on the idea that it makes no sense to think of God being called upon 
to take revenge against himself.  Job, though, does not make any mention of revenge being 
taken against God by the go’el, even though he does recognize that God is currently acting 
as his enemy.  If Job does not speak of any vengeance against God, it must be that he 
expects his go’el to play some other role. 
Common to both definitions of the  go’el, as given in the Concise Hebrew and 
Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Testament, is the idea that the go’el, however he fulfills his 
role, functions to show that the dead man is not alone and to ensure that, though dead, he is 
not forgotten.  By avenging a murdered man against his killers, the go’el makes the claim 
that the murder was not justified, and he does so by identifying himself with the dead man, 
                                                 
61 Crenshaw is not alone in holding this view.  Good, for example, agrees with this assessment, writing, “I 
take the basic metaphor to be the traditional function of the go’el haddam, the ‘avenger of blood’….When 
someone was killed by a member of another tribe or clan, the injured clan appointed one of its members to 
procure vengeance on behalf of the deceased.…The less violent sense of go’el in the Book of Ruth, as a 
kinsman who buys back the clan’s property, strikes me as less consistent with the context” (Good 1990, 102).  
Williams, too, avers, “The go’el is primarily a redeemer of blood, a near kinsman who achieves revenge on 
the one who has harmed or slain his relatives….Remember, in ch. 16 Job has spoken of his death  There he 
calls for a witness.  Now he expresses certainty…that he will have an avenger who will slay his murderer” 
(Williams 1971, 244). 
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identifying himself as someone who is on the dead man’s side.  He cannot be wiped from 
the face of the earth, because there is someone who will remember him and act on his 
behalf even though he is gone.62  This same function—of ensuring that the dead man is not 
erased and his memory obliterated—is fulfilled by the go’el who marries his dead 
relative’s wife so that she is able to bear children.  The children born to the go’el and the 
woman he has married do not belong to the go’el.  Rather, it is as if they are the children of 
the dead man.  The go’el ensures that the dead man is not forgotten by making it possible 
for his line to continue.   
 Coming as it does on the heels of Job’s lament that he has been abandoned by all 
who once loved him and in the context of the friend’s claims that the wicked, like Job, are 
utterly alone and, when they die, are forgotten to the extent that it is as if they never lived, 
Job’s affirmation that he knows he has a go’el  must be taken as an assertion that he is not 
alone and, though he may die of his affliction, he will not be forgotten.  Whatever the go’el 
does, he will do in the name of Job, ensuring that Job’s name is not forgotten and that Job 
is not, consequently, branded as one of the wicked who die and are no longer remembered.  
As part of his description of what his go’el will do, Job seems to envision the go’el as 
enabling him to be reconciled with the God who is now treating him as an enemy.   Job 
says that as a result of the go’el’s redeeming work “ I shall see God, whom I shall see on 
my side” (19:27a).  Instead of avenging Job’s suffering upon the God who remains his 
enemy, the go’el, by showing solidarity with Job, will be able to bring God around to Job’s 
side as well.  By standing up for Job and remembering him, the go’el makes it possible for 
God to remember Job.  By showing God that Job is not alone, the go’el proves to God that 
Job is not one of the wicked.   
It is here, incidentally, that the punishment of the friends becomes an issue.  It is 
not Job’s go’el whose primary function is to avenge Job against the friends who have 
deserted and mistreated him, rather it is God who, reconciled with Job through the 
solidarity of the go’el, will punish the friends for what they have done, even though they 
were only following his lead.  Verses 28-29, in which Job speaks to the friends about the 
coming judgment are not a declaration that the go’el will avenge Job against them, but are 
a warning to them not to cast their lot against him, even if God seems to have done so for 
the time being.  After the reconciling work of the go’el has taken place, God himself will 
punish the friends for siding against Job, who has now been proven righteous through the 
go’el. 
                                                 
62 For this reason, it seems unlikely that Clines is right that the go’el is merely Job’s testimony about his 
innocence.  If Job has only himself, if he is well and truly alone, then he has no go’el.  Such a realization 
would hardly merit the exultant tone Job takes in the passage, let alone Job’s claim that he knows his go’el 
lives. 
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 The work of the go’el, as Job imagines it, is to bring an end to the present chaos 
and return the world to its ordered state.  The way the go’el will achieve this goal is by 
showing solidarity with Job, and thereby proving that Job is not alone.  Why, though, 
should this activity bring about the reordering of the world?  Surely such a grandiose 
outcome can hardly be expected from the simple act of siding with Job.  To comprehend 
the connection between the go’el’s act and the outcome Job envisages, we must remember 
Job’s understanding  of the ordered world, as presented in the prose tale and chapter 29.  
The ordered world, as it existed before Job’s affliction, was a world in which Job was the 
central character.  The go’el, then, must not only stand up for Job or plead his cause, the 
way a lawyer might, but must treat him the way he was treated when the world was 
characterized by order and not chaos.  The go’el’s attention must be focused on Job and he  
must stand beside Job in such a way that he becomes an extension of Job, making Job 
bigger, more real,63 just as in the prologue Job was made great by his many possessions, 
servants, and children and as in chapter 29 he is made great by the town’s elders and 
nobles and its righteous poor.  The go’el’s job, then, is to act as if the world is ordered as it 
should be, to act as if it is centered around Job, and, in so doing, make that world a reality 
once again. 
In affirming the existence of his go’el, Job shows that he agrees with the friends’ 
assessment of aloneness as a mark of wickedness and, therefore, of chaos.  His own 
seeming aloneness he identifies as a false indicator.  Although he appears to be alone at the 
moment, he is not fundamentally alone, because he has a go’el who, by showing solidarity 
with him and acting on his behalf, will reconcile him with God.  After his death, Job will 
be numbered among the righteous and not forgotten like the wicked.  Yet, the fact that Job 
places his hope in a go’el who, by definition, usually acts on behalf of one who is dead, 
shows that he despairs of the world working as it ought to work while he is still alive, that 
is, anytime soon.  He and the friends may have similar ideas of what constitutes order and 
chaos, but they disagree about how the world as it currently is should be characterized.  
For Job it is a chaos in which he, a righteous man, has been left utterly alone, while for the 
friends, Job’s aloneness is a sign of his wickedness and of the ordered working of the 
world. 
 
God’s Speeches: Multiplicity as Order 
 
                                                 
63 This is the case even if the go’el is God.  As argued above, in the prologue God’s attention is entirely 
focused on Job, so much so that God cannot be said to act of his own accord but follows movements 
choreographed by Job. 
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 If there is one thing that can be said about God’s answer to Job from the whirlwind, 
it is that it presents a world characterized by multiplicity.  A quick scan of the speeches 
reveals that in them God speaks of a great number of things and beings: sea and land, 
darkness and light, hail, snow, rain, lions, ravens, mountain goats, wild oxen, ostriches, 
horses, eagles, the wicked, the proud, Behemoth, and Leviathan, among others.  What God 
thinks about this diverse multitude is perhaps less obvious, but hardly so.  Waves of 
positive assessment seem to rise off the page as God describes the many members of his 
creation.  God’s opening words, following his initial challenge, “Who is this that darkens 
counsel by words without knowledge?...I will question you, and you shall declare to me” 
(38:2, 3b), set a positive tone for his description of the multifarious world, despite the fact 
that they are couched in the more negative language of questioning.  God begins by asking 
Job, “Where were you when I laid the foundation of the earth?  Tell me, if you have 
understanding.  Who determined its measurements—surely you know!  Or who stretched 
the line upon it?  On what were its bases sunk, or who laid its cornerstone when the 
morning stars sang together and all the heavenly beings shouted for joy?” (38:4-7).  Four 
things are established in this passage.  First, the questioning format and God’s sarcastic 
tone—“surely you know!”—show that God is going to say something different from what 
Job has said so far.  This, in fact, is what has already been established in God’s opening 
challenge of 38:2.  In Hebrew, the “words without knowledge” which God accuses Job of 
having spoken are t(d-ylb Nylm.  The word Nylm is a plural of hlm, the same word 
used by Job in 29:22 to describe his utterance for which his community waits with bated 
breath.  What is implied, it seems, is not just that Job’s railings against God have been 
“words without knowledge,” but that the words he has spoken about the order of the world, 
which he has detailed in chapter 29, have also been without knowledge.  In addition, God’s 
sarcastic “surely you know!” ((dt yk) echoes his opening “you shall declare to me,” in 
which the verb is the Hiphil of (d’, which instructs Job not just to answer God but to 
make something known to him.  Job is being challenged to teach God something he 
doesn’t already know.  Whether this demand is meant to be heard as fully sarcastic or 
whether it does contain an element of God’s really wanting to know what Job has to say is 
somewhat open to debate.  Although I think it is possible to read the book as making the 
claim that Job does have things to say to God which God does not already know, here 
God’s challenges seem to be sarcastic: Job does not know the answers to the questions 
God will pose about the creation of the world and so cannot be called upon to be God’s 
teacher.  Or, at least, that is what God believes the situation to be. 
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Second, the subject of the passage indicates that what God has to say will be about 
the nature of the created world.  Together, the tone and the subject reveal that if Job has 
insisted that he knows what the world ought to be like, God has some surprises in store for 
him.  Third, in his description of his founding of the world, God claims that the world has 
been intentionally created to be as it is; the world which God will describe in his speeches 
is the world he intended to make, the ordered world.  Finally, as a related point, God 
characterizes this world as good, as is shown by the joy experienced by the heavenly 
beings at its creation.  Although some scholars view God’s speeches as non-sequiturs 
which fail to answer Job’s complaints,64 this opening passage, with its focus on the 
creation of the world, announces that the speeches are intended to answer Job’s claims 
about the world—the way it is, the way it ought to be, and the way it ought not to be.   
Peggy Day points out that God’s speeches make sense “if we understand the 
interaction between Yahweh and the satan to involve a challenge of world order” (Day 
1985, 82).  That is, if the book is not primarily about innocent suffering, but is instead 
about the order of the world, then God’s speeches, the burden of which is to show Job how 
the world is ordered, are highly pertinent to the question at hand.  A related view is offered 
by Janzen, who writes, “Given the prominence of creation throughout Job’s argument with 
his friends, it is no surprise that Yahweh’s address to Job comes as a portrayal of the 
origins and character of the cosmos” (Janzen 1994, 467).  That God follows this initial 
claim—that the world as it is created is good and a source of joy for the heavenly beings—
with a description of the world as inhabited by a profusion of beasts, can only mean that he 
views this multiplicity as essential to the world’s order.  It is not necessary to go through 
the speeches and discuss in detail God’s depiction of each animal he names.  It is enough 
to say that there are a lot of them, and that God’s joy as he speaks of them is evident.  A 
more useful way to engage with the whirlwind speeches on this topic is to ask how they 
can be seen to address the claims made by Job and his friends about the way the world 
ought to be.  As has been discussed, for Job and his friends, to inhabit order is to live in a 
simple world where, nevertheless, one is not alone.  To inhabit chaos is to live in a 
complex world, where, nevertheless, one is alone.   
                                                 
64 Daniel O’Connor writes, “When eventually the Lord addresses Job out of the whirlwind there is no court 
case, and no witness to testify to Job’s integrity.  Moreover there is total silence on God’s part on all the 
positions taken up by the three friends, and by the story of the Prologue” (O’Connor 1985, 84).  O’Connor 
goes on to list 8 issues brought up in the prologue and dialogues which God does not address.  Luis Alonso-
Schökel, however, cautions against viewing the Yahweh speeches as failing to address the issues at stake in 
the book.  He writes, “The fact is that the commentator’s judgment depends on his expectation of what will 
happen when God intervenes….We cannot read these speeches without bringing to them some kind of 
expectation; but we must not judge them without taking account of the expectation factor, which conditions 
us as we read and as we form our judgment” (Alonso-Schökel 1983, 45).  He goes on to list 5 ways in which 
God’s words do address Job’s questions and the claims of the friends. 
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How, then, do God’s speeches deal with the beliefs about order and chaos held by 
Job and his friends?  They deal with them by presenting an ordered world that is utterly 
different from that envisaged by Job and his friends.  Edwin Good remarks that, far from 
being unrelated to the  questions asked in the dialogue, Yahweh’s speeches respond 
directly to those issues but reject the claims on which they are based (Good 1990, 56).  It is 
this rejection which is often mistaken for a failure to engage with the concerns that have 
been central to Job’s discussion with his friends.  Where Job has seen order as simple, 
organized around a single central point, God’s ordered world is diffuse.  There is no 
central point on which the animals fix their gaze and to which they cede their status as real 
characters, even though it might be tempting to claim that, in the world described by God, 
God himself is the only real character, the one upon whom all eyes are focused.  If this 
were the case, God’s depiction of the ordered world would be no different from Job’s.  The 
central character would be different—God instead of Job—but the overall configuration 
would be the same.65  
Henry Rowold has suggested that the implied answer to all of the questions asked 
by God from the whirlwind “ is not merely, ‘No, I can/did not,’ but rather, ‘No I can/did 
not, but you (Yahweh) can/did’” (Rowold 1985, 201), a view shared by Habel (Habel 
1985, 529), and by Whybray, who writes, “the answer to the questions ‘Can you…?’…and 
‘Who can…?’…can only be ‘Only Yahweh can!’” (Whybray 1998, 169).  Coming to the 
same conclusion, Michael V. Fox explains the way in which God’s questions can be 
understood as rhetorical.  He writes, 
One asks a question so obvious that the answer is inevitable…because it asks 
something which both the questioner and his auditor know, and which the 
questioner knows that his auditor knows, and which the auditor knows that the 
questioner knows he knows.  The existence of this circle of knowing that one 
knows etc. is shown by the fact that the auditor realizes that he is not expected 
to answer the question....God asks almost exclusively rhetorical questions in 
this unit.  Most of the questions ask “who?”, the inevitable but unspoken 
answer being “you, God.”  (Fox 1981, 58) 
If these scholars were right, it might be correct to say that, despite the apparent multiplicity 
of the world God depicts, it is actually a simple world, given that God’s own focus is not 
on the diverse multitude of creatures it contains, but on his own creative activity.  God’s 
speeches, then, would not be intended to direct Job’s gaze out in a variety of directions to 
take in the great multiplicity of the world, but to direct his gaze to God as the power 
responsible for everything Job sees, the only real character in a world whose existence 
emanates from his own and which, without him, would cease to be.   
                                                 
65 Much as, in chapter 3, Job is able to conceive of Sheol as an ordered realm because of Death’s singular 
status as its central reality. 
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The Attention of the Animals 
 
Yet, although it is true that God presents himself as the creator of the world, he 
does not present a world in which all eyes are on him and him alone.  Although some of 
the animals acknowledge him as the one but for whose sustaining care they would be 
unable to survive, most direct their attention elsewhere.  God begins his animal discourse 
by asking Job, “Can you hunt the prey for the lion, or satisfy the appetite of the young 
lions, when they crouch in their dens, or lie in wait in their covert?  Who provides for the 
raven its prey, when its young ones cry to God, and wander about for lack of food?” 
(38:39-41).  Here, the young ravens look to God to provide food for them, just as, it might 
be said, the righteous poor in chapter 29 look to Job to provide sustenance for them and to 
act as their defender.  Yet, if the ravens’ attention is focused on God, the lions, for whose 
feeding God depicts himself as equally responsible, do not seem to have God in their gaze, 
or, indeed, on their mind.  It may be God who provides for them, but the lions have their 
eye on their prey as they crouch in their covert and wait for it to draw near.  In fact, with 
the exception of the ravens, none of the animals named by God are looking at him.  The 
wild ass has its eyes on the ground as “it ranges the mountains as its pasture, and it 
searches after every green thing” (39:8).  The ostrich, which ought, perhaps, to be looking 
at its eggs or its offspring if it isn’t going to look at God, is instead watching the horse and 
its rider (39:18b).  As for the horse, it is completely focused on the battle (39:21).  It is not 
only the horse’s eyes that are fixed on the fight, but its ears and nose as well: “it cannot 
stand still at the sound of the trumpet.  When the trumpet sounds, it says, ‘Aha!’  From a 
distance it smells the battle” (39:24b-25a).  The eagle watches the battlefield and spies its 
prey, the dead who have fallen there (39:29-30).  Leviathan, the final beast in God’s litany 
“surveys everything that is lofty” (41:34), which might be taken as an indication that 
Leviathan is looking at God, given that God can certainly be considered as “lofty.”  
However, if Leviathan does include God in its gaze when it “surveys everything that is 
lofty” (41:34a), it cannot be said that this gaze designates God as the central real character, 
to whom Leviathan surrenders its own reality.  The verb translated “survey” in the NRSV 
is plain old h)r, which does not tell us much about the quality or direction of Leviathan’s 
gaze.  The word “survey”, however, connotes a looking down.  The translators’ choice of 
this word instead of “looks at” draws support from the second half of the verse: “it is king 
over all that are proud” (41:34b).  One who is king over the proud naturally looks down 
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upon the lofty.  If anyone is confirmed as a real character by Leviathan’s gaze, it is 
Leviathan and not God.  Everything Leviathan surveys is below it and belongs to it.   
This, though, does not mean that Leviathan occupies the position formerly 
occupied by Job (in chapter 29) and potentially occupied by God (in Rowold’s and others’ 
suggestion of the intended answer to God’s questions).  That is, God does not show Job an 
ordered world which is simple, but in which it is now Leviathan, rather than Job or God, 
who holds the central position.  God directs Job’s attention to Leviathan, but not to 
Leviathan alone.  Neither do the other animals focus on Leviathan; Leviathan may survey 
them, but their gaze is elsewhere.  Instead of focusing Job’s attention on one central 
character, God’s questions direct Job’s attention out to the multiplicity of animals which 
inhabit the complex, diversely populated world. 
 
The Aloneness of the Animals 
 
 If God’s version of the ordered world is not consonant with order as envisioned by 
Job, what can be said of God’s take on the picture Job and his friends present of chaos?  Is 
what Job and his friends call chaos the same thing as what God calls order?  To a degree, 
the answer is yes.  God’s ordered world does bear similarities to chaos as defined by Job 
and the friends, but the two are not identical.  Job and his friends have supposed that, in a 
situation in which there is no central character around whom all others are organized, the 
inhabitants of the world must be fundamentally alone.  The loneliness of the wicked and of 
Job as one of the wicked is a central feature of the friends’ discourse.  If the creatures 
inhabiting the world God has created are not organized around a central figure, are they 
alone as Job and his friends suppose the wicked to be alone?  The question is difficult to 
answer.  God does not dwell on the loneliness—or lack thereof—of the animals he 
describes.  On the one hand, God’s description of the young deer which leave their parents 
once they are strong enough to fend for themselves “and do not return to them” (39:4b) 
and of the ostrich which abandons its eggs and the young born from them, caring little 
whether they survive or not (39:14-16), is not unlike the friends’ description of the wicked 
who are unable to provide for their children and whose offspring do not remember them.  
Bildad, for example, has said of the wicked, “They have no offspring or descendant among 
their people, and no survivor where they used to live” (18:19), and Zophar has said that the 
children of the wicked are forced to “seek the favor of the poor” (20:10a), because their 
parents are unable to care for them as they should.  Are the deer-parents alone like the 
wicked whose children forget them, and are the ostrich-children alone like the children of 
the wicked who are not cared for by their parents?  The answer might be yes, except that 
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God does not assign any stigma to the kind of behavior practiced by the young deer and 
the mother ostrich, nor does abandonment by children or parents seem to negatively affect 
the ones abandoned.  Rather, the abandonment of parents and children is presented as a 
natural occurrence and not as a sign of any kind of particularly chaotic behavior on the part 
of those doing the leaving or those left.  Granted, God does describe the ostrich, in its lack 
of care for its eggs and offspring, as a fool, and the friends have equated fools with the 
wicked. (“I have seen fools taking root, but suddenly I cursed their dwelling,” Eliphaz has 
boasted in his first speech [5:3].)  The foolish ostrich, however, is not censured for its 
foolishness; rather, its foolishness is part of its God-given nature, a characteristic which 
makes it a unique creature and thereby contributes to the multiplicity of the creation.  
Although deer and ostriches are left by children and parents respectively, this does not 
seem to render them alone in the sense that the friends mean. 
 In general, the animals in God’s speeches are not described as interacting with 
other members of their species or with members of other species.  Some animals feed their 
young—like the eagle, which searches out the battlefield, so that its young ones may suck 
up the blood that has been spilled there (39:30)—but others are not depicted as doing so.  
The wild ass and wild ox are specifically described as spurning the company of humans.  
The wild ass eschews the “tumult of the city” (39:7), preferring to range the mountains 
alone.  The wild ox will not stay on the farm or give his attention to the farmer, thereby 
becoming part of the unity of the farm (39:9-12).  Whether or not these animals are alone 
does not seem to be part of God’s consideration in his designation of them as valued 
members of the creation.  A complex world, filled with a multiplicity of beings does not 
seem to automatically give rise to the kind of aloneness that Job and the friends envisaged 
as the lot of the wicked, whose multiplicity was contrasted with the singularity of the 
ordered world.  Multiplicity does not breed aloneness, or, if it does, such aloneness is not 
problematic.  In fact, when God describes the wild ass which “ranges the mountains as its 
pasture” (39:8), the word translated “pasture” is h(r, a word which also means “intimate 
friend.”  Job has used it with this meaning in 6:14 to lament his friends’ treatment of him: 
“Those who withhold kindness from a friend (wh(rm) forsake the fear of the Almighty.”  
It seems possible, then, that God is describing the mountains not only as the pasture of the 
wild ass, but as its friend.  Nature provides companionship even for those who seem 
companionless, a companionship which Job has failed to perceive as a possibility.  In any 
case, when he reveals his care for the animals he names, God shows that he does not leave 
them alone, but is present with them in their wild and (potentially) lonely habitations.  This 
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is surely an indication that these animals are not alone, for the aloneness of the wicked, as 
presumed by Job and the friends, was primarily evidence of their abandonment by God. 
 
The Question of Power in God’s Speeches 
 
 Having seen how God’s speeches answer (and reject) Job’s and his friends’ 
assumptions about the singularity of order and the multiplicity of chaos, let us return to the 
claim made by Rowold and others that all of God’s questions to Job should be answered, 
“You alone did” or “You alone know.”  Some of God’s questions surely imply the answer 
that these scholars suggest.  For example, God does not ask, “Where is the way to the 
dwelling of the light?” because he wants Job to give him directions.  God already knows 
the way to the place where light dwells and thinks it most likely that Job does not.  
Likewise, when God asks Job to tell him who it was determined the measurements of the 
earth, the implied answer is certainly, “you alone did.”  Habel argues that God’s questions 
and their implied answer are “intended to focus on God as the only possible power who 
could perform the action described in the question” (Habel 1985, 529).  Indeed, a great 
number of scholars seem to interpret God’s words from the whirlwind as serving primarily 
to demonstrate his power over against Job’s comparative weakness, even if they disagree 
over whether this demonstration of power is good or bad.   
Among those who view God’s display of power positively is Walter Brueggemann, 
who writes, “While scholars explore what appears to be the subtlety of these responses of 
Yahweh, it is evident that the ground of Yahweh’s response is in power” (Brueggemann 
1997, 390).  About the issues at stake in the Book of Job, Roland Murphy asks, “Is the 
whole question at bottom an issue of power…and not of justice?” and answers, “God…is 
redefining the problem…shifting the focus from justice to the broader notion of 
sovereignty over the universe” (Murphy 1999, 96).  Pope concurs, writing, “God assails 
[Job] with questions he cannot answer….The purpose is to bring home to Job his 
ignorance and his folly in impugning Gods wisdom and justice….Since man has not God’s 
power, he has no right to question God's justice” (Pope 1965, 250, 267).  Those who judge 
God’s display of power negatively include Jack Miles, John Briggs Curtis and Carl Jung.  
Miles declares,  “Few speeches in all of literature can more properly be called 
overpowering than the Lord’s speeches to Job from the whirlwind….But therein lies all 
their difficulty.  The Lord refers to absolutely nothing about himself except his power” 
(Miles 1995, 314).  As Miles sees it, it is because God has subjected Job to unjust torture 
and, therefore, “has something to hide,” that he puts on such a show of power; the 
fireworks are intended to obscure God’s culpability (Ibid., 316).  In the same way, Curtis 
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observes “The tenor of the entirety of the Yahweh speeches is that of the overwhelming 
power and majesty of God as compared with the frailty and ignorance of Job” (Curtis 
1979, 497), and concludes, “A god so remote, so unfeeling, so unjust is worse than no 
god,” a conclusion that he believes is shared by Job, as shown by his final response to 
God’s words (Ibid., 510).  Finally, Jung condemns the god who “comes riding along on the 
tempest of his almightiness and thunders reproaches at the half-crushed human worm” 
(Jung, 1954 16-17). 
 Yet, I wonder whether these scholars are right that the issue of who holds the 
power is really what is at stake in God’s speeches.  Although some of God’s questions may 
be intended to highlight Job’s ignorance and powerlessness in relation to his own 
knowledge and power, it cannot be assumed that everything about which God asks Job he 
already knows and has already done.  Although it might be possible for God to do all the 
things he challenges Job to do, this does not mean that he actually chooses to do them, or 
that he views them as things that must be done in order to  maintain order.  If the issue is 
who holds the power and the implied answer is “God,” I wonder whether that power is of a 
different sort and serves a different purpose than some of the above scholars suppose.  For 
example, is it power that permits God to know where the mountain goats give birth (39:1)?  
Is it  power that has allowed God to “let the wild ass go free” (39:5)?  These do not seem 
like questions calculated to convince the hearer of the speaker’s power.  It may be a 
demonstration of omniscience to show that one knows where the deer calve, but its not a 
terribly compelling one.  A more likely response from Job, instead of a cowering “O 
omniscient God, you alone know,” might be an incredulous “Who cares?”  What does it 
matter to Job where the mountain goats and the deer give birth?  And what about letting 
the wild ass go free?  What kind of power does that show?  God has done no better than 
human beings with respect to the wild ass.  He has not managed to tame it; it is not pulling 
his cart, any more than it is pulling Job’s.66  So God let the wild ass go free?  Everyone has 
to, because the wild ass cannot be domesticated.  And if God’s point is that he is 
responsible for the un-domesticability of the wild ass and ox (which does, in fact, seem to 
be what his questions are intended to convey), then his power is of quite a different sort.   
Power is generally understood as power over something and not as letting 
something go free, which is, properly speaking, a relinquishing of power.  These questions 
do not seem to demonstrate God’s omniscience or omnipotence as much as they 
                                                 
66 Some interpreters assume that what these animals will not do for Job they will do for Yahweh.  Milton 
Horne, for example, writes, “The deity asks Job about whether the wild ox ‘consents,’…to serve Job.  The 
implication of this question is that the wild ox does indeed consent to serve Yahweh, but also, that he is free 
not to do so” (Horne 2005, 139).  Yet, it is not at all clear that the wild ox, if it is as free to choose to serve 
Yahweh as it is free to choose to serve Job, does choose servitude.  It is the freedom of the animals which is 
emphasized and not their servitude, whether freely chosen or not. 
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demonstrate his care for what is insignificant from human perspectives.  God indicates that 
he knows where the deer calve not to prove his omniscience but to show that this kind of 
knowledge matters to him.  He cares about the deer and the mountain goats.  Perhaps the 
more likely implied answer, then, is not “you alone know,” but “you know and you care” 
or “you know because you care enough to know.”  The implication, if this is the case, is 
not that it is impossible for Job to know because Job lacks God’s power, but that if Job 
thought it was worthwhile to know such a detail, he too could know it.67  It is knowledge, 
though, that is of no material benefit to him, so if he is to care enough to know, it must be 
for another reason, namely that he cares about the deer and the mountain goats, that he 
recognizes their importance in and of themselves, that he sees them as real characters with 
real, independent value, and that he accepts that the ordered world is characterized by 
multiplicity instead of singularity. 
 
Leviathan and God’s Power 
 
 Just as the questions about the animals in chapters 39 and 40 do not have the 
demonstration of God’s power as their primary goal, neither, I would argue, do the 
questions about Leviathan in chapter 41.  About Leviathan, God says, “Any hope of 
capturing it will be disappointed; were not even the gods overwhelmed at the  sight of it?  
No one is so fierce as to dare to stir it up.  Who can stand before it?  Who can confront it 
and be safe?—under the whole heaven, who?”  (41:9-11).68  If the interpretation held by 
Rowold and others is correct, then the questions asked here must be understood as 
implying that, although Job cannot stand before Leviathan, God can and has done so; 
although Job cannot hope to capture Leviathan, that is precisely what God has done.  God 
asks Job who there is “under the whole heaven” who is capable of confronting Leviathan 
with impunity, and answers, if Rowold is right, “God alone.”  If Leviathan is viewed as a 
chaos monster, then the implication is that only God has the strength to bind chaos and 
keep it at bay, a feat which Job cannot perform and which, therefore, disqualifies Job from 
                                                 
67 Dale Patrick points out that today, “We can, at one level, answer those questions thundered at Job.”  This, 
though, does not exhaust the import of God’s whirlwind speeches.  Patrick continues, “The voice from the 
whirlwind censures us and invites us to take our place is a community of beings empowered by a creator who 
delights in the flourishing of life.”  In Patrick’s view, as in mine, it is not Job’s inability to answer the 
questions that is at stake.  Although contemporary humans can answer many of the questions put to Job, this 
does not mean that we are any closer to accepting that God’s vision of the world as it ought to be is a world 
rightfully inhabited by a diverse multiplicity of creatures, instead of presided over by a single species, 
namely, our own. 
68 This translation is based on the emendation of the Hebrew )wh-yl, “to me” or “mine” to )wh-ym, “who is 
he?” an emendation supported by Pope.  Gordis, Dhorme, and Habel read )wh )l, “no one,” which has a 
similar force.  In general, these lines (9-11; Hebrew 1-3) are difficult and scholars offer a variety of 
translations. 
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calling God to account for what he perceives as a breakdown in the order of the world.  
John Day endorses this view, writing, “It is clearly implied that Job, and, by implication, 
humans generally, are unable to overcome these creatures and that only Yahweh has 
control over them” (Day 2002, 103).  Cyrus Gordon, too, contends that the questions put to 
Job about his ability to control Leviathan are meant to imply “that God had put a hook 
through Leviathan’s nose or lip, and tied his tongue, rendering him harmless,” a feat of 
which Job would not be capable (Gordon 1966, 3).  Similarly, Hartley maintains that in the 
Leviathan and Behemoth pericopes, “Yahweh challenges Job to demonstrate his prowess 
by defeating in mortal combat the ominous creatures Behemoth and Leviathan.  If he 
cannot master these symbols of cosmic powers, he will have to abandon his complaint.  
Furthermore, Yahweh is arguing that he masters every force in the world” (Hartley 1988, 
518).69  Tryggve Mettinger points out that  
Behemoth and Leviathan are not Hebrew’s appellatives for the hippopotamus 
and the crocodile; and what is more they occur without the definite article, as 
proper names....Thus, the names themselves, especially Leviathan, have 
unmistakable mythical overtones.  One gets the idea that these animals stand as 
symbols of the dark, chaotic side of existence.  (Mettinger 1997, 12)   
Even if Leviathan is not understood to be a mythological chaos monster on the order of 
Tiamat, this interpretation still views Leviathan as something that must be bound if God’s 
ordered creation is to be upheld.  Whatever Leviathan is—whether uncreated chaos 
monster or chaotic creature—it needs to be controlled if the world is to be as it ought to be, 
and God is the only one with the power to control the beast.   
Against this interpretation, though, it must be noticed that the first nine verses of 
the Leviathan chapter have certain things in common with the verses about the wild ox in 
chapter 39.  There, God asks: “Is the wild ox willing to serve you?  Will it spend the night 
at your crib?  Can you tie it in the furrow with ropes, or will it harrow the valleys after 
you?  Will you depend on it because its strength is great, and will you hand over your labor 
to it?  Do you have faith in it that it will return, and bring your grain to your threshing 
floor?” (39:9-12).  Is the answer, “The wild ox will not serve you, Job, but the wild ox will 
serve me, God.  Your lack of control over the wild ox is indicative of your weakness 
relative to my power”?  I do not think it is.  The passage does not seem to be making the 
case that God has managed to domesticate the wild ox for his own purposes, while Job has 
failed in the same endeavor.  Rather, God seems to be saying that the wild ox has no 
                                                 
69 The list of scholars who interpret the Leviathan and Behemoth passages in this way is long.  As the 
position has already been explicated by the scholars quoted above, however, I will not quote from the rest.  
Additional scholars who are of this persuasion include Tur-Sinai, Murphy, Habel, Whybray, Cox, and Ash.  
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obligation to serve anyone—neither Job nor God—and this is how it has been created.  
Compare this passage with the beginning of the Leviathan chapter: 
Can you draw out Leviathan with a fishhook, or press down its tongue with a 
cord?  Can you put a rope in its nose, or pierce its jaw with a hook?  Will it 
make many supplications to you?  Will it speak soft words to you?  Will it 
make a covenant with you or be taken as your servant forever?  Will you play 
with it as with a bird, or will you put it on a leash for your girls?  Will traders 
bargain over it?  Will they divide it up among the merchants?  Can you fill its 
skin with harpoons, or its head with fishing spears?  Lay hands on it; think of 
the battle; you will not do it again!  Any hope of capturing it will be 
disappointed.  (41:1-9a) 
The two passages are not dissimilar.  In both, God asks Job questions about his ability to 
control wild beasts so that he can depend upon them for his livelihood.  God claims that, 
just as the wild ox cannot be tied in the furrow with ropes to pull the plow, so Leviathan 
cannot be led about on a rope or a leash.  The wild ox will not feed at any person’s 
manger—he will not exchange his services for the goods that belong to human beings—so 
Leviathan will not make a covenant with any person, will not enter into a give-and-take 
arrangement and be bound to human control.  The wild ox will not bring the farmer’s grain 
to the threshing floor and thus contribute to the farmer’s livelihood, nor can Leviathan be 
captured and killed, turned into meat that can be sold in the market.  The farmer and the 
fisherman cannot use these animals for their own benefit.  
But if Job cannot use Leviathan for his own purposes, can God?  If Leviathan will 
not make a covenant with Job, is the implication of God’s questions that Leviathan will 
make a covenant with God?  Or that although Job cannot harpoon Leviathan and put his 
flesh on sale in the market, God can?  Although a number of scholars have seen this 
passage as demonstrating God’s power over Leviathan, when we compare the Leviathan 
passage with the passage about the wild ox, such an assumption seems mistaken.  The 
similarities between the passages seem to argue for a similar interpretation of both.  The 
point is not that God can conquer Leviathan, but that Leviathan has been created as an 
unconquerable beast, allowed to live its own life apart from humanity and also apart from 
God.  Whatever the intended answers to God’s questions, their purpose is not to focus 
attention on God’s power and to contrast it with Job’s weakness.  Rather, their purpose is 
to focus Job’s attention on the diverse multiplicity of real characters that inhabit God’s 
ordered creation.  Where God’s power is revealed is in his creation of this complex world, 
but, in creating real creatures God relinquishes power rather than hoarding it for himself.  
Some of that relinquished power falls to Job, but—and this is central to the point God is 
making—not all of it. 
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The Place of Human Beings in God’s World 
 
 Although God’s speeches contain a multiplicity of animals, they are noticeably 
short on humans, who appear only in oblique references.  When God speaks of rain, asking 
“who can tilt the waterskins of the heavens, when the dust runs into a mass and the clods 
cling together?” (38:37b-38), it is possible that the human form appears in that massed 
earth, echoing the Genesis 2 creation story.70  In the next chapter humans are laughed at by 
ostriches and carried into battle by horses (38:18-25), but in both cases the focus is on the 
animals, not the humans.  The prey, spied on the battlefield by the eagle, is certainly partly 
human, or at least was before it met its bloody end (39:26-30).  Finally, the speeches are 
addressed to a human being.  That it is Job to whom God speaks about this world in which 
humans appear to be on the sidelines surely boosts the importance of humans which the 
content of the speeches denies.  
Some interpreters make much of this last detail.  Balentine is convinced that God’s 
speeches are intended to function “as a radical summons to a new understanding of what it 
means for humankind to be created in the image of God” (Balentine 1998, 260).  In his 
speeches, God models for Job what it means “to participate in the governance of the world 
with power and glory that is only slightly less than God’s” (Ibid., 269).  Similarly, Janzen 
writes, “To be a human being is to be a creature who is yet God’s addressee and whom 
God confronts with the rest of creation vocationally” (Janzen 1985, 229).  In the readings 
proposed by Balentine and Janzen, God’s treatment of the animals serves as a model for 
how Job ought to behave.  If God does not include human beings in his picture of the 
world, it is because God himself stands in for human beings.  In this way, far from being 
absent from the speeches, humans are well represented.  This interpretation is attractive.  
There is much to be said for a reinterpretation of what it means to have power and for a 
reevaluation of how human power should be exercised.  Yet, I do not know that this is the 
correct way to read God’s speeches.  This interpretation allows humans to be taken out of 
the center, but immediately puts them back in, insisting that they have been transformed.  
The transition is too quick.   
It seems to me that when God takes humans out of the center, he really takes them 
out.  The message is not, “Human beings have power, but have been misusing it, and now 
I, God, am providing a new model of what power looks like.”  Rather, the message seems 
to be, “Human beings have no real power.  The power they affect is illusory.  And if, by 
                                                 
70 “The LORD God had not caused it to rain upon the earth…but a stream would rise from the earth, and 
water the whole face of the ground—then the LORD God formed man from the dust of the ground, and 
breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and the man became a living being” (Genesis 2: 5b, 6-7).  This 
link was suggested by Professor Diane Jacobson in an unpublished lecture at Luther Seminary in 2003.  
 87
chance, they happen to come into power, it is because they have stolen it, not because it 
has been given them by God.”  This, of course, is an unbearable statement, so it is no 
wonder Balentine and Janzen offer their interpretations.  Although the fact that God 
addresses Job serves to keep Job “in the picture” of creation, a picture which, otherwise, 
would hardly seem to include him, it does not give Job the status of the central character 
that he has previously claimed for himself.  Humans are part of the creation, too, and 
contribute to its multiplicity, but they are deliberately slighted in God’s speeches due to 
their tendency to claim so much importance for themselves that their presence makes the 
world simpler instead of more complex.   
There is one additional reference to humans in God’s speeches.  In 38:13-15 and 
40:10-14 God speaks of a particular human group, the wicked.  Does God present the 
wicked as contributors to the multiplicity that makes up the ordered world, and, therefore, 
of value?  God does not seem to rate the wicked as positively as he rates the animals he 
describes, yet neither does he call for their eradication.  If Job and his friends have 
supposed that the ordered world is a world in which the wicked must be punished and from 
which they must be ultimately purged, God’s version of order seems to allow the wicked to 
remain, a part of order, albeit one that is constrained.  God asks, “Have you commanded 
the morning since your days began…so that it might take hold of the skirts of the earth, 
and the wicked be shaken out of it?....Light is withheld from the wicked, and their uplifted 
arm is broken.” (38:12a, 13, 15) 
Later, he challenges, 
Deck yourself with majesty and dignity; clothe yourself with glory and 
splendor.  Pour out the overflowings of your anger, and look on all who are 
proud, and abase them.  Look on all who are proud, and bring them low; tread 
down the wicked where they stand.  Hide them all in the dust together; bind 
their faces in the world below.  Then I will also acknowledge to you that your 
own right hand can give you victory.  (40:10-14) 
It is tempting to assume that what God challenges Job to do is what he himself does.  If Job 
is strong enough to bind the wicked in the world below, God will acknowledge that Job 
has the right to be God and will surrender his position to Job.  Those who read these 
speeches as a battle between God and Job see in these verses the pronouncement that only 
if Job can crush the wicked as God does will Job be deemed worthy to question the 
validity of God’s actions.   
It is, however, not entirely clear that what God challenges Job to do here is 
something he does himself.  In addition to the fact that throughout his own speeches Job 
has repeatedly accused God of allowing the proud and the wicked to flourish, God’s own 
words cast doubt on this claim.  God’s description of the wicked in chapter 38 presents a 
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different picture of God’s dealings with them. Those verses seem to show that the projects 
of the wicked are limited by natural processes that God has set in place, and not by God’s 
direct intervention. Most scholars seem to agree with this interpretation. 71  Hartley, for 
example, writes of this passage, “Yahweh counters Job’s complaint with the position that 
his own command of the light confines the work of the wicked.  He has contained the 
wicked within limits just as he has stayed the encroachment of the sea against the land” 
(Hartley 1988, 497). 
In addition, God speaks only of placing a limit on the activities of the wicked—
breaking their “uplifted arm”—and not of eradicating them altogether, which is what he 
suggests that Job try to do.  These verses call the interpretation of 40:10-14 as a summons 
to Job to try to do what God does into question.  God’s subsequent description of 
Leviathan as “king over all that are proud” (41:34b) further problematizes this 
interpretation.72  God’s chapter-long description of Leviathan is not a rant against an 
enemy which must be defeated, but a paean to the mighty beast by a creator rejoicing in his 
handiwork.73  If God himself routinely abases the proud, he ought to abase Leviathan first 
of all, but this is not what he describes himself doing.  Those who interpret God’s 
questions in chapter 41, “Can you draw out Leviathan with a fish-hook, or press down its 
tongue with a cord?” (41:1) etc., as evidence that God himself has bound Leviathan and is 
challenging Job to the same test of strength, are surely wrong, as discussed above.  
But if God does not abase the proud and tread down the wicked, why does he 
instruct Job to try to do so?  What God challenges Job to do is to remake the world as Job 
thinks it ought to be.  Job has insisted that, in the ordered world, the wicked are punished 
                                                 
71 Matitiahu Tsevat disagrees with this common interpretation, but takes his disagreement in a different 
direction than one might expect.  For Tsevat, it is not that God directly punishes the wicked instead of relying 
on the world’s natural processes to constrain their evildoing, but that the wicked are not constrained or 
punished at all.  Even though daybreak might provide an occasion for limiting the actions of the wicked, that 
occasion is never seized by God and Job has no power to make use of it himself (Tsevat 1980, 30, 33).   
72 The word translated “proud” in 40:11b-12 is h)g, whereas in 41:34, “proud” translates Ct#$-ynb.  That 
different words are used may, admittedly, indicate that the proud whom God challenges Job to abase are not 
the same proud over whom Leviathan is king.  Yet, at the same time, it is possible that pride is pride and that 
the two groups are the same—or at least have the same prideful attribute—even though different terms are 
used. 
73 Those scholars who insist that Leviathan is God’s enemy are relying too fully on preconceived 
understandings of what Leviathan is and not on God’s words themselves.  Perdue attempts to explain God’s 
praise of Leviathan (and Behemoth) as like the song of  “a heroic warrior of romantic epic, in the prelude to 
deadly battle” which “praises the enchanting beauty and fearsome power of these two mythical beasts who 
must again be subdued to ensure the ongoing of the good creation” (Perdue 1991, 262).  That is, as Perdue 
sees it, God’s praise of Leviathan is a way of praising himself as the conqueror of this mighty foe.  Although 
this interpretation provides a way of making sense of God’s praise of Leviathan while still viewing Leviathan 
as God’s enemy, I do not find it convincing.  It depends too much on the idea that Leviathan must be the evil 
chaos monster, even though God does not actually speak of Leviathan in this way.  Perdue has, in effect, 
asked, “How can we understand God’s praise of Leviathan, given that Leviathan is evil?” and has come up 
with an explanation.  There is nothing in the passage itself, however, that supports the claim that Leviathan is 
evil in the first place.  Perdue’s (hypothetical) question could just as easily be answered, “God praises 
Leviathan because God loves Leviathan,” an answer that is supported by the text. 
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and the proud brought low.  Time and again, Job has castigated God for failing to uphold 
this order.  What God dares Job to do is not to beat him at his own game—to do what God 
already does—but to exhibit enough power to change the rules.  Some scholars see God’s 
challenge to Job as an admission of his own failure to make the world as it ought to be, a 
world from which evil is excised.  Athalya Brenner writes, “God is in fact conceding that 
he cannot dispose of the wicked and of evil….God…rules the world…but has little or no 
control over evil” (Brenner 1981, 133).  Gordis concurs, writing, “Were Job able to destroy 
evil in the world, even God would be prepared to relinquish His throne to him—a moving 
acknowledgment by God Himself that the world order is not perfect! (40:6-14)” (Gordis 
1965,12).  These scholars, though, do not see God as challenging Job to “change the 
rules,” but, rather, to make the world how both he and God agree it ought to be but which 
God, for some reason, has failed to create, an interpretation with which I do not agree. 
If Job is able to structure the world as he sees fit, that world will come into 
existence.  If not, it will not, for the world God has created is not a world in which the 
wicked are routinely snuffed out by God’s direct intervention.  It is here that the issue of 
power is brought to bear on God’s speeches.  God is not saying, “I alone have the power to 
crush the wicked and defeat Leviathan,” and, by demonstrating Job’s inability to do these 
things, denying Job’s right to question him.  Rather, what God is saying is that he has the 
power to have created the world as a world in which a great multiplicity of creatures, 
including Leviathan and the wicked, live.  Dale Patrick describes this world: “There is 
ordering, but no suppression of counter-power….The order includes violence and 
catastrophe, but these are not a struggle…of all with each; the aim is the flourishing of 
each species within a niche in the community of life” (Patrick 2001, 113).  If Job has 
enough power, Job can create a different world, one from which Leviathan and the wicked 
are banned, a simple world organized around Job as its only real character.  But Job does 
not have that kind of power, at least God doesn’t think he does.74  The ordered world 
described by God in his speeches is a world characterized by complexity and inhabited by 
a diverse multitude of real characters.  God may work to contain these characters, but he 
does so in the service of complexity.  His power is not a power which conquers, but a 
power which sets free. 
 
                                                 
74 The prose epilogue may cast some doubt on this assumption, as will be discussed later.   
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CHAPTER 3 
ORDER AND CHAOS AS SINGULARITY AND MULTIPLICITY WITH REGARD 
TO BEHAVIOR AND BELIEF 
 
 In the previous chapter I have been inquiring into chaos and order as related to 
singularity and multiplicity at the level of character.  I have suggested that the characters in 
the book view situations as chaotic or orderly based on the way in which its characters are 
configured.  Job sees the ordered world as configured in such a way that there is one 
central character surrounded by a multiplicity of other characters, all of whom contribute 
to the importance of the central character who alone possesses real existence.  The friends 
see chaos as a situation in which a multiplicity of characters inhabit their own solitary 
centers, each member of the multiplicity utterly separate from every other, and therefore 
fundamentally single.  For God, as he reveals himself in chapters 38-41, it is order which is 
complex, inhabited by a great variety of real characters.  The relation between singularity 
and multiplicity and chaos and order can also be explored at the level of behavior and 
belief.  That is, it is not just configurations of characters which can be viewed as 
participating in either chaos or order, but the ways in which individual characters choose to 
think and act.  To explore this aspect of the discussion about chaos and order, I will 
examine the book’s use of the path as a metaphor for life and the way it is lived. 
 
“How Many Different Ways…?” Excursus on the Metaphor of the Path in a Gospel 
Song and in Proverbs 
 
There’s a gospel song by the Louvin Brothers that asks the question, “How many 
different ways can you reach that city, where angels sing God’s praise for soul-redeeming 
love?” and answers, “There’s only one way in which you can enter, and your key is you 
record above,” before breaking into the jaunty chorus, “No, you can’t go by plane, ’cause 
they ain’t got no landing field, and you can’t go by train, like some folks sing about, and 
you can’t go by ship, ’cause they ain’t got no harbor.  Through grace by faith if you’re 
made whole, you’ll meet him in the clouds.”75 The song plays on the metaphor which 
describes life as a road down which one travels and one’s decisions about how to live as a 
way or a path, treating this metaphorical path as if it is an actual path potentially accessible 
to various modes of transport.  In the end, however, there is only one mode of transport 
which will enable one to reach “that city,” and it turns out not to be a mode of transport at 
all, but a way of acting and believing.  In this way, the song moves back and forth between 
                                                 
75 The Louvin Brothers.  “You’ll Meet Him in the Clouds.”  Keep Your Eyes on Jesus.  Capitol Records, 
1963. 
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imaging the road to heaven as a real road and a metaphorical one.  The point of the song is 
that there is only one way that leads to heaven, and heaven can be reached only by getting 
on and staying on that path, a path characterized by right behavior and right belief.  “How 
many different ways?”  No different ways.  There’s only one way.  
In making the confident claim that there is only one way, the song simultaneously 
assumes that, although there are no different ways to reach the heavenly city, there are a 
multitude of different ways not to reach that city.  The song names three—plane, train, and 
boat—but it could easily name more, given that there are any number of different transport 
options.  If we were to ask “What about by pogo stick?” or whatever new transport option 
has popped into our minds, we can be sure the song would answer, “No, you can’t go by 
pogo stick, ’cause they ain’t got no…place for a pogo stick to go,” albeit with better 
rhymes.  There is one way of acting that is the right way, and a multitude of ways that are 
the wrong way.  Likewise, there is one way of believing that is the right way, and a 
multitude of ways that are wrong.  To believe in Jesus is to be on the right path, the 
songwriters would contend, while to believe in anyone or anything else as the mediator of 
salvation is to be on the wrong path, of which there are, by extension, a wide variety.   
We can imagine the one right path shining like gold—perhaps it is the yellow brick 
road—in the midst of innumerable wrong paths, dim and muddy.  Something like 
Tolstoy’s dictum that “All happy families are all alike, but an unhappy family is unhappy 
after its own fashion” (Tolstoy 1954, 13) is at work here.  Happy families are on the 
yellow brick road to heaven, while unhappy families…well, they might be anywhere.  
(Anywhere else, that is.)  From the point of view of this gospel song, order is singular and 
chaos is characterized by multiplicity.  There is only one path anyone ought to be on.  For 
the world to be as it ought to be, everyone should be on the one path.  This is evidenced by 
the fact that the one path leads to heaven, which is itself the world as it ought to be.  
Although everyone in the earthly world is not on the one path, the heavenly world provides 
a space in which the world as it should be is able to exist.  The only people who reach the 
heavenly city are those who are on the one path, meaning that in the heavenly world 
everyone is on the one, right path.  If you’re on a different path, you just can’t get there. 
This gospel song, obviously, postdates the Book of Job by a long, long while, and, 
on top of this, belongs to a religion which did not even exist when the book was being 
written.  The song’s idea of the one path is clearly drawn from New Testament teachings.  
Jesus’ claim, “I am the way, the truth, and the life.  No one comes to the father except 
through me” (John 14:6), provides the clearest analogue.  The Old Testament, however, 
also uses the metaphor of the path to describe right behavior.  Stephen Geller points out 
that, in the wisdom literature “‘Path’ (derek, natib, ma’agal, ’orah) is almost a code term 
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for piety [see Prov. 3:17; 4:11; 9:6, etc.]....He or she who finds wisdom finds life, its paths 
are paths of life, and so on” (Geller 1987, 169).  In Proverbs 7 and 8, for example, we see 
first the strange woman seducing a youth down the path that will lead to his destruction, 
and then Woman Wisdom, who calls youths to walk down her path, which is the path of 
righteousness, and leads to abundant life.   
In this depiction, though, it would seem we are not presented with one right road 
and a multitude of wrong roads, but with only two roads, one of which is right and one of 
which is wrong.  A person can either choose the path of Woman Wisdom, who points with 
outstretched finger and calls with a clear, loud voice, or he can choose the path trodden by 
the strange woman, who walks with swaying hips, casting beckoning glances over her 
shoulder and motioning the hesitant youth to follow with a crook of her finger.  Yet, at the 
same time, Woman Wisdom is a singular figure.  She is described in Proverbs 8:22-31 as 
the first of God’s creation, with whose assistance the rest of creation was brought into 
being.  The strange woman, by contrast, could be anyone.  The speaker in Proverbs 7 
introduces her as simply “a woman” (Prov 7:10) who approaches a foolish youth hoping to 
seduce him.  By comparison with Woman Wisdom she is anonymous.  While there is only 
one Woman Wisdom—look at her credentials!—there could be any number of strange 
women.  Crenshaw points out that Woman Wisdom invites her guests to “a sumptuous 
banquet in a royal palace,” whereas “her opposite, Madam Folly, plies her trade like a 
common harlot” (Crenshaw 1977, 356).  The one is royal, one of a kind, while the other is 
common, a dime a dozen.   
The only thing required of the strange woman is that she lead one down any path 
other than the one belonging to Woman Wisdom.  Although this path may be 
conceptualized as one path, it is not one in the way that Woman Wisdom’s path is one.  
The strange woman of Proverbs can be seen to stand for any number of strange women, 
each of whom has her own path down which she tempts naïve youths.  These paths can be 
thought of as one path in that they all lead away from the abundant life promised by 
Woman Wisdom, but, in reality, they are a number of different paths.  “How many 
different ways can you fail to reach that city?”  There are a multitude of different ways.  
You can follow this strange woman or that one.  You can ride on the back of her 
motorcycle or stroll with her hand in hand.  There is, though, only one way to have Life, 
and that is to follow Woman Wisdom down her singular path. 
 
The One Right Path in Job’s “Hymn to Wisdom” 
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 Chapter 28, often designated the “hymn to wisdom,” identifies one right road of 
behavior and belief and contrasts this one right way with the multitude of ways in which it 
is possible to go wrong.  Before analyzing what the chapter has to say on this subject, 
however, I first want to make the argument that the hymn represents Job’s views.  That is, 
although Job may say different things about metaphorical paths elsewhere in the book, the 
hymn can be understood as spoken by him and representative of how he thinks about order 
and chaos.   
In some ways, the hymn to wisdom seems out of place in the book.  Commentators 
disagree over who speaks it. It is placed among Job’s speeches, and so would seem to 
come from his mouth, but the pious words of the hymn seem out of place following on the 
heels of Job’s accusations against the God who has turned against him for no reason.  How 
can Job, who insists God is acting unjustly, affirm fear of the Lord as the only route to 
wisdom?  Some scholars suggest that the hymn must be a later interpolation, inserted into 
Job’s mouth as a way of tempering his impiety.  Pope writes, “Some of the 
difficulties…appear to have been produced by pious tampering with the text by well-
meaning meddlers who felt compelled to mitigate Job’s shocking charges against 
God….The poem on Wisdom…is almost universally recognized as extraneous” (Pope 
1965, xxv). 76  Others suggest that the hymn represents the book’s author’s own view, 
placed at this point to tell us what conclusions we should be drawing from his work, in 
case we are feeling a bit at sea.  Habel writes, “I now accept this poem as integral to the 
Book of Job and view it…as the poet’s own commentary on the efforts of the preceding 
participants to probe the hidden side of wisdom and understand the riddle of Job’s case” 
(Habel 1983, 144).  Westermann, too, views the hymn as providing a concluding authorial 
comment on the friend’s arguments, writing, “Chapter 28 is a final word on…[the friends’] 
theology; it is the radical combating of a theology which thinks it has information, in the 
form of available wisdom, about God’s dealings with mankind” (Westermann 1981, 137).  
In a similar vein, Paul Fiddes reads the hymn as “an intermezzo or a chorus, awakening all 
the participants [in the dialogue] to areas of mystery and the unknown” (Fiddes 1996, 186).  
                                                 
76 Terrien, too, writes, “There can be little doubt that this magnificent poem on the inaccessibility of wisdom 
to man does not belong to the discourses of Job….It is not written in his style; it is not connected with the 
Joban context” (Terrien 1954, 1099).  Dhorme, while agreeing that chapter 28 does not quite fit where it has 
been placed in the book argues that, nevertheless, its “author may very well be the same as he who wrote the 
poetic debate” (Dhorme 1967, li).  For Dhorme, the hymn to wisdom is the result of a later burst of 
inspiration which came to the author after he had finished the bulk of the book (Ibid., xcvi-ii).  Similarly, 
Vawter, while viewing the chapter as an interpolation, sees it not as contradicting the message of the rest of 
the book, but as reinforcing it.  He writes, “The best guess is that chap. 28 is a subsequent addition to the 
Book of Job, but an addition…of an author who understood what the Book of Job was all about and decided 
to reinforce it with his own contribution” (Vawter 1983, 77).  Vawter’s suggestion is interesting.  Yet, I have 
to wonder why, if the hymn fits the book as he thinks it does, he views it as an interpolation and not as a 
statement by the author about the point he is trying to make.  That is, if the hymn reinforces the book’s 
meaning, why is it necessary to view it as having originated elsewhere? 
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Offering an alternative interpretation, Newsom reads the hymn, neither as a later 
interpolation nor as the view of the author, but as another genre-voice in the polyphonic 
conversation of the book (Newsom 2003, 170).77   
It seems to me, though, that despite its apparent incongruity, the hymn can be read 
as issuing from the mouth of Job.  Although the hymn does not jibe with the accusations 
about God that Job has been making in his speeches, it is consonant with the prologue’s 
description of Job as “one who feared God and turned away from evil” (1:1b).  Even 
though Job has been insisting that God has made him his enemy for no reason, Job also 
insists throughout the book that he is one who fears God and turns away from evil.  God 
happens to be in the wrong with regard to Job, but that does not means that Job does not 
fear God.  Job rails against God who is not acting as he ought to act, while at the same time 
fearing God who is as he should be.   
The hymn to wisdom serves to identify Job as a sage.  Wisdom, far from being 
inaccessible, is accessible to those who believe and act in a certain way, and Job, despite 
his suffering, is still the supreme example of the man of right belief and right action.  The 
hymn, thus, justifies Job’s words.  Identifying him as the wise man par excellence, the 
hymn offers support for his claims, even when those claims put God in the wrong.  The 
hymn’s placement, before Job’s final long speech, is apropos.  In chapter 29, Job casts his 
memory back over the days in which his right belief and behavior earned him the blessing 
he deserved.  In chapter 30, he contrasts his present situation with the way things used to 
be.  Then, in chapter 31, he makes his oath of innocence, insisting that he still fulfills the 
requirements of righteousness.  Chapter 31 is a litany of the ways in which Job has turned 
away from evil, which is the corollary to fearing God.  If we consider chapter 28 as 
belonging to Job’s final speech, we see that he begins by setting out the qualifications of 
the wise man and ends, in chapter 31, by depicting himself as one who meets those 
qualifications.  There is no reason why, in this context, chapter 28 needs to be considered 
pious speech that is at odds with what Job has to say, and which must, therefore, be the 
speech of someone else.  Job never says that he has stopped fearing God and turning away 
from evil—in fact, he insists that he has continued to do so in all his speeches; his 
                                                 
77 Elsewhere, Newsom gives an overview of recent scholarly inquiry into the provenance of the hymn.  She 
writes, “The question of the speaker of the passage…is answered in one of several ways.  Some (e.g., 
Hoffman 1996:278-85; Coogan 1999:205) adhere to the view that the poem is a late redactional addition.  
Others see the poem as an original part of the book of Job, but independent of the other voices in the text 
(e.g., Fiddes 1996:186; Newsom 1996; 2003a: 169-71), or as the voice of the narrator from the prose tale 
(Cheney 1994:42-48), commenting upon the dialogues.  Not surprisingly, given the continued interest in final 
form readings, several scholars have attempted to read ch. 28 as part of Job’s long monologue, since it 
follows his speech in ch. 27 without any indication of a change in speakers….A recent new twist on the issue 
has been proposed independently by Clines and Greenstein, both of whom would attribute ch. 28 to Elihu” 
(Newsom 2007, 162). 
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contention, rather, is that although he has upheld his part of the bargain, God has not acted 
rightly toward him. 
I am not alone in reading chapter 28 as Job’s words.  Scholars such as Janzen, 
Whybray, Childs, Good, Seitz, and Lo also read the chapter as spoken by Job, though with 
differing interpretations as to its meaning.  Whybray reads the chapter as indicating that 
Job is “already on the way towards the self-assessment that he will make in ch. 42, when 
he will at last have encountered God and listened to God’s account of himself.  He now 
declares his conclusion, that neither he nor the friends nor any human being possesses 
wisdom at all.  Wisdom is the possession of God alone” (Whybray 1998, 21).  Janzen, too, 
sees the chapter as Job’s comment on what has come before, his recognition of the 
inaccessibility of wisdom for humans (Janzen 1985, 187-88).  For Good, by contrast, 
chapter 28 is an ironic pronouncement.   Job asserts that he is wise because he knows that 
it is necessary to be afraid of God, because God is wicked.  Knowing this, he distances 
himself from the evil God, thereby avoiding evil (Good 1990, 292-93).  Alison Lo views 
the hymn as first, Job’s admission that human beings do not possess wisdom, and second, 
along similar lines as those proposed by Good, as evidencing Job’s anger at the world 
which does not work as he believes it should.  She writes, “The failure of his friends’ 
counsels drives Job to seek wisdom and address to God directly (ch. 28).  But his ‘fearing 
God and shunning evil’ in the past did not save him from his present suffering,” (Lo 2003, 
51).  As Lo sees it, chapters 29-31 grow out of Job’s angry realization that, although he has 
feared God and shunned evil, wisdom has not been vouchsafed to him.  Finally, Brevard 
Childs and Christopher Seitz read the chapter much as I do, as Job’s testimony to his own 
wisdom.  Childs writes, “The effect of placing chs. 27-28 in the mouth of Job is to reinstate 
him as a sage” (Childs 1979, 542), and Seitz concurs, “chapter 28, even if originally 
independent, is now assigned to Job, thus reinstating him as a wise man, alongside his role 
as the righteous sufferer” (Seitz 1989, 13). 
 In Proverbs 7 and 8 it is obvious that the path is being used as a metaphor for the 
way a person chooses to live her life.  Woman Wisdom and the strange woman are not 
gesturing toward literal paths that run through town (although walking down a particular 
path in town may be the equivalent of following the way of one woman or the other).  At 
the outset, Job’s hymn to wisdom does not seem to be using the path as a metaphor for life 
at all, but to be referring to actual paths.  Yet, as will be seen, the metaphorical usage is 
present, and it is the metaphorical usage with which the hymn is actually concerned.  Job’s 
hymn, like the Louvin Brothers’ song, plays with the metaphor, pretending to speak of 
actual paths, but, in the end, revealing that it is the metaphorical path of behavior and 
belief that is at issue.  
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The hymn begins by describing the ways in which humans have probed the depths 
of the earth, in order to extract valuable metals and precious stones.  It creates the 
impression that it is relaying a success story, sounding a tribute to human power and 
ingenuity.  We can imagine its words spoken by an announcer in an old-time newsreel, his 
jaunty tones praising progress and the spread of wealth.  There is, however, one small 
glitch in the first part of the hymn (verses 1-6) that troubles its triumphant tone.  In verse 4, 
continuing its description of the miners who have penetrated deep into the earth, the hymn 
says, “They open shafts in a valley away from human habitation; they are forgotten by 
travelers, they sway suspended, remote from the earth.”  For a moment the marching band 
stops playing, and we see the miners, deep underground, suspended in midair by their 
ropes and grappling hooks, darkness and silence all around, solid ground who knows how 
far below or above them.  They hang there, swaying slightly, far from human habitation 
and lost to human memory. In fact, these miners are being described in the same terms the 
friends use to describe the wicked who have died.  They are similarly alone and similarly 
forgotten, inhabiting a similar darkness deep within the earth.  The implication is that the 
path taken by these miners has not led them where they ought to be.  Like the path taken 
by the youth who followed the strange woman in Proverbs, the paths taken by the miners 
have led not to life, but to death.78 
That the miners have not chosen the right path is hardly noticeable in the 
triumphant pomp of verses 1-6; it is only upon rereading the hymn in the light of how it 
ends that the miners’ mistakenness becomes evident.  In the same way, verses 7 and 8, 
which at first seem to be merely participating in the hymn’s praise of human ability, must 
be reinterpreted once the hymn’s conclusion has been read.  In their initial context, verses 
7 and 8 seem to be making the point that even the mightiest of wild beasts cannot compete 
with humans when it comes to seeking out the treasures that the earth has to offer.  In these 
verses, path imagery is used as we are told, “That path no bird of prey knows, and the 
falcon’s eye has not seen it.  The proud wild animals79 have not trodden it; the lion has not 
passed over it.”  If path imagery has not been used in verses 1-6, verses 7-8 cause it to be 
retroactively inserted.  What path is it that the great birds of prey have not been able to 
                                                 
78 Ellen Van Wolde, although she does not link this passage to the friends’ depiction of the wicked, does 
argue that the human activity of the first part of the hymn is meant to be understood negatively.  She 
observes that the focus shifts from human activity to the earth which bears the marks of human enterprise, 
writing, “There it lies, with holes, with burnt slags, turned upside down.  This is what this so-called wisdom 
does” (Van Wolde 2003, 33).  According to Van Wolde, the hymn reveals that what is thought of as wisdom 
is a destructive force and invites humans to engage in a new kind of wisdom, one which is not destructive but 
creative (Ibid.). 
79 The Hebrew phrase here is Cx#$-ynb, the same phrase which is translated “proud” in 41:34b, perhaps 
supporting the argument that Leviathan is king of a very specific group of the proud—“proud wild animals,” 
and not “proud humans.”  But, because these are the only two appearances of the phrase in the Bible, it is 
difficult to come to a conclusion either way. 
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sight from their airy heights?  And what path is it that lions and other proud beasts have 
not trodden?  It is the path discovered and trodden by human beings as they have delved 
deep into the earth, bringing its hidden recesses to light.  To have executed these feats of 
engineering is to have walked a path, and it is a path down which the animals, for all their 
might, have not been able to travel.  In verses 9-11, the hymn’s praise of human endeavor 
reaches its climax.  Humans have overturned mountains, cut channels in rocks, discovered 
the sources of  rivers, and have found every hidden precious thing that the earth’s depths 
contain.  Human beings have mastered the world.  Their paths have led them to victory, as 
is evidenced by their possession of the spoils of the earth.   
 Suddenly, however, the poem changes tone and shifts focus, when, in verse 12, it 
asks, “But where shall wisdom be found?”  This question undermines everything that has 
come before, in its implication that, of all the things humans have laid hands on, they have 
failed to find the one thing worth having.  It is in the light of this question that the miners 
dangling in their caves must be read not as participants in a success story but as evidence 
of human failure.  In verses 13-20, the undermining effect of verse 12’s question is taken 
to the next level.  Although verses 7-8, with their claim that the great beasts do not know 
the path, seemed to imply that human being do have access to the important paths, that 
assumption is struck down by verse 13, which reads, “Mortals do not know the way to it, 
and it is not found in the land of the living.”  Although human beings have trodden many 
secret paths, they have not, the poem says, trodden the one right path, which, as in 
Proverbs 8, is the path of wisdom.  The hymn continues by insisting that wisdom is not 
concealed in the depths of the earth, neither can it be purchased with the gold and jewels 
that can be extracted from those depths.  In addition, we are told that it is “concealed from 
the birds of the air” (28:21b), a claim which necessitates the reinterpretation of verses 7-8.  
The path which is not known by the birds and the wild animals is not, after all, a path with 
which human beings are familiar.  It is not the path by which human beings have 
penetrated deep into the earth, nor is it any path by which they have sought out the earth’s 
secret material treasures.  The path referred to in verses 7-8 can only be the path which 
leads to wisdom.  In retrospect, it matters not at all that the animals do not know the paths 
of human ingenuity, for those paths are shown to be the wrong paths, leading only to 
death.  Where those verses seemed to pay tribute to human beings, in reality they do not; 
they look forward to the announcement of the only path that matters, the path of wisdom. 
 Strangely, God seems to be able to find wisdom in the created world in a way 
denied all living things.  The hymn claims, “God understands the way to it, and he knows 
its place.  For he looks to the ends of the earth, and sees everything under the heavens” 
(28:23-24).  The path which humans and animals, for all their wide-ranging activity, 
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cannot discover, is discovered by God who ranges still farther.  This would seem to imply 
that searching out the deep and secret places of the earth is not actually the wrong way to 
undertake the search for wisdom, but, rather, does not bear results for humans or animals 
simply because they cannot travel far enough.  The way is not wrong in itself, but the 
required path is too long.  Yet, although the hymn does, at one point, seem to say that 
finding wisdom requires not a change of path, but simply the ability to travel farther faster, 
its subsequent claims indicate that this is not the correct interpretation.  The hymn goes on 
to describe God finding and establishing wisdom as part of his creative work: “When he 
gave the wind its weight, and apportioned out the waters by measure; when he made a 
decree for the rain, and a way for the thunderbolt; then he saw it and declared it; he 
established it, and searched it out” (28:25-27).  Wisdom, although it cannot be found by 
searching out the secret depths of the earth, is, in fact, the foundation on which the earth 
was built; wisdom is inherent in the workings of the world.80  The world works as it ought 
to work, because God has ordered it on principles of wisdom.  Although wisdom is present 
in the world, living creatures can have access to it, not by carving up the earth and laying 
hands on it, but by fearing God and departing from evil (28:28).81  God is the one path.  “I 
am the way,” says God.  “No one comes to wisdom except by me.” 
 With God’s declaration that the way to wisdom is to fear the Lord and depart from 
evil, the chapter’s use of the image of the path as a metaphor for the way one lives one’s 
life is made evident.  Most of the hymn has not seemed to be using metaphorical language, 
but to be speaking of actual searching, actual traveling down actual paths.  In the light of 
the hymn’s ending, however, what has come before is made metaphorical.  The hymn 
reinterprets its description of the paths down which human beings have walked in their 
search for the earth’s precious and secret bounty.  It is no longer talking about mining or 
voyages of discovery, but about ways of living.  The right way of living is characterized by 
fear of the Lord and turning away from evil, that is, by a certain kind of belief and a certain 
kind of behavior.  As in Proverbs and the gospel song, there is one right way.  If we were 
                                                 
80 In support of this reading, Habel writes, “wisdom is apparently the deep and mysterious principle behind 
all other laws, principles, and designs of the cosmos….That is, wisdom is…the ‘first principle’ or ‘model’ 
which precedes and informs the creation of the cosmos” (Habel 1983, 145). 
81 Some scholars contend that verse 28 is an interpolation and, therefore, should not be read as contributing 
meaning to the chapter as a whole.  Pope writes, “This verse is suspect on several grounds….After the poetic 
elaboration of the point that wisdom is inaccessible to man, the definition of an entirely different kind of 
wisdom seems rather abrupt.  The divine wisdom by which God created and regulates the cosmos is beyond 
man’s grasp and ken….This is a standard affirmation and formulation of the conservative school...which is 
appended as an antidote to the agnostic tenor of the preceding poem” (Pope 1965, 183).  Geller, too, insists 
that the verse does not fit, writing, “Verse 28 is altogether too bold and bland a statement of traditional piety 
for such a subtly orchestrated context.”  He allows, however, that the verse may be original to the poem, 
noting that, “One may allow that a poet who has displayed the greatest art may suddenly stumble with both 
feet” (Gellar 1987, 174).  I, however, read the verse as integral to the meaning of the chapter, as it is spoken 
by Job. 
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to map the gospel song onto the hymn to wisdom we might sing, “No you can’t find it in 
the depths of the earth, ’cause they ain’t got no wisdom there, and you can’t follow the 
birds, ’cause they don’t know the path, and you can’t pay your way, ’cause they don’t take 
no currency.  But fear the Lord and depart from evil and wisdom you will find.”  Or 
something like that.   
Like the gospel song, the hymn moves between the metaphorical and the actual, 
and for it, as for the song, the actual is something of a ruse or joke.  The hymn is not trying 
to make a point about mining, just as the song is not saying anything about the validity of 
planes, trains, or ships as modes of transport.  It is not that actual mining is wrong.  Mining 
is a metaphor for a way of living that is not the one right way.  In the hymn, there is one 
right way and a multiplicity of wrong ways.  In the first part of the chapter (vv. 1-6, 9-11), 
people are shown engaged in a variety of activities—mining the earth, overturning 
mountains, finding the sources of rivers, etc.—akin to traveling by plane, train, and ship in 
the gospel song.  None of these activities—or, more importantly, their metaphorical 
equivalents, whatever they may be (and it does not matter what they are specifically, it 
only matters that they represent ways other than the one true way)—leads to wisdom.  
Wisdom is found through one specific path of belief and behavior and one only.  In 
addition, the fact that God established wisdom as foundational to the creation (vv. 25-27) 
means that to follow the path of wisdom is to follow the path that is in tune with the 
creation and the way it works; it is the path of life.  To follow any other path leads to 
death, to the miners dangling in their caves, forgotten by the living. 
 
“Fenced In”: The Breakdown of Job’s One Right Way 
 
 In chapter 28, Job makes the claim that there is one right path of belief and 
behavior, while there are a great number of paths that are not the way.  Order is singular, 
characterized by one way of being, while chaos is multiple, in that it can be any way of 
being other than the one way of order.  There are other places in the book where Job uses 
the path as a metaphor for the way one lives one’s life.  In chapter 3 Job asks, “Why is 
light given to one who cannot see the way, whom God has fenced in” (3:23).82  In chapter 
19, he laments, “He has walled up my way so that I cannot pass, and he has set darkness 
upon my paths,” (19:8).  Although at first Job bemoans the light that is on his path, and 
then bewails the darkness, the situations are analogous.  He laments the light of life, 
                                                 
82 Hebrew lacks “Why is light given.”  Pope translates more literally, “To a man whose way is hidden, 
Whom God has fenced about?” (Pope 1965, 27).  The idea that Job cannot see the path he ought to take is 
still present, however. 
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because, in his accursed situation the light does him no good; it is like darkness.  In both 
verses, Job describes himself as fenced or walled in by God.  God has deprived him of the 
ability to travel along his path.   
But how is Job using “way” and “path” here?  Is he using them as metaphors for 
the way life is lived?  Clearly, he is not talking about actual paths.  He is not saying that his 
affliction has affected his eyes so that he cannot see to walk around town.  He is using 
“path” metaphorically, but as a metaphor for what?  What “way” is it that Job cannot see?  
In chapter 3, he wishes he were dead because he cannot see how to live.  He asks why life 
is given to one who cannot see the way to live.  In his new situation, stripped of his 
blessing, Job can only fumble around blindly.  Previously, he knew how to live.  He was 
blameless and upright.  He helped the poor widow and the orphan.  In fact, in chapter 29, 
Job says that in the days before his suffering, he “was eyes to the blind, and feet to the 
lame” (29:15).  It seems probable that Job is not just saying that he helped these people get 
around town, that he was their seeing-eye dog and their wheelchair, but that, as one who 
knew the way to live, he was able to offer guidance to those who lacked his moral clarity 
and alacrity.  This reading is supported by Job’s claim, at the end of chapter 29, “I chose 
their way and sat as chief” (29:25a).  In return for this right behavior, Job reaped blessing.   
This is not to say that Job’s righteousness was in any way the behavior of a 
mercenary.  That is not what is at stake here, even though hassatan has caused Job’s 
suffering in order to test whether he serves God for nothing.  It is not that Job is blameless 
and upright so that he can reap the reward for that behavior.  He is simply blameless and 
upright, and, throughout the speeches of the poetic section, he insists that he is clinging to 
his integrity.  (He does not see the words he speaks against God as in any way 
compromising his righteousness; he says what he says in order to set his listeners—both 
God and the friends—straight on the record of his integrity.)  Although the reason for Job’s 
righteousness is not the promise of reward, he does presuppose that righteousness and 
blessing go hand in hand and experiences his suffering as a rupture in the world as it ought 
to be.  It is not that Job expects to be paid for his righteousness, but that he believes that, 
because one ought to be blameless and upright, this kind of behavior is a contribution to 
the world as it ought to be.  To be righteous is to be in tune with the way the world works, 
to participate in its fundamental order. When one is living in a way which is consonant 
with the way the world is set up, it is only natural that one should experience blessing, as, 
for example, when one eats healthful foods one experiences good health.  
Job is a person who likes to eat healthful foods.  He doesn’t eat them because of the 
reward they offer, but, nevertheless, he expects to be healthy because he eats them.  When 
he suddenly discovers that he as sick as it is possible to be, he feels that the world has 
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turned upside down; he cannot make sense of anything.  This is why Job says that his path 
is in darkness.  He does not know how to live.  His righteous behavior, which he thought 
participated in the workings of the world, has been shown to be irrelevant.  What should he 
do?  Should he persist in his righteousness?  Is it even right to be righteous?  If by being 
righteous one is not participating in the world as it ought to be, what rhyme or reason is 
there to righteousness?  Perhaps it is wickedness which is in tune with the order of the 
world.  Perhaps one ought to behave in a different way entirely.  Or perhaps there is no 
way that one ought to behave.  Perhaps there are no deep structures.  Perhaps the world is 
not organized in any way at all.  There is darkness on Job’s path because he does not know 
any longer how he ought to live his life.  He is stymied.  He cannot go this way or that 
way, because he cannot see where he is going; he does not know what he ought to do. 
 In these verses, we see Job struggling with the idea that there is one right path.  
This is the presupposition behind his laments.  He can no longer see the way that is right, 
and so he cannot go anywhere.  He makes a similar observation on a larger scale in chapter 
12, where he laments, 
[God] leads counselors away stripped, and makes fools of judges.  He looses 
the sash of kings, and binds a waistcloth on their loins.  He leads priests away 
stripped, and overthrows the mighty.  He deprives of speech those who are 
trusted, and takes away the discernment of the elders.  He pours contempt on 
princes, and looses the belt of the strong.  He uncovers the deeps out of 
darkness, and brings deep darkness to light.  He makes nations great, then 
destroys them; he enlarges nations, then leads them away.  He strips 
understanding from the leaders of the earth, and makes them wander in a 
pathless waste.  They grope in the dark without light; he makes them stagger 
like a drunkard.  (12:17-25) 
The upheaval God causes on a grand scale in the social world is the equivalent of erasing 
the right path for those who are affected.  The kings, counselors, priests, princes, elders, 
and nations who find themselves first endowed with power and then overthrown are 
deprived of the knowledge of how they ought to live.  If behavior has no bearing on what 
one’s life is like, then one cannot choose to walk a path of any kind, and one is left 
wandering in a pathless waste.  There is no right way to go.  The word translated “waste” 
here is  wht, the same word which appears most famously paired with whb in Genesis 1:2 
to describe the pre-creation state.  It appears two other times in Job, first in 6:18, which 
reads, “The caravans turn aside from their course; they go up into the waste (wht), and 
perish,” and then in 26:7: “He stretches out Zaphon over the void (wht), and hangs the 
earth upon nothing.”  All three times the word is spoken by Job, as is only fitting given the 
chaos he believes the world to have become.  As can be seen, in Job 26:7, as in Genesis 
1:2, wht describes the world before creation, which is to say the world before it became 
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the ordered world.  The waste in which the caravans and the former leaders lose their way 
is not simply a kind of backwoods wilderness; it has cosmic dimensions.  To be without a  
path, as Job sees it, is to be returned to the pre-creation void; it is to be unable to live as a 
created being in the ordered world. 
For this reason, the eradication of the one right path does not result, in Job’s view, 
in a multiplicity of right paths—an opening up of possibility—but in the deterioration of 
the metaphor of life as path.  The kings, counselors, nations, and so on are not presented 
with one right path, like the path pointed out by Woman Wisdom in Proverbs 8, and a 
multiplicity of wrong paths, like those of the strange woman or women in Proverbs 7.  
They are not presented with choices about how to live and the consequences of those 
choices.  Instead, no path is shown them, and no one beckons, neither Woman Wisdom nor 
the strange woman.  They set out with no clear idea of what they have chosen and no clear 
idea of where they are going.  No participation in the workings of the world is possible, for 
the workings of the world are entirely subject to God’s whim.  Job’s own experience 
mirrors the upheaval wrought upon the kings, princes, nations, etc. described in these 
verses.  He, too, has found himself first exalted—a condition which he assumed was a 
result of his behavior—and then brought low, a condition which he cannot reconcile with 
his behavior.  In this way, he, too, has been made to wander in a pathless waste, groping 
and fumbling like a drunkard.   
It needs to be emphasized that Job’s experience of “wandering in a pathless waste” 
does not mean that he has ceased to believe in the existence of the right path, despite his 
use of the adjective “pathless” (Krd-)l) and the noun wht.  Job continues to believe that 
the right path does exist, even though it is not, for the moment, evident where it lies.  The 
pathless waste created by God’s capricious setting up and overthrowing of various groups 
does not reflect the true condition of the world.  It is a deception brought into being by 
God’s acting how he ought not to act.  The ordered world, in which there is one right path, 
one right way of living, continues to exist somewhere, if only in the stratosphere like one 
of Plato’s forms, and to this path Job wants to remain true.  The right path, however, has 
been obscured, and he and others in similar situations of upheaval fumble through a 
pathless waste, not because the right path has ceased to exist in a real sense, but because 
they cannot see where it is. 
 Later in the book Job laments his inability to find God on the path where he ought 
to be walking.  Job says,  
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If I go forward,83 he is not there; or backward, I cannot perceive him; on the 
left he hides, and I cannot behold him; I turn to the right, but I cannot see him.  
But he knows the way that I take; when he has tested me, I shall come out like 
gold.  My foot has held fast to his steps; I have kept his way and have not 
turned aside.  I have not departed from the commandment of his lips; I have 
treasured in my bosom the words of his mouth.  (23:8-12) 
As Job sees it, God has departed from his own true path; Job searches for him in the place 
where he ought to be, but is unable to find him there.  This means that the right path is not 
defined by its being whatever path God happens to be on, but possesses its own identity, 
independent of God’s presence. Elihu, in his aggravated response to Job, will deny that it is 
possible for God to quit the one true path, saying, “God is exalted in his power; who is a 
teacher like him?  Who has prescribed for him his way, or who can say, ‘You have done 
wrong’?” (36:22-23).  For Elihu, it is God’s presence which makes a path right; there is no 
such thing as a true path which exists independent of God, enabling people to judge 
whether or not God is in the right.  It is a given that because God is God, he is in the right 
and the path he is on is the right path.  From Job’s perspective, though, this is not the case.  
Although in his speeches of chapters 3-27 Job has described his life as so darkened that he 
can no longer see the right way to go forward, he has also insisted throughout that his 
current predicament is not due to his having strayed from the path of righteousness.  He 
may not be able to advance, but he is not where he is because he took a wrong step, and, in 
fact, it is precisely because he has made no misstep that he is unable to advance.  He was 
on the right path, but, somehow, the right path has not led him where the right path goes.   
An analogous situation would be if I set out on my familiar walk from my flat to 
the University, and, without deviating from the way, ended up arriving at Ibrox Stadium, 
which is nowhere near the University.  I would be certain that I had not taken the path to 
Ibrox Stadium, and, finding myself there I would not know  how to advance.  My entire 
spatial frame of reference would collapse.  Not only would I not know how to get to the 
University, but I would not know whether, if I were to retrace my steps, I would end up 
back at my flat.  The right turns have led to the wrong place, rendering all turns potentially 
wrong.84  Job oscillates between not knowing which way to go, now that the path he was 
on has not led where it was supposed to lead, and insisting that he does know the way—
that it is the same as it always was.  Job insists that the fault lies with God who has 
                                                 
83 The Hebrew here is Mdq, the same word translated “east” in 1:3 and “old” in 29:2.  The word means all 
three things.  Yet, just as its use in 1:3 and 29:2 highlighted the fact that Job’s desire to return to the “months 
of old” is a desire to be again “the greatest of all the people of the east,” its use here suggests a possible link 
with those sentiments.  Here, Job’s going forward (Mdq) can be understood as an attempt to be as he was 
before, to live as he used to live.  He finds, however, that he is unable to be who he once was because God is 
not with him, or, at least, this is how it seems to Job whose suffering is not alleviated no matter what he does. 
84 I have already suggested this above, using the example of healthful eating leading to ill health, but perhaps 
this example makes the point more clearly. 
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deviated from the right path.  To return to my analogy, it is not that I have taken the wrong 
path to the University, but that the University itself has moved, swapping places with Ibrox 
Stadium.  The question then becomes, what determines the rightness of the path?  Is my 
path still the path to the University even though the University has moved?  Or does the 
fact that the University has moved mean that now there is another path which is the right 
path to the University?   
The obvious answer is that the location of the University determines the correct 
path.  The path which used to lead to the University does not remain “the path which leads 
to the University” if the University has moved.  If the University is no longer where it once 
was, I need to find out where it is and get on that path, instead of standing where I am and 
insisting, over and over again, “But this is the way to the University.”  Job, though, in the 
passage quoted above (23:8-12) does make this kind of claim.  He insists that there is and 
has always been only one right path.  That the path has not led him where it was supposed 
to lead him does not change the fact of the path’s rightness, nor is the path’s rightness 
invalidated by God’s desertion.  It is the path itself that is right, regardless of where God 
has gone.   
Job’s words about paths have three aims.  First, he testifies to the existence of the 
one, true path—that is, to one right way of being in the world—even if the path has been 
obscured or erased from the world.  The one true path remains the one true path, despite 
the fact that it has not led him where it ought.  Secondly, he insists that this is the path God 
ought to be on.  God ought to travel the path of right behavior, and Job attempts to recall 
him to his rightful place.  Thirdly, Job insists that he himself has never strayed from the 
right path.  In the passage quoted above, he makes the point that although God is not where 
he ought to be, when God returns to his place, God will see “the way that I take… I have 
kept his way and have not turned aside” (23:10a, 11b).  Job stands outside Ibrox Stadium, 
insisting that has followed the path to the University, and, by means of his insistence, 
trying to recall the University to its rightful place.  
 
Job Questions the Existence of the One Right Way 
 
Job’s belief in the one right way is firm.  In chapters 28-31 he culminates his 
discourse by professing himself certain that one right path exists and that he is and has 
always been on it.  In chapter 28, he identifies himself as one who walks the path of 
wisdom, and in chapter 31, he proclaims himself innocent and, therefore, undeserving of 
suffering, saying,  
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If I have walked with falsehood, and my foot has hurried to deceit—let me be 
weighed in a just balance, and let God know my integrity!—if my step has 
turned aside from the way…then let me sow, and another eat; and let what 
grows for me85 be rooted out.  (31:5-7a, 8) 
Although Job’s speeches reach their ending climax with this affirmation, Job’s belief in the 
one right way, though firm, is not so unyielding that he never questions its existence in the 
course of his speeches.  Standing outside Ibrox Stadium day after day he cannot help but 
question not whether he has, in fact, taken the route he tells everyone he has taken, but 
whether one really has any guarantee of where any path leads.  With the world as he 
thought it was having collapsed around him, he wonders whether that world is really as 
rooted in reality as he would like to think.  Is it true that there is one path that is right in 
and of itself, and that this path is the way down which God, the world, and human beings 
ought to travel, even if, at the moment, they do not?  Or is the pathless waste the true 
situation of the world?  Does the University have no obligation to return to its old place?  
Is it, instead, free to go where it will, so that one can never be sure of the path that will lead 
to it, and it is utter foolishness to stand waiting in the old place, using one’s presence as a 
kind of reminder: “This is the place.  Where I am is where you belong.”  Job ends his 
speeches by professing absolute certainty that “This is the place” and “Where I am is 
where you belong.”  Yet, before he arrives at this certainty, he does express certain doubts.   
The most striking of these occurs in chapter 17, where, in response to Eliphaz’s 
second speech, Job says,  
[God] has made me a byword of the peoples, and I am one before whom 
people spit.  My eye has grown dim from grief, and all my members are like a 
shadow.  The upright are appalled at this, and the innocent stir themselves up 
against the godless.  Yet the righteous hold to their way, and they that have 
clean hands grow stronger and stronger.  (17:6-9) 
This is a perplexing passage.  Job has finished the previous chapter by asserting his own 
innocence, claiming that despite God’s violence against him, “there is no violence in my 
hands, and my prayer is pure” (16:17).  Job himself would seem to be on the path of the 
righteous, yet here he is critical of the righteous who “hold to their way.”  What would Job 
have the righteous do?  Get off the path he himself refuses to abandon despite his 
                                                 
85 The word here—y)c)c —also means “my offspring,” and is the same word used by Eliphaz to indicate 
the offspring of the righteous man in 5:25: “You shall know that your descendants will be many, and your 
offspring (Ky)c)c)  like the grass of the earth.”  Making his oath of innocence, Job speaks as if he 
possesses the attributes of the righteous man, as if he has offspring who could be rooted out were he found 
guilty.  What is interesting, of course, is that Job’s offspring have already been “rooted out.”  One has to 
wonder about the resources Job draws on to make his oath of innocence.  Does Job really have anything left 
to lose?  In fact, by the logic of the oath, Job has already been declared guilty.  He has already been stripped 
of possessions and bodily health.  However, because he believes himself to be righteous, he takes the stance 
of the righteous man to whom none of this has already happened, hoping that he will not be called upon to 
relinquish what he no longer actually possesses.   
 106
suffering?  Equally strange is his observation that those who have clean hands—
presumably the same people as the righteous, whose hands are clean because they have 
held to their way—grow stronger and stronger.  This has certainly not been his own 
experience.  He has clung to the path of the righteous and has grown weaker for his efforts.  
If the path of the righteous is leading where it ought to lead—to blessing—for some of the 
righteous, why would he want those particular people to quit the route?  Surely, they are 
the ones who ought to stay on the path.  If anyone ought to abandon the way of the 
righteous, it is Job himself who, though he has followed the right path, has ended up in the 
wrong place.  Is Job’s criticism of the righteous simply a petulant expression of jealousy?  
Perhaps.  Would he really prefer it if the righteous abandoned their way?  It is hard to 
imagine that, if pressed, he would answer this question in the affirmative.  What, then, is 
he saying?  What is the meaning of his critique?   
We can only understand what Job is saying by remembering that he is speaking to 
specific people—his three friends—and that his words are directed to them.  The righteous 
described in verse 9 are not the righteous in the abstract, but Eliphaz, Bildad, and Zophar 
in particular.  The friends, in their descriptions of the fate of the wicked presume that the 
paths of wickedness lead in one direction, while the path of righteousness, down which 
they themselves are traveling, has its own proper destination.  In chapter 8, Bildad has 
asked, “‘Can papyrus grow where there is no marsh? Can reeds flourish where there is no 
water?’” and has answered, “‘While yet in flower and not cut down, they wither before any 
other plant.  Such are the paths of all who forget God; the hope of the godless shall perish.  
Their confidence is gossamer, a spider’s house their trust” (8:8-14).  In chapter 18, he will 
again describe the path of the wicked, saying, 
Their strong steps are shortened, and their own schemes throw them down.  
For they are thrust into a net by their own feet, and they walk into a pitfall.  A 
trap seizes them by the heel; a snare lays hold of them.  A rope is hid for them 
in the ground, a trap for them in the path.  (18:7-10) 
Bildad knows very well what the paths of the wicked are like and where they lead.  Such 
paths lead to suffering and early death; the suffering of the wicked is a direct outcome of 
their behavior, of the paths they have trod, which are, by nature, lined with traps and 
snares.  In the speech to which Job is responding directly in chapter 17, Eliphaz, though he 
does not use the metaphor of the path, has described the fate of the wicked in similar 
terms, saying, “they will not be rich, and their wealth will not endure, nor will they strike 
root in the earth; they will not escape from darkness” (15:29-30a).  Later, Eliphaz will use 
path language to unreservedly accuse Job of wickedness, asking him, “Will you keep to the 
old way that the wicked have trod?” (22:15).  The old way trod by the wicked leads to loss 
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of possessions, suffering, and untimely death; it leads, in short, to the exact spot where Job 
is standing.  For the friends, it is as plain as day that the reason Job is standing in front of 
Ibrox Stadium instead of in front of the University is because he has walked the path 
leading to Ibrox instead of the path leading to the University.  What could be more 
obvious?  The path of the righteous does not lead to Job’s present location; the only way to 
get where he is is to walk the way of the wicked.   
Job’s accusation that “the righteous hold to their way, and they that have clean 
hands grow stronger” is directed at the friends, in the same way that the friends’ 
accusations about the fate of the wicked are directed at Job, despite being cast in the third 
instead of the second person.  But why should “holding to the way of the righteous” be an 
indictment?  Job’s accusation addresses his friends’ belief that the path of righteousness 
leads inevitably to blessing, while the path of wickedness leads inevitably to suffering.  Job 
considers himself living proof that this is not the case.  Part of the friends’ “holding to the 
path of righteousness” is their belief that their own path cannot lead to where Job is 
standing and its corollary that Job, because he is where he is, has followed the old way trod 
by the wicked and not the path that they themselves are walking.  Job sees that his 
suffering does not lead his friends to question whether it might be possible for the path of 
righteousness to lead to suffering, but, rather, to cling firmly to their own path which, so 
far has not, and, they believe, will never, lead them into his kind of affliction.  They stay 
on the path that has made them strong, believing that blessing follows where they walk and 
refusing to accept that Job, too, has never walked any path but the path of righteousness.  
This is the meaning of Job’s indictment.86   
These verses (17:8-9) constitute Job’s most striking questioning of his belief in the 
existence of the one right path.  Although he does not, here, disavow the existence of the 
right path in the abstract but only in his actual, concrete situation, the bitterness with which 
Job accuses his friends of keeping to the way of righteousness indicates that he harbors 
mixed feelings about the path of righteousness in and of itself.  He is not certain that to 
keep to the path of righteousness, when faced with suffering such as his, is, in fact, right, if 
those keeping to that path must condemn him in order to ensure their righteousness and the 
blessing they believe comes with the territory.  Although, in this way, we can make some 
sense of Job’s derogatory comments about those who keep to the path of righteousness, his 
words remain perplexing.  It is difficult to know whether, here, he is rejecting belief in the 
existence of one right path and a multitude of wrong paths, or whether he is simply 
                                                 
86 Clines interprets the passage in a similar way, writing that Job’s critique of the righteous is “against their 
intelligence, which will not let them question their conviction that any sufferer must be a godless person” 
(Clines 1989, 397). 
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angered by his friends’ behavior.  Yet, if he disapproves of his friends’ behavior while, at 
the same time, viewing them as traveling the path of righteousness, with the path serving 
as a metaphor for behavior and belief, he must be taking some issue with the idea of the 
one right path.  If the right path is not right in all situations—that is, if there are times 
when a person ought to deviate from the path—then the whole paradigm of one right path 
versus a multitude of wrong paths is knocked apart and replaced by the idea of a multitude 
of paths, the rightness or wrongness of which depends on the situation in which a person 
finds him or herself.  In this view, order is constituted not by one way of behaving but by a 
multiplicity of ways, and chaos is constituted by the claim that there is only one right way 
no matter what the situation.  Given Job’s situation—which represents something novel in 
his and the friends’ experience—the friends ought not hold to what they consider to be the 
one way of righteousness.  Instead, they ought to leave that path for another more suitable 
to the situation, and be ready to move again when the situation shifts.  Of course, Job does 
not affirm this view in the end, and here he only hints at it.  The confusion caused by the 
verse arises from Job’s failure to develop his thought and also from the fact that what he 
seems to mean is quite different from what he presents himself as believing in the majority 
of his speeches. 
The other place where Job questions the model of one right path is in his 
description of the wicked who prosper despite saying to God, “‘Leave us alone!  We do 
not desire to know your ways’” (21:14).  Granted, whenever he speaks about the prosperity 
of the wicked Job is clear that such a situation does not represent the world as it ought to 
be.  Yet, although there are times when Job imagines the world as it ought to be as existing 
somewhere, if only as an abstract form of perfection which presents the possibility of 
earthly embodiment, there are other points at which Job seems to despair of this 
possibility.   
In his speech of chapter 21, Job makes the claim that it does not matter how a 
person chooses to live.  Job finds this fact appalling.  He says, “Look at me, and be 
appalled, and lay your hand upon your mouth.  When I think of it I am dismayed, and 
shuddering seizes my flesh” (21:5-6).  What appalls and dismays Job is not his suffering 
per se, but what it means about the way the world works.  Job’s suffering, along with the 
prosperity of the wicked, discounts his belief in the one right path.  Both he and the wicked 
are living proof that no such path exists.  It is not that the paths have been reversed, but 
that there is no way of knowing where any path leads.  In fact, no path leads to any fixed 
destination.  No behavior has specific guaranteed consequences, for the only guaranteed 
consequence of life is death.  Job says, “One dies in full prosperity, being wholly at ease 
and secure, his loins full of milk and the marrow of his bones moist.  Another dies in 
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bitterness of soul, never having tasted of good.  They lie down alike in the dust, and the 
worms cover them” (21:23-26).  Although, for the friends, untimely death is the penalty 
for wickedness, for Job, here, death is what comes to all and has nothing to do with which 
path one has chosen to tread.  The fact of human mortality renders one’s choices irrelevant, 
one’s ways a mere passing of the time. Whether one is wicked or righteous, one cannot 
escape the end which nullifies whatever came before.  To his friends who insist that the 
wicked do, in fact, suffer malign consequences for their actions, Job responds, “How…will 
you comfort me with empty nothings?  There is nothing left of your answers but 
falsehood” (21:34).  Job would like to be comforted by the friends’ words; he would like to 
believe that each path is a journey to a specific place, but his experience has taught him 
that this is falsehood. 
Job abandons the idea of the one right path not because it no longer represents his 
idea of order, but because it has no basis in reality.  Unlike the previous passage examined, 
here Job does not gesture toward a different vision of order, in which a multiplicity of 
paths present themselves as potentially right.  Rather, his vision of order remains the same, 
but he understands that he lives in a world in which order is impossible.  God’s capricious 
behavior and the inevitability of death mean that the world as it actually is can be nothing 
but chaos.  The word has never been nor will ever be the kind of order that Job envisions; 
it will never be as it ought to be.  As I have said, Job will not, in the end, affirm this 
statement, but will make his oath of innocence in the firm belief that he has a ground on 
which to stand and that God will recognize his vision of the way the world ought to be as 
his own and set things right.   
In this passage, though, Job seems to approach the idea that God’s vision of order 
may not be his own.  He does not say this outright, but it is implied by his recognition that 
the world has never been and will never be the way he thinks it ought to be.  The world, as 
created by God, is chaos as far as Job can tell.  Yet, it seems that Job would have a hard 
time believing that the world created by God is not the world as God thinks it ought to be.  
To say that something has gone wrong with the world renders its chaotic state 
comprehensible, but to say that it was created as chaos makes no sense.  If the world is, has 
always been, and will always be a place in which there is not one right path, but a 
multiplicity of paths leading in any number of directions, none of which is more right than 
any other, then it follows that this is God’s idea of how the world ought to be.  It remains 
to be seen whether, in his own speeches, God confirms Job’s depiction of the way the 
world is and affirms this world as conforming to his own understanding of order. 
 
“How Many Different Ways…?”  The Multiplicity of Paths in God’s First Speech 
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When God responds to Job in chapters 38-41 he, too, makes use of the language of 
the path or way, but seems to use the terms non-metaphorically, in reference to actual 
roads and not to ways of behaving or believing.  Yet, as has been seen in the gospel song 
quoted at the opening of this chapter and in Job’s chapter 28 hymn to wisdom, it is 
possible to play with the terms in such a way that, while one seems to be talking about 
actual paths, one is really speaking metaphorically.  I want to contend that although God 
seems to be speaking about actual paths, his description of these paths is intended to 
address Job’s description of the metaphorical paths along which one lives one’s life.  In his 
first speech, God asks Job, 
Have you entered into the springs of the sea, or walked in the recesses of the 
deep?  Have the gates of death been revealed to you, or have you seen the gates 
of deep darkness?  Have you comprehended the expanse of the earth?...Where 
is the way to the dwelling of light, and where is the place of darkness, that you 
may take it to its territory and that you may discern the paths to its home? 
Surely you know, for you were born then, and the number of your days is 
great!  (38:16-18a, 19-21) 
Here, God asks Job whether the paths he has walked have led him to the extreme ends of 
the earth.  There is debate about how the book’s author intended God’s questions to be 
answered, as discussed in the previous chapter.  Rowold and Habel argue that the implied 
answer to all of the questions “is not, ‘Who knows?’ or ‘I did not,’ but ‘you alone did’” 
(Habel 1985, 529).  If this is correct, then Job’s unspoken answer to God’s question “Have 
you walked these paths?” should be understood as, “No.  You alone have traveled the 
paths leading to the earth’s extremities.”  Janzen offers a counter-reading of the implied 
answers to God’s questions.  Referring to this passage specifically, he writes, 
Is it the case that Job in no sense has ever taken darkness to its territory and 
delimited its sway through an act which images what God did in Genesis 1:3-
5?…one cannot gainsay the fact that Job’s periodic imaginative ventures of 
hope toward God…do in fact delimit the darkness in which his own life is 
engulfed.  At least in these ways Job has seen the gates of darkness and from 
there has commanded a morning.  (Janzen 1985, 237) 
For Janzen, Job has walked these paths, at least in a sense.  In his suffering he has trod the 
paths of darkness; he says as much in chapter 19 when he laments, “he has set darkness 
upon my paths” (19:8b).   
 But if it is true that, in some sense, Job has walked these paths and can answer God 
in the affirmative, we must ask whether he has seen any value in this journey, and the 
answer to that question would seem to be “no.”  If Job is able to answer “yes,” it must be a 
“yes” tempered by regret, an “unfortunately, yes.”  From Job’s perspective, to walk the 
paths leading to the gates of the deep and to the place of deep darkness is to stray from the 
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one right path.  If Job is able to answer “yes,” he must view it as a sign that the world is 
not as it ought to be; he has been thrust off the path of order and onto the paths of chaos 
where he gropes his way through deep darkness toward he knows not what.  If Job answers 
“No, I have not,” to God’s questions about the paths he has walked, it must be with some 
pride.  Job has walked only one path—the path of righteousness—and it is based on his 
having stuck to this path that Job is able to affirm his innocence and call on God to answer 
him (“Here is my signature!  Let the Almighty answer me!” [31:35b]).  Likewise, in 
chapter 28, Job has sung of the one path to wisdom, a path characterized by fearing God 
and departing from evil; it is down this path and this path only that Job has walked, 
avoiding the mistaken paths taken by others.  Indeed, in that chapter, Job has described the 
miners who delve deep into the earth, bringing light to its deepest darkness, and has 
rejected those paths as leading to death. 
  That God questions Job about what paths he has traveled is apropos.  What Job has 
been asking for throughout the book is for God to appear and examine his paths.  In 
chapter 23, he has said, “My foot has held fast to his steps; I have kept his way and have 
not turned aside” (23:11), and, in his oath of innocence has sworn,  
Does he not see my ways, and number all my steps? If I have walked with 
falsehood, and my foot has hurried to deceit—let me be weighed in a just 
balance, and let God know my integrity!—if my step has turned aside from the 
way…let what grows for me be rooted out.  (31:5-7a, 8b) 
Job has expected God to question him about the paths he has traveled, and he has been 
ready to answer, “I have not traveled any path except the one true path.”  Job expects that 
when God sees the path he has walked God will realize that he has been made to suffer 
unjustly and will be swift to set things right.  Sure enough, God questions Job about paths, 
and Job has his answer ready.  If he does not blurt it out at once, it must be because of a 
dawning uncertainty about the answer God would consider correct.  Job is all set to say, 
“No, of course not.  You know I have not walked those paths,” but, given the context of 
God’s questions, it must occur to him that God would prefer the answer to be “yes.”   
Unlike Job, God does not seem to view order in terms of the one right path and 
chaos in terms of the many wrong paths.  Instead, as God presents it, there are a 
multiplicity of right paths, and the more of them one has walked the better off one is.  It is 
not that there is one path to wisdom, as Job supposes, and that, having walked that path, 
one will be wise, but that there are many paths leading to wisdom, and, if one hopes to be 
wise, one must walk them all.  That is, it is not that all paths lead separately to wisdom, 
and that if one chooses one or the other one will end up being wise.  Rather, it is that one 
must walk this path and that path and that other path and still another in order to gain 
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wisdom.  As God sees it, such wide-ranging movement is the ideal; Job has been limited 
rather than enriched, as he supposes, by clinging to his one path and avoiding all others.  
Indeed, if Job is entitled to answer “yes” to God’s questions about whether he has 
traveled the paths to the dwelling of darkness and the gates of death and from there has 
groped his way along the path to the dwelling of the light by virtue of his having suffered, 
as Janzen proposes, he can only lay claim to this answer by abandoning his insistence that 
there is only one right path from which he has never strayed.  In order to want to answer 
“yes” Job must change his beliefs about what the ordered world looks like.  He must 
recognize his suffering as valuable experience, permitting him access to paths which he 
would not otherwise have traveled, instead of as a walling up of his access to the right path 
(3:23; 19:8) or a breaking down of the barriers protecting the right path from being 
disturbed (30:13-14).  There is some irony here.  Job cannot hold to what he considers his 
integrity if he hopes to answer “yes” to any of God’s questions; to answer “yes” he must 
affirm that he has left the one path behind and has traveled down ways which he considers 
wrong.  At the same time, to answer “yes” would increase his standing before God, 
because it would prove that he, Job, has traveled the multiplicity of paths necessary to gain 
wisdom.  Before God appears, Job believes that God wants human beings to travel the one 
path of righteousness and not to stray from its way.  When God begins to speak, Job 
discovers that God has quite another thing in mind.  For human beings to do what they 
ought to do and to be what they ought to be, they need to travel as many paths as possible.  
It is no wonder that Job cannot find God on the path he is traveling.  Job has previously 
lamented, “If I go forward, he is not there; or backward, I cannot perceive him; on the left 
he hides, and I cannot behold him; I turn to the right, but I cannot see him,” (23:8-9).  
Job’s plan has been to stay on the path and wait for God, in whose footsteps he believes he 
is following, to return.  In his speeches, however, God reveals that Job’s one path is not 
God’s only path.  To follow in God’s footsteps is to move in various ways, and God’s 
questions challenge Job to follow by walking the many paths of life.  
 As his speech continues, God details the variety of ways by which the many 
creatures of the world live.  The wild ass “ranges the mountains” (39:8a).  The wild ox will 
not “harrow the valleys after you” (39:10b), that is, the wild ox will not follow in the paths 
designated by human beings, but, like the wild ass, will follow its own ways.  The ostrich 
lays its eggs in the paths of other animals “forgetting that a foot may crush them, and that a 
wild animal may trample them” (39:15), but even such seeming stupidity is not condemned 
by God.  If Job thinks he has identified the one path to wisdom, God throws a wrench in 
Job’s suppositions by saying, “Well, there are other things besides wisdom.  Look at the 
ostrich.  It follows the way of foolishness, and, not only do I approve, but I set it on that 
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path in the first place.”  The horse follows a path leading into battle—“It paws violently, 
exults mightily; it goes out to meet the weapons… With fierceness and rage it swallows 
the ground; it cannot stand still at the sound of the trumpet” (39:21, 24)—also arguably a 
path of foolishness which God does not condemn.  God depicts hawks and eagles soaring 
through the sky, looking not for wisdom as Job had claimed in chapter 28, a quest in which 
they are unsuccessful, but for blood, which they do find; having found it, they drink deeply 
of its life-giving draughts, succoring their young with the blood of the slain.  In his 
depiction of these animals, God describes himself as the creator and guardian of a great 
multiplicity of paths, a great variety of ways of behaving, which are certainly not reducible 
to Job’s one right way.  “Are the birds of prey in the wrong because they do not find 
wisdom?” God can be understood to be asking Job.  God’s answer would seem to be, “No.  
They are not looking for wisdom, but for blood.  They are not on the wrong path.”   
 God speaks not only of the ways animals live, but of the ways in which natural 
phenomena occur.  He asks, “Who has cut a channel for the torrents of rain, and a way for 
the thunderbolt, to bring rain on a land where no one lives, on the desert which is empty of 
human life, to satisfy the waste and desolate land, and to make the ground put forth grass?” 
(38:25-27).  The way followed by this rain and these thunderbolts would seem, from a 
human perspective, to be the wrong way.  It would make more sense for God to ask Job, 
“Who has cut a channel for the torrents of rain, and a way for the thunderbolt, to bring rain 
on the land where people live, so that the fertile ground is able to bear crops and sustain 
human life?”  How impressed can Job be with a God who sends rain in the wrong direction 
and down the wrong paths?  If God’s intention in his speeches is simply to “wow” Job, to 
overwhelm him with depictions of his power by comparison with which Job is puny and 
insignificant, as some would argue, his examples are all wrong.  That God describes his 
activity as providing a way for the rain to fall on uninhabited land indicates that he is 
making a different point.  The point being made, as in the case of the animals who eschew 
captivity and/or wisdom, is that a multiplicity of paths are valid.  The path which leads to 
uninhabited land is not the wrong path, and rain falling on such land is not falling where it 
ought not to fall.  It is falling where it ought to fall, and its falling on the land where no one 
lives is not an example of chaos but of order.  Rain is not confined to one right channel, 
from which it should not deviate, but falls everywhere, on all sorts of landscapes.   
In his first speech, God presents Job with a world in which there are a multiplicity 
of right ways and not just one, as Job has supposed, and challenges Job to change what he 
believes about the singular way in which one ought to live and the multiple ways one 
ought not to live.  Whether Job relinquishes his own beliefs and adopts God’s point of 
view is uncertain.  However, if he does cling to his own claim that there is only one right 
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path, he now does so in denial of what God has identified as his own paths.  That is, Job 
can no longer claim that he has kept to the path followed by God, or the path that God 
ought to follow.  God, in affirming a multiplicity of paths, disputes Job’s claim that there is 
one right path down which both he and everyone ought to travel.  For Job to stay on his 
one path and affirm its superiority over all others is for him to disagree with God, which is, 
in itself, a recognition that there are a multiplicity of paths and not just one.
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CHAPTER 4 
ORDER AND CHAOS AS RELATED TO TIME: STASIS AND CHANGE 
 
The Temporal Dimensions of Order and Chaos 
 
 Whereas the second and fifth chapters of this thesis deal with spatial aspects of 
chaos and order, this chapter addresses their temporal dimensions;87 it is concerned with 
how chaos and order are perceived in time.  There are two ways of thinking about this.  
First, it may be asked when chaos and order are believed to exist.  For example, is chaos 
located sometime in the past, or is it something experienced now, in the present?  Does 
order accurately describe a past time or does it a describe a time looked forward to, in the 
future?  In the myths of Eden and Apocalypse, order is designated as belonging to the past 
and the future, while chaos characterizes the present time.   
The second way of thinking about the temporal dimensions of order and chaos is to 
ask about how they relate to time, a question which is somewhat more difficult to 
formulate. That is, it is not when chaos and order appear in time that is the issue, but what 
they do with time once they have appeared.  For example, if the appearance of an ordered 
world is anticipated in the future, what happens to time once that ordered world has 
arrived?  Does time stop, rendering the ordered world static and stable, a world, 
essentially, without time, or does time continue, meaning that the ordered world is open to 
change?  And what about chaos?  If the present is designated chaotic time, is that chaos 
timelessly static or is it timefully changeable?   
In this chapter, I will deal primarily with the ways in which the characters in the 
Book of Job answer the second kind of question about chaos and order as they relate to 
time.  As regards the first kind of question—the when question—the characters do answer 
it, and I will touch on their answers.  It is, however, the second question which elicits 
answers about the actual nature of order and chaos, as they are perceived.  The first 
question only tells me when, it does not tell me what.  The second question, by contrast, is 
formulated to tell me what chaos and order are like as they relate to time, so it is this 
question which can actually reveal characters’ beliefs about how chaos and order are 
constituted.   
 
Stasis and Utopia 
 
                                                 
87 Chapter 3 uses a spatial metaphor to address a non-spatial dimension of chaos and order. 
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Although scholars like Niditch and Cohn describe chaos as static and timeless and 
order as characterized by change and movement in time,88 this depiction is quite 
counterintuitive, as discussed in the introductory chapter.  It seems far more natural to 
conceive of order as static and of chaos as characterized by change.  That this is the case is 
borne out by utopian fiction, in which, once the order of utopia has been achieved, nothing 
ever happens.  Once things have become as they ought to be, any change must only serve 
to disrupt that order.  Of utopian fiction Jean Pfaelzer writes, “There is no extended 
conflict, because utopia marks the end of history; without history there can be no fictional 
activity” (Pfaelzer 1981, 120).  The Talking Heads song “Heaven,” can be seen to make a 
similar point.  In the first verse David Byrne sings, “Everyone is trying to get to the bar.  
The name of the bar, the bar is called Heaven.  The band in Heaven plays my favorite 
song.  They play it once again, they play it all night long.”89  Between verses which detail 
the unchanging nature of heaven, Byrne sings the chorus, “Heaven is a place where 
nothing ever happens.”  Once the when of heaven has been reached, time stops; the same 
things happen over and over, but this is not a problem, for, as Byrne sings, “It’s hard to 
imagine that nothing at all could be so exciting, could be so much fun.”  Once the ordered 
world has been established, in which one can hear one’s favorite song all night long, there 
is no need for anything else.  To change the record can only be to make things worse. 
Of course, not everyone has the same favorite song.  In Maurice Sendak’s 
children’s story Very Far Away, a group of characters, including a horse, a sparrow, a cat, 
and a boy named Martin go off in search of a place “very far away” which will fulfill all 
their desires.  Once they reach that place, however, they quickly fall into quarrels over 
whose version of “very far away” ought to hold sway.  The horse, for example, believes 
that “Very far away is where a horse can dream….The way I used to dream in the deep 
blue grass” (Sendak 1957, 20), but this is not a place which has room for cats who believe 
that “Very far away is where a cat can sing all day, and nobody says, hush cat!” (ibid., 26).  
Although “very far away” can be reached, it does not maintain its status as “very far away” 
for long.  Discovering that the place they have found cannot fulfill all their ideas about 
what the world ought to be, the characters soon disperse.  Although Sendak’s book tells the 
story of a failed utopia, it falls short of describing a dystopia.  Kenneth Roemer explains 
dystopia as, “an imaginary alternative that is much worse than the present…the negative 
image of utopia…the depiction of a bad time and place” (Roemer 1981, 3).   
There is more, though, to dystopia than Roemer’s description suggests.  In fiction, 
dystopia is not simply “the depiction of a bad time and place,” but of a utopia gone wrong.  
                                                 
88 See chapter 1, pages 10-11. 
89 Talking Heads.  “Heaven.”  Fear of Music.  Sire Records, 1979. 
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In this way Very Far Away comes close to being dystopian fiction.  What keeps it from 
becoming a picture of dystopia is that the place “very far away” turns out to be no worse 
than the world the characters inhabited before going there.  It is not better, as they 
expected, but it is not worse, either; it is the same kind of place as any other place.  When 
their utopia fails, the characters simply pack up and go home, having lost nothing but an 
afternoon and their illusions.  In dystopian fiction, by contrast, the utopian situation is 
prolonged past the point where it has become evident that it does not satisfy all the 
characters’ hopes and desires.  Sendak’s book could be made into dystopian fiction if all 
the characters were forced to remain “very far away” and submit to one vision of how that 
place ought to be: if all the characters were required, for example, to dream dreams of deep 
blue grass and to acknowledge that this activity is essential to the maintenance of utopia.  
A dystopia is a utopia taken too far, a utopia in which one idea of how the world ought to 
be is enforced,  and in which no change is possible, and yet, in this, the similarity between 
the two designations is revealed.  In both, one idea of how the world ought to be is 
maintained and in both, no change is possible.  In both there is only one song being played 
again and again.  Whether the world seems utopian or dystopian depends on whether you 
like the song enough to hear it over and over again, forever.  Chances are, if there is more 
than one person in such a world, it will be a dystopia, not a utopia. 
Although, above, I have suggested that it is counterintuitive to think of chaos as 
static and order as changeable, this discussion of dystopia lends support to this 
counterintuitive notion, or at least shows how we might conceive of chaos as static and 
order as a state in which change is possible.  Gary Saul Morson, responding to a newspaper 
headline describing the toppling of a statue of Lenin in Ethiopia, reflects,  
Over the past two and a half years, this scene has been repeated in numerous 
countries governed by regimes proclaiming that the end of history has been 
reached.  Statues of the man who established the final system…were 
overthrown in a kind of ritual return to ‘history.’…Like executing the tsar, 
overturning Lenin was a kind of metahistorical act, in this case asserting the 
openness of time.  (Morson 1994, 1) 
  Implicit in Morson’s observations is the claim that the “end of history” proclaimed by 
Lenin was not all it was cracked up to be, not because it was not static, but because stasis 
leaves much to be desired.  At the same time, Morson acknowledges that human beings 
“hunger for the end of time” for, in his view, timelessness equals certainty (Ibid.).  If there 
is no time, there is no change, and if there is no change, one always knows what will 
happen in the future (if the term “future” is even applicable in such a situation).  
 On the one hand, the appeal of stasis is obvious.  It almost goes without saying that 
once an ordered world has been arrived at, no further change ought to be necessary, for 
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change can only upset the stability of what has been achieved.  On the other hand, there are 
ways in which stasis can be seen to be undesirable, to be an aspect of chaos and not of 
order.  Among these is the fact that order which is prolonged, with no room for change, 
tends to turn into chaos, not because it changes, but because the characters who inhabit it 
change.  Once I have heard my favorite song a million times, it may no longer be my 
favorite song.  It may, in fact, be my least favorite song.  Additionally, problems arises 
from the issue of “conflicting utopias.”  For a static order to remain order it needs to be a 
world occupied by only one person, the person whose favorite song is being played.  For 
those who never liked the song in the first place, the static world can only be a dystopian 
chaos.   
In the Book of Job, the characters answer the question of the relation between 
chaos and order and time in several ways.  For Job, who views the ordered world as 
simple, order is static, as would be expected.  The friends, while they agree with Job about 
the stability of order, focus on describing the change which afflicts the lives of the wicked, 
designating them as chaotic beings.  When God speaks from the whirlwind, he presents an 
ordered world that is changeable, basing the orderliness of change on the multiplicity of 
creatures which share the world. 
 
The Static Nature of Order in the Prose Tale 
 
 In the prose tale, Job presents an ordered world that is essentially unchanging.  
Although there is a kind of “blip” of change in the middle of the tale—where Job is 
reduced from being “the greatest man in the east” to being a pauper afflicted with horrible 
sores—the end of the tale brings a resolution that is, arguably, a return to its beginning.  
That is, whatever happens in the middle of the story, its beginning and end are essentially 
the same and, in their sameness, they render the intervening difference insignificant.90  It 
might be asked, of course, what the point of telling such a story is.  If the end and the 
beginning are the same, why bother telling a story at all?  Indeed, stories seem to require 
change, often embodied in conflict, if they are to be considered stories.  Shlomith Rimmon-
Kenan defines narrative fiction as representing “a  succession of events,” where an event is 
defined as “something that happens” (Rimmon-Kenan 1983, 2).  If there is only one event, 
one thing that happens, there would seem to be no story.  And if nothing happens there is 
even less of a story!  A story with no change—with no conflict—is no story.  Is it true, 
                                                 
90 Here, I am dealing with the prose tale on its own, ignoring the intervening poetic material.  Read in the 
light of the poetic section, the prose ending does not figure as a return to the beginning.  I will discuss this in 
more detail below. 
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then, that the prose tale is static, and, if it is true, is it correspondingly true that it is not a 
story but only a kind of fragment?   
Let us take the second part of the question first.  The prose tale does not read like a 
fragment.  It reads like a proper story.  It begins, as proper stories should, with exposition, 
introducing the characters and the situation.  A conflict follows this introductory material, 
as hassatan calls into question the motivations lying behind the behaviors of both Job and 
God.  (Job has not served God for no reason, and God has been too quick to supply Job 
with reasons for worship.)  In order to resolve the conflict, God allows hassatan to afflict 
Job, proving that he himself is not guilty of putting a protective fence around Job, and 
allowing Job to prove that his righteousness is unmotivated by selfish factors.  Following 
the resolution of the conflict, the story concludes with the removal of Job’s affliction and 
the restoration of his status of “greatest man in the east.”  The prose tale, then, can clearly 
be seen to fulfill the requirements of a story, which would seem to indicate that it is not, 
after all, static.  Stories are not static, and if the prose tale is a story, then it, necessarily, is 
not static either.   
Yet, I come back to the fact that Job, in the prose tale, ends up essentially where he 
begins, with one distinction, which may be major or minor depending on the lens through 
which one views it.  Job begins and ends the tale as the “greatest of all the people of the 
east.”  He begins and ends as the tale’s central character, surrounded by a multitude of 
others whose focus is on him.  What changes from beginning to end is that Job’s fear of 
God is proven to be unmotivated by external factors.  At the beginning, hassatan is able to 
advance the possibility that Job may not fear God “for nothing,” but at the end this is no 
longer available as a possibility.  Job is proven to act in one way and not in another.  How 
much this change is seen to matter depends on how much value we accord the proof.  In 
fact, it is equally true of Job at the beginning of the tale as at the end that he fears God for 
nothing.  Job himself has not changed.  What has changed is how we are able to view Job; 
previously, it was possible to surmise that Job feared God for something instead of 
nothing, but now Job bears a special seal, informing us that he has been tested and is 
guaranteed to fear God for nothing.  What is required of Job in his passing of the test is not 
that he change, but that he stay the same, exhibiting the same behavior during the test as he 
exhibited before the test began.  This is a crucial detail.  At one level, change happens in 
the story, in that Job, who was great, is, for a time, brought low.  At another level—I 
would argue the more important level—change is what does not happen.  Change is what 
Job successfully avoids, even as he is assailed by changes from without. 
 Job, though beset by changes in his circumstances, does not himself change.  If he 
appears different at the end of the tale, it is only because our perception of him has 
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changed and not because he himself has changed.  Indeed, if our perception of him has 
changed, it is precisely because he himself has not changed, allowing us to view him, now, 
as a stable entity instead of as a being capable of change!  In addition, the significance of 
this change in perception is further minimized if we accept that the prose tale is Job’s 
daydream, as I have already suggested.  If whatever seems to happen in the tale only 
happens in Job’s mind, then whose perception are we talking about?  If Job imagines the 
story, then the one perceiving would seem to be none other than Job himself.  Can we say 
that Job’s perception of himself changes as the tale progresses?  I do not think we can.  Job 
knows at the beginning of the tale that his righteousness is guaranteed.  He has hassatan 
and God set up the test in the way they do because he is certain he will pass it.  He is 
certain that he will not change, no matter how much (imaginary) pressure is applied.  It 
seems fair to say that Job, at the end of the tale, views himself no differently from how he 
viewed himself at the beginning.  The guarantee of his unmotivated righteousness provided 
by his passing of the test does not change his perception of himself.  It is, in fact, a 
gratuitous guarantee, a guarantee “for nothing.” 
 If Job does not change in the tale and if his self-perception does not change and if 
our perception of him is only secondary—brought to bear by the author telling the tale91—
then it seems fair to say that the story is static.  Nothing happens, and the whole point of 
the story is that nothing happens.  The apparent change in Job’s status is only superficial.  
His real status—as the righteous man who fears God for nothing—remains unchanged and 
intact.  The tale is able, however, to retain its categorization as a story in its presentation of 
potential change.  The conflict that appears in the story exists only as a kind of ghost, a 
wispy intimation of what might possibly happen, but does not actually happen.  Job might 
fail the test, hassatan suggests and we, the readers, take hassatan’s suggestion to heart, 
viewing it as a real possibility, even though Job himself knows that it will never happen 
the way hassatan thinks it might.  The suggestion of change is enough to qualify the prose 
tale as a story (as least in embryonic form), but change itself is shown—by Job, who does 
not change and reaps the attendant rewards—to be undesirable.   
                                                 
91 The tale exists at two levels.  On one level, as I have argued, it is a daydream in the mind of Job.  On 
another level, however, it is a story written by an author for us (whoever we may be) to read.  The tale is both 
inside Job’s mind and outside of it.  If it remained in his head, we would have no access to it.  Obviously, 
though, we do have access to it!  Because of the two levels at which the tale exists, it can be read as 
presenting two different points of view.  It presents both Job’s point of view and the point of view of the 
author.  It may be that, while from Job’s point of view, he undergoes no change as the tale progresses, from 
the author’s point of view (and from ours inasmuch as we have access to the tale through the author) Job 
does change, in that the guarantee of his righteousness is established through the tests he undergoes.  It is 
important not to conflate these two points of view, but to treat them as separate despite the fact that they 
overlay each other in the prose tale. 
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The fundamental stasis of Job’s character in the tale (viewed as Job’s daydream) 
allows us to perceive that Job views order as similarly static. For Job, change, if it is to be 
regarded as order and not as chaos, must happen in the service of stasis, in the same way 
that multiplicity, if it exists within the ordered world, must exist to support singularity.  
The superficial changes that are forced upon Job by God and hassatan do not represent an 
incursion of chaos into Job’s ordered world, because they serve to bolster his status as a 
static being.  Change happens, but it happens so that it need not happen ever again.  The 
world which comes into being after Job’s trials is more static and therefore more orderly 
than the world which existed previously. 
 I have said above that the prose tale manages to qualify as a story by presenting at 
least the potential of conflict and change, even though these are never realized.  Thinking 
again, though, I am not so sure that story is the best designation for this piece of writing.  
The conflict and changes that occur (as potentialities) do so only in the mind of the reader.  
It seems to me that “snapshot” might be the better term to describe the prose tale’s genre.  
It is, primarily, a picture of a world and not a story about something that happens in that 
particular world.  What is this world like?  It is a world in which Job is, always and 
unchangingly, the central, real character.  It is a world in which Job is, without fail, 
blameless and upright, and in which he, at all times, serves God for nothing.  It is a 
Disneyesque world; you can almost see the Technicolor stream running alongside Job’s 
thatched-roof cottage, inside of which he is engaged in some virtuous activity such as 
mending shoes or stacking wood by the fireplace.  Even though trouble—in the form of 
some rude ruffian like hassatan or some haughty and villainous prince like God—may be 
about to intrude on the scene, the scene itself is essentially stable.  The end will find the 
humble hero exactly where he began, so much so that it is as if the villain never poked his 
head into the scene at all.  The villain flits through like a passing breeze, perhaps ruffling a 
few leaves, but making no lasting impression.  He need not have bothered, so irrelevant are 
his efforts. The world is as it ought to be, and as it is it will stay.   
Newsom, noticing the absence of any real conflict in the prose tale, also asks the 
question of whether it can be said to qualify as a story.  She suggests that the tale be 
understood as a “pre-emptive narrative” as defined by Wolfgang Iser.  She explains Iser’s 
term, writing, “‘pre-emptive’ narratives…take an established social or moral norm (like 
piety) and, rather than rendering it problematical, involve the hero in some sort of activity 
that tests and reconfirms the value....A story of this sort is a socially stabilizing rather than 
a socially transforming story” (Newsom 1993, 123).  In this way, it is possible to view the 
prose tale as a story, despite its lack of conflict.  It is, though, a very special kind of story, 
one which promotes stasis rather than change.  Job, as the central real character of the 
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prose tale is able to guarantee the stability of the world in which he lives.  What matters is 
not what others do—even if they are powers on the level of God or hassatan—but what 
Job does.  He is confident of his ability to stand firm, and his static pose supports the 
unchanging order of the world. 
 
Job’s Static View of Order in the Poetic Section: Life is not a Journey 
 
It is not only in the prose tale that Job preferences stasis over change.  Throughout 
his speeches of the poetic section he makes clear that, in his view, the world as it ought to 
be is static.  In her essay, “Wounded Hero on a Shaman’s Quest,” Carole Fontaine reads 
the Book of Job, in its entirety, as a folktale which follows the traditional sequence of 
action of folk literature as described by Vladimir Propp92  and also as a “shaman’s tale” 
(Fontaine 1992, 70-85).  Both of these readings stress the idea that everything Job 
experiences throughout the course of the book has, as its goal, his transformation.  As 
Fontaine sees it, the other characters who appear in the book act as “donors” or “helpers” 
whose purpose is to speed Job toward his goal.  At the end of the book, after his encounter 
with God, Job reaches the end of his “quest” and is healed.  The successful completion of 
Job’s journey is indicated by his reinstatement in society. Fontaine explains,  
The tale concludes with functions which center upon the reinstatement of the 
Hero.  The action of a tale does not simply return the Hero to his initial 
situation, but, as a result of the values gained by successful completion of all 
the tale tests, leaves the Hero at a higher level than that at which he began.  
(Fontaine 1987, 222) 
For Fontaine, reading the book as a folktale, where Job is at the end of the book, though it 
may appear similar, is not the same place as that from which he set out.  Instead, his ordeal 
has been a transformative journey, which has had as its goal his arrival at a new 
understanding of his place in the world.   
 Reading the book as a shamanic tale, Fontaine reaches similar conclusions.  She 
identifies Job as undergoing a shamanic ordeal based on the fact that illness often serves as 
the entry point into the shamanic world.  She writes, “Often the dread illness functions…as 
a sort of…initiation…as the afflicted soul is sent wandering away from its body to return 
                                                 
92 In an earlier essay Fontaine explains Propp’s theory of folk literature, writing, “Propp’s approach to the 
folktale starts with the consideration of those features of the tale which are invariant, rather than focusing on 
individual motifs or themes.”  For Propp, though there may be any number of actors or “subjects” in the 
folktale, “the actions of these characters, the ‘predicates’ of the tale are actually fairly limited.”  These 
actions, or “functions,” as Propp calls them, “are ‘understood as an act of a character, defined from the point 
of view of its significance for the course of the action.’  They constitute the recurring, stable elements which 
make a given folk narrative into a folktale.”  Fontaine goes on to list the thirty-one functions identified by 
Propp, and, in the rest of her essay, ties a number of these functions to the various characters in Job, showing 
how the book follows the structure of a folktale.  (Fontaine 1987, 207). 
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eventually in possession of the secrets of life and healing” (Fontaine 1992, 80).  So, Job, in 
his illness, can be seen as departing from normal human society, communing with the 
divine, and returning with a new understanding of the position of humanity in the world 
and the capacity to intercede for his friends who have not been through the same 
experience.  As Fontaine understands it, Job’s return to health is triggered by his newfound 
knowledge of his place in the world.  Yahweh, in his speeches, reveals the 
interconnectedness of all creation, and, in doing so, heals Job.  Job repents, not because he 
has been overpowered by Yahweh, but because he has been “firmly reintegrated into the 
web of creation” (Ibid., 83). 
Fontaine may well be correct in her assertion that the author of the book intends 
Job’s suffering to be viewed as a transformative journey which, in turn, has the power to 
transform its readers.93  Indeed, she is not alone in interpreting the book in this way.  
Perdue writes, “in the book of Job…sages struggle to articulate a language that engages 
faith, revitalizes tradition, and recreates the world….Reality is redescribed, and in its 
redescription is transformed into a new creation” (Perdue 1991, 38).  I do not disagree 
with reading the book as a whole as potentially performing this function.  It seems to me, 
though, that Job himself does not view his suffering in this light.  Transformation, far from 
being his goal, is not even in his vocabulary.   
When Job speaks his oath of innocence, he does so not to effect his transformation 
but to effect his restoration.  What Job envisages as the outcome of his meeting with God 
is not the completion of a journey to some place new, but his return to where and how he 
used to be.  Job does not imagine himself as coming out on the other side of his suffering 
having learned something that he could not have learned otherwise, but as returned to 
where he was before he started to suffer, so that it is as if his suffering never happened.  
That this is how Job views his situation is evidenced by his cry in chapter 29, “O that I 
were as in the months of old” (29:2a).  The world as it was is how the world ought to be, as 
far as Job is concerned.  Job does not even expect to learn anything new from an encounter 
with God.  Rather, he expects that if God consents to meet him it will be to go over the 
accounts of his behavior which will give him the opportunity to show that, despite the 
changes in his circumstances, he has remained the same as he always was and that, 
therefore, his circumstances, too, ought to have remained unchanged.  Job views his ordeal 
not as a journey but as a mistake, a chaotic disruption of the static order of the world. 
 
God as Agent of Chaotic Change 
                                                 
93 I will discuss the author’s attitudes toward change and stasis in more detail at the end of this chapter. 
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 One of the major accusations Job brings against God is that he acts as an agent of 
change in the world, in fact as the solitary agent of change.  In chapter 9 Job describes the 
changes—both creative and destructive—wrought upon the earth by God.  He says, 
If one wished to contend with him, one could not answer him in a thousand.  
He is wise in heart, and mighty in strength—who has resisted him, and 
succeeded?—he who removes mountains, and they do not know it, when he 
overturns them in his anger; who shakes the earth out of its place, and its 
pillars tremble; who commands the sun, and it does not rise; who seals up the 
stars; who alone stretched out the heavens and trampled the waves of the Sea… 
How then can I answer him, choosing my words with him?... If it is a contest 
of strength, he is the strong one!  (9:3-8, 14, 19a) 
On its surface, this passage would seem to be about the discrepancy in strength between 
God and Job.  Because God is strong enough to build and tear down on the grand scale, 
Job has no way of levying a claim against him.  Job cannot prove his innocence because 
God has declared him guilty, and what God says goes, as is evidenced by his powerful 
control of the elements of earth, sea, and sky.  If God decides that what was once a 
mountain shall be a flat plain, then the mountain becomes a flat plain.  It is no good for the 
mountain to argue against God, saying, “But I am a mountain and not a plain.”  God’s 
activity has made the mountain’s point moot.  Though the mountain may claim that it is a 
mountain and not a plain, in fact, because God has willed it, the mountain is not a 
mountain but a plain.  Job sees that the same goes for him.  Although he is a righteous 
man, Job has been declared guilty by God and the power of God’s declaration has made 
him guilty, just as the mountain, subject to God’s shaping force, has been made into a 
plain.  Job describes his situation, saying, “Though I am innocent, my own mouth would 
condemn me; though I am blameless, he would prove me perverse” (9:20).   
Although Job is speaking about God’s power, it should be evident that his emphasis 
is on God’s use of his power to effect change.  In the speech to which Job is directly 
responding, Bildad has admonished Job to “make supplication to the Almighty” (8:5b), 
who, if Job is indeed blameless as he claims, will “restore you to your rightful place” 
(8:6b).  Bildad’s advice rests on his belief that God uses his power to support the static 
stability of the world.  God will not bring about a change in Job’s circumstances if Job 
prays but will “restore [him] to [his] rightful place.”  God will rewind the tape, so to speak, 
so that the present upheaval, which should never have occurred, ceases to exist.  Job, after 
his restoration, will dwell perpetually “in the beginning,” in one single moment of being 
that is eternally renewed, untouched by change.  In chapter 29, Job, too, wishes for such a 
return to the way things were, a restoration of his rightful place.  In chapter 9, though, Job 
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dismisses the possibility of such a return.  He asserts that God is not interested in the 
maintenance of stasis, but only in propagating upheaval.   
Later in the same chapter Job accuses, “It is all one; therefore I say, he destroys 
both the blameless and the wicked” (9:22).  What concerns God, according to Job, is not 
justice—that is, building up those who deserve to be built up and destroying those who 
deserve to be destroyed—but creation and destruction engaged in for their own sake.  God 
is not a just judge, but a force like a rolling glacier that changes whatever it touches, 
making mountains into plains, plains into ravines, and the innocent into the guilty.  It is 
not, then, simply God’s strength that makes him inaccessible to Job—a strong, just judge 
would be able to restore Job to his rightful circumstances—but the nature of that strength.  
It is because God is a force of change that Job cannot contend with him.  Job cannot ask 
the rolling glacier to unmake the lake that it has gouged out of what used to be a flat plane, 
so he has no means of asking God to unmake the guilty man into which he has made Job.   
In a later passage, Job is even more explicit about God’s role as the world’s solitary 
agent of change.  He says, “In his hand is the life of every living thing and the breath of 
every human being” (12:10) before going on to describe what God does with these lives 
over which he has control: 
With God are wisdom and strength; he has counsel and understanding.  If he 
tears down, no one can rebuild; if he shuts someone in, no one can open up.  If 
he withholds the waters, they dry up; if he sends them out, they overwhelm the 
land….He leads counselors away stripped, and makes fools of judges.  He 
looses the sash of kings, and binds a waistcloth on their loins.  He leads priests 
away stripped, and overthrows the mighty.  He deprives of speech those who 
are trusted, and takes away the discernment of the elders.  He pours contempt 
on princes, and looses the belt of the strong.  He uncovers the deeps out of 
darkness, and brings deep darkness to light.  He makes nations great, then 
destroys them; he enlarges nations, then leads them away.  He strips 
understanding from the leaders of the earth, and makes them wander in a 
pathless waste.  (12:13-15, 17-24) 
Just as God stretches out the heavens and establishes the earth and then seals up the stars 
and overturns the mountains, so God makes people and nations mighty and important and 
then strips them of their power and status.  The word translated “mighty” in 12:19 is the 
plural of Nty), which literally means “continuous (one)…perennial (one), eternal 
(one)…reliable (one)” (The Dictionary of Classical Hebrew, 237).  Those who are 
overthrown by God are not just strong, they are established, fixed, seemingly immovable.  
Yet, defying their apparent stability, God brings them low.  As God behaves in the natural 
world, so he acts with regard to human affairs.  In neither one is there any stability.  God 
exercises his agency willy-nilly and with great frequency, so that the only constant is the 
constancy of change. 
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God’s “Wisdom” as God’s Whim 
 
 A word should be said about Job’s attribution of wisdom to God in both passages.  
One would expect that if Job views God as possessing wisdom and acting according to its 
precepts, he would necessarily view God as acting rightly.  Wisdom in the Old Testament 
does not describe mere knowledge but the ability to discern the right way to act and the 
undertaking of that right behavior.94  If Job views God as “wise in heart” (9:4a), it would 
seem that Job views God’s random creative and destructive behavior as the appropriate 
behavior for the situation.  This, however, does not jibe with the descriptions that follow, 
especially in the second passage (chapter 12).  Although God’s creative activity is often 
described as informed by wisdom (see Job 28 and Proverbs 8, for example), what Job is 
describing is primarily destruction.  God may stretch out the heavens, but he then goes on 
to shake the earth out of its place (9:6).  God may create a great nation, but he goes on to 
bring that nation low (12:23) for no apparent reason, or, at least, no reason for which the 
nation itself is responsible.95  In addition, it is hard to imagine Job praising God’s wisdom 
with regard to his own circumstances, which mirror those of the important men and nations 
detailed in chapter 12 and the high mountains described in chapter 9.  Indeed, throughout 
his speeches Job accuses God of treating him wrongly—of having brought about an 
unwarranted change in his circumstances—so surely he would not simultaneously ascribe 
wisdom to the God who has behaved in this way.  Rather, though he speaks of God’s 
wisdom in these passages, he seems to do so in order to undermine the idea that God’s 
actions are governed by wisdom.  
Job takes the pious stance that God is wise in heart,96 while at the same time 
striking a blow at the idea of God’s goodness, which, traditionally, would go hand-in-hand 
with wisdom, but here is severed from it.97  In his speech which precedes Job’s chapter 12 
response, Zophar has spoken of God’s possession of “the secrets of wisdom” (11:6a), 
                                                 
94 See my discussion of the “hymn to wisdom” in the previous chapter. 
95 About this passage Gordis writes, “Job’s description [of the social upheaval caused by God] has nothing in 
common with such pictures of social change [Ps. 113:7-8, in which the high are brought low and the low 
raised up].  The salient difference lies in the fact that the psalmists who praise God’s greatness depict both 
aspects of the change—the fall of the mighty and the rise of the lowly....Job, however, describes only half of 
the picture—the decline of the powerful—because he is arraigning his Maker as a destructive force.  Nor is 
Job’s attitude similar to that of the prophets.  They saw in the collapse of these elements of society the 
deserved punishment of a sinful people...and the necessary prelude to a reconstructed social order....But for 
the author of Job, as for the Wisdom writers in general, a transformation of the social and political status quo 
meant catastrophe” (Gordis 1965, 52). 
96 Brown calls this “a perfunctory nod of deference” to God’s traditional attributes, after which Job goes on 
to depict God in quite other terms (Brown 1999, 328-29). 
97 Perdue points out that, although Job speaks of God’s wisdom and might, “what is not only glaringly 
absent, but resoundingly repudiated, is the justice of God” (Perdue 1991, 154). 
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which, if God would only divulge them to Job, would convince him of the justness of his 
suffering.  Job’s use of the term wisdom in his description of God plays with Zophar’s 
insistence on God’s superior knowledge and the just action which ensues.  Job’s apparent 
praise would seem to be euphemistic, partaking of that flipside of meaning which allows 
bless to mean curse.98 Perdue identifies this passage as a parody of a hymn of praise, 
noting that, although Job attributes wisdom and strength to God, his presentation of what 
God does with his wisdom and strength is wholly negative.  Perdue writes,  
God uses wisdom and might, not to create and sustain life and nations, but to 
destroy them....God does not tear down the structures of life and society in 
order to rebuild them, but to prohibit their being restored.  And instead of 
allowing humans to participate in divine wisdom and power to create social 
spheres in which justice and life flourish, God limits, constrains, and even 
denies them to human leaders.  (Perdue 1991, 155) 
In chapters 9 and 12 it is significant that wisdom is paired with strength in Job’s 
description of God.  In chapter 9, Job says, “He is wise in heart, and mighty in strength—
who has resisted him and succeeded?” (9:4) and in chapter 12 he says first “With God are 
wisdom and strength; he has counsel and understanding” (12:13), and then echoes, “With 
him are strength and wisdom; the deceived and the deceiver are his” (12:16).  In chapter 9, 
it is as a result of God’s combined wisdom and strength that the havoc wrought by God 
cannot be resisted.  In chapter 12, it is as a result of God’s combined strength and wisdom 
that he acts with impunity against both deceived and deceiver, rewarding and punishing, 
founding and destroying as his fancy takes him.  In both chapters, strength would seem to 
be all God needs in order to effect his purposes.  Supremely powerful, God can both raise 
mountains and flatten them with no recourse to wisdom, if wisdom is understood as the 
discernment of right behavior and the implementation of that behavior in its appropriate 
situation. 
Job is explicit that God’s activities are not based on any appraisal of the correct 
behavior for the situation but happen according to God’s whim.  Why, then, does Job 
bother speaking of wisdom at all?  He does so because wisdom is already part of the 
discussion.  The friends who assert that God is behaving rightly assume that God’s 
behavior is grounded in wisdom and that Job’s suffering is, therefore, a sign of the wisdom 
of God.  Job responds, in effect, “God may be wise, but if he is, wisdom doesn’t mean 
what you think it means.”  In 12:16’s repetition of verse 13’s praise of God’s wisdom and 
strength, a subtle reversal takes place.  Where in 12:13 Job says, “With God are wisdom 
and strength,” in verse 16 he says, “with him are strength and wisdom,” exchanging the 
placement of the two terms.  If we read the two verses as parallels of each other, the effect 
                                                 
98 See the discussion of Krb in chapter two, footnote 6. 
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is that wisdom and strength are seen to be being used as interchangeable terms.  What is 
the nature of God’s wisdom?  Its nature is God’s strength.  If what Job means by God’s 
wisdom can be at all differentiated from what he means by God’s strength, then wisdom 
must be defined as the ability to choose to do something, while strength must be seen as 
the ability to carry out that decision.  In fact, the word used for wisdom in 12:16 is not 
hmkx, as it is in 12:13, but hy#$wt, a word which can also be translated as “success” or 
“(good) results” (A Concise Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Testament, 388).  In 
Job 5:12 it is used this way by Eliphaz who says, “He frustrates the devices of the crafty, 
so that their hands achieve no success (hy#$t).”  This alternate meaning of the word 
reinforces the idea that when Job attributes wisdom to God, he is really only 
acknowledging his strength.   
Job’s “praise,” then, can be read as merely a statement of his belief that God has 
both the power to decide what to do and the power to carry out what he has decided to do.  
What Zophar means by God’s wisdom in chapter 11 is a thoroughly just apprehension of 
and interaction with the world.  Job’s description of God’s wisdom has no room for justice.  
God simply does things, does everything, in fact, and this doing seems to be motivated 
only by God’s desire to do whatever it is he wants to do.  This is hardly praise, given that 
Job perceives himself as the victim of God’s decision and ability to inflict suffering 
randomly and without cause.  In chapters 9 and 12, then, Job describes God’s wisdom as 
the desire to cause random and continuous change and God’s strength as the effects of this 
desire as they are felt in the world. 
 
The Friends on the Static Life of the Righteous Man 
 
 For the friends, as for Job, the world as it ought to be is stable and unchanging with 
everyone occupying his or her appointed place from which he or she does not move.  The 
only change condoned by the friends is a change that restores a disturbed stasis. When, in 
chapter 8, Bildad urges Job to pray to God, it is not so that God will change his 
circumstances but so that God will restore him to that situation from which he never 
should have been moved in the first place.  It is a movement back to a time before the 
change-that-should-not-have-happened happened and not a movement forward to a new 
place on the other side of change.  Against this interpretation, Newsom argues that the 
friends privilege future time in their speeches.  She writes, 
The friends offer Job the narrative schema of the good person who endures 
suffering, is delivered by God, and enjoys a peaceful and prosperous life after 
deliverance.  They offer several variations of the schema (5:19-26; 8:8-20; 
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11:13-19), but in each the crucial element of time is to be found in the happy 
ending.  The outcome of the narrative does not so much serve to integrate and 
give meaning to all that has come before as to enable it to be voided of 
significance—to be forgotten.  (Newsom 2003, 212) 
Newsom’s observation that the friends focus on the happy ending and view it as 
obliterating, or at least obscuring, the prior suffering is correct, yet it seems to me that the 
conclusion drawn from this observation, namely, that the friends privilege the future as the 
time of real significance, is not quite right.  In Newsom’s analysis, Job, too, although he 
begins by privileging the present moment of his suffering, comes to privilege the future, as 
he develops the idea of meeting with God in a court of law, as the time at which his 
innocence will be proved and his fortunes restored.  Newsom asserts that “For both the 
friends and Job the end of the story is what truly matters” (Ibid.).   
I would argue, however, that the time that matters most to Job and his friends is not 
the future but the past.  For both, the end of the story is marked by a return to the 
beginning, and this return occasions not another telling of the story, in cyclical fashion, but 
an erasing of the story itself.  Newsom is right that the outcome of the friends’ narrative is 
that the story is voided of meaning and is forgotten, and, of course, she is also right that 
this is something that happens in the future.  Both the friends and Job know that there is no 
such thing as a real return to the past; what has happened cannot be undone.  But what has 
happened can be forgotten to such a degree that it is as if it never happened.  Yes, this 
forgetting happens in the future, but when it happens it makes the future so like the past 
that it might as well be the past.  What the friends envision for Job is a future that is 
exactly like the past, but even more so, so much more so, in fact, that the prospect of any 
future is eradicated.   
When, in chapter 29 Job begins his final defense, leading up to his oath of 
innocence in chapter 31, he prefaces his remarks by crying, “Oh, that I were as in the 
months of old” (29:2a).  He does not say, “Oh, that it were sometime in the future when I 
had made it through this time of suffering and had come to a new place of rest and 
refreshment.”  Although any restoration must necessarily occur in the future, Job wants 
that future to be so much like the past that it is as if he is living in the past and not in the 
future.  The same can be said for the friends’ vision of the future; it is not really the future 
to which they urge Job to look forward, but to a time when the past will, once again, be 
made present.  For all the friends, this past-in-the-future, once achieved, will be guaranteed 
never to change; it will be a futureless present. 
 Eliphaz, in his first speech, describes this futureless present, saying, 
He will deliver you from six troubles; in seven no harm shall touch you.  In 
famine he will redeem you from death, and in war from the power of the 
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sword.  You shall be hidden from the scourge of the tongue, and shall not fear 
destruction when it comes.  At destruction and famine you shall laugh, and 
shall not fear the wild animals of the earth.  For you shall be in league with the 
stones of the field, and the wild animals shall be at peace with you.  You shall 
know that your tent is safe, you shall inspect your fold and miss nothing.  You 
shall know that your descendants will be many, and your offspring like the 
grass of the earth.  You shall come to your grave in ripe old age, as a shock of 
grain comes up to the threshing floor in its season.  (5:19-26) 
Although it will be necessary for Job’s circumstances to undergo a change before he can 
find himself living the life described by Eliphaz, the change serves the prospect of stasis.  
It is a small thing compared with the vista of sameness that stretches before Job in 
Eliphaz’s description.  What Eliphaz promises Job if he repents (5:8), is a life unthreatened 
by change.  Though wars may rage around him, his protection will be guaranteed.  Wild 
animals may stalk the earth, but they will not touch him.  He will be preserved no matter 
what dangers threaten.  Even death, which must eventually come to Job as a condition of 
his mortality, is robbed of its sting.  It comes not suddenly and without warning, but when 
Job is ready for it.  Nor does death cause the kind of change in Job’s circumstances that it 
causes for the wicked, who, dying, are wiped from the face of the earth and lost to 
memory.  Rather, when Job comes to die, he will know that his tent is safe (5:24) and that 
his descendants will be many (5:25).  What he has established will continue to exist as he 
established it, even though he is no longer present.  For Job, the final change of death will 
not signal change so much as the continuation ad infinitum of his well-ordered life. 
 In this passage Eliphaz makes clear that, in his view, the world as it ought to be is a  
static world.  Any change which occurs within this order must serve to bring about 
increased stability. Earlier in this speech, Eliphaz has spoken about changes wrought by 
God who “does great things and unsearchable, marvelous things without number” (5:9), 
such as, “he sets on high those who are lowly, and those who mourn are lifted to safety” 
(5:11) and “he wounds, but he binds up; he strikes, but his hands heal” (5:18).  Verse 18 
may sound similar to Job’s claim of chapter 12 that God “makes nations great, then 
destroys them” (12:23a), but it has one important difference.  In Eliphaz’s depiction, the 
wounding comes first, followed by the binding up of the wound, while for Job it is the 
binding up that comes first, followed by the wounding.  The sequence of God’s actions in 
Job’s speech gives a sense of continuous upheaval.  In Eliphaz’s speech, by contrast, an 
elevated end follows a lowly beginning, and once a person is lifted up, he stays where he 
is.  Eliphaz’s description of the static life Job will lead after he has sought and been 
recognized by God follows his claim that God “wounds, but he binds up,”  indicating that 
he is not talking about a vicious cycle of wounding and healing energized by a God who is 
a force of constant change, but about change that leads to stasis.  In Eliphaz’s view, God’s 
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goal for the world is stability.  Those who are righteous are enabled to move into God’s 
ordered world and settle there, where nothing causes change, not even death.  
 Zophar, in his first speech, presents a view of stasis and change that is consonant 
with that held by Eliphaz.  Zophar says to Job, 
If you direct your heart rightly, you will stretch out your hands toward 
him….Surely then…you will be secure, and will not fear.  You will forget your 
misery; you will remember it as waters that have passed away.  And your life 
will be brighter than the noonday; its darkness will be like morning.  And you 
will have confidence, because there is hope; you will be protected and take 
your rest in safety.  You will lie down, and no one will make you afraid.  
(11:13, 15-19a) 
For Zophar, as for Eliphaz, change can happen within the ordered world, but only if it 
serves the institution of stasis. Job will undergo change as he leaves behind his time of 
trouble, but he will emerge to occupy a space of absolute stasis, and, with his troubles 
behind him it will be as if both they and the change required to deliver him from them 
never happened.  Just as Eliphaz envisions a life in which Job has nothing to fear from the 
wars and wild animals that threaten others, so Zophar claims that Job will be protected 
from danger. In addition, Job will be continuously surrounded by the light of noonday, 
even when he is sleeping.  Even a natural change, like the change from  the light of day to 
the darkness of night to the light of day again will be eternally suspended.  Job, the once-
again righteous man, will have nothing to fear when he lies down, because there is no 
prospect of change.  The world as he leaves it when he goes to sleep will be the world as 
he finds it when he awakes.   
Zophar’s emphasis on the sleep of the righteous man inhabiting a stable cosmos 
recalls Job’s complaint of a few chapters earlier that even sleep fails to grant him respite 
from his suffering.  There, Job says, “When I say, ‘My bed will comfort me, my couch will 
ease my complaint,’ then you scare me with dreams and terrify me with visions, so that I 
would choose strangling and death rather than this body” (7:13-15).  In his current state, 
when Job lies down to sleep he does not know what the night will bring; he hopes for 
comfort but often enough finds himself assailed by nightmares.  After his repentance, 
Zophar promises that the nights will be predictable.  They, like the days, will bring nothing 
that Job does not expect and welcome.  His righteousness will assure the stability of the 
cosmos, or at least of his corner of it.  Change may afflict others, but he will experience the 
world as static and secure. 
 Bildad, though he does not flesh out a vision of what the world will be like after 
Job repents to the degree that Eliphaz and Zophar do, would seem to agree with them that 
the world as it ought to be is a static world.  As already noted above, he tells Job to “seek 
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God and make supplication to the Almighty” (8:5), just as Eliphaz and Zophar advise, an 
action that will result in his restoration to his rightful place (8:6b), a reversal of what has 
happened to him, not a change but an undoing of change.  Bildad’s agreement with Eliphaz 
and Zophar about the stasis of the ordered world is most fully evidenced by his description 
of the world of the wicked as fundamentally changeable, as will be seen below.   
 
The Changeability of the World of the Wicked 
 
 All three friends present the lives of the wicked as marked by instability and 
change.  Eliphaz initiates this theme, saying, “I have seen fools taking root, but suddenly I 
cursed their dwelling.  Their children are far from safety, they are crushed in the gate, and 
there is no one to deliver them” (5:3-4).  Here, Eliphaz describes himself as ensuring that 
the undeserving do not benefit from stability.  He is quick to curse a fool who seems to be 
“taking root,” that is, building for himself a stable life; because it is the lot of fools and the 
wicked to lack stability, Eliphaz’s curse is immediately effective.  The change that affects 
the lives of fools and the wicked is in marked contrast to the stability available to the 
righteous.  Whereas the righteous man, even after death, can be certain of the security of 
his tent and his family, the fool has no control over what happens to his children even 
during his lifetime.  The protective bubble which surrounds the righteous man and his tent, 
deflecting whatever troubles might threaten, does not surround the fool or the wicked man, 
and he and his family feel the force of the world’s troubles and are overwhelmed by them.   
In his first speech, Bildad confirms Eliphaz’s assessment of the instability of the 
world as experienced by the wicked.  He says,  
Their confidence is gossamer, a spider’s house their trust.  If one leans against 
its house, it will not stand; if one lays hold of it, it will not endure.  The wicked 
thrive before the sun, and their shoots spread over the garden….If they are 
destroyed from their place, then it will deny them, saying, “I have never seen 
you.”  (8:15-16, 18) 
Just as Eliphaz’s curse is effective against the “taking root” of the fool, so Bildad claims 
that any gentle pressure is enough to topple the seeming security of the wicked.  The 
wicked are blown away, and the change in their circumstances is so extreme that it is as if 
they never existed.  Zophar, too, in his first speech, after detailing the protection from 
change that is available to the righteous man, offers the contrast of the changeable fate of 
the wicked man, saying, “But the eyes of the wicked will fail; all way of escape will be lost 
to them, and their last hope is to breathe their last” (11:20).  Unlike the righteous, the 
wicked have no way of planning or knowing what to expect from a life which assaults 
them with random change.  
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Death as the Mark of the Supreme Changeability of the Lives of the Wicked 
 
Here, Zophar asserts that for the wicked death is the only potential escape from the 
instability of life as they experience it.  If the wicked cannot count on life to provide a 
stable environment, they must turn to death as the only realm of stability to which they 
have access.  Yet, although Zophar here presents death as a potentially stabilizing 
occurrence, for the most part the friends view death, as it comes to the wicked, as evidence 
of the fundamental changeability of their lives.  We have already seen, in Eliphaz’s first 
speech, the depiction of the death of the righteous man as a continuation of the stasis in 
which he has lived his life; death does not disrupt the stability of his tent, for his line is 
guaranteed to continue exactly as he left it on into eternity.  For the wicked, however, 
death is a disruption, a final mark of change and changeability upon a life lived in 
continuous flux.   
Eliphaz, in his second speech, describes the ultimate change of death that stalks the 
lives of the wicked, saying, 
In prosperity the destroyer will come upon them.  They despair of returning 
from darkness, and they are destined for the sword….They know that a day of 
darkness is ready at hand; distress and anguish terrify them; they prevail 
against them, like a king prepared for battle….They will not be rich, and their 
wealth will not endure, nor will they strike root in the earth; they will not 
escape from darkness; the flame will dry up their shoots, and their blossom will 
be swept away by the wind.  (15:21b-22, 24, 29-30) 
Eliphaz does not deny that the wicked may seem to prosper, just as they may seem to be 
taking root and enjoying stable lives on earth, but he insists that this prosperity is fleeting.  
For the wicked man, death stands at the end of life and, like the vortex of a whirlpool, 
sucks him toward its center so that he cannot get his footing but can only grab at the rocky 
shore and hold on for dear life until the pull overwhelms him and he is forced to let go.  
Bildad’s second speech echoes Eliphaz’s words, but he describes the changeability of the 
lives of the wicked as marked with the ultimate change of death with even more fervor.  
His speech is a narration of continual change: their “light…is put out” (18:5), “their strong 
steps are shortened” (18:7), “they are thrust into a net” (18:8), “their strength is consumed 
by hunger” (18:12), “they are torn from the tent in which they trusted” (18:14), “they are 
thrust from light into darkness, and driven out of the world” (18:18).  As Bildad explains 
it, it is not that the wicked live continuously in a state of darkness or weakness, but that 
they are caught in a downward spiral, moving from light to darkness, from strength to 
weakness, from health to disease, from freedom to captivity, and, finally, from life to 
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death.  In this way, their lives are characterized by unending upheaval.  When it is again 
his turn to speak, Zophar concurs with his two friends, describing at once the heights to 
which the wicked may climb and the depths to which they are destined to fall.  He says,  
Even though they mount up high as the heavens, and their head reaches the 
clouds, they will perish forever like their own dung….Their bodies, once full 
of youth, will lie down in the dust with them….They swallow down riches and 
vomit them up again….Utter darkness is laid up for their treasures….The 
possessions of their house will be carried away, dragged off in the day of 
God’s wrath.  (20:6-7a, 11, 15a, 26a, 28) 
The lives of the wicked as described by the friends are supremely changeable, leading 
toward the final change of death, but there is, at the same time, a constancy to this change 
that might be seen to lend it some stability.  Can it be said that because the wicked can 
count on their lives to change and can count on death to meet them in the end, their lives 
may be conceptualized as static and not as fundamentally changeable?  It would be 
possible to make this argument.  It would also be possible to say that because in the end 
the wicked achieve stasis in death (which Zophar hints at in his first speech), all the 
changes that beset them in life can be seen as change in the service of stasis.  I do not, 
however, think that this is how the friends see it.  Their intention is to contrast, in the most 
striking terms possible, the changeability of the lives of the wicked with the stability which 
characterizes the life of the righteous man.  They do not want us to ask, “But doesn’t all 
that continuous change and the inexorable pull of death add up to a kind of stability?”  And 
if we were to ask that question, they would be sure to answer, “No.  You’re missing the 
point.” 
The point is that the world as it should be is static.  The righteous man, who is 
“man-as-he-ought-to-be” both supports and benefits from the stability of the world as it 
ought to be.  The wicked man, who is “man-as-he-ought-not-to-be” must necessarily live 
in the world-as-it-ought-not-to-be, which is a world beset by instability and continuous 
change.  The wicked man, as the friends depict him, is like a man falling off a high cliff.  
There is nowhere for him to go but down, and it is certain that he will eventually hit the 
bottom.  Yet, while he is falling, each moment brings a change from what came before.  
His fall is inexorable and his death is inevitable, but, at the same time, he is in a state of 
profound change, especially when compared with the man who is standing, not only on 
solid ground, but far from the edge of any cliff and the potential for change that it 
represents. 
Of course, it is not only the wicked who die.  Righteous men, too, must meet death.  
The inevitability of death for righteous men might be seen to give the lie to the friends’ 
claims that the righteous live in a world that is static.  In a sense, the righteous, no less than 
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the wicked, are falling inexorably from a cliff toward the inevitability of hitting bottom.  
Eliphaz, as we have seen, does his best to distinguish the death of the righteous from the 
death of the wicked.  He claims that death comes to the righteous man only when he is 
fully ready for it, and does not strike him down before his time, as happens to the wicked 
man.  He also claims that death does not annihilate the righteous man, who lives on in the 
continuation of his household, as it does the wicked man, who, having died, is forgotten.  
At the same time, however, Eliphaz recognizes that the fact of human mortality prevents 
even the most righteous men from participating fully in the world as it ought to be.  The 
ability of human beings to live stable lives is compromised by their inability to escape the 
change wrought by death.  Any human being, therefore, whether righteous or wicked, is 
subject to the force of chaos as well as being a bearer of chaos and a threat to the order of 
the world.   
 
The Spirit’s Message: Mortality as Unrighteousness 
 
In his first speech, Eliphaz expresses this recognition by recounting it as a message 
he has received in a nocturnal visitation from a spirit.  According to the spirit messenger, 
the fact that all human beings die is proof of their collective and unavoidable guilt.  The 
spirit begins by asking, “Can mortals be righteous before God?” (4:17).  The word 
translated “mortals” is #$wn), which, though its plainest meaning is simply “human being,” 
does denote humans in their frailty and mortality.  The spirit pairs #$wn),  “mortals” with 
rbg, translated “human beings” in the next line.  rbg, in its relation to the verb rbg, 
meaning “to be mighty,” connotes a mighty man.  Yet, by beginning with the term 
“mortals,” the spirit places the emphasis on the mortality of human beings, robbing the 
rbg of any power he might want to claim.  The fact of their mortality is what marks 
human beings as incapable of true righteousness.  The spirit continues, telling Eliphaz that 
if even the angels are capable of erring (4:18), “how much more so those who live in 
houses of clay, whose foundation is in the dust, who are crushed like a moth.  Between the 
morning and evening they are destroyed; they perish forever without any regarding it” 
(4:19-20). The spirit presents a scenario in which the changeability of the human being, 
evidenced primarily by mortality, is reason enough for God’s disapproval.  Human beings 
are not stable, but by nature are destined to disappear from the face of the earth, and God 
can place no trust in such a being.  Humans may be righteous one moment, but they are 
dead and gone the next. 
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Not all scholars recognize that mortality is the issue here.  John Hartley, for 
example, claims that the disparity between God and humans is based on God’s absolute 
justice and purity, compared with which humans must always be found lacking.  He writes, 
“God being just and pure by nature, wins every dispute, and each person, no matter how 
upright on earth, is found guilty by comparison” (Hartley 1988, 113).  Other scholars, 
however, agree with the assessment that it is mortality which distinguishes humans from 
God.  Terrien writes, Eliphaz “implies, consciously or not, that finiteness is contiguous 
with moral corruption (vs. 19)” (Terrien 1957, 75).  Samuel Driver and George Gray, too, 
see that the emphasis of the passage is on humanity’s “frailty and, hyperbolically, the 
brevity of human life: man is the creature of a day, dying more quickly and easily than 
such a fragile insect as the moth” (Driver and Gray 1921, 47). 
Eliphaz’s inclusion of the spirit’s message in his own speech is curious.  The 
spirit’s claim that humans have no access to righteousness because of their mortality 
plainly contradicts the views Eliphaz expresses in the rest of his first speech.  Both before 
and after his recounting of the spirit’s message, Eliphaz insists that human beings, by being 
righteous, can access a degree of  stability that deprives even death of its ability to act as a 
force of change.  (“Think now, who that was innocent ever perished?” [4:7a] he asks Job.)  
As Eliphaz sees it, humans can be righteous, and, by being righteous, can participate in and 
inhabit a world that is static.  According to the spirit quoted by Eliphaz, however, human 
beings cannot be righteous in the first place, precisely because they are not so constituted 
as to be able to participate in stability.  Instead of righteousness leading to stability, as 
Eliphaz contends, the spirit insists that humans’ lack of stability leads to their inability to 
be righteous.   
Strangely, although the spirit’s words contradict Eliphaz’s own, Eliphaz does not  
argue against them, but, instead, pretends that they support his position.  There are a 
number of reasons why he may have chosen to do this.  Perhaps Eliphaz’s contradictory 
words mean nothing more than that he does not know his own position.  Janzen suggests 
this possibility, writing, “The fact is that persons often do entertain logically incompatible 
views, which arise from the multifarious character of human experience” (Janzen 1985, 
75).  It is possible, however, to view Eliphaz’s contradictory words as spoken more 
deliberately.  That Eliphaz has received such a visitation serves to bolster his position as 
one competent to speak on God’s behalf.  If Eliphaz were to acknowledge that the spirit’s 
message challenges his own claims, the benefit he is able to derive from having been 
visited by the spirit would be annulled.  Eliphaz cannot say, “I received a message from the 
divine realm, which confers on me the status of one who has access to divine wisdom” and 
follow it up with, “but I disagree with what the spirit messenger told me.”   
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Another reason for including the spirit’s message and pretending that it does not 
contradict his own speech is that it provides a kind of safety net for Eliphaz’s argument 
against Job.  Vawter describes Eliphaz’s repetition of the spirit’s words as providing him 
with an “escape clause.”  He writes, “If there is a contradiction here [between what Eliphaz 
says in 4:12-21 and what he says elsewhere about the possibility of being righteous], it is 
intentional…the built-in safeguard to the logic of Eliphaz is its inconsistency” (Vawter 
1983, 53).  Eliphaz believes that Job has sinned and that by repenting he will be restored to 
the position rightfully enjoyed by the righteous.  If, however, it turns out that Job has not 
actually sinned, Eliphaz can fall back on the argument presented by the spirit that humans 
are inherently unrighteous because they are mortal.  The one who is protected by this 
safety net is God.  In Eliphaz’s view, God is justified in punishing a Job who has sinned, 
but if by chance Job has not sinned, God’s actions must still be justified, and the spirit’s 
message allows for this eventuality.  Indeed, as the book continues, and Job continues to 
insist upon his innocence, Eliphaz will make the spirit’s message his own, relaying it not 
as reported speech but as  his own belief about human life, even as he simultaneously 
continues to claim that stability is accessible to the righteous.   
 In his second speech, Eliphaz incorporates the spirit’s message into his own, 
saying, “What are mortals [#$wn)] that they can be clean?  Or those born of woman, that 
they can be righteous?” (15:14)  At this point, though, Eliphaz modifies the spirit’s 
message, continuing, “God puts no trust even in his holy ones, and the heavens are not 
clean in his sight; how much less one who is abominable and corrupt, one who drinks 
iniquity like water!” (15:15-16).  In this formulation, it is not mortality that brands humans 
as unclean, but their penchant for iniquity.  The remainder of the speech is taken up with 
Eliphaz’s description of the fate of the wicked, which is, as already discussed, to be subject 
to change and bound toward the ultimate change of death.  Still, that Eliphaz echoes the 
spirit’s language shows that he has not dismissed the spirit’s position.  He continues to use  
human mortality as the safety net for his accusations against Job.  In his third speech, 
Eliphaz again references the spirit’s message, asking, “Can a mortal99 be of use to God?  
Can even the wisest be of service to him?  Is it any pleasure to the Almighty if you are 
righteous, or is it gain to him if you make your ways blameless?” (22:2-3). Once again, the 
gulf of mortality is what separates human beings from God and prevents them from being 
truly righteous; humans’ best efforts at righteousness mean nothing to God because they 
can only ever be approximations.   
                                                 
99 The word here is rbg, not #$wn), but the emphasis on mortality has already been established in the spirit’s 
pairing of the two words and his focus on mortality as the preeminent human failing. 
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Having said this, however, Eliphaz goes on to deny the implications of these 
claims.  He follows these questions, almost in the same breath, with questions that 
presuppose an entirely different view of the human capacity for righteousness.  He asks, 
“Is it for your piety that he reproves you, and enters into judgment with you?  Is not your 
wickedness great?  There is no end to your iniquities.” (22:4-5).  Job is punished, Eliphaz 
contends, not for the general sin of being mortal, something over which he has no control, 
but for the commission of specific sins, which Eliphaz details in verses 6-9.  Although 
Eliphaz makes use of the spirit’s message, he never sits completely easy with it.  He 
acknowledges that death is the mark of chaos upon every human being, but is quick to 
temper and obscure his acknowledgment.  Although the mark of chaotic change may be on 
everyone, it is more evident on the brow of the wicked, whereas, on the brow of the 
righteous man it is so faint as to be almost invisible.  In his third speech as in his first, 
Eliphaz urges Job to repent and promises that if he does so he will find himself living in a 
world unthreatened by change: “You will decide on a matter, and it will be established for 
you, and light will shine on your ways” (22:28).   
It is, in fact, Bildad, in his final speech, who most fully embraces the idea that 
mortality is the sign that humans are hopelessly embroiled in chaotic change.  Bildad’s 
third speech is short and Zophar’s third speech, which ought to follow it to complete the 
cycle, is absent.100  It is almost as if Bildad, finding that Job has continued to reject the 
friends’ admonitions to repent, preferring to insist on his innocence, has pulled the safety 
brake.  He cuts the discussion short by calling in the spirit’s message without qualification, 
in the light of which Job’s argument that he has not sinned is made irrelevant.  Bildad says,  
How then can a mortal [#$wn)] be righteous before God?  How can one born of 
woman be pure?  If even the moon is not bright and the starts are not pure in 
his sight, how much less a mortal [#$wn)] who is a maggot, and a human 
being101 who is a worm!  (25:4-6) 
Although the dichotomy drawn between humans and God here seems to be based on size 
and not on life-expectancy, Bildad’s initial identification of human beings as “mortal” and 
his repetition of this designation shows that human mortality is as much at stake as human 
smallness.  For Bildad, God is as justified in crushing a human being as a human being is 
in crushing a worm.  Humans have the right to crush worms not just because they are 
                                                 
100 Many scholars rearrange the third cycle of speeches in such a way that Zophar is assigned a final speech, 
insisting that the text must have been corrupted.  Clines, for example, writes, “24:18-24 belongs to Zophar, 
not Job…26:2-14 belongs to Bildad, not Job…and…27:7-3 belongs to Zophar, not Job” (Clines 2006, 548).  
On page 629 of his commentary he provides a list of the ways other scholars have redistributed some of the 
speeches of the third cycle.  I, however, see no reason for rearranging the speeches.  If sense can be made of 
them as they are, redistribution seems unwarranted. 
101 Here the Hebrew is Md)-Nb, “son of a man,” perhaps intended to parallel h#$) dwly, “born of woman” 
which appears in 25:5.  These phrases highlight human mortality, in that one who is born must also die. 
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relatively small in size, but because their natural lives are so short as to be hardly worth 
considering.  The same goes for God who crushes a human being.  In the scheme of time 
as it appears from God’s perspective, the human’s life has hardly been cut short at all.  Of 
course, Bildad’s description of how humans appear to God is concerned not only with 
human smallness and mortality, but also with human impurity.  The human is described 
not as some kind of noble insect, like the industrious ant, for example, but as the most 
ignoble, a maggot and a worm.  This impurity, though, can be seen to stem from human 
mortality, because this is how the spirit presents it in his nocturnal visitation and Bildad is 
clearly picking up on what the spirit has been reported to say.  Bildad chooses to liken 
human beings to maggots and worms, because these are creatures associated with the grave 
and, therefore, with mortality.  The human, like the maggot, is a creature of the grave.  
Both humans and worms have life for only the briefest moment, and it is on this basis that 
humans share the worms’ impurity. 
 For Eliphaz, as he reports the spirit’s message and tempers it to incorporate it into 
his own, and for Bildad, as he accepts the spirit’s message wholeheartedly and speaks it as 
his own word, it is their mortality which prevents humans from participating in or 
contributing to the world as it ought to be, which is a stable, static world.  As such, humans 
can only be forces of chaos, giving God full justification when he chooses to punish them, 
regardless of how they have behaved.  If Bildad, in fully embracing the spirit’s claims has 
pulled the emergency cord hoping to put an end to Job’s arguments against God, he has 
failed.  Job is not silenced by Bildad’s last-ditch argument, but launches into his longest 
speech yet.  The ones who are silenced by Bildad’s emergency speech are, in fact, the 
friends.  Zophar does not give a third speech, nor does Eliphaz begin a new cycle.  
Although Eliphaz has toyed with the view of the relationship between humans and God 
presented by the spirit, the spirit’s claims are really at odds with what the friends believe 
about the human possibility for righteousness.  When Bildad claims those views as his own 
and, by extension, those of his friends, all three are reduced to silence.  Not only are Job’s 
claims of innocence invalidated by the spirit, but the friends’ own beliefs about the 
importance of righteousness are negated.  Job can go on speaking because he has ceased to 
put any stock in what the friends say.  The friends themselves, however, are struck dumb 
by their espousal of the spirit’s pronouncements; they may not really believe the spirit’s 
claims, but they cannot argue against them if they hope to use them to convince Job of the 
justice of his suffering. 
Indeed, if we are reading the book as a unified whole, we might construe God’s 
condemnation of the friends’ words in 42:7 as a response to their appropriation of the 
spirit’s views.  Read this way, God’s judgment against the friends is a censure of their 
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dishonesty.  They are chastised for having professed beliefs that they do not actually hold, 
simply in order to silence Job.  God’s chastisement, then, is not a judgment against the 
friends for having believed the wrong thing—after all, in his speeches God has told Job 
that his view of the relationship between God and world is flawed, but in the epilogue 
claims that Job has spoken rightly (42:7)—but for having lied about their beliefs in order 
to triumph over Job and bring the discussion to an end in their favor, a plan that has 
backfired. 
 
Job and the Problem(s) of Human Mortality 
 
 Job, although he never agrees with the spirit that mortality justifies God’s 
punishment of any person regardless of whether he or she is otherwise innocent or guilty, 
is deeply distressed by his own mortality and the constraints it puts on his ability to interact 
with God.102  Job, as discussed above, is in agreement with the friends that the world as it 
ought to be is a static world and that change is evidence of chaos.  Although in his 
speeches he sometimes wishes for death as an escape from his suffering, most of the time 
he sees death as problematic for one who desires to prove his righteousness.  In chapter 9, 
he laments, 
My days are swifter than a runner; they flee away, they see no good.  They go 
by like skiffs of reed, like an eagle swooping on the prey.  If I say, “I will 
forget my complaint; I will put off my sad countenance and be of good cheer,” 
I become afraid of all my suffering, for I know you will not hold me 
innocent….For he is not a mortal, as I am, that I might answer him, that we 
should come to trial together….If he would take his rod away from me, and not 
let dread of him terrify me, then I would speak without fear of him.  (9:25-28, 
32, 34-35a) 
Here, although it is ostensibly God’s overwhelming power which prevents Job from 
addressing him as an equal, that power is linked to God’s immortality which is compared 
with Job’s mortality.  Job makes clear that his inability to find a suitable solution to his 
                                                 
102 Lloyd Bailey argues that in the Old Testament, “Protests against ‘death’ are aimed primarily at those 
qualities and situations which detract from life lived to the full (illness, alienation, persecution, doubt, and so 
on) or at a ‘bad’ biological death.  They are seldom if ever directed against the appropriateness of death 
itself.  The question ‘Why should I (or we) die?’ is not asked, except in particular circumstances where that 
immediate fate might be avoided through the proper course of action (e.g. Gen. 47:15).  Death at old age 
does not raise the question of theodicy, in contrast to the misfortunes which may befall one within the bounds 
of the life span (e.g., in Job’s case).  The ultimate fate of all humankind is accepted as part of the definition 
of creaturehood, as part of God's good creation....There is no suggestion that the meaning of life is thereby 
called into question, in strong contrast to much modern Western thought” (Bailey 1979, 52).  Indeed, as has 
been seen, in his first speech Eliphaz presents Job with the “good death” that will come to him if he repents 
and becomes, once again, a righteous man.  Yet, as I will argue below, throughout the book Job does view 
death itself as problematic.  If he were experiencing the world as stable, he might agree with Eliphaz’s 
assessment of death as the welcome end of a well-lived life.  Experiencing life as fundamentally unstable, 
however, Job views death as part and parcel of that instability.  For Job, death contributes to and is a factor of 
the world as it ought not to be. 
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predicament is due to his mortality.103  Job does not agree with the spirit that mortality 
equals guilt, but he does agree that his mortality prevents God from seeing his innocence, 
not because there is anything inherently wrong with being mortal, but because of the gap 
that exists between God’s experience of temporal existence (or lack thereof) and how 
humans, as mortals, experience time.   
In chapter 7, Job has already spoken of his mortality with regard to God’s 
immortality, saying, “Remember that my life is a breath….while your eyes are upon me, I 
shall be gone” (7:7a, 8b), and “What are human beings that you make so much of 
them…?...For now I shall lie in the earth; you will seek me, but I shall not be.  (7:17a, 
21b).  In this chapter, Job cites his mortality as the reason for his unwillingness to restrain 
his complaint against God.  Having reminded God that his life is a breath, Job goes on to 
say, “Therefore I will not restrain my mouth; I will speak in the anguish of my spirit; I will 
complain in the bitterness of my soul” (7:11).  Job has no patience because, as a mortal 
being, he is subject to the ultimate change brought on by death.  In making this assertion, 
Job inadvertently confirms what the spirit has said about human beings as mortals.  Job’s 
mortality makes him unreliable; he changes before the eyes of those who behold him, and 
it is his knowledge of his inherent instability that loosens his tongue.  After all, what does 
he have to lose by speaking out against God when in the end he will lose everything no 
matter what he does?  Although in this way, Job confirms the spirit’s assertion about the 
link between mortality and unrighteousness, he also uses the fact of his mortality as the 
grounds by which to bring his accusation against God.  The spirit messenger has claimed 
that no human being, as a condition of mortality, can be righteous before God, giving God 
the right to bring calamity upon any human being he chooses, whether that person be 
righteous or wicked by human standards.  Job, though, asks why God should concern 
himself with such lowly creatures as human beings.  God may have the right to afflict any 
mortal he chooses, but this does not mean that God’s own righteousness is not 
compromised by such behavior.  A God who takes it upon himself to bring calamity upon 
mortals regardless of deserts cannot be anything but a bully.  Human beings live a short 
while and then they die.  Because of this, Job contends, God ought to let them be.  
Mortality, far from singling human beings out for punishment, ought to absolve them, in 
Job’s view.  That his life is short and that he will soon be no more is given by Job as the 
reason why God ought to pay him no mind.  What does it matter to the eternal God what a 
creature who is here today and gone tomorrow does?  Whatever that creature is doing will 
swiftly be cut short, without any need for God to intervene.  As Job sees it, then, human 
                                                 
103 The word translated “mortal” in 9:32 is #$y),  but that mortality is the issue is made clear by verses 25-26. 
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mortality does not give God carte blanche in his dealings with human beings, as the spirit 
asserts, but, rather ought to block God from any mistreatment of them. 
 In chapters 7 and 9 Job approaches the problem of his mortality in different ways.  
In chapter 7 he presents his mortality to God as a kind of “pass,” which ought to excuse 
him from God’s scrutiny.  God has no right to torment one whose days are so brief and 
fleeting.  Here, Job also uses his mortality as his justification for speaking out against God; 
his impending and unavoidable death gives him the power to condemn God, for the worst 
that God can do to him is already his certain end.  In chapter 9, by contrast, it is his 
mortality that Job cites as preventing him from attracting God’s attention in the way he 
would like to attract it.  He does not contradict what he has said in chapter 7, but  reflects 
on  his situation from another angle.  If, in chapter 7, he claimed that his mortality 
empowered him to speak out against God, in chapter 9 he recognizes that his mortality 
prevents him from being heard by God.  He may speak out all he wants, but God will not 
hear because he does not view Job as an equal.  In neither chapter does Job view mortality 
as a boon, or even as a neutral human characteristic.  Even when he is being empowered 
by the thought of the unavoidability of death, Job views his mortality negatively.  If he 
were not mortal, it would not be necessary for him to make accusations against God, for he 
would be able to bear God’s punishment in the knowledge that he will live to see better 
days.  It is his mortality that makes it necessary for him to turn against the God who has 
turned against him; it is his mortality that necessitates a change in his attitude toward God 
and prevents him from remaining the same as he ever was.   
In chapter 10, Job again brings up the issue of human mortality, but this time 
instead of wishing that he and God were on an equal footing, which would be possible if 
they had mortality in common, as he has done in chapter 9, here Job accuses God of 
behaving toward him as a mortal would behave.  Job asks, “Are your days like the days of 
mortals, or your years like human years, that you seek out my iniquity and search for my 
sin, although you know that I am not guilty…?” (10:5-7a).  Here, Job seems to return to 
the idea he introduced in chapter 7, although with a somewhat different focus.  There, he 
had stated that, due to the brevity of human life, God ought to leave humans alone instead 
of watching them so as to be able to catch them sinning.  Now,  Job accuses God of 
engaging in a kind of game of macabre make-believe, in which he pretends that he is 
mortal and subject to the limits that characterize the lives of mortals.  Mortals must watch 
their fellows to see if they sin.  God, though, Job seems to imply, knows by virtue of his 
position who has sinned and who has not sinned.  The perspective accessible to mortals is 
limited; their interpretation of what they see is largely up to conjecture.  They must watch 
and weigh the evidence of their observations and draw conclusions as best they can, never 
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certain that they have got it right.  God, though, sees differently.  “Do you have eyes of 
flesh?” Job asks.  “Do you see as humans see?” (10:4).  God has access to full knowledge 
in ways that humans, because of their mortality, do not.  For him to seek out Job’s iniquity 
and declare him guilty is a piece of play acting.  God made Job, as Job goes on to detail, 
and so knows him through and through, and has no business making the kind of mistaken 
judgment a mortal human might make; to pretend that he knows no better is a lie.  
Although previously Job has affirmed certain aspects of the spirit’s message that it is the 
gap between God’s immortality and human mortality that makes all humans sinners, here 
he contradicts that claim.  If God views him as sinful, it is because God isn’t acting like 
God, like the immortal one who created Job with his own hands, but is behaving like a 
mortal.  Here, as elsewhere in Job’s speeches, to be mortal is to be compromised, unable to 
participate in the stability that marks true order.  By abandoning his rightful stability for 
the changeable position of the mortal, God undermines the order of the world and 
unleashes chaos. 
 In chapter 14 Job returns to the problem of human mortality, repeating his claim of 
chapters 7 and 10 that God should not bother watching one whose life is as brief as Job’s 
own.  Here, though, Job’s tone seems mournful, where previously it had been sharply 
accusatory.  Job says,  
A mortal, born of woman, few of days and full of trouble, comes up like a 
flower and withers, flees like a shadow and does not last.  Do you fix your eyes 
on such a one?  Do you bring me into judgment with you?...Since their days 
are determined, and the number of their months is known to you, and you have 
appointed the bounds that they cannot pass, look away from them and desist.  
(14:1-3, 5-6a) 
Because of their mortality, Job insists, humans must live by different terms than God does 
and must be subject to a different judgment.  In the middle of this speech, Job asks, “Who 
can bring a clean thing out of an unclean?” and answers, “No one can” (14:4).  Here he is 
agreeing with the spirit that humans, because of their mortality, are inherently unclean.  
Mortality is a deep flaw in the human makeup, and renders humans incapable of true 
righteousness.  Yet, where the spirit accords God the right to punish humans because of 
this inherent flaw, Job once again cites this unavoidable imperfection as the reason why 
God should “look away…and desist,” going so far as to point out that it is God who is 
responsible for creating humans as they are in the first place.  How can God blame his 
creatures for an inherent uncleanness that he instilled in them? Job reminds God that if he 
has appointed the bounds beyond which humans cannot pass, he has no right to blame 
them for their inability to transcend those boundaries.  
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Continuing his speech, although Job has previously compared the brevity of human 
life to that of a plant, which grows and withers in quick succession (14:2), Job now 
contrasts human mortality with the relative immortality of a tree which, “though its root 
grows old in the earth, and its stump dies in the ground…at the scent of water…will bud 
and put forth branches like a young plant” (14:8-9).  If Job regards order as static, we 
might be surprised to find that he favors the life-cycle of a tree, which dies and is reborn, 
over that of a human being, who lives and then dies and is no more.  The tree would seem 
to have the more changeable existence, as it moves back and forth between life and death, 
flitting from this world to the next and back again.  Yet, the tree which dies does not 
experience death as a complete change in its circumstances; its death possesses the 
promise of possible future life, making death into a phase of life.  The tree continues to 
exist and is not eradicated by death, and, therefore, does participate in the stasis of the 
ordered world.  Humans, by contrast, experience death as the ultimate change; their death 
is fully death, fully different from life because there is no spark of future life in it.   
Craving a more stable existence, Job wishes that human life were like plant life, 
saying to God,  
O that you would hide me in Sheol, that you would conceal me until your 
wrath is past, and that you would appoint me a set time, and remember me!  If 
mortals die, will they live again?  All the days of my service I would wait until 
my release should come.  You would call, and I would answer you; you would 
long for the work of your hands.  (14:13-15) 
The desire Job expresses here kills two birds with one stone.  First, Job envisions a time 
when God will have changed his mind about how to treat him, when “my transgressions 
would be sealed up in a bag, and you would cover over my iniquity” (14:17).  From Job’s 
perspective, it is not he who needs to repent, but God.  Hidden in Sheol, Job will be able to 
wait out the time of God’s wrath, and will reemerge after God has realized that his 
affliction of Job was misguided.  Secondly, the ability to move between the world of the 
dead and the world of the living, like a plant does, would remove from Job the stigma of 
mortality.  Job would no longer be guilty simply because he is a human being whose life is 
bounded by death.  Emerging from Sheol, Job would find God waiting to befriend him, not 
only because his misguided anger has been appeased, but because the one thing that could 
possibly mark Job as guilty has been removed.  Immortal, Job is cleared of whatever guilt 
inheres in mortality. 
 As the chapter continues, however, Job rejects the possibility of an incubation 
period in Sheol.  For him, death remains the mark of the fundamental changeability of 
human life.  Job compares human changeability to that of a mountain, saying, “But the 
mountain falls and crumbles away, and the rock is removed from its place; the waters wear 
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away the stones; the  torrents wash away the soil of the earth, so you destroy the hope of 
mortals.  You prevail forever against them, and they pass away” (14:18-20a).  The 
comparison is somewhat odd.  Previously, Job has compared human life to that of a plant, 
pointing out the fleeting existence of both (14:1-2 and elsewhere).  A mountain does not 
share this ephemerality.  In fact, compared with the life spans of humans and flowers, 
mountains would seem to be immortal; any given mountain “lives” far longer than any 
human or any plant.  Yet, as we have seen, Job has changed his mind about the lives of 
plants.  They may seem brief and fleeting, but because of the plant’s potential for 
regeneration, are not.  The plant only seems to die, but really goes on living.  It is a fixture, 
unaffected by the real change that is death.  The mountain, whose “life” cannot be 
considered fleeting is, nevertheless, similar to human beings in that both experience real 
change.  The plant does not actually cease to exist, but both mountains and human beings 
experience irreversible change, leading up to the final change that wipes them off the face 
of the earth, either through death or erosion.  Neither mountains nor human beings have 
any claim to stability and stasis; both are thoroughly changeable.  Although this marks 
humans and mountains as chaotic, Job continues to lay the blame for this with God—“You 
prevail forever against them, and they pass away” (14:20a).  It is through no fault of their 
own that humans and mountains are changeable entities.  If there is a fault—and Job 
believes there is—then it is God who is responsible, God who, in creating humans and 
mountains and the forces that act upon them in the way that he has, has introduced change 
into what ought to be a stable cosmos. 
 
The World According to God: The Stable Foundation of the Earth 
 
 It is difficult to say whether the world described by God when he answers Job from 
the whirlwind is changeable or static.  Chapter 38 begins with what seems to be a picture 
of stasis, when God asks Job, 
Where were you when I laid the foundation of the earth?...Who determined its 
measurements?  Surely you know!  Or who stretched the line upon it?  On 
what were its bases sunk, or who laid its cornerstone when the morning stars 
sang together and all the heavenly beings shouted for joy?  Or who shut in the 
sea with doors…and set bars and doors, and said, “Thus far shall you come, 
and no farther, and here shall your proud waves be stopped”?  Have you 
commanded the morning since your days began, and caused the dawn to know 
its place…?  (38:4a, 5-8a, 10b-12) 
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These questions are surely meant to be answered, “you alone did.”104  Interestingly, 
though, God’s seemingly mocking, “Surely you know!” would certainly be met by Job’s 
affirmation, “Yes, I do know who is responsible.”  Job has never questioned God’s power 
or his role as creator; rather, Job has questioned the uses to which God has put his power.  
If God is trying to show Job’s ignorance, “Who did this?” is not the right question to be 
asking, and, for this reason “who” cannot be what is most at stake in this passage.  Rather, 
what is most important is not “who”—which is already known—but “what.”  God’s goal is 
not to convince Job that he is the creator, but to show Job what his creative activity entails.   
Contrary to Job’s accusations that God has acted as an agent of change in the 
world, God here presents himself as the establisher of stability.  Where Job has brought the 
charge against God that he “shakes the earth out of its place, and its pillars tremble; [he] 
commands the sun, and it does not rise; [he] seals up the stars” (9:6-7), God answers by 
insisting that, contrary to the charges advanced by Job, he is responsible for setting the 
earth in its place and for commanding the sun to rise on a daily basis.  In the world God 
has created, the earth is firmly fixed in place and the alternating cycle of day and night is 
set.  What God is responsible for is stability, not the upheaval of random change, as Job 
has argued.  God does mention change in this first section of his speech, but it is change 
that occurs as part of a regularly recurring cycle.  With each dawn, the earth “is changed 
like clay under the seal, and it is dyed like a garment” (38:14), but, presumably, every 
evening the earth changes back to its old color, only to change again with the dawn to the 
color it was the previous dawn.  This is not the kind of change that Job has accused God of 
instigating; instead, this is change which happens within stasis, and which, indeed, is a 
mark that stability prevails. 
 The rest of God’s words do not primarily address the question of whether the world 
is or ought to be static or changeable, but instead focus on presenting the world as a 
complex place, filled with a multiplicity of creatures and a variety of paths, as discussed in 
the previous chapters.  Yet, when God shows Job that each creature has its appointed place 
in the world, he does seem to be describing a stable, static world.105  The wild ass, for 
example, has been “given the steppe for its home” (39:6a), and the eagle “lives on the rock 
and makes its home in the fastness of the rocky crag” (39:28).  God cautions against trying 
to make any creature live where it does not belong.  The wild ass cannot be made to live in 
the city or to pull a cart for a driver (39:7), neither can the wild ox be made to live on a 
                                                 
104 See pages 77-79, 110-111. 
105 I realize that here I am writing about space instead of about time.  Yet, as I will show below, the spatial 
arrangement of the world described from the whirlwind affects how it exists in time. 
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farm and pull the plow (39:9-12); efforts to force a creature to occupy a place other than 
that ordained for it by God will be futile.   
The world is, therefore, like a kind of zoo106 (created, perhaps, for God’s viewing 
pleasure), in which a great variety of creatures live in pens or cages (albeit invisible ones), 
separate from each other and never crossing boundaries in such a way as to affect any 
change.  The wild ass’s cage is the steppe, and the boundary which it will not cross is 
marked by the borders of the town.  Likewise, the sea is contained by the shore, which acts 
as the boundary which it cannot cross.  Things happen in this world, of course, but they 
happen within set boundaries which their happening does not disrupt.  Deer give birth 
(39:1-4), the wild ass “ranges the mountains…and searches after every green thing” (39:8), 
“the hawk soars, and spreads its wings towards the south” (39:26).  To this list, we might 
add, from Job’s own vision of the static world-as-it-ought-to-be, Job “sits as chief 
and…lives like a king among his troops” (29:25).  Yet, the fact is that Job does not 
currently occupy this position.  Instead, “Terrors are turned upon me; my honor is pursued 
as by the wind, and my prosperity has passed away like a cloud” (30:15).  If God is 
presenting the world as it ought to be as static, then Job is in agreement with him.  If, 
however, God is presenting the world as it is as static, then Job must beg to differ.  Job has 
undergone profound changes in his circumstances, even though he himself has not changed 
and has sworn that whatever befalls him in life he will not change.  Job, as we have seen, 
can only vouch for his changelessness during his life, for he knows that death, when it 
comes, will change him utterly.   
We must ask, then, whether God is really presenting the world as it is, or just as it 
ought to be.  And if God is describing the world as it both ought to be and actually is, is he 
describing a static world or a changeable one?  Is he saying to Job, “You’re wrong in 
supposing that you’re beset by change, because the world I created is static”?—as he 
seems to be saying in the opening of his speech when he recalls the founding of the 
earth—or, if we go deeper into his speeches, do we find him to say, “The world as it ought 
to be is not static but changeable”?  It seems to me that this latter alternative is what we 
find. 
 
God’s Changeable World 
 
                                                 
106 Terence Fretheim writes that, answering Job, “God does not take Job into the temple or into the depths of 
his own soul, or insist on some ancient equivalent of C.P.E.  God takes him to the zoo, or better, out to 
‘where the wild things are’” (Fretheim 1999, 89).  Yet, there is a great difference between animals in a zoo 
and animals in their natural habitat; “zoo” and “where the wild things are” do not describe the same thing, 
even different degrees of the same thing.  As I will show below, “zoo” is the wrong term altogether for what 
God shows Job. 
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 We have a hint that God is describing the world as changeable, at least to a degree, 
when he asks Job, “Who has cut a channel for the torrents of rain, and a way for the 
thunderbolt, to bring rain on a land where no one lives, on the desert, which is empty of 
human life, to satisfy the waste and desolate land, and to make the ground put forth grass?” 
(38:25-27).  Although here, again, the question God begins with is “who?”, what is 
primarily at stake is “what.” It is not who has done this that God wants Job to recognize, 
but rather, the fact that such a thing is done in the ordered world.  Though stated in terms 
of fructifying—of making barren land productive—and not its reverse, what God is 
describing is essentially the same kind of change that Job accuses him of causing when he 
claims that God “ removes mountains, and…shakes the earth out of its place” (9:5a, 6a) 
and “makes nations great, then destroys them” (12:23a).  Job accuses God of both building 
up and tearing down, though his emphasis is certainly on the tearing down.  It is the 
changes wrought by destruction, not creation, of which Job accuses God.  Still, in the 
topsy-turvy world that Job describes as reality, albeit one that should not be, God is the 
agent of change who both raises up and casts down, and for God to admit to one side of the 
equation is certainly significant.  Due to God’s action, the land that was a desert is changed 
into fertile grassland.  The use of the term “waste” further links this passage to Job’s 
chapter 12 accusation, and serves as an answer of sorts.107  Those who were once great 
have been made to wander in a pathless waste, Job charges.  God does not deny that this is 
so, but does show that in the world as he has created it the wasteland can put forth grass; it 
need not necessarily remain a wasteland, but can change into fertile ground.  That is to say, 
something else might happen.  Job, despite accusing God of being an agent of change, has 
viewed that change as cyclical to the degree that it becomes static, though Job does not 
seem to recognize that this is the case.  He says, essentially, “God builds up, then God 
tears down, then God builds up, then tears down, and on and on ad infinitum.”   In these 
verses, read as a response to Job’s accusation, God does not deny that change happens or 
that he is responsible for its happening, but he does reject Job’s pronouncement that all 
change is cyclical and, therefore, predictable.  These verses present a world that is, 
actually, more changeable, than the world presented by Job in chapter 12.  What happens 
                                                 
107 Admittedly, the Hebrew words translated “waste” are not the same in both passages.  In 12:24, the word is 
wht, while in 38:27 it is h)#$.  Whereas wht has overtones which link it to the pre-creation void, h)#$ 
connotes land upon which disaster has come and which, consequently, has been laid waste.  It is used in 
Isaiah 47:11, for example, and translated “ruin” in the NRSV: “ruin shall come on you suddenly.”  It might 
be argued that the h)#$ of 38:27 is a more thoroughly wasted land than is the wht of 12:24, but it is hard to 
say.  What can be stated more definitively is that h)#$ is a more concrete term.  It relates to actual, physical 
land.  wht, on the other hand, has a more metaphorical ring.  God is speaking about actual land, whereas Job 
is speaking metaphorically. 
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is what is not foreseen.  Those who have entered the wasteland may not find their way out 
of it, but the wasteland may change in such a way that they are able to survive there. 
 Of course, it is easy to read these verses (38:25-27) as a positive assessment of the 
changeability of creation as that which allows for hope.  We might react quite differently if 
this passage were slanted the same way as Job’s accusations of chapters 9 and 12.  If God 
had said, instead, “Who has withheld the rain from the fertile ground where all the people 
live so the land becomes a desert which can no longer support them?” we might find 
ourselves exclaiming, along with Job, that God ruins everything that seems established for 
good. Yet, even though the passage describes a positive change and not a negative one, its 
view of the world is not that of the Disneyland happy ending.  The new fertility of the 
desolate land does not preclude once fertile land from becoming desolate; that is, it does 
not prevent other changes from happening, even negative ones.  More significant to the 
import of the passage, though, is that it talks about God bestowing the gift of fertilizing 
rain “on a land where no one lives, on the desert, which is empty of human life” (38:26).  
From the immediate human perspective, the change that occurs in the desert, though it may 
be positive, is of no benefit to anyone.  God does not depict himself fertilizing the land 
where humans live, but the place from which they are absent.  This is certainly jarring.  It 
is a Disney movie gone askew, in which it is neither Cinderella nor one of her stepsisters 
who catches the prince’s eye and wins his affection, but some third person who didn’t 
figure in the story at all.  It is not Cinderella who weds the prince, indicating that all is 
right with the world, nor one of her sisters, indicating that all is wrong, but another person 
altogether, someone we have never even seen, indicating that all is neither right nor wrong, 
but weird.  In the same way, God does not tell Job that he improves the lot of the righteous, 
nor that he improves the lot of the wicked, but that he improves the lot of the land where 
no one lives, some land Job has never even seen.  
Is this passage, then, only about multiplicity and not about change?  Is its only 
message that, like the wild ox, who is valued by God despite his unwillingness to serve 
humans, so the wasteland is valued, despite the fact that no one lives there.  I do not think 
so.  A change is clearly described: the land is first desolate and then it becomes fertile.  
What needs to be asked is what happens to the desolate wasteland after it has been rained 
on and has put forth grass.  Does it change once, and afterwards stay the same?  Is this a 
case of change which occurs in the service of stasis, the sort of change of which Job and 
his friends approve?  Having been rained upon, does the land remain as it was with the 
exception that, where once it was barren, now it is covered with vegetation?  Does it 
remain a place empty of human—and other—life, or do creatures which did not live there 
before start finding their way in?  Do humans find their way there, so that the place can no 
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longer be described as “a land where no one lives”?  It seems possible and, given the fact 
that human civilization tends to go where the water is, likely.  Is this what God intends?  
Does God foresee this occurrence?  It should not, of course, be said that God sends the rain 
on the desolate ground so that humans can move in and inhabit it.  To make this claim 
would change the whole import of the passage, making the rain on the desolate ground not 
a sign of God’s valuation of what is other than human but of God’s valuation of what is 
only human.  That the passage should not be read this way is shown by the worth God 
accords to the other-than-human in the rest of his speeches.   
At the same time, I do not think it should be claimed that God, having bestowed 
fertility on the desert, would view the incursion of humans and other animals as a chaotic 
invasion of beings who should have stayed in their own places.  For God to view the 
movement of humans and others in this way is for him to take a static view of the created 
world, to view it as a kind of zoo.  If the world is a zoo, then I have been wrong to identify 
this passage as evidence of the changeability of the world.  The rain in the desert must be 
viewed, instead, as something that happens within established boundaries which are not 
transgressed, just like the deer giving birth in the wild or the wild ass roaming the steppe.  
It is change, but so limited that it does not reveal the world as changeable and God as open 
to change.  I do think, though, that the passage is about the changeability of the world and 
God’s approval of such a world.  The desolate ground bringing forth grass is not the same 
kind of happening as a mountain goat giving birth or a hawk soaring towards the south.  
Such things are happenings, but they are not changes.  The desert becoming fertile ground 
is a change, and that this change is approved by God is indicated by his claim of 
responsibility for it.  If God has created a world where change is possible it cannot be that 
God is open to one change but would view others as marring his creation.108  Rather, if it is 
                                                 
108 This logic is somewhat flawed.  Of course it is possible to be open to one change and not to another.  I 
may welcome the change involved in winning the lottery while ruing the change that comes from breaking 
my leg.  Yet, in the case discussed above, it does seem to me that God’s openness to changing the desert to 
fertile ground indicates his openness to other changes, such as empty land becoming populated.  But what 
support is there for this claim?  Is it anything more than a hunch?  I base my claim on the nature of the 
change and the context in which it is described.  If God were speaking of change in the service of stasis, his 
words would not surprise Job.  Making the desert into fertile, habitable land, which will remain fertile and 
habitable ever after, is what is expected of God.  Robert Leal points out that “Several of the prophetic books, 
notably Isaiah and Ezekiel, contain extended visions of an ideal situation to follow the judgment, 
reconciliation and salvation of God’s people….[These visions] tend to exclude the natural aspects of 
wilderness and transform them into features that are more conducive to human (and divine) comfort” (Leal 
2005, 372).  In Isaiah 40:3-4, for example, the prophet presents a vision of the future making-right of the 
world which involves the transformation of the wilderness into land easily traversed by humans.  Indeed, it is 
possible to read God’s question in  Job 38:25-27 as making the same kind of claim.  God is telling Job that he 
is the one who makes the chaotic wasteland into ordered land that can be used by humans.  Leal reads the 
verse this way, writing, “This view of wilderness as essentially chaotic is pursued further in Job through the 
depiction of God as being victorious in his battle against chaos.  God alone is able ‘to satisfy the waste and 
desolate land, and to make the ground put forth grass’ (Job 38.27).  In this sense God’s victory over chaos is 
associated in Job, as elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible, with the coming of rain and fertility” (Ibid., 374).  Yet, 
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good for desolate land to become fertile, it must also be good for human beings and other 
creatures to move into land that was once unoccupied.  The first change begets the second, 
and so on.  Here, the possibility of further change is dependent upon the multiplicity of 
created beings.  
It is because creation is inhabited by a great variety of creatures that the created 
world is not static.  Creatures move from one place to another.  They encroach on each 
other’s territory.  Their interaction causes change.  Indeed, the accusation hassatan brings 
against God in the prologue is based on his assumption that the world is not structured like 
a zoo.  He says to God regarding Job, “Have you not put a fence around him and his house 
and all that he has, on every side?” (1:10a).  If the world were structured like a zoo, with 
each creature occupying its own place and never coming up against the threat of encounter 
with another creature, then God would have been able to answer hassatan, “Of course I 
have put a fence around him.  I have put a fence around everything.  That’s the way the 
world works.  Now go do something useful for a change.”  Instead, God is cowed by 
hassatan’s claim, precisely because it suggests that he has been tampering with the way 
the world ought to work.  God has been maintaining Job in a static situation, preventing 
anything that might induce change from touching him. Job and his friends, as has been 
seen, assume that stasis is the goal of creation.  God’s revelation in his speeches that the 
world was not created to be a changeless place shatters Job’s illusions, but these are 
illusions for which God, in his fencing in of Job, is to blame.  
 
The Purpose of Death in God’s Speeches 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
the fact is that God does not present the wilderness in a negative light in his Joban speeches.  Rather, the 
wilderness and the “wild things” which live there are depicted as the recipients of his special care.  God’s 
sending rain on the desolate land is described not as a battle against chaos, but as God’s care for the land 
itself.  The land is not conquered by God’s activity, but satisfied.  That this is God’s attitude is what surprises 
Job.  But how does this lead to the idea that God is open to change in the world?  If God quenches the thirst 
of the desolate ground and does not do so for the sake of humans, so that they may find the desert a more 
hospitable environment, wouldn’t it follow that God would want to keep the wilderness free from human 
life?  Having achieved his goal of satisfying the desolate ground, wouldn’t he want to keep the now-fertile 
ground in its current state, stable and eternally undisturbed?  Perhaps.  Perhaps I am thrust back upon my 
hunch, insisting, “No, that just doesn’t seem right,” but unable to explain why.  But let me continue to try.  If 
God has a static goal in mind for the desolate ground, the stasis he envisions is utterly different from the 
stasis envisioned as orderly by Job: the wilderness becomes fertile ground, but humans are barred from 
entering it, instead of the wilderness becoming fertile ground so that humans can enter it and make their 
dwelling there.  “I agree with you that the world shouldn’t change,” God might be understood to say, “But 
what it shouldn’t change from is something different from what you imagine.”  But this cannot be right.  
Somehow, although it seems paradoxical, it is the fact that the ground does not become fertile so that it may 
be taken over by human civilization (as in Isaiah and Ezekiel) which, simultaneously, opens it up to the 
migration of humans and keeps it open to further change.  Humans who move into the now-fertile land 
cannot insist that it remain fertile, because it was not made fertile for their benefit in the first place.  This is 
not land which has been transformed, once and for all, by an apocalyptic occurrence.  Rain may come for a 
time, and then it may go, meaning that the land may be fertile for a time and then may turn, once again, to 
desert. 
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As his speeches continue, God touches on the difficulties inherent in a world that 
contains a great variety of creatures.  One of these difficulties is the reality of death.  It is 
particularly important to look at how God addresses the issue of death, given the problems 
human mortality poses for the stability of the cosmos, as identified by Job, his friends, and 
the spirit messenger.  Actually, though, God never addresses the issue of human mortality 
head on.  His first reference to the existence of death in the world comes in relation to the 
necessity of being fed.  He asks Job, “Can you hunt the prey for the lion, or satisfy the 
appetite of the young lions, when they crouch in their dens, or lie in wait in their covert?  
Who provides for the raven its prey, when its young ones cry to God, and wander about for 
lack of food?” (38:39-41).  These verses seem to answer the question of why death exists 
in the animal kingdom, “Because it is necessary for animals to eat in order to live.”  Death 
exists to support the multiplicity of life.  Indeed, God follows these references to death 
with questions about birth, asking, “Do you know when the mountain goats give birth?  Do 
you observe the calving of the deer?” (30:1).  The animals God names here are animals 
that might fall prey to lions, but he is not saying that some animals exist solely to support 
the lives of other animals through dying and being eaten.  The attention he gives to the 
calving of the deer rules out this claim.   
It is not only the need to eat that necessitates death.  Death also happens when 
creatures “bump into each other,” so to speak.  God describes the ostrich which  “leaves its 
eggs on the earth…forgetting that a foot may crush them, and that a wild animal may 
trample them” (39:14a, 15a).  The ostrich’s embryonic young perish simply because of 
where the ostrich leaves its eggs.  Of course, God admits that this is foolish behavior.  A 
wiser ostrich might leave its eggs elsewhere.  Yet, God says, “though its labor should be in 
vain…it has no fear….When it spreads its plumes aloft, it laughs at the horse and its rider” 
(39:16b, 18).  Despite the danger into which it puts its young, the ostrich is unconcerned.  
After, all, the species does survive in spite of its danger-incurring foolishness.  Although 
the ostrich acts unwisely in leaving its eggs on the ground where they might be trampled 
and might expose them to less danger by storing them somewhere else, there is, in reality, 
nowhere that is entirely safe.  A safe place would be a place wholly apart from other 
creatures, and there is no such place.  God’s description of the ostrich, whose eggs are 
inadvertently crushed by other animals who are doing nothing more than going about their 
daily business, serves as a larger statement about the danger that is inherently present in a 
varied creation.  Death happens because one happens to be where one happens to be, like 
eggs lying in a path which are accidentally crushed underfoot.  Change happens because 
creatures interact.  There is nothing sinister about it; it is simply a function of sharing 
space. 
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 God’s description of the ostrich which “laughs at the horse and its rider” transitions 
into a description of the horse whose nature makes it eager for battle.  Of the horse God 
says, “With fierceness and rage it swallows the ground; it cannot stand still at the sound of 
the trumpet” (39:24).  Although the ostrich is pictured laughing at horse and rider, God 
describes only the horse.  Although we would normally assume that horses go into battle at 
the bidding of humans, here it is the horse which seems in control.  It is not because 
humans control it that the horse charges into the fray; instead, it is because of the horse’s 
love of a fight that humans are carried into battle.  The horse gallops toward its potential 
death because it has an adventurous nature.  Like the ostrich, the horse also laughs: “It 
laughs at fear, and is not dismayed; it does not turn back from the sword” (39:22).  The 
horse laughs because it is not afraid of death; its love of adventure cancels out any fear it 
might otherwise feel.  Why, though, does the ostrich laugh at horse and rider?  Is it because 
its foolishness causes it to giggle at most everything?  No.  The ostrich laughs because it 
sees that the horse and rider are no less foolish than it is itself and, indeed, are perhaps 
more so.  The ostrich laughs at the rider because he thinks he is in control and that the 
battle serves his aims, when really the battle is instigated by the horse and his love of a 
good fight.  The ostrich laughs at the horse because the horse’s noble attributes—its 
“majestic snorting” (v. 20b) and its fearlessness—will land it in the same boat as the 
ostrich’s eggs.  The ostrich may be less than conscientious when it comes to protecting its 
eggs and rearing its young, but such foolhardy behavior pales in comparison with the 
horse’s rushing into battle where it will no doubt get itself killed.  The horse laughs at 
battle and exposes its breast to the thrust of the sword, but the ostrich laughs at the horse 
and leaves its young to fend for themselves, reasoning perhaps that surely they will do a 
better job of it than the horse does, and if not…well…somehow the species still manages 
to go on, and horses, too, continue to exist.  The ostrich, though undoubtedly something of 
a fool, is also a philosopher. 
 In his speech so far, God has said that death exists in the animal kingdom for 
several reasons.  First, animals have to eat, and what they eat, at least in some cases, is 
other animals.  Secondly, death exists because the world is a crowded place and animals 
cannot help but bump into each other, sometimes causing harm.  Thirdly, death exists 
because some animals—like the ostrich—cannot be bothered to try to avoid it (at least 
where their young are concerned) and others—like the horse—are blinded to its threat by 
the thrill of adventure.  These animals risk death because something in their nature 
compels them to live in a particular way.  In each of these examples, death is a 
consequence of life in an inhabited world.  If lions did not exist, deer might not die.  If 
other animals did not exist, the ostrich could be as lazy as it liked about its eggs and do so 
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with impunity.  If humans did not exist, horses might not find themselves pierced with 
arrows, but might gallop to their hearts’ content in empty fields.  If horses did not exist, 
humans might not be carried into battle, but might sit at home tending their fires and 
grilling vegetables on the coals.  In the world as God describes it, stasis can only be 
maintained at the cost of the multifarious creation; if complexity is to exist, then change 
must be a feature of the world.   
Although God does not address human mortality outright, humans are present on 
the periphery of God’s discourse about death.  The ostrich, as we have already seen, laughs 
not only at the horse but at its rider, and it is human beings who brandish the spears toward 
which the horse, in its impetuous lust for adventure, rushes.  It is humans whom the horse 
hears shouting and blowing the war trumpets (39:24-25).  Humans are present in the battle, 
and perhaps it can only facetiously be said that they are there because of the horse’s desire 
for a fight.  Perhaps they have their own reasons for being there, possibly as foolish and 
unavoidable as the horse’s own.  However, where humans are most notably and jarringly 
present is as the slain, lying on the battlefield after the conflict is over.  This depiction 
occurs after God has ostensibly left the subject of battle behind, moving on to a description 
of the birds of prey which live “on the rock and make [their] home[s] in the fastness of the 
rocky crag” (39:28), seemingly making the same point he has already made about the wild 
ass and the wild ox, namely, that these animals are part of God’s good creation and have 
sanctioned places within it, set apart from human control.  Once again, though, God is not 
describing the creation as a kind of zoo, with enforced and uncrossable boundaries 
between each creature.   
This point is brought home, when at the end of his passage about the great birds, 
God returns to the battlefield, this time through the eagle’s eyes, saying, “From there [the 
high, rocky crag] it spies the prey; its eyes see it from far away.  Its young ones suck up 
blood; and where the slain are, there it is.  (39:29-30).  We are reminded of God’s initial 
foray into the subject of mortality, where he asked, “Who provides for the raven its prey, 
when its young ones cry to God, and wander about for lack of food?” (38:41), and we can 
now see that the question was a kind of trick and has a double answer.  Previously we 
might have answered, “God provides food for the raven and its young,” acknowledging 
that God has created the world in such a way that his creatures can be nourished, even if 
the nourishment of one depends on the death of another.  Now, though, we see that the 
question “Who provides for the raven its prey” can be answered “human beings do,” in 
that human beings, dead on the field of battle, become prey for scavenging birds.  The 
question, “Why are human beings mortal?” is answered here, “Because ravens and eagles 
have to eat.”  This is God’s answer to the claims Job and the friends have made about the 
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problem of human mortality.  Both Job and the friends have seen human mortality as 
something that should not be, as a blot on human perfectibility.  God’s response is at once 
flippant and serious. Death is not something that humans ought to be able to be able to 
avoid, nor does it mark them as unable to participate in the world as it ought to be.  Rather, 
death is the means by which humans participate in the world as it ought to be.  The world 
as it ought to be is inhabited by a multiplicity of creatures, and from this multiplicity stems 
change and also change at its most extreme, which is death.   
Job’s response to God’s claim that humans are mortal so that scavengers can have 
something to eat is, understandably, bitter: “See, I am of small account; what shall I 
answer you?  I lay my hand on my mouth.  I have spoken once, and I will not answer; 
twice, but will proceed no further” (40:4-5).  It is one thing to accept that one’s mortality 
designates one as a chaotic being, unable to fully participate in the order of the world, and 
quite another to swallow the idea that the world is ordered in such a way that one dies in 
order to feed dirty, scavenging birds.  Both Job and Eliphaz have envisioned a way in 
which the problem of human mortality can be overcome, even if not through the literal 
avoidance of death (5:20-26; 29:18).  For both, in the world as it ought to be, humans can 
get the better of death by ensuring, through their own righteousness, that their family line 
will continue after they are dead.  God, though, presents no such option.  In God’s order, 
death feeds life, for humans and animals alike. 
 
God Challenges Job to Afflict the Wicked with Change 
 
God begins his second speech by challenging Job to “look on all who are proud, 
and abase them.  Look on all who are proud, and bring them low; tread down the wicked 
where they stand.  Hide them in the dust together; bind their faces in the world below” 
(40:11b-13).  If Job can successfully do this, God promises, “Then I will also acknowledge 
to you that your own right hand can give you victory” (40:14).  Although these verses are 
often read as proclaiming that only if he can crush the wicked as God does is Job justified 
in finding fault with God, I do not think we are meant to understand them in this way, as 
discussed in chapter two.  As already argued, God challenges Job not to beat him at his 
own game, but to make the world as he believes it ought to be, which is not the world God 
ever intended to make.  In his speeches, Job has accused God of acting as the primary 
agent of change in the world, who brings humans to power and then topples them (12:13-
25), and who founds the earth and then shakes it from its foundations (9:5-8).  The changes 
wrought by God, Job has accused, are chaotic undoings of the order of the world.  At the 
same time, both he and the friends have insisted that the wicked, who are allied with chaos, 
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ought to experience changeable lives, culminating in the ultimate change of death.  God’s 
words in 40:10-14 can be seen to address both Job’s accusations and the assumptions 
which he and the friends share.  The changeability that Job and the friends see as 
inherent—or ideally inherent—in the lives of the wicked is denied by God.  Job is offered 
a go at making a world in which this is the case, but God seems to know that he will not 
succeed.  The world may be a changeable place—and a place where change has God’s 
approval—as is suggested by 38:25-27, but it is not a place in which change applies only 
to one group, while other groups experience stability.  In addition, the passage can be seen 
to address Job’s accusation that God manipulates people, situations, and even the earth 
itself to suit his whim.  If God does not act directly upon the wicked in order to bring about 
changes in their circumstances, it seems unlikely that he acts as the source of change in the 
lives of others.  The world is changeable, yes, and God has created it to be so—its 
changeability is a function of its complexity—but it is not changeable because God 
intervenes to bring one person high and cast another low.  God may have established a 
world in which change is possible, but he does not control its changes in the way that Job 
supposes. 
 
Job and “The Beasts”: Survival in a Changeable World 
 
After challenging Job to remake the world as a place where change happens only to 
the wicked, while the righteous experience stasis, God progresses to a description of the 
great beast, Behemoth.  Directing Job to “Look at Behemoth, which I made just as I made 
you” (40:15), God once again binds the human condition to the animal condition.  Where 
previously God has spoken (albeit indirectly) of human death, explaining human mortality 
as that which allows the scavenging birds to be fed, now God speaks of human life, 
likening it to the life of an animal.  There is, of course, debate over just what kind of 
animal Behemoth is109 and over whether Behemoth is even an animal at all,  or whether it 
is, instead, a mythic beast, a composite of known creatures which, together, make up the 
                                                 
109 Most contemporary scholars agree that  if Behemoth is a natural animal, it is the hippopotamus, though 
other identities have been proposed.  B. Couroyer, for example, argues that Behemoth is the wild buffalo, 
showing that of the nine traits which Behemoth is described as possessing, only four match the 
hippopotamus, while all match the buffalo (Couroyer 1975, 443).  For instance, Behemoth’s tail, which is 
said to be “stiff like a cedar” does not accurately describe a hippopotamus’s tail, which is short and stubby, 
and not at all tree-like.  Scholars frequently make up for this discrepancy by understanding “tail” to be a 
euphemism for “penis,” but this, too, is problematic.  Watson points out that “hippopotami have internal 
testes and a recurved penis.  This translation would therefore only work if the knowledge of ancient Israelites 
about hippopotamus genitalia was as scant as that of most modern biblical scholars, which of course may be 
so” (Watson 2005, 340). 
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unknown.110  The actual identity of Behemoth is not, however, important to my reading of 
the text.  For my purposes, it makes sense to understand Behemoth—which literally means 
“beasts” (beast plural), and is by extension, understood to mean “great beast,” given that 
the singular pronoun is used to refer to it111—as representative of the animal kingdom as a 
whole.  Read this way, the purport of God’s reference to Behemoth is not the comparison 
of Job to one specific animal, but the comparison of Job to all animals.  The animals that 
inhabit the world were created by God to the same degree that human beings were created 
by God.  Animals and humans are, collectively and to an equal degree, God’s creatures.  In 
this section, God does not question Job or urge him to try his strength to see if it can equal 
God’s own.  The passage, until its final verse where God asks, “Can one take it with hooks 
or pierce its nose with a snare?” (40:24), is entirely descriptive.  Even this verse does not 
question Job directly—God asks, “Can one take it?” (wnxqy) not “Can you”—making the 
verse less about what Job can do and more a continuation of the description of Behemoth.  
What is the significance of the descriptive nature of this passage?  I am in 
agreement with John Gammie who suggests that Job is meant to see himself in Behemoth, 
particularly the potential which he shares with the beast (or with beasts in general) to face 
whatever dangers may threaten.  God depicts Behemoth as a powerful, yet peace-loving 
creature, which has been created and given a place to live within the created world.  God 
says, “Its bones are tubes of bronze, its limbs like bars of iron….Under the lotus plants it 
lies, in the covert of the reeds and in the marsh” (40:18, 21).  The river in which Behemoth 
lives is not always calm, but, “Even if the river is turbulent, it is not frightened; it is 
confident though Jordan rushes against its mouth” (40:23).  Gammie writes that the import 
of this passage is that like Behemoth, Job too has “the defenses with which he may 
vigorously resist all attack,” as well as “the sexual strength to start again” (Gammie 1978, 
226).  I would add to this interpretation the idea that Job has been given what he needs to 
survive in a changeable world.  Or, that is, at least to survive for a time.  It cannot really be 
said that Job has the strength to “resist all attack.”  He is not immortal, and neither is 
Behemoth.  
God’s message, though, would seem to be that Job is stronger than he thinks he is.  
Previously, while complaining of his situation Job had asked, “What is my strength, that I 
                                                 
110 See the discussion in chapter 1. 
111 Dhorme writes, “The form is nothing more than the plural of  hmhb (12:7), and it makes of  twmhb a 
designation of majesty, the brute beast par excellence” (Dhorme 1967, 619).  Pope, too, explains that the 
name is “an apparent plural of the common noun behemah, ‘beast, cattle.’ The verbs used with the noun in 
this passage are third masculine singular thus indicating that a single beast is intended and that the plural 
form here must be the so-called intensive plural or plural of majesty, The Beast, par excellence” (Pope 1965, 
268).  At the same time, Pope argues that the name has mythic overtones, and that Behemoth may be related 
to “the monstrous bullock of the Ugaritic myths and…the Sumero-Akkadian ‘bull of heaven’ slain by 
Gilgamesh” (Ibid., 270). 
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should wait….Is my strength the strength of stones, or is my flesh bronze?  In truth I have 
no help in me, and any resource is driven from me” (6:11a, 12-13).  God’s answer is that 
Job’s strength is the strength of stones and his flesh is bronze, just as Behemoth’s bones 
are tubes of bronze and its limbs bars of iron.  Job is not without resources.  The resources 
that are available to the natural world are also available to him.  Clearly, Job is not literally 
made of stone and bronze, just as Behemoth is not actually made of bronze and iron, but, 
as creatures of the God who also created stone and bronze and iron the link between their 
bodies and these materials is a close one; there is strength in flesh and bone.  God has 
endowed Job, like Behemoth, with the resources to weather the changeability of the world 
in which he lives. 
 
Leviathan as the Embodiment of Unpredictable and Uncontrollable Change 
 
Then God turns to speak of Leviathan.  Ah, Leviathan.  What a splash the monster 
makes and how easy it is to call that splash chaos—what should not be—instead of order.  
What are we to make of Leviathan and of God’s speech about it, which is so clearly a 
hymn of praise?  In the first part of this section, God returns to the question format but 
soon abandons it again in favor of pure description.  The questions in the first part of the 
chapter are addressed to Job and have to do with whether he is capable of capturing the 
mighty beast.  “Can you draw out Leviathan with a fish-hook, or press down its tongue 
with a cord?  Can you put a rope in its nose, or pierce its jaw with a hook?  Will it make 
many supplications to you?  Will it speak soft words to you?  Will it make a covenant with 
you to be taken as your servant for ever?” (41:1-4).  The questions continue along the same 
lines for another three verses, and then God answers the questions he has been putting to 
Job, saying, “Lay hands on it; think of the battle; you will not do it again!  Any hope of 
capturing it will be disappointed; were not even the gods overwhelmed at the sight of it?  
No one is so fierce as to dare to stir it up.  Who can stand before it?  Who can confront it 
and be safe?—under the whole heaven, who?” (41:8-11).  Those who read the chapter as a 
reenactment of the combat myth see it as God’s challenge to Job to try to be the one who 
creates the world by conquering the chaos monster.  If Job cannot perform this most basic 
of God’s tasks, how can he presume to know how the world should function and how God 
should behave?112  As already discussed, I do not think the Leviathan questions should be 
                                                 
112 Among those who read the passage in this way, Hartley writes, “Yahweh challenges Job to demonstrate 
his prowess by defeating in mortal combat the ominous creatures Behemoth and Leviathan.  If he cannot 
master these symbols of cosmic powers, he will have to abandon his complaint” (Hartley 1988, 518).  
Similarly, Batto remarks, “the author of Job 40:15-41:34 has Yahweh challenge Job to play the role of 
creator, if he can, by subduing Behemoth and Leviathan, the traditional twin chaos monsters representing the 
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interpreted in this way.  Rather, it seems to me that God includes himself among those 
“under the whole heaven” who cannot confront Leviathan and be safe.113  Good supports 
this view, writing, “is Job 41.17 an admission that Yahweh, like the other gods, has his 
moments of terror before his astounding monster?  The text does not say ‘the gods’...or 
‘other gods’...but just, in the abstract generality, ‘gods’....Surely no claim is implied that 
Yahweh is not a ‘god’” (Good 1990, 363-64).114   
If, in chapter 40, God has presented Job with Behemoth as a mirror to show him 
that, contrary to what he believes, he does have the resources to survive in a changeable 
and unsafe world, here, with his description of Leviathan, God acknowledges that, in the 
world as he has created it, there are forces and beings that pose the kind of threat that 
cannot be resisted.  Leviathan is the supreme embodiment of that which is uncontrollable 
in the world, over which even God has no control.  If the changeability of the world stems 
from its multiplicity, then Leviathan, whose inclusion in the ordered world marks the 
extremes to which its multiplicity is taken, is also the mark of its extreme changeability.  In 
his description of Behemoth God has said that Job is equipped to survive some of the 
changes life throws at him, but in his description of Leviathan he concedes that Job is not 
equipped to survive all of them.  And it is no use asking God to take control by subduing 
or binding Leviathan, because God cannot control Leviathan.  Or perhaps Leviathan is not, 
necessarily, the representative of change that Job cannot survive, but only of change that 
he is powerless to resist.  He cannot stop Leviathan’s onslaught, nor can he be safe in its 
presence, but who is to say what he might be capable of surviving?  Behemoth survives the 
turbulent waters, so it is possible that Job, too, might survive the turbulent waters stirred up 
by Leviathan who “makes the deep boil like a pot” (41:31a).  But then again, maybe not.  
Who can say?  Job has resources, but his resources have a limit to them, as do, it seems, 
God’s.  But if God can watch Leviathan recede, seeing the “shining wake” that it leaves 
behind it (41:32) as it swims away, then perhaps Job can, too, at least some of the time.   
                                                                                                                                                   
dry wasteland and the unformed ocean, respectively.  Since Job obviously cannot subdue the chaos monsters, 
Job has no right to challenge the Creator about he way he runs this world” (Batto 1992, 47-48).  John Day, 
too, suggests that “the implication seems to be that, just as Job cannot overcome the chaos monsters 
Behemoth and Leviathan, which Yahweh defeated at creation, how much less can he…overcome the God 
who vanquished them.  His only appropriate response is therefore humble submission to God” (Day 2002, 
103).  Rowold  concurs with these interpreters, writing,  “Leviathan is the fierce one who stands/stood 
against Yahweh….Yahweh’s challenge is that Job begin his moral governance with this primal beast.  Of 
course, Job can no more master this task than he can perform any of those tasks detailed in the first speech of 
Yahweh” (Rowold 1986, 88).  
113 See my remarks in on pages 84-85, likening God’s description of Leviathan to his description of the wild 
ox, and drawing from this similarity the idea that God is not presenting himself as the champion who has 
defeated Leviathan but as the one who has created Leviathan to be free. 
114 In contrast to the great multitude of scholars who read the Leviathan chapter as depicting God’s control of 
Leviathan, Good seems to be unique in holding the view that God himself may be overwhelmed by 
Leviathan’s power, a view with which I agree.   
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 After asking his final question, “Who can confront it and be safe?—under the 
whole heaven, who?” to which the answer is, presumably, “no one,” and, I would argue, 
“not even God,” God leaves off questioning Job and focuses his attention fully on 
Leviathan, singing a hymn of praise to this “king over all that are proud.”  God’s 
description of Leviathan continues the theme originated in the questions of the first part of 
the chapter, namely the impossibility of conquering the beast.  God enthuses, 
I will not keep silence concerning its limbs, or its mighty strength, or its 
splendid frame.  Who can strip off its outer garment?  Who can penetrate its 
double coat of mail?  Who can open the doors of its face?  There is terror all 
around its teeth….The folds of its flesh cling together; it is firmly cast and 
immovable.  Its heart is as hard as stone, as hard as the lower millstone.  When 
it raises itself up the gods are afraid; at the crashing they are beside themselves.  
Though the sword reaches it, it does not avail, nor does the spear, the dart, or 
the javelin.  It counts iron as straw and bronze as rotten wood.  (41:12-14, 23-
27) 
God has described Behemoth as having bones that are tubes of bronze and limbs that are 
like bars of iron (40:18).  Supporting the idea that, in Leviathan, God is describing an 
agent of change that Behemoth, and by extension Job, cannot resist, is the fact that the 
strong materials of which Behemoth is made are as nothing to Leviathan.  To Leviathan, 
iron is like straw and bronze like rotten wood.  Behemoth has no chance against this beast, 
but Behemoth does have a chance against plenty of other threats.  Such is the nature of life 
in the world as God has created it.   
It is significant that what God praises in Leviathan is its unconquerability, its 
inability to be subdued or bound, let alone killed.  The crowning achievement of God’s 
creation is this uncontrollable beast.  If Behemoth has held a mirror to Job,  how does 
Leviathan function with regard to Job?  Clearly, God’s claim that Leviathan is “king over 
all that are proud” serves to answer Job’s reminiscence about the world as it was and ought 
to be, where, he says, “I lived like a king among his troops” (29:25b).  Job, who has seen 
himself as the crowning achievement of creation, is unseated by Leviathan.  The static 
world favored and upheld by Job is toppled by the turbulent, changeable world ruled by 
Leviathan.  Job, though, would never have counted himself as king of the proud.  His 
subjects are meek and mild; they keep silence and draw back.  The proud, at least in God’s 
words of 40:11b-13, are synonymous with the wicked.  Are Leviathan and Job, then, kings 
of different realms, with Job ruling the righteous and Leviathan the wicked?  Is God’s 
claim that Leviathan is “king over all that are proud” the equivalent of saying, “Leviathan 
is the proudest of the proud, and also, therefore, the wickedest of the wicked”?115  I do not 
think so.  The chapter’s ebullient praise of Leviathan’s characteristics prohibits this 
                                                 
115 See chapter 3, footnote 5. 
 161
interpretation.  Leviathan’s kingship is described by God as legitimate, which means that 
Job cannot call for Leviathan to be overthrown and the crown ceded to Job himself.  In a 
sense, while Behemoth holds a mirror to Job, Leviathan holds an anti-mirror.  Leviathan 
stands for everything that Job is not, and the world over which he is king is, in Job’s view, 
a chaotic world.  God, though, insists that the world ruled by Leviathan is the world 
ordered as it ought to be.  
There is a sense, however, in which Leviathan, too, can be seen to hold a mirror to 
Job.  Job, too, is a powerful creature.  He does not have the power to completely remake 
the world according to his own vision, but he does have the capability to act unpredictably 
and uncontrollably.  Although Job has assumed that God has complete control over human 
destiny and has accused him of acting as the agent of random change in human life and 
society, perhaps, in the Leviathan pericope, God is arguing otherwise.  If Leviathan is not 
subject to God’s control and, for this reason, earns not God’s enmity but God’s praise, then 
perhaps Job, too, has independence.  Perhaps it is not true that “In his hand is the life of 
every living thing and the breath of every human being” (12:10), as Job has claimed.  If the 
life of the living thing called Leviathan is not in his hand, perhaps the life of every human 
being is not under God’s thumb, for him to do with as he pleases.  God is not the agent of 
change in the world.  Rather, it is his uncontrollable creatures who shape and change the 
world, Job included.  The ordered world, as God sees it, is a world over which he has 
relinquished control, over which he is not king, in which creatures are free to act as real 
characters and who, in consequence, act as agents of change.  God has equipped creatures 
to survive in such a world, and yet death is also a reality, itself based on the great 
multiplicity of creatures which possess full reality. 
  
The Laughter of the Animals in God’s Speeches and Bakhtin’s Carnivalesque 
 
 Before leaving God’s speeches behind, it seems worth touching, again, on the 
laughter that springs from the mouths of many of the creatures that God describes from the 
whirlwind.  In her reading of God’s speeches, Keller invokes Bakhtin’s ideas about the 
role of laughter, quoting his claim that “Laughter is a vital factor in laying down that 
prerequisite for fearlessness without which it would be impossible to approach the world 
realistically” (Bakhtin 1981, 23).  I have already written about the laughter of the ostrich 
and the horse, both of which are described as fearlessly laughing in the face of danger.  
The word translated “laugh” with both ostrich and horse as subject is qx#&.  It is also used 
in God’s description of the wild ass: “It scorns (qx#&y) the tumult of the city” (39:7).  The 
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ass laughs at a way of life in which it does not wish to participate, but it is also possible to 
see fear as the ultimate object of this laughter.  Perhaps the ass laughs at the tumult of the 
city against the fear of being captured and taken there.  Behemoth, though he is not 
pictured as laughing, is described as fearless.  God says of this beast, “Even if the river is 
turbulent, it is not frightened” (40:23).  Indeed, laughter might strike us as out of character 
for Behemoth, who is portrayed as placid by comparison with the frenzied horse and the 
foolish ostrich.  Still, if Behemoth were the type to let loose with a laugh, we would, no 
doubt, find him laughing at the turbulent waters as an expression of his lack of fear.  When 
we come to the final chapter of God’s second speech, we find that Leviathan, too, laughs 
to display its fearlessness when faced with potential death.  We read, “Clubs are counted as 
chaff; it laughs (qx#&y) at the rattle of the javelins” (41:29).  Of course, Leviathan, with its 
impenetrable skin, may as well laugh at whatever weapons are thrust against it; if it is truly 
as invincible as God seems to say, even the direst threat is rendered laughable.  If this is 
the case, Leviathan’s laughter is quite different from that of the ostrich, the horse, the ass, 
and Behemoth, all of which face the real possibility of harm and laugh in spite of it.  
Leviathan has cause to laugh; the others have no cause, but laugh anyway, mocking the 
unlaughability of their situations.   
Is it a correct assessment to say that Leviathan’s laughter is qualitatively different 
from that of the other animals?  Leviathan’s laughter does seem different, because its 
situation seems different.  At the same time, however, the fact that Leviathan is not the 
only animal depicted as laughing, but is instead the final animal in a series of laughing—or 
at least fearless—animals seems to link Leviathan’s laughter to theirs and to indicate that 
all this laughter is of a piece.  The series seems to move from the one who has the least 
reason to laugh through to the one who has the most reason to laugh, with each animal’s 
fearlessness being progressively more justifiable.  The horse has more reason to be fearless 
than the ostrich—it is a mightier beast, described as majestic and terrible, while the ostrich 
is depicted only as foolish and lazy; the horse laughs at death, knowing that it gallops into 
danger, while the ostrich seems to be fearless only because it doesn’t know any better, 
because it doesn’t realize the danger into which it is putting its eggs and offspring.  
Behemoth, whose “bones are tubes of bronze, its limbs like bars of iron” is again more 
justified in being fearless than either the horse or the ostrich; it does not expose itself to 
death accidentally like the ostrich or purposefully like the horse, but faces the threats that 
arise naturally in the course of its life.  And then there is Leviathan, which seems to have 
the right to laugh in the face of danger, because nothing can touch it.   
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Yet, though Leviathan might be the only creature for which laughter is really wise, 
God does not criticize the other animals for laughing in the face of danger.  Even his 
designation of the ostrich as lacking in wisdom does not indicate his belief that the ostrich 
would be better off if it did not laugh.  Although by laughing an animal may court death, 
taking risks that a wiser being might avoid, in a sense the only way to live is by being 
fearless in the face of danger and laughing at the threat of death.  To do otherwise is to risk 
being paralyzed by fear.  This is the substance of Bakhtin’s claim, quoted by Keller in 
relation to the laughter of the animals in God’s speeches.  But, again it must be asked what 
this has to do with Leviathan, which laughs because it has nothing to fear.  Perhaps the 
answer is that Leviathan does not know it has nothing to fear, but laughs, like any other 
creature, to overcome the fear it feels. Perhaps all these beasts are in the same boat, 
laughing to overcome their fears, because they do not know what the future holds. 
Or perhaps the answer lies in the fact that there are times when all the animals’ 
laughter seems justified.  There are times when the ostrich’s young survive, despite being 
uncared for by their parent, as is evidenced by the fact that there are ostriches.  There are 
times when the horse is not killed in the fray of battle.  There are times when Behemoth is 
not overwhelmed by the waters.  Leviathan, God tells Job, always survives attack, but, 
when they do survive the dangers that assail them, the ostrich, the horse, and Behemoth are 
as invincible as Leviathan.  They are not as reliably invincible, but their sometime survival 
justifies their laughter.   
In his exploration of the medieval carnival as the interaction between “official 
culture” and “folk culture,” Bakhtin links laughter to change.  Official culture, in his view, 
is characterized by a denial of time; it locates itself in a timeless realm, insisting that its 
authority will be valid in every time and for all time.  Official culture believes that it is 
endowed with eternity, where eternity is not merely a surplus of time, but, rather, time’s 
superfluity; to invoke eternity is to abolish time.  By contrast, folk culture, in its carnival 
mode, is able to uncrown official culture precisely through an invocation of time in its full 
potency. Time, which passes and which guarantees and ushers in change, is  a 
carnivalesque force.  It is precisely because time passes that it is possible to laugh at what 
seems to be fixed and immutable.  Discussing the beatings and abuses heaped upon 
representatives of official culture in Rabelais’ novels, Bakhtin observes, 
They are all subject to mockery and punishment as individual incarnations of 
the dying truth and authority of prevailing thought, law, and virtues.  This old 
authority and truth pretend to be absolute, to have an extratemporal 
importance.  Therefore, their representatives…are gloomily serious….They do 
not see themselves in the mirror of time, do not perceive their own origin, 
limitations and end; they do not recognize their own ridiculous faces or the 
comic nature of their pretensions to eternity and immutability….They continue 
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to talk with the majestic tone of kings and heralds announcing eternal truths, 
unaware that time has turned their speeches into ridicule.  Time has 
transformed old truth and authority into a Mardi Gras dummy, a comic monster 
that the laughing crowd rends to pieces in the marketplace.  (Bakhtin 1984b, 
212-13) 
Claiming eternal authority, the representatives of official culture cannot perceive that time 
has invaded their supposedly extratemporal space and has burst it open, exposing it as a 
sham.  
In Rabelais’ portrayal of the uncrowning of official authority figures, as described 
by Bakhtin, laughter figures prominently.  The ravages of time are hilarious.  It is funny 
that those who claimed eternal authority have been proven fools and liars by the passage of 
time.  Nor, Bakhtin claims, is the funniness of the situation due only to the fact that it is 
“them” and not “us” to whom this has happened, as if their hypocrisy has been exposed, 
allowing us to mock them while patting ourselves on the back for avoiding similar 
hypocrisy.  The laughter of the “folk” or of the people in the marketplace cannot be 
attributed to their perception of themselves as immune to the power that has unseated the 
agelasts.116  They know that time has the upper hand where they, too, are concerned.  
Bakhtin insists that carnival mocks not only agelast members of the official culture, but 
also the carnival’s participants.  He writes, “The people do not exclude themselves from 
the wholeness of the world.  They, too, are incomplete, they also die and are revived and 
renewed” (Ibid. 12).  This knowledge, however, provokes laughter, instead of grief or 
silent pensiveness, because, if Bakhtin is right, change is valued over immovability.  
Everything is understood to be in a state of becoming, and this becoming is affirmed over 
the preservation of a stasis that is equated with death.  If there is an us/them situation in 
Rabelais as understood by Bakhtin, it is between those who affirm change and those who 
affirm changelessness.  Those who recognize the unstoppable power of time and rejoice in 
the changes that time brings can mock those who claim extratemporal authority, but their 
laughter acknowledges that they themselves are also caught in time’s current and will be 
swept away. 
What, then, of the laughing animals in God’s speeches?  Can their laughter be 
linked to the laughter of the “folk” during carnival?  Does it serve a similar purpose?  And, 
if so, who is the representative of official culture at whose pretensions their debunking 
laughter is directed?  Of course, I do not mean to contend that there is a direct correlation 
between the laughter of the “folk,” as described by Bakhtin and the laughter of the animals 
in the whirlwind speeches, but only to suggest that Bakhtin’s observations about carnival 
laughter may provide a lens through which to view the animals’ laughter.  Indeed, Bakhtin 
                                                 
116 Rabelais’ term for the time-denying members of official culture  
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himself, with his coining of the term “carnivalesque” intended his insights to be applicable 
to areas of study beyond that of the medieval carnival alone.  Terrien describes God’s 
speeches as presenting a “carnival of the animals” (Terrien 1971, 501), and although he 
does not mean that the animals literally participate in the kind of carnival staged by 
medieval Europeans, the phrase may at least gesture toward  a reading of the animals’ 
laughter that looks toward the carnivalesque.  For Bakhtin, when the people laugh their 
carnival laughter, they laugh not only in response to time’s unseating of the eternal dictates 
of official culture, but in order to bring about the overturning of what seems eternally 
established.  To laugh at what is deemed unsusceptible to ridicule is to render that thing 
susceptible to ridicule, to cause it to crumble and force it to change, which is also the work 
of time.  Laughter and time, then, work together to topple what has been declared wholly 
stable. 
What, though, do the animals want to topple?  At whom is their laughter directed?  
Is it directed at God?  Is God the representative of official culture to the animals’ “folk” 
culture?  I do not think so, although some scholars read the relationship in this way.  
Robert Fyall, for instance, writes, “Laughter is a sign of control; God laughs because he is 
in control: ‘The One enthroned in the heavens laughs’ (Ps. 2:4).  The evocation of the 
grotesque here is amusing, but it is the amusement of the Creator who laughs with total 
knowledge and power” (Fyall 2002, 76).  For Fyall, laughter means the opposite of what it 
means for Bakhtin.  Whereas for Bakhtin, it is the powerless who laugh, for Fyall, laughter 
is the prerogative of those whose sovereignty is unchallenged.  Here, it is not only that God 
is the representative of official culture, but that God has taken their only weapon out of the 
hands of the “folk.”  God confiscates the animals’ laughter, and, in so doing, stops time.  
Fyall makes sense of the animals’ laughter by explaining it in terms of their participation 
in the world ordered by God’s power.  He writes, “The ostrich, too, secure in her place in 
creation, can afford to laugh” (Ibid.).  Yet, although it is true that God does not chastise the 
ostrich for her lack of wisdom, it can hardly be said that her life is presented as secure.  
Rather, the ostrich laughs despite her insecurity.  Habel, too, transfers to God the laughter 
which is said in the speeches to belong to the animals.  He claims that, although Leviathan 
may laugh “at the rattle of javelins” (41:29b) “In the hands of Yahweh…the defiant laugh 
of this sea monster can be transformed into a giggle or a game (as in Ps. 104:26)” (Habel 
1985, 573).  Leviathan still laughs here, but its laughter is robbed of power.  It does not 
laugh so much as simper, batting its eyelashes at the God who has subdued it. 
In both of these interpretations, God is represented as the official, while, at the 
same time, the animals are robbed of the laughter which might allow them to expose this 
official as subject to the vicissitudes of time and chance.  Of course, the point Fyall and 
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Habel are making is precisely that God is not subject to these vicissitudes; God is not like 
one of Rabelais’ overturnable agelasts, and so can laugh heartily in self-satisfaction.  I do 
not, however, think that God is the official in this picture.  If God laughs, it is not because 
he is in complete control, but because he has relinquished at least some of that control to 
the world he has made.  His laugh is not  the self-confident guffaw of the unchallengeable 
official, but a peal of delight in what he has made.  Perhaps, also, God’s laughter is like 
that of the animals who laugh in spite of fear and whose laughter generates change.  If, in 
creating the world and its inhabitants, God has let go of his ability to control everything 
that exists, perhaps he, too, has need of laughter to fortify himself against the unknown 
future and to stave off fear.   
Although God may be the obvious choice for the representative of official culture, I 
do not think the whirlwind God fits this bill.  But if God is not the official, then who is?  
Having ruled out the first obvious answer, let me propose another: the representative of 
official culture is Job.  Job is the one for whom the world as it ought to be is static, eternal, 
untouched by time.  Job is the one who insists that the change in his circumstances is 
unjust and who calls for a return to the way things used to be.  In fact, Eliphaz, in his first 
depiction of the stable life of the righteous man, has told Job that once he has repented and 
is restored, “At destruction and famine you shall laugh (qx#&t), and shall not fear the wild 
animals of the earth” (5:22).  Here, Eliphaz promises Job the laughter of the powerful, of 
those who have no reason to fear change.  Yet, this is not the laughter of the animals as 
God describes it, nor is it the kind of laughter in which God’s speeches would encourage 
Job to engage.117  Job may claim his authority by an appeal to God’s authority—as 
Newsom points out “In Job’s construction, God functions…as the social and moral order 
writ large” (Newsom 2003, 196)—but this is not the God of the whirlwind.  
The animals, to be sure, are not laughing directly at Job.  They do not even see him.  
That they laugh, though, calls into question what he holds to be true about the world as it 
ought to be.  Although Job has already been toppled from his position of power, he has 
clung to his belief that time and the changes it brings are precluded from the world as it 
ought to be.  In God’s speeches, however, the animals’ laughter both acknowledges and 
affirms the changeability of the world, and God reveals himself as disinclined to prohibit 
their laughter.  In Bakhtin’s thought, laughter functions in two related ways.  First, it is a 
                                                 
117 There is one other occurrence of qx#& in the Book of Job.  In 30:1 Job says, “But now they make sport of 
me (wqx#&), those who are younger than I, whose fathers I would have disdained to set with the dogs of my 
flock.” Their laughing at Job does seem like the laughing of the folk at the agelasts. These are people whom 
Job describes negatively, in terms that are thoroughly animalistic, so that God’s positive description of the 
animals, including their laughter, must be a response to what Job has claimed.  The animals’ laughter must be 
related to the laughter of what Job calls the “senseless, disreputable brood” (30:8a).  I will discuss the 
relation between God’s speeches and Job’s speech of chapter 30 in more detail in the next chapter. 
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kind of “whistling in the dark,” without which it would be impossible to live in the 
unpredictable and uncontrollable world.  This is the sense Keller picks up on in her 
Bakhtinian interpretation of the animals’ laughter.  Secondly, it is a force for change, a 
way of harnessing the unpredictability and uncontrollability of the world by recognizing 
that whatever one’s situation, it will not last forever.  The world is changeable and one 
laughs to get up one’s nerve to face that changeability, but one also laughs to create 
change, to debunk official culture, recognizing that it, like one’s own life, is ephemeral.  
Why does laughter function in this way?  Perhaps because it is a delight to laugh, and, 
laughing, the world becomes delightful, whatever else it may be. 
 
The Epilogue as Evidence of the Changeability of the World 
 
 After God finishes his description of the ordered world as characterized by wild 
multiplicity and, in consequence, change, a strange thing happens.  We return to the world 
of the prose tale, a world which God has shown does not exist.  Although previously I have 
argued that both prologue and epilogue present Job’s vision of the static world-as-it-ought-
to-be, in its present location the epilogue is experienced as an abrupt change.  Just as Job 
has accepted—(or has seemed to accept, depending on how his response in 42:6 is 
interpreted118)—that the world is a certain way, it changes and takes on quite different 
characteristics.  In fact, it becomes the kind of world that Job has been insisting ought to 
exist throughout his speeches.  His efforts at remaining static despite changes to his 
circumstances, finally pay off.  His circumstances are reconciled with his behavior, 
becoming similarly stable.  The outcome of the story is as predictable as Job had argued it 
ought to be.  He has argued that reward ought to follow righteousness, and, in the epilogue, 
it does.  Forget about the ostrich taking its chances with its eggs and laughing all the while.  
It is not necessary to laugh against fear when the end so clearly follows expectation.  
Yet, at the same time, there is a kind of laughter than runs through the epilogue.  
Some interpreters, in fact, have identified the Book of Job as a comedy, based on the 
happy ending of the epilogue, which reverses the downward trend of the rest of the 
book.119  But if there is laughter in the epilogue, whose laughter is it and what does it 
signify?  Newsom argues that, in its current placement, the epilogue functions as a kind of 
Bakhtinian “loophole” through which Job slips.  Morson explains Bakhtin’s concept of the 
loophole, writing,  
                                                 
118 See the discussion of Job’s response in the conclusion. 
119 William Whedbee points out that a central component of comedy is “a basic plot line that leads ultimately 
to the happiness of the hero and his restoration to a serene and harmonious society,” a plot line which Job 
clearly follows (Whedbee 1977, 5). 
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Life in an artwork…possesses what Bakhtin calls “rhythm.”…In understanding 
and planning a story, the author discovers the rhythm of the whole from its 
beginning to its end, the patterning that ensures closure and dictates the 
significance of everything along the way.  In Bakhtin’s terminology, rhythm 
therefore becomes the opposite of “loophole,” the capacity for genuine 
surprise.  (Morson 1994, 90)  
For Newsom, the epilogue as loophole is evidence that even God cannot fully comprehend 
the world which he has created.  Although God claims that righteousness is not the 
precondition for prosperity, Job discovers, in the end, that he is rewarded for his 
righteousness.  God does not know everything after all and his question, “Who is this that 
darkens counsel by words without knowledge?” (38:2), which served to show Job that his 
own vision of the world was limited and insufficient, now reflects back on God himself.  
Job’s vision is partial, but, it turns out, so is God’s.  Things can happen that God has not 
envisaged.   
If Job laughs in the epilogue, it is not as a means of overcoming fear, but because 
he has been right about the world after all.  If the epilogue is Job’s loophole, however, 
having slipped through it he does not return to the static world he once envisaged as the 
embodiment of order.  The events of the epilogue come as a shocking change, not a 
maintenance of the status quo.  Experiencing his restoration as change, Job can no longer 
insist that the world is not changeable, nor can he disparage change as he once did, for it is 
change which has permitted him to occupy his new position. 
Or does the epilogue ring with God’s laughter?  Some, like Pyper, see the epilogue 
as evidence of God’s sadism; in it, God destabilizes Job by telling him one thing and then 
doing another.  If this is the case, then the laughter of the epilogue is the crazed glee of the 
torturer who has sprung the trap on his victim.  Pyper writes, 
Job has to live on in the epilogue after the experience of his utter humiliation 
before God.  Before the divine speech, Job is secure in his right to challenge 
God and demand justice….Afterwards, he has to live knowing how utterly 
dependent he is on God’s grace.  His restored prosperity can be no comfort to 
him as its precariousness has been made so abundantly clear to him….The 
comfort of his friends and family must ring rather hollow given their earlier 
desertion of him….His new children are a different matter.  There is almost a 
fairy-tale unreality about them in their perfection and the whimsy of his 
daughters’ names.  The fact that he makes the unique provision for his 
daughters to inherit…along with their brothers may reflect the way in which 
his material possessions have…become…unreal to him.  To top it all, he has to 
survive under these ambivalent circumstances for a hundred and forty years, 
twice a normal life-span.  (Pyper 2005, 59-60) 
In this assessment, the prose ending does not represent the loophole by which both Job and 
God are surprised, but, rather, God’s final silencing of Job.  How can Job complain now 
that he has been restored to his former position?  He has been utterly silenced, and a 
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capricious but calculating God has the last word and the last laugh.  Read this way, the 
epilogue is a dark ending to a dark book.  The book has put God on trial and has 
pronounced the verdict “Guilty,” but it is a verdict that cannot be enforced.  God is guilty 
of crimes against humanity, but humanity is powerless in relation to God, and so in 
practice humanity loses, even though in theory humanity has won the trial.   
The interpretation advanced by Pyper is plausible.  The bet between God and 
hassatan that sets in motion the murder of Job’s children and servants, the theft of his 
livestock, and the affliction of his body, followed first by God’s refusal to answer Job’s 
pleas, and then by God’s speech from the whirlwind in which God harps on Job’s 
insignificance and insists that there is no such thing as retributive justice, finally followed 
by God’s rehabilitation of Job’s fortunes, in seeming contrast to the claims about the 
workings of the world that he has just made, can all be seen as serving to highlight the 
cruelty of God.  This God toys with Job, despite Job’s efforts to enter into honest dialogue 
with him.  When Job uses legal language to refer to the complaint he wants to bring against 
God, indicating that he wants to put God on trial, he does so because wants God to be 
acquitted.  Although Job wants it proven that God has wrongly afflicted him, what Job 
does not want proven is that God is, by nature, the afflicter of the innocent.  Job firmly 
believes that God is not fundamentally Guilty in his relations with human beings.  In 
Pyper’s reading of the book, however, God’s fundamental Guilt is precisely what is 
proven.  It is not that a mistake has been made with regard to Job, rendering God guilty on 
a small scale but innocent on the large scale.  Instead, God is shown to be fundamentally 
Guilty—capital G—in his relations with human beings. 
 Where, though, does this kind of reading leave us?  Job, Pyper argues, is silenced 
by the rehabilitation of his fortunes; he has been paid off, and, even if the payment 
indicates his innocence, it prevents him from speaking what he knows about the Guilt of 
God.  Does the reader of the book find herself similarly silenced by this reading of its 
meaning?  I would argue that she does.  She can see that God is Guilty in a large sense, but 
Job has seen this, too—he has experienced it first hand.  Although, in this interpretation, 
part of what prevents Job from crying “Guilty!” from the rooftops is the hush money he 
has been paid by God, in the form of the rehabilitation of his fortunes, this is not the whole 
reason for his silence.  At the end of the book, having discovered that God is Guilty, to 
whom is Job to address his accusation?  Previously, when he called for God to meet him in 
court, Job counted on God to be the judge.  God, whom Job envisioned as righteous by 
nature, was the one who would declare the verdict of guilty against himself in his affliction 
of Job.  Now, though, who is to be the judge against God?  Revealed as essentially Guilty, 
God cannot be appealed to as the upholder of justice.  This does not, however, mean that 
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God ceases to matter; his Guilt does not make him any less God, at least as far as power is 
concerned.  Job is faced with a God who is both utterly Guilty and absolutely powerful.  
Job cannot speak because he has no power in relation to God.  Earlier, Job thought he had 
power, because he could appeal to God’s true, righteous nature as his defense.  In relation 
to the Guilty God, Job is rendered absolutely powerless.  He cannot speak, because there is 
no one to speak to except other powerless beings like himself.  And we, reading the book 
in this way, are rendered as powerless as Job.  We regard each other mutely and shrug our 
shoulders. 
 Yet, the book’s readers have not been rendered silent.  Quite the opposite is the 
case.  If the author meant to reduce the book’s readers to silence, he has not succeeded, but 
I am not convinced that this was, in fact, his intention.  It is even a matter of debate as to 
whether Job himself is actually reduced to silence by God’s speeches of chapters 38-41.  
Newsom, as we have seen, views the prose ending as evidence of a loophole through 
which Job slips and which allows Job to keep speaking after God’s speeches, which might 
have, but do not reduce him to silence.  Elsewhere, Newsom wonders about how Job lived 
the 140 years between his restoration and his death, the details of which are not discussed 
in the book itself.  Newsom answers the questions she poses by suggesting that  
In many respects he probably behaved much as he always had: in uprightness 
and integrity.  I suspect, though, that he understood the motivation of his deeds 
quite differently.  I doubt that he cared much any more for gestures of 
deference.  It probably did not matter to him as it once had whether the 
distressed blessed him for his help or not.  Above all, I suspect that he looked 
on society’s outcasts with rather different eyes….The horizon of his vision and 
the patterns he discerned were different.  (Newsom 1994, 27)  
Far from seeing Job as an anguished survivor, isolated by his suffering and unable to speak 
to anyone who will comprehend him, least of all God,  in Newsom’s view the result of 
Job’s suffering and his encounter with God is his integration into his community in a new 
and deeper way.  He no longer sees himself as above the fray of common mortals, but as 
joined with others in the joy and pain of what it means to be a human being.   
Interestingly, Newsom points to Job’s bestowing an inheritance on his three 
daughters as one of the details that supports this reading (Ibid.), a detail which Pyper uses 
to support his own, opposite interpretation.  He claims that it is not because Job is so 
integrated into his community that he gives an inheritance to his daughters, but because he 
is supremely disillusioned, having learned the hard way that whatever seems to belong to 
him can be taken by force at a moment’s notice.  In Pyper’s reading, Job is pictured as 
saying, in effect, “If I can’t have the certainty that my wealth will continue to belong to me 
I might as well throw it away by giving it to the girls.”  To interpret Job’s giving of an 
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inheritance to his daughters in this way seems, to me, to underestimate the significance of 
the action.  It strips it of meaning, making it into a kind of shrug-of-the-shoulders, I-
couldn’t-care-less gesture, instead of a demonstration of purposeful intent.  Pyper sees the 
Job who makes heirs of his daughters as a man completely resigned to his lot, a whipped 
dog who has lost the ability to care about what becomes of his earthly possessions.120  It 
seems to me, though, that a Job as resigned to his lot as Pyper makes him out to be would 
not bother naming his daughters as co-inheritors with his sons.  It is not the sort of action 
that would be undertaken lightly, without effort.  It is not the action of one who has 
become so listless that he can only float where the current takes him; it is an action that 
requires exertion against the current of societal norms.  Even if it is listlessness that first 
causes Job to disregard the norms, his disregarding of the norms allows him to move, to 
take an active part in carving out a new situation for himself, to be an agent of change in 
his own life and the lives of others. 
One of the striking things about Pyper’s reading of the epilogue is how it deals with 
issues of stasis and change.  The world Pyper sees Job inhabiting in the epilogue is a world 
which is strangely subject to both stasis and change.  It is, first, a world in which Job’s 
“restored prosperity can be no comfort to him as its precariousness has been made so 
abundantly clear to him” (Pyper 2005, 59).  That is, it is a world over which the threat of 
change hangs at all times and, in the face of which, Job can do nothing to establish stability 
or guarantee security.  Yet, despite being a world in which the threat of change looms 
large, it is, at the same time, an utterly static world.  What does Job do in the epilogue?  He 
lives out a dreary, disillusioned double-lifetime, never forgetting his suffering, never 
moving on.  Job’s first moment in “epilogue-time” is exactly like his last.  In this way, 
Pyper presents Job as inhabiting a world that is simultaneously utterly changeable and 
utterly static.  This inherent contradiction casts doubt on the validity of Pyper’s 
interpretation.  He is, it seems, concerned to present Job’s situation in the most negative 
light possible.  He claims that negative change is possible, but not positive change; Job’s 
situation could get worse at any moment with no warning, but there is no way for his 
situation to get better.  If only negative change is possible, we might be led to suppose that 
Job would prefer a static situation, one in which his restored wealth, family, and friends are 
                                                 
120 Indeed, Pyper likens Job-after-the-whirlwind to one of Pavlov’s dogs.  Like the dogs, Job, after being 
“bombarded with contradictory stimuli” is “reduced to an abject and listless silence” (Pyper 2005, 51).  
James Reynierse, undertaking a “behavioristic analysis of the Book of Job,” makes a similar comparison, 
writing, “The present analysis compares the behavior of Job with the phenomenon of ‘learned helplessness’ 
from behavioristic learning psychology.  Such a comparison indicates that there is almost perfect 
correspondence between Job’s circumstances and the necessary experimental conditions which produce 
‘learned helplessness’ in the laboratory” (Reynierse 1975, 81).  That is, Job’s passivity corresponds to the 
passivity of lab animals which have received random shocks instead of shocks which can be correlated to 
specific behaviors.  I am not convinced, however, that Job is as listless as Pyper and Reynierse presume. 
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not threatened by the possibility of being removed from him.  Stability, too, however turns 
out to be a bad deal, as Job is forced to drag himself through 140 years of a life forever 
soured by suffering, with no possibility of reprieve.  Job lives a life of absolute stasis 
threatened at every moment by absolute change, and both are rotten.   
In Pyper’s analysis, God is in complete control of Job’s life, able to dictate when he 
will experience stability and when he will experience change.  In this way, Pyper affirms 
Job’s previous claim that “In his [God’s] hand is the life of every living thing and the 
breath of every human being” (12:10) and Job’s insistence that “I have no help in me, and 
any resource is driven from me” (6:13).  God howls with laughter through the epilogue 
because, although he has given Job everything he asked for (full restoration of his wealth 
and position, and then some) Job remains unsatisfied, haunted by the sneaking suspicion 
that he has been the victim of a cruel joke, which, indeed, he has.  Job will live out his 
static life, loathing his situation, but at the same time fearing change, and powerless to do 
anything about either.  
Yet, as I have already noted, it does not strike me that the Job of the epilogue is 
dissatisfied with his lot and powerless to do anything to change it.  If he has learned 
anything from God’s depiction of the animals, he need not fear change in the same way 
that he once did.  “All this could be taken away” must ring in his ears not as a threat that he 
knows to be real because he has already experienced its enactment, but as a fact of what it 
means to be alive.  Like the ostrich, the horse, Behemoth, and Leviathan, he is empowered 
to laugh at fear and not to be paralyzed by it, as Pyper contends he is.  In addition, as I 
have already said, naming his daughters as inheritors does not strike me as the gesture of 
one who is so exasperated with his powerlessness that he can think of nothing else to do 
but to throw the false indicator of his power (that is, his wealth) in the garbage can.  It is, 
rather, a definitive action, an action that displays a sense of power and purpose.  (That it is 
an action which gives power away does not lessen the empowerment of the one performing 
the action.)  In performing this action, Job shows himself to be an agent of change in the 
world, against his prior claim that God has complete control over the life of every living 
being.  He changes his daughters’ lives, by giving them an unexpected inheritance, but he 
also changes his own life.  He is no longer simply one who is “like a king among his 
troops.”  He is now one who has acted against societal norms and given his daughters an 
inheritance.  Who he is has shifted, and he himself can claim at least partial responsibility 
for the change. 
I do not, therefore, think that the laughter of the epilogue belongs to God in the 
sense that Pyper claims.  God does not cackle over his cauldron, stirring up an epilogue 
that identifies him as victorious villain and Job as his victim.  If God laughs over the 
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epilogue it must be laughter of quite a different sort, laughter, I would argue, that is linked 
to Job’s own laughter at the discovery of a loophole.  In Newsom’s reading, the loophole 
belongs to Job, who escapes being pinned down or fully defined by God’s explanation of 
the world.  Although it is true that Job finds that things turn out differently for him than 
God has predicted, his escape is not a “narrow” one.  That is, he does not escape his 
suffering and reap reward despite the way in which God has created the world, but because 
of it.  In his hymn to Leviathan, God reveals that he has created a world filled with real 
characters who are capable of surprising him, and to be thrilled that this is the case.  If, in 
Leviathan, God  rejoices over a creature that exceeds his control, in the epilogue God must 
rejoice over a world that exceeds his control.  The surprise of the epilogue’s events must 
strike God as happy evidence that the world is actually real, that it is not just his personal 
fantasy.  God has told Job that the righteous are not rewarded as a matter of course; the 
workings of the world are far more complicated.  However, the workings of the world turn 
out to be so complicated that Job, the righteous man, does end up reaping reward for his 
righteousness: what was originally expected to happen happens, but only after it has been 
shown to be unexpected!   
Read this way, the epilogue contains the laughter of both Job and God—Job, 
because he has survived his suffering and has ended up reaping reward, God, because he 
has told Job, in his depiction of the animals, that it is possible to survive life’s trials and 
dangers, and because the epilogue ending comes as a complete surprise, but one that 
happens in a world that he has described as changeable and capable of generating surprise.  
If anyone else laughs in the epilogue, it must surely be Job’s daughters, who themselves 
reap unexpected reward when their father gives them an inheritance.  Far from clinging to 
his restored wealth, as he might do were he afraid of what it would mean to let it go, Job is 
profligate with it, bestowing it where it is not deserved or expected.  In this, Job mirrors, in 
a certain way, God’s creative activity.  Just as God has let the wild ass go free and given it 
the resources to live free from human (and also divine) control, so Job gives his daughters 
the financial wherewithal to be free from male control.  This freedom from his and others’ 
control creates them as separate, real characters.  If Job’s bestowal of an inheritance is a 
surprise to them, they themselves are now free to work their own changes, their own 
surprises.  The epilogue, which, in its current position, appears as a change in both Job’s 
circumstances and in the world as God has described it, is a place in which change 
generates change and surprise gives rise to surprise.  If there is laughter in this, there must 
also be a degree of fearlessness, which, God has claimed, is signaled by laughter.  God 
laughs and fearlessly creates in such a way as to relinquish control.  Job laughs and 
fearlessly gives an inheritance to his daughters.  The daughters laugh, and who can say 
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what they will do?  If such fearless laughter signals a degree of foolishness—which in the 
case of the daughters, their names might suggest121—well, there are worse things to be 
than a fool, and, indeed, sometimes it is necessary to be a fool in order to face the 
changeable and unpredictable world. 
  
The Author’s Vision of the Changeable World 
 
 It is clear that the author of Job has written the world of his book to be changeable, 
rather than static.  The book is shot through with change, both in its shifting genres and in 
the turns of its plot.  It moves from prose, unexpectedly to poetry, and then, doubly-
unexpectedly, back again.  The friends claim that Job will not be restored unless he 
repents, but then he is restored, without repenting.  Job claims that his integrity will win 
him reward, and though his life does turn sweet, it does so not as reward in the sense that 
Job had expected, and its amelioration seems to have little to do with his integrity.  The 
dialogue between Job and the friends progresses, and, just when it seems to be winding 
down, another character appears, seemingly out of the blue, and lends his voice to the 
discussion.  Elihu, the unexpected and late-arriving character, claims that God will not 
appear to Job (“The Almighty—we cannot find him” [37:23a]), and immediately God 
appears and begins to speak.  Elihu also makes claims about what God will have to say—
“he is great in power and justice, and abundant righteousness he will not violate 
(37:23b)—but when God speaks he does not seem at all concerned with the issues Elihu 
has put at the top of his agenda.  Job, too, has expectations about what God would say 
were he to appear, and these, at least in part, are thwarted.  Even God makes claims that 
are shown to be erroneous.  God claims that, in the world he has created, the righteous do 
not reap reward, but immediately afterward Job does reap reward, or, at least, finds his 
fortunes restored. The world created by the author is a topsy-turvy world, a world where 
the unexpected happens and where surprise is the order of the day.   
There is, in fact, much in common between the world created by the author and the 
world described in God’s speeches, not least the fact that, just as God is able to be 
surprised by the world he has created, so, too, the author is able to be surprised by the 
                                                 
121 According to Anthony and Miriam Hanson, the daughters’ names can be translated “Dove,” “Cassia,” and 
“Box of Antimony,” which they paraphrase as “‘Swansdown’, ‘Lavender’, and ‘Mascara’” (Hanson and 
Hanson 1953, 118).  That the girls are named after beauty products is, perhaps, a sign of foolishness on at 
least someone’s part, if not their own.  Of course, other interpretations of the significance of the names are 
possible. Stephen Mitchell suggests that the beauty-product names  “symbolize peace, abundance, and a 
specifically female kind of grace,” indicating that “the story’s center of gravity has shifted from 
righteousness to beauty, the effortless manifestation of inner peace” (Mitchell 1989, xxvi).  For John Wilcox, 
the daughter’s names emphasize their sexuality and draw attention to what has been revealed in God’s 
speeches, “the amoral goodness of the natural order” (Wilcox 1989, 218). 
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world within the book that he has made.  Having orchestrated the surprise ending to Job’s 
story by attaching the prose ending, he must himself be surprised to find that the ending is 
actually fitting.  The epilogue resonates with the poetry in unsuspected ways.  For 
example, the surprise of the events of the prose ending mirrors the surprise which 
Leviathan is capable of creating as a supremely free and real character, and Job’s bestowal 
of an inheritance on his daughters, making them into free, real characters, mirrors God’s 
creative activity.  Attaching the poetry to the prose tale, the author transforms the meaning 
of the story of Job.  But, having forced together two totally different narratives, the poet 
discovers that they are, somehow, apposite, and the fact that they don’t fit together is, in 
large measure, what makes them fit.  Discovering this, the poet must gasp, and, if he has 
taken his own lessons to heart, must also laugh.  The world of God’s making eludes God’s 
grasp in the author’s telling, and, it turns out, the world of the author’s making eludes his 
own grasp, as well. 
Earlier in this chapter, interacting with Fontaine’s reading of Job as a 
folktale/shamanic tale in which the goal of the book is Job’s transformation, I said that 
although it may be the case that the author is telling a story about Job’s transformation, 
Job himself does not conceive of his situation in this way.  Unlike the hero of a folk story 
and unlike a shaman, Job does not think that he is on a Quest, walking a path fraught with 
danger and difficulty that will lead to his transformation, from frog to prince, from 
ordinary mortal to one who communes with the divine, or whatever.  Job has no goal 
except to go back where he came from.  It is time now to ask whether the author has a 
goal, if Job does not.  If Job does not view his experiences as telling the story of his 
transformation, does the author view them in this way?  I have to confess that I don’t 
know.  It must first be asked whether any transformation takes place.  Does Job change in 
the course of the book?  If not, then it can hardly be said that the author is telling the story 
of Job’s transformation.  Although, above, I have made the case that the epilogue functions 
as evidence of the changeability of the world and have argued that, in the epilogue, Job 
shows himself to have embraced change, it is possible to read it as meaning something 
else.  Perhaps the appearance of the epilogue is not, after all, evidence of the changeability 
of the world as it ought to be, but is only an instance of change in the service of stability, 
the kind of change that Job and his friends sanction throughout the book, but which does 
not qualify as real change.  When I read the epilogue as part of Job’s daydream, I saw it as 
a picture of a fully static ordered world.  In the next chapter I will read the epilogue again 
and come to yet another set of conclusions.  Much hinges on the meaning of the epilogue, 
a meaning which needs further investigation before it can be fully pronounced (if it can be 
fully pronounced). 
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In addition, if the Book of Job functions like Bakhtin’s polyphonic novel, in which 
the author’s position is not superior to that of the characters, then it cannot be said that an 
authorial proclamation of “Transformation!”—(like a magician whisking aside a curtain to 
reveal that what was previously a dove has become his lovely assistant, Rita)—holds sway 
over the characters’ own insistence that no change has taken place.  At the same time, in 
chapter two I argued that, even in polyphonic novels, the author still retains some power 
over the characters, because it is the author who dictates what the fictional world will be 
like.  The world is, at least initially, his world, even if he subsequently dives into it and 
relinquishes his importance.  If a character wanted to create the world in a different way, 
he would find that he could not, no matter how much independence he has been granted.  
In the Book of Job, the author has created a changeable world and so, even if he is 
surprised by some of the changes that happen, he cannot be fundamentally surprised.  What 
would surprise him fundamentally would be the shutting down of change in the world he 
has created.  If the world of the book became unchangeable, the author’s expectations 
would be shattered.  Can it be said, then, that even though the Book of Job may function 
like Bakhtin’s polyphonic novel, the author really can claim that he is telling a story about 
transformation and have that claim borne out by the book?  Can he wave his wand and 
shout, “Transformation!” and show us that this is what has really happened to Job?  After 
all, if the ground is moving under Job’s feet, Job cannot stand still, no matter how much 
freedom over his own limbs he may possess.  Yet, I am reluctant to say that the author 
does use his magical powers to effect Job’s transformation.  The ambiguity of Job’s 
response to God and of the epilogue lingers (like the grey feathers stuck to Rita’s skin and 
the beak-like hook of her nose), suggesting that, despite the changeability of the world he 
has created, one of his characters, Job, might have somehow managed to choose another 
world in which to live—a stable world, in which no change happens.  I will return to this 
question in my conclusion.
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CHAPTER 5 
THE SPATIAL LOCATIONS OF ORDER AND CHAOS: INSIDE AND OUTSIDE 
 
Inside as Order and Outside as Chaos 
 
 In my introductory chapter I argued that chaos and order are not fixed concepts but 
function as “umbrella terms,” each capable of covering a variety of definitions, some of 
which are contradictory.  It is for this reason that I have adopted general definitions for 
chaos and order—“how the world ought not to be” and “how the world ought to be,” 
respectively—and have used these definitions to explore what the characters in the Book 
of Job think chaos and order are like.  I have asked whether they perceive order as 
primarily simple or complex, whether they think of chaos as primarily static or as a state of 
change.  The oppositional pair “inside/outside” functions somewhat differently with 
relation to chaos and order than the pairs already examined.  This pair is tied in a far more 
fixed way to the terms it defines.  Whereas either chaos or order may be defined as simple 
or multiple or static or changeable, when it comes to the inside/outside pair, inside can be 
seen to define order, while outside defines chaos.  The world “inside” is the world as it 
ought to be, while the world “outside” is the world as it ought not to be.  The inner world 
has boundaries which must be protected against the incursion of the chaos which exists 
outside those boundaries.  The inner order may be simple or complex, it may be static or 
changeable, and the outer chaos may, likewise, possess any of these characteristics, so long 
as the attributes of each space are opposites, but the fact remains that what is inside is 
order, while what is outside is chaos. 
 Why, though, should this be?  Why should what is inside be synonymous with 
order, while what is outside corresponds to chaos?  And, equally importantly, what is it 
that designates a space as “inside” and another as “outside”?  From whose perspective are 
such classifications made?  In a way, both questions can be answered by the recognition 
that where “I” am is inside, and where “I” am is also the location of order.  Eliade 
explains,  
One of the outstanding characteristics of traditional societies is the opposition 
that they assume between their inhabited territory and the unknown and 
indeterminate space that surrounds it.  The former is the world (more precisely, 
our world), the cosmos; everything outside it is no longer a cosmos but a sort 
of “other world,” a foreign, chaotic space, peopled by ghosts, demons, 
“foreigners.”  (Eliade 1961, 29)   
It is easy to see why this would be so, and not just for “traditional” cultures.  Where I 
am—or, by extension, where we are—must be the world.  Inasmuch as whatever is beyond 
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the boundaries of our world threatens our world, it cannot be called a world, because our 
world is the world; it follows that the world beyond the boundary of our world is chaos, the 
world as it ought not to be.  The inside/outside distinction arises naturally.122 
 There is a second aspect of the inside/outside distinction which Eliade elucidates: 
not only is the inside world characterized as order because it is where we are, but the inside 
world is primarily designated as order because it is where God is.  Eliade writes, 
We shall see that if every inhabited territory is a cosmos, this is precisely 
because it was first consecrated, because, in one way or another, it is the work 
of the gods or is in communication with the world of the gods.  The world (that 
is, our world) is a universe within which the sacred has already manifested 
itself….The sacred reveals absolute reality and at the same time makes 
orientation possible; hence, it founds the world in the sense that it fixes the 
limits and establishes the order of the world.  (Ibid., 30) 
That is, it is the contact of the divinity with the space in which we dwell that makes it 
cosmos and that designates us as insiders.  Where we are is where God has been and has 
instituted order.  The world beyond is where God has not been, and has not instituted 
order, and is therefore chaos.  
Mary Douglas, in her book Purity and Danger writes of the importance of 
boundaries and boundary-making to the creation and maintenance of order.  She says, “It is 
only by exaggerating the difference between within and without, above and below, male 
and female, with and against, that a semblance of order is created”  (Douglas 1966, 15).  
Here, although Douglas suggests a connection between boundary-making and order-
making, she does not yet claim that inside the boundaries is where order resides. She does 
this later when she writes, “The idea of society is a powerful image.  It is potent in its own 
right to control or to stir men to action.  This image has form; it has external boundaries, 
margins, internal structure.  Its outlines contain power to reward conformity and repulse 
attack” (Ibid., 137).   
Douglas’s ideas are similar to those propounded by Eliade, though stated 
differently. She does not use the term order to describe what is contained within the 
boundaries of human society, nor does she call what is beyond those boundaries chaos.  
Nevertheless, she notes that what is inside attempts to remain inside.  Conformity to the 
behaviors associated with being on the inside are rewarded at the same time as  attempts by 
                                                 
122 It is, of course, possible for “me” to inhabit chaos, instead of order.  If, for example, I conceive of the 
temporal location of order as sometime in the future, as compared with present chaos, then where I am is 
chaos and not order.  However, it is also the case that when the time comes for order to exist, I will locate it 
as the place where I am.  Even if, temporally speaking, I live in a chaotic present, I project myself into the 
ordered future, using my imagination.  It may also be possible for me to believe that I inhabit chaos spatially 
as well as temporally-speaking.  In this case, though, it seems that I would conceive of myself as inhabiting a 
place outside the inside space where I actually belong, and I will do what I can to move inside.  See more 
discussion of this issue beginning on p. 166. 
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whatever is outside to cross the boundaries and get in are repulsed.  To conform to certain 
accepted behaviors is to maintain the boundary around the group—“We are the ones who 
do this.”  Conversely, to engage in deviant behavior would be to open a breach in the 
boundary, allowing something external to enter in, even if the behavior was instigated by 
an insider.  For Douglas as for Eliade, the world as it ought to be is the world inside the 
boundaries of a given human community, while the world beyond those boundaries 
represents what ought not to be and which, therefore, must be kept out.  The outer chaos is 
kept out by specific behaviors on the part of the inside group, including both efforts against 
those inhabitants of the outside realm who attempt to break through the boundary to get in 
and efforts to maintain the cohesion of the group that is contained within the boundary. 
 Turning from anthropological assessments of cultures in general to the Bible, we 
find the same inside/outside distinction at work.  In his discussion of the disposal of 
impurity in the Bible, Robert Wright points out that  
All examples of the riddance of idolatrous impurities from Kings and 
Chronicles, except for 2 Chr 33:15, explicitly state that the disposal occurred in 
the Kidron Valley.  Also of note are the locative phrases ‘outside’ (2 Chr 
29:16), ‘outside Jerusalem’ (2 Kgs 23:4, 6), and ‘outside the city’ (2 Chr 
33:15).  The mention of the Kidron as the disposal place and the locative 
phrases show that the concern was to remove the impurity from the city’s 
boundaries.  (Wright 1987, 285-86) 
Here, we see that what does not belong as part of the world-as-it-ought-to-be, is put out 
beyond its boundaries.  Here, as elsewhere, order is inside, where we are, and chaos is 
outside, where we are not.  In a way, this point is so obvious that there is not much that can 
be said about it.  Of course what does not belong inside is put outside—where else would it 
be put?  And of course inside, here, is where order resides.   
Whereas Wright speaks of what does not belong inside being put out, Benedikt 
Otzen writes about what belongs outside trying to get in.  Ozten claims that common to 
ancient Israel and its neighbors, 
is the idea that chaos still threatens the world of man, despite the fact that it 
was originally defeated, or perhaps tamed, at the creation.  The desert may 
force its way into good arable land and make it uninhabitable by man; death 
may “ease his tentacles” into human existence in the forms of illness and sin, 
which can wreck man’s existence; and death itself is the final reality to which 
every man is subject.  Moreover, at any moment the primordial sea, which lies 
beneath the earth and above the firmament of heaven, may break through and 
annihilate the cosmos, as in fact happens in the story of the flood.  (Otzen 
1980, 36-37) 
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Otzen, of course, is referring to the combat myth which, it has been argued, may not 
actually be present in the Bible’s depictions of creation.123  In addition, I have argued in 
my introductory chapter that the combat myth is merely one aspect of the discussion about 
chaos and order, and should not be taken as representative of how chaos and order are 
conceived across the board.  Yet, at the same time it is true that chaos and order are 
oppositional concepts and, as such, are in conflict with each other regardless of whether 
combat along the lines of the Chaoskampf is envisioned.  In the biblical narratives, chaos 
as an active force may not have been “originally defeated…at the creation.”  Despite this, 
it is still possible to think of chaos as present beyond the boundaries of the world, and 
possible to see it as threatening to break through those bounds.  Where Eliade and Douglas 
speak of the inside/outside distinction as a feature of cultures in general, Otzen identifies 
this feature as present in biblical culture specifically.  He sees the flood as a breakthrough 
of chaos into the ordered world.  In the world as it ought to be, dry land ought not to be 
overwhelmed by water, because, if it is, the human community cannot survive.  In the 
flood, then, the world becomes as it ought not to be—it is subsumed by chaos—regardless 
of the fact that this breakthrough of chaos, as Otzen points out, is sanctioned—indeed, 
caused—by God. 
 According to Otzen, the designation of inner space as order and outer space as 
chaos was a fundamental aspect of the worldview of the ancient Israelites.124  Robert Cohn, 
in his exploration of sacred space in the Bible, notices the same inside/outside distinction 
at work, but with an important twist.  Corroborating the views expressed by the scholars 
quoted above, he writes, “Salvation is being within Yahweh’s land; exile is always 
catastrophe” (Cohn 1981, 2).  To be inside Yahweh’s land is to be inside the world as it 
ought to be, which is the world as it ought to be both because we are there and because 
Yahweh is there and has put us there.  However, Cohn’s simple sentence brings up a 
heretofore unnoted issue.  If we are exiled from our land, then are we no longer inside?  Or 
if inside is where we are, then does inside shift when we move, so that wherever we are is 
inside?  As Cohn presents it, the former is the case.  He argues that the boundaries of 
                                                 
123 About the comparative method which has linked biblical creation accounts to those in other ancient Near 
Eastern mythologies, Watson writes, “This has resulted in an approach whereby a divine conflict with the 
sea, characteristically resulting in creation, is often assumed in passages where the pretence of such allusions 
could hardly be supposed on the basis of the biblical text itself.  Thus, a picture is drawn, according to which 
there are numerous references to Yahweh’s battling with the waters of chaos and thereby bringing the 
cosmos into being, without there being any clear statement or account of such an idea in the Hebrew corpus, 
and despite the many inconsistencies between such a notion and much of Old Testament theology” (Watson 
2005, 2).  See the discussion on pages 8-10, 13-17 of this thesis. 
124 Otzen writes, “No matter how these myths were employed in the cult, the Israelite cult was in any event 
permeated on all levels by what was termed the ‘total world-view’ of myth, the understanding of existence as 
determined by the tension between cosmos and chaos.  In short, it was the task of the cult to reinforce the 
cosmos and combat the destructive forces which assail it” (Otzen 1980, 59). 
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inside are defined primarily by the gods, in this case Yahweh.  It is Yahweh who 
designates a place as inside.  It is, therefore, not quite correct to say that where we are is 
the inside, ordered world and the boundaries around our community mark the boundary 
between inner order and outer chaos, because it is possible for us to find ourselves in exile, 
outside those boundaries.  In light of this, our claims about what designates a space as 
inside or outside must be refined.  Let us say, then, that inside, if it is not where we are, is 
where we ought to be.   When we find ourselves where we ought to be, then we inhabit 
order.  When we find ourselves where we ought not to be, then we inhabit chaos, and must 
concern ourselves with finding our way into ordered space.    
 
Wilderness as Chaos 
 
This is precisely how Cohn views the wilderness journey from Egypt to Canaan.  
Even though the Israelites found themselves in the wilderness, this did not transform the 
wilderness into an ordered realm.  Rather, the wilderness journey was a trek through 
chaotic space, a journey from the non-world outside into the world as it ought to be.  Cohn 
writes, 
The Hebrew midbār, ‘wilderness,’ and related wilderness terminology are not 
simply neutral geographical designations but occur with generally negative 
connotations in the Bible….[M]idbār is the periphery, the undomesticated, the 
uncivilized….It is the dwelling place of wild and demonic creatures…and the 
refuge of outlaws and fugitives.  The Pentateuchal narrative views the 
wilderness in light of these negative connotations….The difficulty of life in the 
wilderness is repeatedly contrasted with the security of life in the promised 
land.  The wilderness is desolate; the land is fertile (Deut. 8:1-10).  The 
wilderness is chaos; the land is rest.  (Ibid., 13-14) 
Cohn points out that the wilderness was viewed negatively by the Pentateuchal authors 
despite the fact that the wilderness journey was a time and location “of divine protection 
and favor” (Ibid., 14).  God’s presence with the traveling Israelites did not serve to 
transform the wilderness into inner space.  Rather, the ordered realm remained the 
promised land of Canaan. 
One might be tempted to think that if a community finds itself in a particular place 
in the presence of its God, it would consider itself to be already inside, and would set up 
boundaries around itself, proclaiming the outer world to be chaos.  This, though, does not 
happen in the Pentateuch’s telling of the wilderness journey.  Cohn continues, “The 
Pentateuch’s overall evaluation of…[the wilderness journey] is overwhelmingly negative.  
The trek is a punishment more than a rite of passage;…The Pentateuchal vision of the 
wilderness period is not one of nostalgia for a liminal time to be recaptured but one of 
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hope for its termination” (Ibid., 20).  The wilderness in which the Israelite community 
finds itself does not become the inside world, even though their God accompanies them on 
their journey, precisely because God, despite his presence, has proclaimed that the true 
inside world—the one he has created for them—lies elsewhere.  Until they reach that land, 
the Israelites will be outsiders, by God’s decree.   
It seems possible that this may have to do with the strength of the wilderness as a 
symbol for outsideness.  The wilderness is constitutionally outside and, as such, cannot be 
made into an inside world even if a community and its god finds itself there.125  Of course, 
here I am contradicting what I have already claimed, namely that chaos and order do not 
have set characteristics but have their characteristics determined by how any given person 
or group conceives of the way the world ought and ought not to be.  If wilderness is always 
outside and is, therefore, always chaotic, despite the fact that groups and their gods may 
find themselves inhabiting the wilderness, then chaos can be said to have certain 
inalienable traits, namely the traits of wilderness.  Yet, I do not think this fully disproves 
my claims about the unfixability of definitions of chaos and order.  It would be possible for 
a group to dwell in the wilderness and consider itself as inhabiting an inside world around 
which boundaries that should not be transgressed are fixed.  The ancient Israelites, 
however, were not such a group.  For them, it seems, we can say that the wilderness was 
synonymous with chaos, and that chaos possessed the attributes of wilderness.  This was so 
                                                 
125 Some scholars contend that a positive portrayal of wilderness does exist in the Bible in the writings of the 
prophets who recall the wilderness journey as the time when Israel was faithful to Yahweh, before the 
people’s apostasy in Canaan.  In support of this position, Andrew Louth writes, “the period of the wandering 
in the wilderness, in contrast to the period that followed when…the Israelites began to settle in Palestine, is 
often regarded by the later prophetic tradition as a kind of golden age.  Renewal of the covenant, so often 
breached by Israel, is frequently seen in terms of a return to the desert” (Louth 2003, 33).  In the same way, 
Roland de Vaux points out that in the Bible “we do encounter what has been called the ‘nomadic ideal’ of the 
Old Testament.  The Prophets look back to the past, the time of Israel’s youth in the desert, when she was 
betrothed to Yahweh (Jr 2:2; Os 13:5; Am 2:10).  They condemn the comfort and luxury of urban life in their 
own day (Am 3:15; 6:8, etc.), and see salvation in a return, at some future date, to the life of the desert, 
envisaged as a golden age (Is 2:16-17; 12:10)” (de Vaux 1961, 14).  Yet, de Vaux also stresses that 
“nomadism in itself is not the ideal….If the Prophets speak of a return to the desert, it is not because they 
recall any glory in the nomadic life of their ancestors, but as a means of escape from the corrupting influence 
of their own urban civilization” (Ibid.).  Most scholars seem to concur with this caveat, and many of them 
take it further than de Vaux does.  Shemaryahu Talmon, for example, writes, “the theme of ‘disobedience 
and punishment’ is of much greater impact on the subsequent formulation of the ‘desert motif’ in Biblical 
literature than is the concept of the desert as the locale of Divine revelation and of Yahweh’s love for Israel.  
The idealization of the desert, which scholars perceived in the writings of some of the prophets, derives from 
an unwarranted isolation of the ‘revelation in the desert’ theme from the preponderant ‘transgression and 
punishment’ theme, with which it is closely welded in the Pentateuchal account of the desert trek.  The 
widespread opinion that ‘the pre-exilic prophets for the most part [sic!] interpreted the forty years as a period 
when God was particularly close to Israel, when he loved his chosen people as the bridegroom his bride,’ 
(Williams, Wilderness and Paradise in Christian Thought, pp. 15-16)…rests on the slender evidence of two 
passages, Hosea 2:17 and Jeremiah 2:2….A closer analysis of this theme…indicates that it is of minor 
importance” (Talmon 1966, 48).  Leal, too, contends, “Though several biblical commentators deny the 
presence in the prophetic books of negative attitudes towards the wilderness, they are there to be 
found….[W]ilderness and desert are frequently perceived as not only undesirable through lack of comfort; 
they are also the haunt of wildlife inimical to humans and they contain evil creatures” (Leal 2005, 371). 
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precisely because their world as it ought to be, namely the promised land of Canaan, was 
literally surrounded by wilderness.  From the perspective of those inside the world as it 
ought to be, wilderness appeared as what lay beyond the boundaries of their community.  
Thus, because of its outside location it became synonymous with chaos and remained so, 
even when the Israelites found themselves inhabiting it.  Theoretically, wilderness need not 
be associated with chaos, but in practice it often is, and in ancient Israel, as depicted by the 
Bible, it certainly was.  As Brueggemann writes, 
Wilderness is not simply an in-between place which makes the journey longer.  
It is not simply a sandy place demanding more stamina.  It is a space far away 
from ordered land….Wilderness is the historical form of chaos and is Israel’s 
memory of how it was before it was created a people.  Displacement, in that 
time and our time, is experienced like the empty dread of primordial chaos, and 
so Israel testifies about itself.  (Brueggemann 1978, 29) 
Writing about more recent times, Roderick Nash in his Wilderness and the 
American Mind notes that  
European discoverers and settlers of the New World were familiar with 
wilderness even before they crossed the Atlantic.  Some of this acquaintance 
was first-hand….Far more important, however, was the deep resonance of 
wilderness as a concept in Western thought.  It was instinctively understood as 
something alien to man—an insecure and uncomfortable environment against 
which civilization waged an unceasing struggle….Anyone with a Bible had 
available an extended lesson in the meaning of wild land.  (Nash 1982, 8) 
It was not just for ancient Israel, then, that wilderness was associated with outer chaos, but 
those culturally much closer to us also shared this view, partially because of the Bible’s 
depiction, but not entirely.  Nash is concerned to show how the attitudes about wilderness 
held by the European settlers have influenced and affected their descendants’ dealings with 
the American wilderness up through the present day.  Later in his book Nash makes an 
observation that is relevant to our discussion of inside and outside as related to order and 
chaos.  He points out that wilderness can only be defined over against civilization, writing, 
“wilderness is an entirely human concept, an invention of civilized man” (Ibid., 270).  
Similarly, Ian Holder asserts, “the wild and the natural are not themselves ‘natural’ 
categories….[They] are created as categories in order to form the domesticated and the 
cultural, and vice versa.  In the opposition and juxtaposition of the cultural and the wild 
society is dialectically created out of its own negative image” (Holder 1990, 11).  These 
claims suggest that wilderness, by definition, is that which is outside human community, 
and human communities are created by its exclusion.  If this is the case, then wilderness 
can be equated with chaos, simply because of its outsideness, and not because of any other 
trait it possesses.  If a space is not outside, then it is not wilderness.  Those who inhabit 
space which one group considers wilderness, do not see themselves as inhabiting 
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wilderness, because the territory is inside the boundaries of their community and not 
outside. 
 
An Overview of the Relationship Between Inside/Outside Locations and Order and 
Chaos in the Book of Job 
 
 In the section above I have attempted to show that the ideas of inside and outside 
space are involved differently with chaos and order than are the other attributes I have 
been examining in this thesis so far.  Whereas either chaos or order may be simple or 
complex or static or changeable, when it comes to being inside or outside, order is always 
associated with being inside, while chaos is associated with what is outside.  I have tried to 
show that this association existed in ancient Israel, as it existed and exists in other ancient 
and contemporary cultures.  This is not to say that there is no fluctuation of inside/outside 
designations, but only that they fluctuate quite differently than do simplicity and 
multiplicity, stasis and change as related to chaos and order.  If inside space is that place in 
which I ought to be, as sanctioned by divine authority, I will necessarily view where you 
are, unless you are a member of my community, as outside space.  You, however, will no 
doubt view your own location as inside and my location as outside.  It is in this sense that 
inside and outside are not fixed.  You and I have different ideas about which space should 
be designated inside and which outside.  We do not, however, have different ideas about 
how these spaces are designated with regard to chaos and order.  We agree that inside is 
order and outside is chaos, though we may disagree over where inside and outside are and 
which of us inhabits each kind of space. 
 I have wanted to show that order is linked to inside space and chaos to outside 
space because of the way the two locations are dealt with in the Book of Job.  Around 
these concepts there is less discussion and more assumption than there was around the 
other concepts I have examined.  Job and his friends assume that to be inside is to inhabit 
order, and assume that this view is intuitively held by everybody, and, because of this, the 
book offers fewer descriptive examples of inside as order than it does of simplicity or 
multiplicity, stasis or change as constitutive of order or chaos.  Nevertheless, that Job and 
the friends do hold this view can be shown by the way they describe the fate of the wicked.  
The wicked are punished by being cast out of the human community.  In addition, in 
chapter 29 where Job describes in detail his vision of the world as it ought to be, his focus 
is on his place as an insider among other insiders.  This emphasis is further highlighted by 
Job’s words in chapter 30, which contrast his present situation which ought not to be with 
his well-ordered past.  In chapter 30 Job turns his attention to a group which he describes 
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as “a senseless, disreputable brood” (30:8).  This group inhabits the wilderness, having 
been driven out beyond the boundaries of the town.  In his affliction, Job describes himself 
as the subject of this group’s mockery, an indication that, whereas he was once the 
preeminent insider, he is now even more outside than these most outside of outsiders.   
Job’s focus on the inside/outside distinction in these two chapters and his clear 
designation of the inside world as the world of order and the outside world as the realm of 
chaos make the inside/outside aspects of order and chaos central to the book as a whole, 
even though the attendant discussion occupies less space in the dialogues of chapters 3-27.  
In addition, in the prologue hassatan introduces issues of inside and outside as central to 
his accusations against God and Job.  He questions God, “Have you not put a fence around 
him and his house and all that he has, on every side?”  (1:9).  Hassatan is claiming, in 
effect, that God has granted Job special insider status, walling him in so that he is 
unthreatened by the chaos that exists outside.  In this regard, it is significant that, in his 
affliction, Job leaves the boundaries of the town and takes up residence on the ash heap 
beyond its boundaries.126  At the same time, though, it might be asked whether, if order is 
intuitively allied with inside and chaos with outside, it is worth discussing the appearance 
of these topics in the book.  That is, if everybody already knows that order is inside and 
chaos is outside and everybody agrees that this is the case, there is not really much to be 
said on the subject, apart from giving examples of how these universal beliefs are 
expressed in the book.  Such an objection would be fair enough, although the counter 
argument that it is worth seeing how the beliefs are expressed in the book, even if 
everybody holds them to be true, also has merit.  I will, in fact, spend part of this chapter 
showing how Job and the friends express the idea that inside is order and outside is chaos.  
However, what makes this topic especially important is the fact that, in his speeches, God 
rejects the association of order with inside and chaos with outside.  Although, as has been 
seen, God’s views of chaos and order have differed from those held by Job and the friends 
as regards simplicity, multiplicity, stasis, and change, this disagreement is far more radical.  
It is one thing to hold a different view in a situation where difference is to be expected, 
even if all the other participants in the conversation share the same view, and quite another 
to offer an alternate understanding of something that is held to be one way across the 
board.  God’s speeches explode the distinction between inside and outside that Job and his 
                                                 
126 Here, I am following the majority opinion that this is what Job does.  Clines points out that it is not 
necessary to interpret the text in this way, writing, “It is by no means clear from the text whether Job has 
performed this ritual [sitting among the ashes] in his own house or has gone out to a public place to display 
his grief.  But,” Clines continues, “it is almost universally assumed by interpreters that the ashes in which Job 
sits are in the public ash-heap outside the town, the resort of outcasts and persons with infectious diseases, as 
well as, in cases like the present, those who psychically identify themselves with the rejected and destitute.  
The Septuagint in fact explains ‘ashes’ by its translation ‘the dungheap outside the city’” (Clines 1989, 50). 
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friends assume to be unchallengeable.  For this reason, the discussion of the book’s 
dealings with ideas of inside and outside as related to order and chaos is important and 
must not be overlooked on the basis that everybody already knows how the discussion will 
end.  God’s speeches show that we do not know how the discussion will end, as they 
challenge one of the most basic assumptions held by Job and his friends, and, indeed, 
perhaps by all of us. 
 
The Wicked as Outsiders and the Metaphor of the House as Inner Space 
 
 It is in their descriptions of the punishment that attends the wicked that the friends 
most clearly show their assumption that being inside designates one as a participant in 
order, while being outside reveals one’s alliance with chaos.  When God punishes the 
wicked, in the friends’ depiction, he either uproots them from within the bounds of the 
community and casts them into the outer chaos, or allows what it outside to come in and 
claim them.  Untimely death, which the friends claim is the fate of the wicked, functions in 
both ways.  The realm of the dead exists outside the human community, and, as such, is a 
chaotic realm.  When the wicked die, death crosses the boundaries into the human 
community and then, snatching its prey, carries them back to its domain beyond those 
borders.  Both Job and the friends use the image of the house as a symbol for inner space.  
To have one’s house destroyed is to be claimed by what belongs outside the boundaries 
and to be taken thither.   
In his first speech, quoting the spirit messenger who insists that all humans are 
unrighteous because of their shared mortality, Eliphaz says, “Their tent-cord is plucked up 
within them, and they die devoid of wisdom” (4:21).  Here, the destruction of the house 
(the uprooting of the tent cord) is paired with untimely death (death devoid of wisdom, that 
is, before sufficient time has elapsed in which to attain wisdom).  The inner space of the 
house is collapsed, and what ought to have been kept outside by its boundaries comes 
rushing in to claim its own.  Eliphaz, despite the fact that he reports the spirit’s message, 
does not really agree that all humans are unrighteous simply by virtue of their mortality.  
For him it is the wicked and fools, who are unable to remain inside, but find their homes 
destroyed and themselves subject to the dangers of the outside realm.  He says, “I have 
seen fools taking root, but suddenly I cursed their dwelling.  Their children are far from 
safety, they are crushed in the gate, and there is no one to deliver them” (5:3-4).  It is 
significant that it is the dwelling of such people that Eliphaz curses.  In doing so, he 
removes their ability to stay inside the protective boundaries of the town.  The destruction 
of the dwelling results, for Eliphaz as for the spirit messenger, in death.   
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The children of those whose homes have been cursed and destroyed are 
subsequently “crushed,” and that Eliphaz describes this as happening “in the gate” is 
significant. The gate functions as an opening between the inner world of the town and the 
outer world that exists beyond its boundaries.  It is through the gate that things can come in 
from outside, and through it that things can go out from inside.  As such, it is a particularly 
vulnerable place in the boundary between the two realms.  It is no surprise that the town’s 
elders chose to meet in the gate.  Their presence there would have protected the vulnerable 
place in the boundary.127  In addition, it was in the gate that they would have passed 
judgment against those accused of wrongdoing.  Such judgement would have served to 
separate the righteous from the wicked, that is, insiders from outsiders.  This activity 
would have replicated the function of the gate itself, as the passageway between inside and 
outside, the place through which what belongs outside is cast out and what belongs inside 
is gathered in.  When Eliphaz describes the children of fools as being crushed in the gate, 
he is describing them as being judged, found guilty, and punished by those whose job it is 
to repulse what belongs outside and protect what belongs inside.  Crushing, here, is 
certainly synonymous with killing, and, as the kingdom of death is a place outside the 
human community, being killed is synonymous with being cast out through the gate into 
outer chaos. 
Although in chapter 3 Job imagines the world of death as an inner space, in general 
he agrees with the friends that the kingdom of death is a chaotic outer realm.  In chapter 3 
he longs to be inside the halls of death, to make his home there.  In chapter 7, however, Job 
laments his mortality and the fact that all humans must die.  He says, “As the cloud fades 
and vanishes, so those who go down to Sheol do not come up;128 they return no more to 
their houses, nor do their places know them any more” (7:9-10).  Like Eliphaz, Job uses 
the house as a symbol for being inside.  Those who are dead cannot return to the inner 
space of home, but are doomed to “exist” outside the human community.  Job complains 
that the affliction God has leveled against him is robbing him of his only opportunity to 
                                                 
127 Frank Frick points out that the gate functioned as the meeting place for the city’s elders for practical 
reasons.  He writes, “due to the lack of extensive city planning there was little if any open space within the 
typical Palestinian city.  Consequently, the place of assembly was around the city gate, to a limited extent 
inside, but usually outside, where the converging tracks made a well-worn area which was the scene of much 
of the activity of a public nature” (Frick 1977, 125).  However, in addition to the practical reasons for 
assembling at the gate, Frick also cites a religious reason, quoting Eliade who writes about the importance of 
thresholds as the place where two worlds (the sacred and profane) are both separated and, paradoxically, 
joined (Ibid., 126).   
128 Although Eliphaz would certainly agree with Job that those who go down to Sheol do not come up 
( hl(), in his depiction of the righteous man’s death in 5:26, he likens the death of the righteous man to “a 
shock of grain [which] comes up (hl()…in its season.”  For Eliphaz, there is something regenerative in the 
righteous man’s death.  Even though the dead man goes down into the ground and into Sheol, there is a sense 
in which his death is also a coming up.  The movement is not entirely downwards. 
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live on the inside, in an ordered world.  His end will be in the outer realm of death, from 
which he will not be able to return home.   
In the same chapter Job asks God, “Am I the Sea, or the Dragon, that you set a 
guard over me?” (7:12), perhaps referring to the combat myth of creation in which the Sea 
and Dragon are the representatives of chaos that must be kept out so that the ordered world 
can exist (an interpretation which may be supported by the lack of definite articles in the 
Hebrew).  Yet, whatever cosmic implications may or may not inhere in these names, what 
is certain is that the Sea and the Dragon are menacing figures which the boundaries of the 
town are in place to repulse.  Even if Job’s question is not directly related to a full-scale 
combat myth of creation, it is clearly meant  to demonstrate his belief that he is being kept 
out when he should be allowed in.  His suffering at the hands of God has made him into an 
outsider.  Job, though, insists that he is not a threat to the world inside the boundaries, and, 
in a peculiar move, uses his mortality as evidence to support his claim; it is because he will 
ultimately be thrust out by death that God need not trouble himself to keep him out.  Yet, 
as will be seen, Job only makes this argument because he believes himself to be innocent 
and, therefore, a true insider.  He would not question God’s casting out of the wicked, 
despite the fact that they too are ultimately subject to death.  His argument, then, can be 
seen to respond to the spirit messenger’s claim that all humans are constitutively 
unrighteous and therefore liable to punishment.  If Job is only being punished for being 
human, then God might as well not bother, because death will do the trick in the end 
without any help from God.  Although, according to the spirit, it is mortality that marks 
humans as deserving of punishment, Job makes the counter-argument that death is 
punishment enough and ought to absolve otherwise innocent humans from feeling the 
effects of God’s wrath.  Although in this speech, Job does not speak specifically of inside 
as the locus of order, he makes clear his belief that this is the case, both through the 
opposition he describes between the inner world of home and the outer world of death and 
through his depiction of himself as kept outside by God’s fury, while, by rights, he ought 
to be inside. 
When it is Bildad’s turn to talk, he too uses the house as a symbol of insideness, 
speaking not of exiling the wicked beyond the walls of the community, but of causing the 
collapse of their houses so that, though still inside, they are thrust out into the realm of 
death.  He says, “The hope of the godless shall perish.  Their confidence is gossamer, a 
spider’s house their trust.  If one leans against its house, it will not stand; if one lays hold 
of it, it will not endure….If they are destroyed from their place, then it will deny them, 
saying, ‘I have never seen you.’…and the tent of the wicked will be no more” (8:13b-15, 
18, 22b).  The walls that are meant to protect the wicked cave in upon them, letting that 
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which they intended to repulse in to claim them.  It is no accident that Bildad describes the 
wicked as driven out by being walled in.  This language is a direct comment on Job’s own 
situation.  Bildad has begun his speech by telling Job, “If your children sinned against 
[God], he delivered them into the power of their transgression” and consoling, “If you will 
seek God and make supplication to the Almighty…surely then he will rouse himself for 
you and restore you to your rightful place” (8:4-5, 6b).  Job’s children, Bildad knows, were 
killed when the oldest brother’s house collapsed and crushed them.  The surviving servant 
reports, “a great wind came across the desert, struck the four corners of the house, and it 
fell on the young people, and they are dead” (1:19).  That the tumbling of the house is 
occasioned by the force of a great wind is also significant.  In later depictions of the 
casting out of the wicked, the friends and Job will describe it as accomplished by a 
powerful wind sent from God for the purpose of punishing them.  Although Job’s children 
were not literally driven out beyond the boundaries of the town in recompense for their 
transgressions, they were driven out by being crushed to death, their inner sanctuary of 
home having become the outer domain of death.  Job himself, following the deaths of his 
children and the affliction of his own body has been literally driven out of town.  For Job’s 
children, cast out into the realm of death, there is no possibility of return to the inside 
world of the human community.  For Job, however, Bildad insists, there is the possibility 
of return.  If Job contends that he has been wrongfully driven out, he should present 
himself to God who, if he judges that Job is indeed innocent, and, therefore, an insider and 
not an outsider, will restore him to his “rightful place” (8:6) inside the community.   
In his first speech, Zophar makes a similar point, but focuses on the security of the 
righteous, instead of on the insecurity of the wicked.  Echoing Bildad’s words he images 
Job’s position after repentance, promising him, “you will have confidence, because there is 
hope; you will be protected and take your rest in safety.  You will lie down, and no one 
will make you afraid” (11:18-19a).  The righteous, unlike the wicked, are able to have 
confidence that the walls protecting them will not cave in, that the boundaries of their 
houses will not be breached.  Although Zophar does not use the word “house,” that he 
envisages Job as being inside a house is shown by his description of Job lying down and 
taking rest, an activity that would take place within the house.  That Zophar pictures this 
house as having strong, even impenetrable walls, as opposed to the “gossamer” walls of 
the houses of the wicked, is evidenced by his depiction of Job lying down without fear.  
The walls of the houses of the righteous function as protective boundaries, keeping what 
belongs outside out and what belongs inside in, while the walls of the houses of the wicked 
are flimsy defenses, easily breached.   
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In his second speech, Zophar speaks of the lack of protection afforded the wicked 
by their houses.  He says, “a fire fanned by no one will devour them; what is left in their 
tent will be consumed….The possessions of their house will be carried away, dragged off 
in the day of God’s wrath” (20:26b, 28).  Here, the focus is not so much on the claim that 
what ought to be kept out by the walls of the house gets in, as on the claim that what ought 
to remain inside—the possessions of the wicked, and indeed, they themselves—are 
dragged out.  Indeed, in this speech Zophar has already said that the wicked “will fly away 
like a dream, and will not be found; they will be chased away like a vision of the night” 
(20:8).  The place to which the wicked will be chased is the outer realm of death: “they 
will perish forever like their own dung….Their bodies, once full of youth will lie down in 
the dust with them” (20:7a, 11).  For the wicked, borders and boundaries do not do the job 
for which they are intended: what belongs out—death and destruction—comes crashing in, 
and what belongs in—the wicked themselves (given their status as human beings), and 
their possessions—is dragged out. 
 
Job as Outsider/Death as Inner Space 
 
In general, Job sees as evidence of the chaos that has overwhelmed the world the 
fact that the wicked are not dragged out beyond the boundaries of their homes and of the 
human community.  He contrasts the insider status of the wicked with his own outsider 
status.  He, the righteous man, is the one who has been forced out beyond the boundaries 
of the town.  He is the one whose house provided him with no protection from affliction.  
He is the one whose possessions were carried away.  He is the one whose children were 
crushed by the collapsing walls of their own home.  Job responds to Zophar’s speech by 
asking, as regards the wicked, “How often are they like straw before the wind, and like 
chaff that the storm carries away?” (21:18).  Job contends that the wicked are not, in fact, 
forced beyond the boundaries of the community; the wicked are not scattered outside of 
their tents, but, rather, reside securely within them.  Even death, which the friends have 
presented as that which carries the wicked away to its outer space, is denied “outside-
making” power by Job.  He says, “When they are carried to the grave, a watch is kept over 
their tomb.  The clods of the valley are sweet to them; everyone will follow after, and 
those who went before are innumerable” (21:32-33).  In death, Job claims here, the wicked 
are not exiled from the human community, for the community gathers around their graves, 
keeping watch there.  In this way, the dead remain inside.  Additionally, the fact that the 
number of those who have already died is “innumerable” and that “everyone” who now 
lives will die means that the kingdom of death cannot really be an outside space.  It is not 
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where the human community is not, but is the place where the human community most 
fundamentally is.  Far more people are dead than are alive, and the number will go on 
growing.  It is, therefore, no consolation to speak of the wicked as being cast out by death.  
Death is no ousting, no matter what anyone says.   
It seems significant that the word Job uses for tomb—#$ydg—is a word which also 
means “shock of grain.”  It is used with this meaning by Eliphaz when he promises his 
hypothetically-repentant Job, “You shall come to your grave in ripe old age, as a shock of 
grain (#$ydg) comes up to the threshing-floor in its season” (5.26).  Here, though, it is the 
wicked man’s tomb that Job likens to #$ydg, denying Eliphaz’s claim that only the 
righteous partake of a death that has been robbed of its power.  At other times in his 
speeches, of course, Job does view death as a casting out.  Here, he is making the effort to 
respond to his friends’ claims about the lot of the wicked, claims with which he disagrees 
because of his own situation.  The location in which he finds himself is the situation the 
friends reserve for the wicked.  His own outsider status gives the lie to the friends’ 
insistence that only the wicked are cast out.   
 
Job’s Antithetical Comments on the Outsideness of the Wicked 
 
There is, however, one place in his speeches where Job, somewhat bewilderingly, 
given what has come before, seems to agree with the friends’ assessment of the outsider 
status that is forced upon the wicked as punishment for their wickedness.129  In chapter 27 
he says,  
They build their houses like nests,130 like booths made by sentinels of the 
vineyard.  They go to bed with wealth, but will do so no more; they open their 
eyes, and it is gone.  Terrors overtake them like a flood; in the night a 
whirlwind carries them off.  The east wind lifts them up and they are gone; it 
sweeps them out of their place.  It hurls at them without pity; they flee from its 
power in headlong flight.  (27:18-22) 
Zophar has spoken of the righteous man’s certainty that, when he goes to sleep, he and his 
possessions will be protected by the walls of his house, contrasting this with Bildad’s 
description of the gossamer walls of the house of the wicked man.  Here, Job affirms his 
                                                 
129 Elsewhere in his speeches Job does envision “outside” as the domain of the wicked.  His comments in 
chapters 29-30 are clearly based on the assumption that the wicked belong outside and the righteous belong 
inside, as will be discussed in more detail later.  In general, however, Job insists that, although the wicked 
belong outside and the righteous belong inside, this spatial arrangement is not being upheld in the world as 
Job has experienced it since the beginning of his affliction.  Chapter 27 is unique in that, in it, Job seems to 
claim that in the present the wicked are confined to outer space, instead of presenting this as the way the 
world ought to be but, currently, is not. 
130 #$(k, which might also be translated “like the moth,” which would allow for a similar interpretation to 
that I am proposing. 
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friends’ claims.  The houses of the wicked are built “like nests” or like “booths” in a 
vineyard.  Job surely means to indicate that these structures are flimsy and provide only a 
false security.  Like Bildad’s picture of the confidence of the wicked as a “spider’s house,” 
here Job describes the dwellings of the wicked as temporary structures.  A booth thrown up 
in a vineyard as a temporary dwelling to be used during the harvest is not a real house with 
real walls that can keep out what ought to be kept out.  A nest, made of twigs and mud and 
spit, perched precariously among the branches of a tree, is easily blown down and carried 
away by a gust of wind.  Job, like the friends, is not speaking simply of destruction as the 
fate of the wicked.  His emphasis, like theirs, is on the casting out of the wicked, whether 
to the realm of death or to the wilderness beyond the confines of the town.   
Of course, it is uncertain how Job means his friends to hear these words of apparent 
agreement.  These claims seem so out of place in his mouth that it can hardly be assumed 
that he speaks them with a straight face and means what he says.  Some scholars suggest 
that Job’s words are the result of a mix-up in the text.  Clines attributes the antithetical 
passages in chapter 27 to Zophar (Clines 1989, 629), while Habel gives them to Bildad 
(Habel 1985, 37).  Offering another possibility, Newsom reads chapter 27 as a nod to the 
wisdom dialogue genre to which she believes the conversation between Job and the friends 
belongs.  Wisdom dialogues typically end with the participants adopting aspects of each 
other’s views, signifying that they value what their conversation partners have to say.  
Here, Job, or the Job-author, follows the convention, but with quite different results. Job’s 
adoption of the friends’ views does not serve to validate the discussion that has preceded, 
but to render it incomprehensible.  Newsom writes,  
I wonder whether the author of Job is paying a parodic homage to a generic 
convention….Both perspectives from the dialogue remain present, but rather 
than being represented in some mutual acknowledgment, they are present 
together within Job’s own speech.  Most perplexingly, however, Job’s 
speeches not only remain polemical…but he also uses the friends’ arguments 
as though they were a refutation of what the friends had just said.  Though in 
one sense this kind of mad writing brings closure (the friends are literally left 
with nothing to say), it does not relieve tension but rather exacerbates it.  
(Newsom 2003, 164) 
Other scholars who retain chapter 27 as Job’s words include Good, Lo, and Janzen.  
For Good, the chapter is spoken by Job as a parody of his friends’ position,131 but a parody 
which functions somewhat differently from Newsom’s idea.  Good argues that Job’s words 
do not simply mock the friends’ position.  Rather, finding that God has made him into his 
enemy, Job identifies himself as one of the godless who are cast out by God.  The irony is 
                                                 
131 Good rejects the reassignment of the speech, arguing that “The best index to its success as parody is the 
way we moderns…have been hoodwinked into thinking that the speech belongs to Zophar” (Good 1990, 
289).   
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that, by all standards besides God’s, Job is righteous.  Job declares himself to be “godless” 
because he possesses integrity and righteousness, whereas God is wicked.  God punishes 
him, therefore, not because he is wicked, but because he is righteous and, hence, godless 
(Good 1990, 287-88).  Although Good’s argument succeeds in making sense of Job’s 
apparently antithetical words, I do not find it entirely convincing.  I find it hard to believe 
that Job would identify himself as one of the godless, even if he identifies God, in his 
current manifestation, as acting like one of the wicked.  Throughout the book, Job counts 
on God to become, once again, who God ought to be, and, in so doing, to reorder the world 
as it ought to be.  Job prides himself on remaining one of the God-ful, even if God himself 
is behaving like one of the godless.132 
In Lo’s interpretation, Job’s words do not identify God as one of the wicked and 
himself as, consequently, God-less, but, instead, are aimed at the friends.  It is the friends 
whom Job designates as the wicked who will reap God’s punishment.  Lo writes, “The 
crucial thing is that, in the flow of the argument, Job uses his friends’ words against them.  
In so doing, he silences them, though we know that the issues are not yet settled.  Such a 
declaration of punishment has driven them into total silence, a state Job requested of them 
in 13:5” (Lo 2003, 193).  Why, though, should the friends accept that Job’s words apply to 
them?  They do not consider themselves wicked, nor are they experiencing the punishment 
which Job claims attends the wicked.  In Lo’s reading, it is as if Job has responded to the 
friends’ accusations by saying, “I know you are, but what am I?”  Far from silencing them, 
this ought to propel them into voluble denials, or at least their own repetition of the chant, 
“I know you are, but what am I?”  If Job is indeed trying to turn the tables on his friends, 
there is no reason to expect his success.  There is no reason to expect that the friends will 
be struck dumb.  It does not make sense to reason backward from the fact of their silence 
to the fact that Job has successfully convinced them of their own wickedness. 
Janzen’s position is the most convincing.  He argues that, in chapter 27, Job angrily 
interrupts Bildad, finishing his speech for him, and then preempts Zophar’s speech by 
delivering the response Job already knows he would give.  The friends are silenced 
because they have exhausted their arguments, as is demonstrated by Bildad who “adopts 
the structure of the argument which Eliphaz had used in 4:17-19 and 15:14-16 (cf. 25:4-
26)” (Janzen 1985, 173).  Job already knows what Zophar will say and shows him that he 
does, thus taking away Zophar’s ability to respond.  Janzen writes, “More clearly than any 
other indication could give, the rhetorical device of having Job finish his friends’ 
                                                 
132 See, for example, 23:10-11, where Job says,  “But he knows the way that I take; when he has tested me, I 
shall come out like gold.  My foot has held fast to his steps; I have kept his way and have not turned aside.”  
The steps to which Job’s foot has held fast are still God’s, even if God has temporarily abandoned his true 
way. 
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arguments for them signals the end of the dialogues….The friends see that they have 
nothing more to say, or that there is no point in trying to say it” (Ibid., 174). 
I want to propose a related, but somewhat different possibility.  Perhaps Job’s 
adoption of the friends’ position on the wicked is related to Bildad’s wholesale adoption of 
the spirit messenger’s position about the impossibility of human righteousness (as 
discussed in chapter four).  Bildad pulls the safety cord and shuts down the dialogue, and 
Job responds in kind, taking up the friends’ position, but after it is too late for it to do them 
any good, for it is a position they have already abandoned in favor of the “safety net” 
argument by which they are able to condemn Job and defend God once and for all.  Job’s 
speech, therefore, becomes a taunt.  The friends cannot answer him because they have 
already given up the right to speak.  Job does not silence them.  Rather, they have already 
silenced themselves, and Job takes advantage of this.  Although Job seems to agree with 
the friends on the fate of the wicked, this agreement does not strike us as sincere, and, 
therefore, reads as parody. 
Yet, despite the problematic nature of Job’s words, I do not think they can be read 
as pure parody.  Although in earlier speeches Job has insisted that the wicked are not cast 
out, as the friends contend, for which he presents the evidence that he, a righteous man, is 
the one who has been forced beyond the boundaries, in chapter 29 he will present a picture 
of the world as it ought to be, in which the righteous are inside and the wicked outside.  If 
he sneers at the friends’ claims about the current order of the world, he can only sneer to a 
certain degree and no further.  He may sneer at their insistence that the world, in its current 
state, is functioning as they describe it.  However, he cannot sneer at their idea of the way 
the world ought to function, for this is a view he shares.  At the beginning of chapter 27, 
Job makes an oath, saying, “As God lives, who has taken away my right…as long as my 
breath is in me and the spirit of God is in my nostrils, my lips will not speak falsehood, and 
my tongue will not utter deceit.  Far be it from me to say that you are right; until I die I 
will not put away my integrity from me” (27:2a, 3-5).  Immediately following this oath Job 
launches into his puzzling depiction of the fate of the wicked.  However, if Job means this 
description to be heard as a complete parody spoken with a sarcastic sneer, it is strange 
that he begins with an oath in which he promises “my lips will not speak falsehood, and 
my tongue will not utter deceit.”  Those hearing him might very well charge him with 
uttering deceit, speaking that which he does not believe to be true with the intention of 
mocking and confounding his friends.133  Of course, the friends themselves cannot charge 
                                                 
133 Good avoids this conundrum by viewing Job’s words as having undergone “ironic reversals” (Good 1990, 
289) of their true meanings.  Job is speaking what he believes to be true, but his words do not mean what the 
friends (and we) think they mean.   
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Job with speaking falsehood, given that the claims he makes are the very claims of which 
they have been trying to convince him throughout their own speeches.   
Job’s oath, though, is not made before his friends, but before God.  Job goes so far 
as to identify this God as the one “who has taken away my right…the Almighty who has 
made my soul bitter” (27:2).  If he is so forthright in describing his perception of God’s 
behavior and links this honesty to his unwillingness to relinquish his integrity, it seems 
strange that he would equivocate in the rest of his speech, speaking what he does not 
believe to be true simply for the purpose of “scoring off” his friends.  Quite a different 
preface ought to precede a speech spoken with such an intention.  Instead of saying, “I will 
not put away my integrity,” a Job about to speak what he does not believe but which 
accords with the orthodox view ought to say, “I will now say what you think I ought to 
say, in the interest of appearing righteous, because there is no other way to convince you—
or the God who has done me wrong—of my integrity.”  This, though, is not what he says.  
Job’s opening oath combined with his depiction of the world as it ought to be in chapter 29 
and as it ought not to be in chapter 30 renders his depiction of the fate of the wicked in 
chapter 27 something more than a parody that silences his friends.  His claim that the 
wicked are cast out by the hand of God represents his affirmation that, though the world is 
not currently as it ought to be, in the world as it ought to be the wicked are cast out.  Job 
stakes his claim with the fact that even though such a world does not exist now, in reality it 
does exist.  In the same way, although a God who does not afflict him does not exist now, 
such a God does exist.  Job lays claim to these realities despite the fact that they to not 
currently exist, in the hope, it seems, that his oath of innocence will bring them into being. 
 
The Body as a Microcosm of the Human Community 
 
 Before turning to an investigation of the all-important chapters 29 and 30, in which 
Job gives his clearest expression of his ideas about the distinctions between inside as order 
and outside as chaos, I want to approach the depiction of these distinctions in the rest of 
the book from another angle.  Douglas advances the idea that the human body can function 
as a microcosm of human society. She writes,  
The body is a model which can stand for any bounded system.  Its boundaries 
can represent any boundaries which are threatened or precarious….We cannot 
possibly interpret rituals concerning excreta, breast milk, saliva and the rest 
unless we are prepared to see in a body a symbol of society, and to see the 
powers and dangers credited to social structures reproduced in small on the 
human body.  (Douglas 1966, 138) 
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That is, just as the boundaries of the town serve to separate what belongs inside from what 
belongs outside, so the boundaries of the body protect what is inside from what is outside.  
Orifices, which provide potential passageways between inside and outside must, therefore, 
be carefully guarded, just as the town gate must be guarded.  Although Douglas observes 
this phenomenon as arising particularly among minority groups which would have a 
special concern to protect their unique identity,134 it need not apply only to groups of this 
kind, as Douglas recognizes.  Ronald Simkins makes a similar claim about the human body 
as an entity that partakes of inside/outside distinctions.  He writes, 
From an external perspective, the body is a highly ordered and symmetrical 
entity with fixed boundaries that differentiate it from other entities.  The body 
also has a number of orifices in its boundaries that can be penetrated and that 
discharge internal bodily fluids.  These orifices make the body vulnerable to 
external attack…and so must be protected.  (Simkins1994, 76) 
Simkins goes on to liken the body not to the human community, but to the earth.  Yet, his 
statements about the body, though they lead elsewhere, do present the body as an inner 
space with boundaries which must be protected from what lies outside, a description that 
allows us to see how the body might function as a microcosm of the human community. 
Although she does not write about the body and the town as linked through their 
shared necessity of keeping inside what belongs there and keeping out what belongs out, 
Elaine Scarry does identify the body as a microcosm of civilization, arrived at through the 
house, which is both a projection of the body and civilization in miniature.  That is, house 
is body and civilization is house, meaning that civilization is also body writ large.  She 
writes, 
the room, the simplest form of shelter, expresses the most benign potential of 
human life.  It is, on the one hand, an enlargement of the body: it keeps warm 
and safe the individual within; like the body, its walls put boundaries around 
the self presenting undifferentiated contact with the world, yet in its windows 
and doors, crude versions of the senses, it enables the self to move out into the 
world and allows that world to enter.  But while the room is a magnification of 
the body, it is simultaneously a miniaturization of the world, of civilization.  
(Scarry 1985, 38) 
For Scarry, the house (or room, the simplest form of house) stands for the world because it 
is an artifact external to the body, and what the world is is such external artifacts: “objects 
which stand apart from and free of the body, objects which realize the human being’s 
impulse to project himself out into a space beyond the boundaries of the body in acts of 
making, either physical or verbal, that once multiplied, collected, and shared are called 
                                                 
134 She writes, “When rituals express anxiety about the body’s orifices the sociological counterpart of this 
anxiety is a care to protect the political and cultural unity of a minority group.  The Israelites were always in 
their history a hard-pressed minority.  In their beliefs all the bodily issues were polluting….The threatened 
boundaries of their body politic would be well mirrored in their care for the integrity, unity and purity of the 
physical body” (Douglas 1966, 148). 
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civilization” (Ibid., 39).  Yet, at the same time, the external artifacts that constitute the 
world are linked to the body in that they perform functions that, previously, the body 
performed itself or that the body wishes it were able to perform.  Walls, for example, 
function like the epidermis, they “mimic the body’s attempt to secure for the individual a 
stable internal space,” but they do a better job of it than the body does itself and permit the 
body to “suspend its rigid and watchful postures; acting in these and other ways like the 
body so that the body can act less like a wall” (Ibid.).  Because of the link she perceives 
between the world and the body, Scarry argues that the disintegration of the body results in 
the disintegration of the world.  If a body is in enough pain, the world, which is a 
projection of the body and which, normally, functions to relieve the body of the aversive 
aspects of sentience—(i.e. the trouble of having to be rigidly attentive at all times)—fails 
to fulfill its purpose and is, consequently, unmade.  Additionally, if pieces of the world 
cause pain, whether that pain is purposefully inflicted, or inadvertently stumbled across, 
those pieces of the world cease to be part of the world as it was intended to be.  If the 
world revisits aversive sentience upon the body, then it is no longer the world.  Although 
Scarry does not focus on inside/outside distinctions as regards the body and civilization, 
they are assumed in her work.  When things get into (or out of) the body that should not be 
there, civilization falls apart. 
 
The Breaking of Job’s Body as Indication of his Outsider Status 
 
 Because the body functions as a microcosm of the human community as regards 
inner and outer space as related to order and chaos, it is no surprise that Job’s bodily 
affliction coincides with his relocation outside the boundaries of the town.  Throughout the 
book, when Job describes the suffering inflicted upon him by God, he describes it in terms 
of a breaching of the boundaries of his body.  In chapter 10, Job appeals to God for a 
release from his anguish on the basis that God is the one who created him.  He describes 
God’s work in the womb, saying, “You clothed me with skin and flesh, and knit me 
together with bones and sinews” (10:11).  Here, Job presents God as responsible for giving 
him an inside, and for separating his insides off—by means of skin and flesh—from what 
is outside.  God is the one who has created the boundaries surrounding Job, and Job uses 
this fact to argue that God should not, then, breach those boundaries.  In this chapter, he 
accuses, “Bold as a lion you hunt me; you repeat your exploits against me.  You renew 
your witnesses against me, and increase your vexation towards me; you bring fresh troops 
against me” (10:16-17).  Although here he does not specifically speak of God’s attack as 
breaking through the boundaries of his body, that this is implied is indicated by the use he 
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will make of breaching imagery later in the book.  When God hunts Job and brings troops 
against him, what happens is that Job’s bodily integrity is compromised.  Although Job 
may insist that he retains his moral integrity despite the affliction of his body, his friends 
do not believe him, viewing his loss of bodily integrity as proof of his loss of moral 
integrity, assuming that the two go hand in hand.  Indeed, that Job’s bodily affliction 
incites him to take himself out to the ash heap shows that he, too, knows that a firmly 
defended body is a sign of insider status, and, with his body’s defenses broken down, 
knows that he has become an outsider, though he continues to argue that because of his 
righteousness he should not be one.135   
After accusing God of bringing “fresh troops against me” to break through the 
boundaries of his body, despite the fact that God erected those boundaries in the first place, 
Job wishes, as he has wished in chapter 3, to have never been born in the first place.  He 
asks, “Why did you bring me forth from the womb?” (10:18).  The implication of this 
question is, “Why did you create me, if you planned only to destroy your creation?” or 
“Why did you establish protective boundaries around me, if you planned to breach those 
boundaries and leave me unprotected?”    The womb is an inside space; it exists inside the 
boundaries of the body, and the child that grows in the womb is protected by those 
boundaries while its own boundaries are constructed.  In order for the child to be born, the 
boundaries of its mother’s body must be crossed, but this crossing is of a particular kind 
and serves the purpose of expelling what now belongs outside the borders of the mother’s 
body, having become a body in its own right with its own protective boundaries. Job, 
having discovered that the boundaries of his body cannot protect him from God’s attack, 
wishes to be back in the womb, within the protective sphere of his mother’s body.  His 
own boundaries are useless, so he wishes to rely on the boundaries of another, in the hopes 
that they will serve him better.  However, knowing that it would have been impossible to 
have survived indefinitely in the womb, Job continues, “Would that I had died before any 
eye had seen me, and were as though I had not been, carried from the womb to the grave” 
(10:18b-19).  Here, Job envisages the grave as another inside space, analogous to the 
                                                 
135 It might be argued that the breaching of Job’s bodily defenses results in a confusion of the distinction 
between outside as chaos and inside as order.  If Job’s body has become chaotic, then that chaos can be seen 
to occupy an inside space.  Yet, even when chaos has penetrated to the inner space of the body, there is never 
the sense that it belongs there.  The body’s boundaries ought to be intact, and whatever is capable of 
breaching them—disease, the infliction of pain, etc.—ought not to breach them, or ought not if the body is 
that of a righteous man.  Job insists that he is innocent, but, at the same time, recognizes that his broken body 
contradicts his words.  Clines writes, “Job is helpless against the criticism of his friends if his own physical 
appearance is testimony of his wrongdoing.  His…suffering and even his own body are witnesses against 
him” (Clines 1989, 382).   Yet, Job never tries to argue that his broken body identifies him as anything but 
guilty, even as he protests that his body is not speaking the truth.  Job does not want to redefine the meaning 
of a broken body, but only to have his body brought into alignment with his status as a righteous insider. 
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womb, but more accommodating.  Whereas he could not remain forever in the womb, he 
can remain forever in the tomb, surrounded by its protective boundaries.   
What those boundaries protect him from is, of course, a good question.  If death has 
already claimed him, what is there that needs to be kept outside?  It would seem that, for 
the dead person, the most formidable enemy has already breached the boundaries; the 
walls of the body have collapsed and cannot be resurrected.  It seems that Job imagines the 
womb and the tomb as protecting him from life, and, what he most needs to be protected 
from in the world of the living is God.  Womb and tomb, then, are location in which 
boundaries exist between Job and God—womb because it is the location of creation (and, 
therefore, not of the destruction which Job is experiencing in his life outside the womb) 
and tomb because it is beyond God’s grasp.  Later in the book, Job cries out to God, “O 
that you would hide me in Sheol, that you would conceal me until your wrath is past” 
(14:13a), indicating that he does conceive of the realm of the dead as, in some way, 
protected space, surrounded by boundaries that God cannot cross.  Yet, although at one 
moment Job wishes for enclosure in the tomb, in the next he laments the inevitability of his 
death, saying, “Are not the days of my life few?  Let me alone, that I may find a little 
comfort before I go, never to return, to the land of gloom and deep darkness, the land of 
gloom and chaos,136 where darkness is like light” (10:20-22).  In these verses, Job ceases to 
envision the grave as inner space, seeing it instead as that from which his life must be 
protected.  Because God did not allow Job to stay inside the womb and to go from there 
straight into the tomb, Job asserts that God ought to leave him alone for the time being.  
God should not pierce Job’s body, but should allow its boundaries to continue intact, for, 
before long, Job will be claimed by the realm of outer darkness, a realm that is physically 
outside the boundaries of the human community and in which the boundaries of his body 
will be overrun once and for all.  Worms and the earth will do the job without any help 
from God. 
 In chapter 16 Job embarks on his most vivid description of the ways in which God 
has violated the boundaries of his body.  He cries, 
[God] has shriveled me up, which is a witness against me; my leanness has 
risen up against me, and it testifies to my face.  He has torn me in his wrath, 
and hated me; he has gnashed his teeth at me….I was at ease, and he broke me 
in two; he seized me by the neck and dashed me to pieces; he set me up as his 
target; his archers surround me.  He slashes open my kidneys, and shows no 
                                                 
136 The phrase translated “chaos” here is Mrds )l.  According to The Dictionary of Classical Hebrew,  
rds means “order, formation, arrangement, esp. of battle formations” (The Dictionary of Classical Hebrew, 
122).  Here, then, Job envisions the grave as the domain of formlessness, a place in which the boundaries of 
his body will cease to exist.  
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mercy; he pours out my gall on the ground.  He bursts upon me again and 
again; he rushes at me like a warrior.  (16:8-9a, 12-14) 
Job’s body is utterly broken by God, and what ought to remain inside—his kidneys, and 
his gall within them—is pulled out into the open, deprived of the protection of skin and 
flesh.  Job identifies the brokenness of his body as “a witness against me.”  The state of his 
body identifies him as one who is undeserving of the protection afforded by inclusion 
within the human community.  The link between the breaching of the body and the 
breaching of the city’s defenses is shown by the fact that “the image [of God’s attack on 
Job’s body] shades off into the breaching of a strong city wall.  Once sufficient openings 
appear, the enemy rushes in for the kill” (Crenshaw 1984, 68).  Job, though, insists again 
as he has insisted all along, “there is no violence in my hands, and my prayer is pure” 
(16:17).  He claims that he is righteous and therefore deserving of insider status, despite 
the testimony his afflicted body bears against him.   
In chapter 19, Job again takes up this theme, this time accusing the friends of 
contributing to the breaking of his body.  He asks, “How long will you torment me, and 
break me in pieces with words?” (19:2).  Job is responding directly to Bildad’s second 
speech, the subject of which has been God’s punishment of the wicked.  Bildad has said, 
“In their tents nothing remains; sulfur is scattered upon their habitations….Their memory 
perishes from the earth, and they have no name in the street.  They are thrust from light 
into darkness, and driven out of the world” (18:15-18).  His depiction of the punishment of 
the wicked focuses on the breakdown of that which ought to provide them with  protective 
boundaries—that is, the tent—and on their expulsion from the human community.  After 
describing the casting out of the wicked, Bildad concludes, “Surely such are the dwellings 
of the ungodly, such is the place of those who do not know God” (18:21).  That is, their 
dwellings are flimsy and do not serve to protect them from the threats that lie beyond the 
walls, and their rightful place is in the outer space beyond the boundaries of the town and 
its righteous inhabitants.   
It is no wonder that Job responds with incredulous accusations of wrongdoing.  
Bildad has described the situation in which Job finds himself.  Identifying Job as an 
outsider is commensurate with breaking Job’s body in pieces.  In this, though, Bildad 
breaks one who is already broken.  Bildad identifies Job as an outsider, but Job is already 
outside.  With his words, Bildad afflicts Job’s body, but Job’s body is already afflicted.  
Bildad is simply calling it as he sees it.  Later in the chapter, Job again names God—and 
not the friends—as the one responsible for the breaking of his body and its conferral of 
outsider status.  He says, “He breaks me down on every side, and I am gone, he has 
uprooted my hope like a tree.  He has kindled his wrath against me, and counts me as his 
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adversary.  His troops come together; they have thrown up siege-works137 against me, and 
encamp around my tent” (19:10-12).  This description of God’s enmity and his breaking 
down the boundaries of Job’s body is not as vivid as that given in chapter 16, but its 
sentiment is the same.  Here, the image of the tent functions as a symbol of insider status 
both at the level of the town and the body.  Job’s tent is both his body and his position 
within the boundaries of the town.  He finds the tent of his insider status threatened, as he 
is surrounded by God’s troops, who, having laid siege to it, are attempting to break through 
its defenses so that they can drag Job out or, who, perhaps, plan to cause the tent to 
collapse so that Job is crushed inside and exiled to the realm of death.  As the tent of his 
insider status is threatened, so the tent of his body is assaulted by those who would pierce 
and break it, spilling its insides out on the ground.  These actions are one and the same: to 
breach the boundaries of his body is to identify Job as an outsider and to drag him beyond 
the boundaries of the community.   
As chapter 19 continues, Job speaks of the way in which he has been deemed an 
outsider by the members of his household, those for whom the tent still provides a 
protective boundary.  He is ignored by relatives, guests, and servants alike because, due to 
the affliction of his body, he has become an outsider.  In relation to this passage (19:13-
19), Philippe Nemo makes the link between outsider status and the breakdown of the body 
explicit, writing that the members of Job’s household, “might have tried to overcome their 
moral repulsion…had Job’s physical existence remained intact and healthy.  However, 
confronted with his ‘putrid’ body odor and ‘unbearable’ bad breath, even his wife 
recoils....The dissolution of the body automatically dissolves the convention of 
communication” (Nemo 1998, 32).  That is, the affliction of the body can only ever signal 
moral failure requiring expulsion from the community, because the community cannot bear 
the presence of the one whose body is in a state of disintegration.  The breakdown of the 
body cannot stand simply for itself, with no larger meaning, for if it did it would not 
require the expulsion of the afflicted one, but the expulsion of the afflicted one is 
necessary, at least in Nemo’s view.  He continues, “In their eyes, or rather in the eyes of 
their unconscious, Job is guiltier of an illness for which, obviously, he can bear no real 
responsibility, than of a transgression which, presumably, he committed freely.  They are 
ready to discuss the latter; from the former they recoil in fear” (Ibid., 33).  According to 
Nemo, Job’s household can hardly be blamed for their treatment of Job, for “This is not a 
defect in their personalities; it is a shortcoming in our nature” (Ibid.).  His community’s 
                                                 
137 Literally, another occurrence of a path word, Krd.  Gordis translates, “they have paved their road against 
me” (Gordis 1978, 196).  This is where God’s deviation from the one right path has led—to his violent 
affliction of Job. 
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physical repulsion and fear of death make the afflicted one an outsider, even if he has done 
nothing else to merit outsider status.  Whether or not Nemo is correct that such behavior is 
human nature, his observations highlight the  essential tie between the wholeness of the 
body and the integrity of the community.  The community abhors a broken body and casts 
it out, even if it is necessary to trump up alternative reasons (i.e. the sufferer’s 
unrighteousness) for doing so.   
 In chapter 20 Zophar responds to Job first by describing the casting out of the 
wicked (“They will fly away like a dream, and not be found; they will be chased away like 
a vision of the night” [20:8]), and then by linking this to the affliction of the body.  He 
ends his speech by returning to his report of the destruction of the tent of the wicked and 
the dispersal of their possessions, symbolizing their banishment from the inside world of 
the town and human community.  For Zophar, as for Job, the destruction of the body is 
synonymous with the destruction of the tent, both of which indicate that the afflicted 
person is an outsider.  As Zophar presents it, it is precisely through the affliction of their 
bodies that the wicked are cast out of the community.  He says, “God will send his fierce 
anger into them, and rain it upon them as their food.  They will flee from an iron weapon; a 
bronze arrow will strike them through.  It is drawn forth and comes out of their body, and 
the glittering point comes out of their gall” (20:23b-25a).  The similarity between Zophar’s 
claims about the piercing of the bodies of the wicked and Job’s description of his body’s 
destruction by God should not be overlooked.  In chapter 16, Job has  said that God’s 
archers surround him and that God slashes open his kidneys and spills his gall on the 
ground.  Here, Zophar describes God’s arrow piercing the bodies of the wicked, 
specifically their kidneys, spilling their gall.138  What happens to the wicked, according to 
Zophar, has happened to Job, by his own admission.  The boundaries of their bodies are 
                                                 
138 I’m wondering what it is about the piercing of the kidneys and the spilling of the gall that leads both Job 
and Zophar to describe these as the actions taken by God against his enemies.  Perhaps it is as simple as 
Zophar picking up on the imagery already used by Job, in order to include Job in his indictment of the 
wicked.  I have not found any scholarly speculation about the meaning of Job’s and Zophar’s shared use of 
this picture, but some scholars do offer interpretations of Job’s choice of the kidneys as the specific locus of 
God’s attack.  Balentine suggests that the attack on the kidneys signifies an attack that is emotionally 
overwhelming, writing, “At one level the expression signifies the overwhelming emotional fatigue that drains 
Job’s passion for carrying on with the struggle, for the kidneys, like the heart, are the symbolic center of 
intense affections and desires.  At a more basic level the kidneys are a vital and extremely sensitive part of 
the human anatomy….Job of course does not speak with the expertise of a medical internist....He does know, 
however, what it is like when the kidneys are under attack….It is out of that experience…that Job speaks 
about the dangerous imbalance between God’s hostile presence in his life and his emotional and physical 
capacities to withstand it” (Balentine 1999, 276).  Offering an alternate (but not contradictory) interpretation, 
Newsom writes, “In the symbolic anatomy of Israelite thought, divine scrutiny is often represented as the 
searching of the kidneys and the heart (e.g. Pss 7:10; 26:2; cf. 73:21).  Though such scrutiny is represented 
by the psalmist as legitimate and even welcome, Job insists on the close connection between looking and 
harming” (Newsom 1999, 247).  If Job experiences himself as wrongfully scrutinized and harmed by God, 
Zophar’s use of the same language might indicate his belief that, for the wicked, scrutiny which results in 
punishment is legitimate: God examines the kidneys (as we would say the heart) of righteous and wicked 
alike, and, depending on what he finds, allocates reward or punishment as appropriate.   
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violated, their insides spilled out on the ground, identifying them as outsiders who ought to 
be repulsed beyond the boundaries of the town and denied its protection.  Zophar asserts 
that the spilling out of the insides of the wicked is based on their having tried to assimilate, 
to take in, that which should have remained external to them.  He declares, “They knew no 
quiet in their bellies; in their greed they let nothing escape.  There was nothing left after 
they had eaten; therefore their prosperity will not endure” (20:20-21).  Because they have 
attempted to hoard within the boundaries of their bodies that which ought rightfully to 
have belonged to others, their bodies must be invaded, and the wrongfully appropriated 
wealth reclaimed.  The wicked man is like a city which, having stolen a treasure, is sacked 
when that treasure is reclaimed by its rightful owners.  By taking in more than his share, 
the wicked man has, ironically, declared himself an outsider, and, Zophar contends, his 
casting out is soon to follow.  As can be seen, for both Job and Zophar, the body functions 
as a microcosm of the town and its human community.  A broken body is synonymous 
with a town whose walls have been breached and no longer serve their protective function.  
A broken body is a body claimed by what is outside and, as such, declares its possessor an 
outsider.  If chaos is to remain outside, the outsider must be cast out, so that order can 
reign inviolate within. 
 
Job’s Self-Identification as an Insider through his Preservation of the 
Inside/Outside Distinction 
 
 Despite his location outside the boundaries of the community, Job continues to 
insist that he is actually an insider.  In fact, the narrator’s early designation of Job as  Mt 
(1.1), may be an indication of an insider status that goes beyond that secured by righteous 
behavior.  Ellen Davis points out that  
There is one other place in the patriarchal narratives that this theme of integrity 
appears….I refer to the designation of Jacob as ’ish tam (Gen 25:27).  As with 
Job, the first thing we learn of the grown Jacob is that he is “a person of 
integrity”; but the phrase poses a conundrum, for if indeed tam denotes ethical 
integrity, then Jacob is not an obvious candidate for that accolade.  Here the 
word characterizes a disposition and lifestyle sharply distinct from that of 
Esau, who is “a man experienced at hunting, a man of the open country”....The 
best clue to the meaning of tam in this passage is the continuation of the verse: 
tam marks the character of the tent-dweller, one who lives with others and 
recognizes the demands of the social order.  (Davis 1992, 211)   
As an ’ish tam, Job is a civilized man.  He belongs within the borders which surround the 
town.  For this reason, throughout his speeches, he alternately begs and demands that God 
return him to his rightful place, and, in chapter 29 presents a picture of what his rightful 
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place looks like.  I have already discussed this chapter in detail in chapter two.  The 
observations that I made there about Job’s central position and his status as the only real 
character, whose importance all the other characters serve to bolster, are applicable here as 
well.  Job, at the center of the town’s attention, is the insider par excellence.  It is 
important to notice that, in chapter 29, he bases his insider status on his righteousness, and 
it is to this claim of righteousness that he clings throughout his speeches, despite the 
affliction that has branded him an outsider.  He relies on his righteousness as the key that 
will open the gates of city and community to him again.  It is his righteousness that Job 
lays before God in his oaths of chapters 13, 27, and 31, certain that if God will only deign 
to look he will recognize Job as an insider and effect his restoration.139   
This righteousness, as Job describes it in chapter 29, is of a specific sort.  Job is not 
simply “a good person” in general.  Rather, Job’s righteousness, which he presents as the 
sign of his insider status, is based on his ability to judge the righteousness and wickedness 
of others and to enforce insider/outsider distinctions.  Job ensures that those who belong 
inside, because of their righteousness, remain inside, and casts out those who, because of 
their wickedness, do not belong.  He speaks of his saving work on behalf of the poor, the 
orphan, the widow, the wretched, the blind, the lame, the needy, and the stranger, all of 
whom bless him for what he has done, turning their eyes heavenward and fixing them on 
Job who shines above, surrounded by God’s holy light.140  He saves these righteous poor 
by  breaking “the fangs of the unrighteous” and making “them drop their prey from their 
teeth” (29:17).  It is this very act that occasions Job’s reflection, “Then I thought, ‘I shall 
die in my nest, and I shall multiply my days like the phoenix’” (29:18).  Although Job uses 
the term “nest” to describe his dwelling, a term that he has used in chapter 27 to describe 
the insecurity of the homes of the wicked and the lack of protection they afford, it is clear 
that here he is not describing his own home as similarly insecure, or if he is, it is only in 
the light of the affliction that has befallen him and does not reflect how he perceived his 
                                                 
139 Newsom reads Job’s chapter 31 oath of innocence as spoken to a community which shares his values and 
which, after hearing what he has said, must recognize him as an insider.  She writes, “As Job swears to 
different kinds of conduct, it allows Job to rehearse with his audience the virtues and values they mutually 
endorse and so to present himself persuasively as ‘one of us’”  (Newsom 2003, 195).  As Newsom sees it, it 
is the community that Job must convince of his insider status, and not primarily God, for God as “the social 
and moral order writ large” (Ibid., 196) will necessarily agree with the community’s evaluation.  It is, 
therefore, the community’s decision to allow Job to reenter its boundaries that comes first, even though the 
community assumes that God has made the first move to rehabilitate Job.  The maintenance of boundaries 
between inside and outside is here recognized as a function of society. 
140 Of Job’s work on behalf of the righteous poor, Mark Hamilton writes, “the author pictures Job as mender 
of the very bodies of those who did not receive deference, the lowest tier of society….Indeed, his body 
merges with theirs, so that, in a brilliant literary maneuver, the text identifies the body of the ruler with the 
body politic itself…[T]he emphasis on the ruler’s protection of the ruled…reinforces the elite’s status but 
does so by seeming to distribute power and wealth more widely than before” (Hamilton 2007, 78).  Here, it is 
not just that any body is a microcosm of the human community, but that the leader’s body is representative of 
the community. 
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security in the days when he was the consummate insider.141  In those days, Job believed 
that his work on behalf of the righteous poor and against the wicked guaranteed his own 
position as an insider.  He expected to remain within the protective walls of his house and 
community throughout all the years of his life.  Indeed, it is interesting that, although Job 
speaks of dying “in my nest,” in the second half of the verse he speaks of multiplying “my 
days like the phoenix.”  On the basis of his differentiation between righteous and wicked, 
Job has confidence that his life will be prolonged, allowing him to remain within the 
bosom of the community for a long, long time.  Even death, which would normally be seen 
as an outside force that drags its victims outside the boundaries of the community, did not 
seem to function in this way for Job, at least in his imagination, in the days before his 
suffering.  He planned to die in his “nest,” in the security of his home, if he planned to die 
at all; his use of the image of the phoenix, which is perpetually reborn from its ashes, 
seems to suggest that, at least at some level, Job believed that he would continue to live 
indefinitely, 142 for, given his position at the center of the community, without him the 
distinctions between inside and outside would break down and the community would be 
overwhelmed by chaos. 
 That Job understood his work on behalf of the righteous poor and against the 
wicked as serving to maintain the boundaries between inside and outside is supported by 
his description of the treatment of the poor by the wicked in chapter 24.  There, Job says, 
The wicked remove landmarks; they seize flocks and pasture them.  They drive 
away the donkey of the orphan; they take the widow’s ox for a pledge.  They 
thrust the needy off the road; the poor of the earth all hide themselves.  Like 
wild asses in the desert they go out to their toil, scavenging in the waste-land 
food for their young….They lie all night naked, without clothing, and have no 
covering in the cold.  They are wet with the rain of the mountains, and cling to 
the rock for want of shelter.  (24:2-5, 7-8) 
It is significant that the wicked are described as “removing landmarks.”  The word 
translated “landmarks” is tlbg, meaning “borders” or “boundaries.”  The wicked are 
guilty of removing the markers of separation and differentiation, so that the boundaries 
between one person’s land and another’s are made unclear, rendering the distinction 
between inside and outside uncertain.  They do this, presumably, with the intention of 
claiming for themselves what rightfully belongs to another.  The landmark, which should 
have served to keep them out and to protect what was inside, fails to do its job, and what is 
outside comes in and claims for its own what was formerly inside.  By stealing from the 
                                                 
141 The word translated  “nest” here is nq.  In 27:18 “nests” is the translation of a different word, #$(. 
142 Because the Hebrew lwx has both meanings, it is also possible to translate this verse as saying that Job 
expected to multiply his days “like sand,” instead of “like the phoenix,” which, though it does not connote 
endless life through continual rebirth, does indicate the extreme prolongation of Job’s life.   
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poor any means they may have had to support themselves within the human community, 
the wicked thrust them “off the road” and out into the wilderness where they are forced to 
live like animals.  These needy people have done nothing wrong.  They belong within the 
boundaries of the town.  They deserve to benefit from its protection, as all righteous people 
do.  The wicked, however, make them into outsiders, and, by doing so, illicitly appropriate 
their insider status.143  It is the wicked who now live in town and own fields and flocks, 
donkeys and oxen, slaves and olive groves and vineyards, when they ought to be outside 
the boundaries of the human community.  From this passage it is clear that when Job helps 
the righteous poor and defends them against the wicked by “breaking the fangs of the 
unrighteous” he is performing that most important function of maintaining the correct 
boundaries between inside and outside, preserving order against the onslaught of chaos. 
 
The “Senseless, Disreputable Brood”: Humans as Animals in the Outer Space of 
the Wilderness 
 
In chapter 24, Job has described what happens when correct boundaries between 
inside and outside are not maintained.  In the world as it currently is, those boundaries are 
in turmoil.  Whereas previously Job took responsibility for ensuring that those who 
belonged inside remained inside and that those who belonged outside were repulsed, he no 
longer has the power to do so.  An outsider himself, he can no longer protect the 
community’s boundaries through his righteous judgment, but can only sit outside and 
demand that God let him back in so that he can get back to work.  Not only are the 
righteous poor in the situation he describes in chapter 24, but he himself is among them.  
In chapter 30, he describes himself as “a brother of jackals, and a companion of ostriches” 
(v. 29), that is, as a wild beast inhabiting the wilderness beyond the boundaries of the 
town.  He and the righteous poor alike must scavenge in the waste-land (24:5b) and “cling 
to the rock for want of shelter” (24:8b).144  Here, again, the image of “home” is used as a 
                                                 
143 Clines identifies the wicked described in chapter 24 as being “not professional thieves or brigands,” but  
“the chieftains and ruling class” of the same community as the poor (Clines 1998b, 247), basing his 
identification on the fact that these wicked people do not make off with what they have stolen, but, instead 
enjoy their ill-gotten gains under the very noses of those who have been robbed.  They are insiders, not 
outsiders.  According to Clines, what Job is describing is a problem in the structure of his society itself—the 
rich and powerful exploit the poor and no one does anything to stop them.  Whereas, in chapter 29 Job 
describes himself as the one who, in his former glory, protected the poor from the wicked, in chapter 24 Job 
blames God for allowing the wicked to prevail.  This is because Job now finds himself in the situation of the 
exploited poor, unable to carry out his former duties, a circumstance for which he believes God is 
responsible. 
144 This language may be metaphorical.  Clines argues that the poor do not literally inhabit the wilderness.  
Instead, “What we have here…is…a metaphorical depiction of the hard work required to earn an inadequate 
living as a farm laborer: it is no better…than scavenging for roots in the steppe” (Clines 2006, 605-06).  Yet, 
even if the language is metaphorical, the link between the poor and the animals of the wilderness is not 
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symbol for insider status.  Like animals, Job and the righteous poor have no home; having 
been thrust beyond the walls of the community, they must make do with the meager shelter 
of rocks and bushes, which can provide no real protection. 
In chapter 30, instead of describing how his position as an insider has been usurped 
by the wicked, Job speaks of another group of animal-like outsiders whose mockery shows 
how much of an outsider he has become.  He is mocked by 
those who are younger than I, whose fathers I would have disdained to set with 
the dogs of my flock.  What could I gain from the strength of their hands?  All 
their vigor is gone.  Through want and hard hunger they gnaw the dry and 
desolate ground, they pick mallow and the leaves of bushes, and to warm 
themselves the roots of broom.  They are driven out from society; people shout 
after them as after a thief.  In the gullies of wadis they must live, in holes in the 
ground, and in the rocks.  Among the bushes they bray; under the nettles they 
huddle together.  A senseless, disreputable brood, they have been whipped out 
of the land.  (30:1b-8) 
Job has gone from being the consummate insider, the one who secured the boundary 
between inside and outside, to being considered an outsider even by those who are 
themselves the most outside.  Like the righteous poor of chapter 24, this group’s members 
are described as living like animals, scratching out an existence in the wilderness outside 
the boundaries of the town, trying to find dwellings for themselves by squeezing into 
gullies and holes in the ground and gaps between rocks, but unable to create the true inner 
space of a home.   
Unlike the righteous poor, however, this group is described as deserving its 
wilderness habitation.  These people have been “driven out from society” and “whipped 
out of the land,” not by the wicked who would wrongfully appropriate their place as 
insiders, but by the righteous who are defending the integrity of their inner space.  This 
group is described by the epithet, M#_ylb ynb_Mg lbn_ynb, “foolish ones and ones with 
no name,” which is translated by the NRSV as, “a senseless, disreputable brood.”  Janzen 
explains the force of this appellation, writing,  
In human society, where social relations are rooted in sensibilities of primal 
sympathy having moral and religious overtones and where individual identity 
arises partly through embodiment of recognizable common values and partly 
through the individually distinctive way in which those values and sensibilities 
are embodied and enacted, how can one discover or make contact with 
anything personal or individual in a nabal, a fool, much less give a personal 
name?  The very namelessness of such a brood is already their alienation from 
the community.  (Janzen 1985, 205) 
                                                                                                                                                   
lessened.  Brown writes, “In his description of the needy, Job freely moves from the domain of harsh and 
unforgiving nature to the brutal arena of human culture to describe the plight of the vulnerable.  Abused by 
nature and society, the onager and the orphan share in common their status as victims.  The poor have 
been…exiled…to the margins to become kin with the exploited class of asses” (Brown 1999, 334).  Even if 
they remain literally within the human enclosure, these people have been made into animal-like outsiders. 
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The epithet conveys, in the strongest possible terms—(Janzen writes, “It is difficult to find 
a translation adequate to the extreme lengths to which the Hebrew terms here take the 
reader’s moral imagination” [Ibid.].)—the outsideness of this group,145 seeming to imply 
that they do not possess the characteristics necessary for participation in human 
community.  They would seem to be those who are “so far gone” (for whatever reason), 
that their rehabilitation to insider status is unimaginable, if not entirely impossible. 
The animal descriptors applied to the “senseless, disreputable brood” indicate Job’s 
belief that a boundary exists between humans and animals which marks humans as insiders 
and animals as outsiders.  Although the righteous poor in chapter 24 are described as 
having been forced to live like animals because of the oppression of the wicked, the 
“disreputable brood” of chapter 30 is described in terms that are even more animalistic.  
This group must not only scavenge for food like animals do, eating whatever vegetation 
happens to be growing instead of cultivating grain for themselves, nor must they only try 
to shelter themselves under bushes and outcroppings of rock instead of building homes for 
themselves, but when they open their mouths animal sounds come out.  Job says, “Among 
the bushes they bray” (30:7a).  The verb here is qhn, the same as is used by Job in 6:5, 
“Does the wild ass bray over its grass…?”, a noise which is thoroughly animal.  A person 
may live like an animal and still remain human so long she retains the power of language, 
but this group has crossed the line.  That animal sounds come out when they open their 
mouths is proof of how far outside the boundaries of the human community this group 
lives.146   
That the members of the “senseless, disreputable brood” are consummate outsiders, 
outside to the point that they could not be more outside if they were actually animals, is 
clearly established in Job’s description of them.  What is not so clearly established is what 
                                                 
145 In 18:17, describing the destruction of the wicked, Bildad has claimed, “Their memory perishes from the 
earth, and they have no name in the street.”  For Bildad, having no name means that one has completely 
ceased to exist.  A man whose name survives him still has some claim on the world, but one whose name has 
been wiped out is an absolute nonentity.  Job’s “senseless, disreputable brood,” then, is made up of people 
who do not exist.  And yet, in his suffering, undergoing their scorn, Job discovers that their existence is 
reasserted against him.  In his suffering, he has become the nonentity. 
146 Although it does seem to me that the members of the “senseless, disreputable brood” are described in 
terms that are more animalistic than those applied to the poor of chapter 24, as is shown by the animal sounds 
which Job attributes to them, I should perhaps be more careful not to underestimate the extent of the animal 
descriptors used in chapter 24.  When Job says that these people are forced to scavenge for food, he uses the 
term Pr+, the same word translated “prey” in 29:17: “I broke the fangs of the unrighteous and made them 
drop their prey from their teeth.”  The same word is used by God in 38:39: “Can you hunt the prey for the 
lion…?”  Clearly, this term describes the hunt for food of a carnivorous animal, and not the human search for 
food.  In addition, Job dwells on the nakedness of the poor who have been forced to inhabit the wilderness—
“They lie all night naked, without clothing, and have no covering in the cold” (24:7)—a detail which links 
them to animals.  These animal descriptors are tempered, however, by the assertion which runs through the 
passage that this situation is at odds with how things ought to be.  The members of the “senseless, 
disreputable brood” are rightfully animalistic, whereas the righteous poor of chapter 24 are not. 
 209
they have done to mark themselves as such.  Are they the wicked?—those whose fangs Job 
has broken in defense of the vulnerable (29:17), and who are, therefore, his enemies?  It 
does not seem so.  If they were, Job would surely call them by that name, which he does 
not.  Unlike the wicked of chapters 24 and 29, they are not described as attempting to cast 
out the righteous poor.  Rather, it is they themselves who are cast out.  Whereas those who 
force out the righteous poor are wicked, those who have forced out the “senseless, 
disreputable brood” are righteous.  But why?  What have the members of the second group 
done to warrant their status as outsiders?  If they are as destitute as those whom Job makes 
it his business to defend, why does Job not fight on their behalf?  Why are his words 
insulting instead of compassionate?  The answers to these questions have to do with the 
economic nature of insider status. 
 
The Economics of Insider Status 
 
In chapter 29, Job has described his vision of the world as it ought to be, the salient 
feature of which is his position at the center of his community’s deferential attention.  
Essential to this depiction is Job’s insistence that he has earned this deference.  Why do the 
elders make way for Job and the poor regard him with shy gratitude?  They do so because 
he is their defender. “I broke the fangs of the unrighteous, and made them drop their prey 
from their teeth” (29:17), Job recalls.  This arrangement is an economic one, even if no 
money changes hands.  Job engages in behaviors valued by his community and, in 
exchange, they repay him with behavior which he values, namely the homage befitting a 
king.  
When this behavior is contrasted with that of the “disreputable brood,” what the 
members of this group have done to deserve their outsider status becomes clear.  They 
have refused to enter into economic agreements with the members of their community, 
most specifically with Job.  They have rejected what Job has to sell and have refused to 
pay for his services.  Job does not ask much—only gratitude displayed in silent deference 
and acknowledgment of his superior status, a fee well within their range.  Others as poor as 
they have paid it before and found the trade in their favor.  But, in fact, in Job’s view, the 
members of this group are not as vulnerable as their destitution might imply.  His opening 
reference to their fathers is not accidental.  These people are not in the same position as the 
widows and orphans Job helps in chapter 29.  There is nothing stopping them from earning 
adequate food and shelter besides their refusal to enter into the necessary economic 
agreements and do the requisite work.   
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Job begins his description of them by claiming that their fathers were worse than 
dogs.  This is an insult, to be sure, but Job does not employ it generically.  He speaks 
specifically of “the dogs of my flock,” dogs with which he has an arrangement.  These 
dogs herd Job’s flocks, and in return, he gives them food and shelter.  For Job to be 
unwilling to set this group with his sheepdogs is an indication of their refusal to uphold 
their end of any give-and-take arrangement he might make with them.  It is in this specific 
sense that they are worth less than “the dogs of my flock.”  That this is the correct 
interpretation of this particular insult is confirmed by the next line of Job’s description, 
“What could I gain from the strength of their hands?” a question he answers with the 
claim, “All their vigor is gone” (30:2). 147  These are people from whom Job has nothing to 
gain, not because they are truly incapable of giving him any return on his investment—Job 
only requires what they can afford—but because they refuse to do so.  Furthermore, Job’s 
remarks should not be taken as entirely hypothetical.  Chances are he has first-hand 
experience of their lack of vigor.  He knows they are not powerless widows and orphans 
but lazy, good-for nothings who would rather sit around all day picking their teeth than 
make any kind of honest effort.  If they took the job Job offered to help get them on their 
feet, they would show up late for work, take a long lunch, and knock off early to play darts 
with their friends at the local bar.  Then, when Job was forced to fire them for their lack of 
initiative, they would shrug and say, “Didn’t want it anyway,” before shuffling off to join 
the rest of their gang on the corner.   
In chapter 29, Job has described a world in which economic agreements are entered 
into and kept, a situation which results in the correct functioning of the human community.  
To be an insider is, by definition, to participate in such arrangements.  Such arrangements 
are what differentiate humans from animals.  Although the righteous poor of chapter 24 
may adopt some animal behavior because it is necessary to their survival, the members of 
the “senseless, disreputable brood” are animals through-and-through.  The division 
between them and the human community is firm and final.  This is what makes their 
mockery so hard for Job to bear.  It is one thing to be mocked by those who are jealous of 
one’s position and who, seeing one fall, are eager to climb into one’s place.  The wicked 
might mock Job in this way, but such mockery, though galling, would not be like the 
mockery of the “disreputable brood.”  The “disreputable brood” has no stock in Job’s 
former position.  They do not recognize it as desirable, nor do they aspire to hold a similar 
                                                 
147 The word translated “vigor” is the same as that used by Eliphaz in his description of the righteous man’s 
death in 5:26, xlk.  Eliphaz claims that the righteous man “shall come to [his] grave in ripe old age (xlk).”    
As Eliphaz sees it, the righteous man never loses his vigor.  That the members of this group lack vigor, 
despite presumably being young men (given that Job can remember their fathers), is not just a sign of their 
weakness but of their moral turpitude. 
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position.  Like wild animals, they do not care about the boundaries between inside and 
outside—those upheld by Job and the human community through a variety of economic 
agreements—but, even so, they know that Job is even farther outside than they themselves 
are.  Their world becomes an inside space and they become insiders when they compare 
themselves with Job.   
 
Job’s Inability to Draw the Boundary Line 
 
What is it that makes Job, who was the insider par excellence, into the outsider of 
all outsiders?  It is, Job says, “Because God has loosed my bowstring and humbled me” 
(30:11a).  In this, Job identifies himself as the enemy of God.  The disreputable brood may 
have been whipped out of town by its rightful inhabitants, but Job has been whipped out by 
God himself.  A more definite expulsion would not be possible.  The word translated 
“bowstring” is rty, the same word translated “tent-cord” in 4:21 where Eliphaz claimed of 
the wicked “Their tent-cord is plucked up within them, and they die devoid of wisdom.”  
Here, the word does double-duty: Job’s bowstring has been loosed, symbolizing his defeat 
by God, and his tent-cord has been “plucked up,” casting him beyond the boundaries of the 
community.   
God’s enmity, though, is not the whole reason for the brood’s mockery.  In chapter 
29, Job has claimed, “my glory was fresh with me, and my bow ever new in my hand” 
(29:20).  It was with this bow, presumably, that Job “broke the fangs of the unrighteous, 
and made them drop their prey from their teeth” (29:17).  The bow was the means by 
which Job maintained the boundaries of the ordered world—the world inside—protecting 
it against the ever-threatening incursion of chaos from outside.  If Job’s bowstring has 
been loosed, Job no longer has the means by which to guarantee these boundaries.  What 
he has lost is, in effect, the privilege of defining the borders of order.  Are the members of 
the “disreputable brood” outsiders?  Job insists that they are, and yet he has no power to 
prove that they are by separating himself from them.  They can come close to him and 
poke at him, and he can do nothing about it.  The boundaries have been erased, and 
because he has been stripped of boundary-making power, Job cannot reestablish them.  He, 
like the members of the disreputable brood, is a powerless outsider, but unlike that group 
he wants in whereas they could care less, a distinction which gives them power over him. 
 
God’s Denial of the Distinction Between Inner Space as Order and Outer Space 
as Chaos 
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 God’s answer to Job from the whirlwind is based on a different set of assumptions 
about how order and chaos are related to inner and outer space than those held by Job and 
his friends.  Whereas for Job and the friends inside is unquestionably the domain of order 
and outside the realm of chaos, God takes a different view.  This is made most clear in 
God’s depictions of the wild animals, a discourse which picks up on Job’s claims about the 
“senseless, disreputable brood” and the economic agreements necessary to insider status.  
What God has to say about the animals utterly undermines the distinction between inside 
and outside, and it is in this respect that God’s speeches are most radical.  Although God 
may disagree with Job and the friends about the nature of order and chaos as regards 
simplicity and multiplicity or stasis and change, here God disagrees with everybody 
(except, perhaps, the “disreputable brood” and, perhaps also, the animals they resemble).  
Refusing to recognize the value of inside over against outside which is basic to 
understanding the difference between order and chaos, God, in effect, derails the whole 
chaos/order discussion. 
Although I have claimed that it is possible to disagree over the characteristics of 
chaos and order while still maintaining the idea that there is such a thing as order and such 
a thing as its opposite, chaos, I now want to assert that this is only possible so long as the 
distinction between inside as order and outside as chaos is maintained. That is to say, if I 
have designated one locale as order and another locale as chaos, then it is possible for me 
to describe the first locale as simple or complex or static or changeable, and the same goes 
for the second locale.  If, however, I remove the dividing lines between the two locales, 
then all bets are off.  
God’s depiction of the world as it ought to be as a place characterized by 
complexity and change lays the foundation for his undermining of the inside/outside 
distinction.  The world as a whole is complex and multiple.  With no dividing line, it is 
impossible to know which piece of that complex multiplicity is order and which corner is 
chaos.  Additionally, if the world as it ought to be is subject to change, it may be that it 
goes through periods which are less complex than others, or more complex for that matter.  
How is one to pinpoint order amidst the flux if one does not already know where it is?  The 
point is, one cannot.  One can only point to order if one already knows where it is, and, in 
the same way, one can only locate chaos if its location is already known.  If the boundary 
is removed, one loses one’s bearings, and is left not with order and chaos as distinct 
regions, each with specific characteristics, but only with the world, with the creation in its 
entirety, which is neither as it ought to be nor as it ought not to be but only as it is.  It is in 
his description of the animals that God gleefully erases the line between inside and outside 
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and, with it, the distinction between order and chaos.  Before he gets to that, though, he 
drops certain hints which suggest where he is going. 
 
The Meaning of the Whirlwind 
 
It is significant, first of all, that God answers Job from the whirlwind.  In his 
speeches, Job has used the wind as an image of that which blows outsiders beyond the 
boundary of the community and which has, now, blown him out into the wilderness.  In 
chapter 27, describing the fate of the wicked, he has said, “Terrors overtake them like a 
flood; in the night a whirlwind lifts them up and they are gone; it sweeps them out of their 
place” (27:20-21).  In chapter 30, describing the way in which God has made an outsider 
of him, Job accuses, “You lift me up on the wind, you make me ride on it, and you toss me 
about in the roar of the storm” (30:22).  In these depictions, the wind is the instrument used 
by God to cast out those who do not belong inside, thereby protecting what is inside from 
the threat of what needs to be kept out.148   
God’s appearance in the whirlwind might, in fact, be read as performing the same 
function that Job has attributed to the wind throughout.  Perdue writes, “The storm with 
mighty winds most often occurs in the context of theophanic judgment and the destruction 
of chaos in its various incarnations….Yahweh has come to engage chaos in battle, reassert 
divine sovereignty, and issue judgment leading to the ordering of the world”  (Perdue 
1991, 202).  According to Perdue, Job is an outsider who must be repulsed, and God 
appears in the whirlwind to effect that warding off.  David Robertson offers an alternate 
interpretation of God’s whirlwind appearance, writing, “God comes in a storm in order to 
appear to Job…as awesome; but because Job has already prophesied that he would come in 
a storm, he seems not awesome but blustery” (Robertson 1973, 463).   In Robertson’s 
reading, it is not Job who is shown to be a force of chaos that must be blown away by God, 
but, rather, God who reveals himself as chaotic.  Continuing to treat Job, who is by rights 
an insider, as an outsider and a force of chaos, God puts himself in the wrong; the 
maintenance of order depends not on the repulsion of Job, but on the warding off of a God 
who fails to maintain the correct boundaries.  There is, in fact, something in Robertson’s 
construal, as opposed to Perdue’s, that is consonant with the meaning I want to propose for 
God’s whirlwind appearance, although I do not agree with Robertson’s interpretation in its 
entirety. 
                                                 
148 Job, of course, insists that he is an insider not an outsider, and that he has not deserved to be blown away 
by the wind from God.  This, though, does not change his understanding of the wind as a tool God uses to 
maintain the boundaries between insiders and outsiders. 
 214
  Terence Fretheim and Ronald Simkins offer an explanation of God’s appearance in 
the whirlwind that seems to me to be closer to the mark.  They view the whirlwind 
appearance as evidence of a link between God and the natural world.  According to 
Simkins, “There is a definite correspondence between God and the natural world.  The 
biblical theophanies function primarily to reveal God, and nature often serves as the means 
by which God is revealed” (Simkins 1994, 130).  In addition, God does not wear the storm 
as a kind of mask behind which he conceals his true appearance, but, as Fretheim explains, 
“natural metaphors for God are in some way descriptive of God…they reflect…the reality 
which is God” (Fretheim 1987, 22).  That is, there is something about the storm that is 
consistent with who God is.  Simkins points out that God’s appearance in a natural form is 
apt, given the speeches that follow, in which God parades the creation before Job, in all its 
wild splendor.   
Yet—and here is where I think Robertson’s interpretation is relevant—the natural 
world depicted in God’s speeches is an outside space; from Job’s perspective it is the 
domain of chaos.  Shockingly, God appears to Job wearing the garments of an outsider, 
and, if Fretheim is right, those garments are actually accurately indicative of who God is.  
For Robertson this confirms Job’s accusations that God is behaving like a force of chaos.  
I, however, want to argue that God’s appearance in the whirlwind undermines the 
distinction between inside and outside and, therefore, between chaos and order.  If inside is 
where God is, and outside is where God is not, what must it mean for God to reveal 
himself as present in that world which Job has designated as outside, the world that exists 
beyond the boundaries of the human community?  God’s appearance in the whirlwind is a 
different thing entirely from God’s use of the wind as a weapon against outsiders.  In that 
figuration, God is inside, hurling the wind out to repel those who must not enter.  When 
God appears to Job in the whirlwind, the wind is where God is.  God’s presence in the 
whirlwind reveals God’s presence in the non-human world, a presence which must 
consecrate that world and annul its outsider status. 
 
God’s Boundary-Making (or lack thereof)  in the Founding of the Earth and the 
Birth of the Sea 
 
Having appeared in the whirlwind, and thus, already made a statement to Job about 
what constitutes inside and outside, God begins to speak, asking Job, “Where were you 
when I laid the foundations of the earth?”  (38:4).  As discussed above, the world that a 
given human community understands as having been founded by God is the world of its 
own community, its own inner space.  What lies beyond the boundaries of the community 
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is not considered to have been founded; it is space into which God’s creative activity has 
not extended.  Yet, here, God does not distinguish between inner space and outer space; he 
simply speaks about the earth in its entirety having been established and rejoiced over by 
the morning starts and the heavenly beings (38:7).  If God has created the whole earth and 
the heavenly beings have rejoiced over all of it, then the idea that one space is desirable 
because blessed by God’s founding presence and another undesirable because it is 
untouched by God is shown to be misguided.  The second kind of space simply does not 
exist. 
God now directs Job’s attention to the sea, asking, “who shut in the sea with doors 
when it burst from the womb—when I made the clouds its garment, and thick darkness its 
swaddling band, and prescribed bounds for it, and set bars and doors, and said, ‘Thus far 
shall you come, and no farther, and here shall your proud waves be stopped?’” (38:8-11).  
These questions play with ideas of inner and outer space.  The sea comes from one inner 
space—the womb149—and is then enclosed in another inner space—the place apportioned 
for it by God.  But is the place of the sea inside or outside?  In combat mythology, the 
place of the sea would be designated outside space, in that the sea is linked with chaos as 
the medium in which the chaos monster is embodied.  The sea would be out, not in.  Here, 
though, the sea does seem to inhabit an inner space consecrated for it by God and 
surrounded by protective boundaries.  Interpreters have noticed that, if the sea is bursting 
forth from the womb, the boundaries set for the sea must be the boundaries set by a parent 
for a child, boundaries that are meant to protect the child and not merely to constrain.  
Brown writes, “Yahweh as a caring mother or midwife wraps chaos with a cumulus 
swaddling band (38:9b)....Caring sustenance and firm restraint are woven together” 
(Brown 1996, 93-94).  Similarly, Janzen comments, “the Sea…is described in its birth with 
Yahweh as midwife.  The images of swaddling bands, bars and doors, and bounds or 
delimiting decrees...connote parental care and discipline” (Janzen 1994, 468).150  The 
                                                 
149 “Whose womb?” we might ask.  Keller answers that the womb must be God’s.  She writes, “But then 
whose womb is this, that precedes all creatures?  From the perspective of the whirlwind circling like the very 
ruach that pulsed over the deep, how can we avoid the inference that the rehem is God’s, from whose 
unfathomable Deep the waters issue?  Since goddesses had been a priori ruled out…the waters stir rather 
queerly.  We would have to say that ‘His’ womb belongs to ‘His’ fecund body” (Keller 2003, 131). 
150 Despite the birth imagery and the parental care for the sea that it seems to connote, some scholars still see 
this description of the sea as primarily evincing God’s power.  Habel writes that God depicts a world in 
which, due to his power, “The forces of chaos are harnessed and the threatening sea confined like a baby to 
its playpen (38:8-11)” (Habel 1985, 66).  Brueggemann ignores the birth story altogether, writing, “it is 
evident that the ground of Yahweh’s response is in power, the power of the Creator God who is genuinely 
originary, who can found the earth, bound the sea, summon rain and snow, order the cosmic lights, and keep 
the food chain functioning….These doxological verses strain for words to articulate the massiveness and 
awesomeness of this God” (Brueggemann 1997, 390).  That is to say, that the sea is described as a baby is 
not meant to demonstrate that God cares for the sea as if it were his own child, but, instead, reveals God’s 
power as so awesome that the raging sea is no more threatening than a newborn infant.  I do not, however, 
think that this reading is correct, as should be evident in my discussion above. 
 216
parent, in restricting the child, has the child’s interests at heart.  The child is not restricted 
primarily so that he or she will not encroach on the space of the someone else who really 
matters.  Rather, it is the child who is at the center of the parent’s attention.  So it is with 
God and the sea.  God wraps the sea in swaddling bands, so that it will be comfortable and 
warm.  God sets boundaries for the sea so that the sea will have a place in which it can be 
at home.  Hearing God begin to speak of the binding of the sea, Job might expect to hear 
an account of how the sea has been kept out, away from the boundaries that surround the 
human community.  Instead, what Job hears is an account of how protective boundaries 
have been placed around the sea.  The boundaries that surround the sea are the same kinds 
of boundaries that Job imagines encircle the human community.  God presents the place of 
the sea not as outer space but as inner space.151 
 
Questions about Place 
 
 God moves on to a series of questions about place.  He asks, “Have you…caused 
the dawn to know its place?” (38:12); “Where is the way to the dwelling of light, and 
where is the place of darkness, that you may take it to its territory and that you may discern 
the paths to its home?” (38:19-20); “What is the way to the place152 where the light is 
distributed, or where the east wind is scattered upon the earth?” (38:24).  God presents a 
series of inner spaces which Job might have classed as outer spaces.  He uses the terms 
“dwelling,” “territory,” and “home,” to refer to the places where light and darkness reside.  
As we have seen, the idea of “home” has been used by Job and his friends to refer to the 
inner space of the human community.  Here, though, God claims that light and darkness 
also have homes, as do snow, hail, and the east wind (38:22-24).  If these things have 
homes, those homes must be inside and not outside, even though these homes may be 
located in the farthest reaches of the earth or sky, in places nowhere near the boundary 
walls of the human community.  In chapter three I suggested that Job might answer these 
                                                 
151 The verb translated “shut,” in “who shut in the sea with doors,” is the same word used 3:23 , Kws, and a 
similar word to that used in 1:10.  In 1:10 hassatan questions God, “Have you not put a fence (tk#&,  which 
seems like a variant form of Kws, using #& instead of s) around him and his house and all that he has…?”  In 
3:23 Job laments, “Why is light given to one who cannot see the way, whom God has fenced in (Ksy)?”  
There is an interesting play of inside/outside here.  Hassatan assumes that to be fenced in is a boon, albeit an 
illegal one; it is preferential treatment given to Job.  In 3:23, Job experiences being fenced in as a curse; the 
boundaries around him contain his suffering and make it impossible to escape.  Then, in 38:8, God describes 
himself putting a fence around the sea, an action which, based on the previous two uses of the term, could be 
either a blessing or a curse.  Additionally, because hassatan assumes that the hedge makes Job an insider, 
which contrasts with Job’s assumption that the hedge makes him an outsider, it is impossible to say whether 
the hedge around the sea is intended to keep it in or to keep it out.  In this way, the boundary, even though it 
is there, becomes confused.  It ceases hold a definite meaning. 
152 Technically, the word “place” is absent from the Hebrew.  However, it can be reasonably assumed to be 
implied. 
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questions, “Of course not.  I haven’t deviated from the path of right belief and behavior in 
order to seek out the way to these distant and irrelevant places.”  If we are thinking of 
these questions in terms of the inside/outside discussion, we might imagine Job making a 
similar answer.  If Job has seen the gates of darkness, it is only because he has been forced 
to do so by being blown out of the inner world of the human community.   
God, though, in asking these questions, indicates that it is desirable to have been to 
these places, to inhabit these locales, erasing the distinction between inside and outside by 
presenting all places as part of his good creation. God makes this explicit when he asks, 
“Who has cut a channel for the torrents of rain, and a way for the thunderbolt, to bring rain 
on a land where no one lives…to satisfy the waste and desolate land, and to make the 
ground put forth grass? (38:25-26a, 27).  God’s blessing of rain is purposefully given to 
land outside the human community, to the wilderness, inhabited only by outsider animals 
(and perhaps those humans who live like them).  God’s blessing on this land can only 
mean that God does not regard this space as chaotic space.  It may be space “outside” the 
inside world of human habitation and community, but outside does not mean what Job 
thinks it means.  To be outside is not to be condemned as wicked, nor is it to be banished 
from the presence of God.  God, it seems, does not recognize inside/outside distinctions, 
or, he recognizes them only in that he has prepared places for his many creatures to live.  
The sea lives in the sea bed, the hail lives in the storehouses of the hail, the light and the 
darkness have their place.  None of these places can be classed as inherently outside or 
inherently inside.  They are inside to those who live in them, but the world beyond is 
inside to those who live there.  The world is made up of a great variety of inside places, 
and though these may be outside relative to each other, no space is inherently outside.  No 
space is, by nature, chaotic. 
 
Animals and the Economics of Insider/Outsider Status 
  
 Having begun his speech by giving glimpses of where he is going with his 
discussion of inside and outside as related to order and chaos, God now begins his 
discourse on animals which will carry his speeches to their conclusion.  To those who 
insist that God’s speeches fail to answer Job’s questions and greet him only with 
incomprehensible non-sequiturs, it must be pointed out that God’s consideration of the 
animals, which makes up the bulk of his speeches, is a direct response to Job’s claims of 
chapters 29 and 30.  In those chapters, Job has presented his most complete picture of the 
world as it ought to be and ought not to be, and so it is fitting that God should choose to 
respond to the ideas set out there.  Indeed, chapters 29 and 30 stand as the summation of 
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Job’s claims against God about the chaotic structure of the world in which he has, because 
of his suffering, found himself.  In them, he shows God order and then  chaos, and then, 
with his oath of innocence in chapter 31, orders God to choose between the two, confident 
that God’s idea of what the world ought to be like matches his own.  In their direct 
response to Job’s concluding arguments, God’s speeches address Job’s claims in their 
entirety.  If they are perceived as non-sequiturs, it is only because they reject Job’s most 
basic assumptions about how the world ought and ought not to work.  God answers, but he 
does not give the answer Job anticipates.  Whereas, in chapter 30, Job has described the 
members of what he calls the “senseless, disreputable brood” as the consummate outsiders, 
so far outside that they have become animals, who are, by reason of not being human, 
inherently possessed of outsider status, God’s discourse, with its focus on animals, 
indicates that, from his perspective, neither animals nor the “senseless, disreputable brood” 
can be considered as outsiders.  The wilderness is not a place where God is not present.  In 
fact, God dwells on his presence in the wilderness and fails to describe himself as present 
at all within the bounds of the town and the human community. 
It is significant that when Job speaks of the members of the “senseless, disreputable 
brood,” he speaks of them not only as animals, but as animals that are of no use to human 
beings, those which refuse to enter into economic agreements with human beings.  That 
God disagrees with the worldview that brands those who refuse to participate in economics 
as outsiders is indicated by his focus on animals who are similarly noncooperative, 
presenting them as recipients of care and devotion, for which he expects nothing in return.  
Beginning his talk about animals with lions and ravens, God asks, “Can you hunt the prey 
for the lion, or satisfy the appetite of the young lions, when they crouch in their dens, or lie 
in wait in their covert?  Who provides for the raven its prey, when its young ones cry to 
God, and wander153 about for lack of food?  (38:39-41).  It is easy to answer these 
questions “God can” and “God does” and to view them as assertions of God’s power. 154  
God is powerful enough to feed lions and ravens, tasks that Job, with his limited abilities, 
cannot successfully undertake.  But we ought to pause to ask why it should be anyone’s 
                                                 
153 The word translated “wander”—h(t—is the same as that used by Job to describe the toppled leaders 
who “wander in a pathless waste” (12:24).  For God, such wandering does not seem negative, at least where 
ravens are concerned. 
154 Prey here is Hebrew Pr+.  It is the word used by Eliphaz in 4:11 to make his claim that “The strong lion 
perishes for lack of prey,” a description which allies lions with the wicked.  God’s words in 38:39 clearly 
refute what Eliphaz believes to be true about the way God relates to lions.  More disturbingly, in 16:9, Job 
uses a verbal form of the same word to describe his abuse at the hands of God: “He has torn (Pr+) me in his 
wrath.”  Similarly, in 10:16 he accuses, “Bold as a lion you hunt me,” where the word “hunt” is the same as 
that used in 38:39, dwc.  Whereas Eliphaz imagines God to be the hunter of the lion, Job envisions God as 
the hunter of the lion’s prey, an assertion which God confirms, although he does not confirm its corollary, 
that Job is that prey. 
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responsibility to feed lions and ravens.  Shouldn’t  lions and ravens take responsibility for 
their own sustenance?  Don’t they know that God helps those who help themselves?  Of 
course, I know that these questions can be read as affirmations of God’s creative power 
instead of intimations that God is literally out on the prowl for prey which he carries back 
to the lions and ravens, as if they have ordered take-away and God is the delivery man.   At 
the same time, though, even if all God means to claim is that he is the one who created 
those animals that serve as prey, the focus is still on God as the active party.  God is the 
one doing all the work.  The lions and ravens are passive.  Nor is any sign given that the 
lions and ravens, if they are passive in their acceptance of God’s care, are active in 
returning thanks and praise.  Feeding the lions and ravens, God has not arranged a situation 
which will benefit him as well as them.  Rather, these lazy creatures take what God gives 
without returning anything to God.  Like chapter 30’s outcasts they are ingrates.  But God 
doesn’t seem to expect gratitude. 
When God moves on to his description of wild asses and oxen, his response to 
Job’s assumptions about the economic nature of insider status becomes more explicit.  
Like Job’s outcasts who “gnaw the dry and desolate ground…picking mallow and the 
leaves of bushes” (29:3-4a), the wild ass is described as “ranging the 
mountains…searching after every green thing” (39:8).  And like Job’s outcasts, the reason 
for the wild ass’s difficult search for food is its rejection of the economic agreements that 
would guarantee it food in exchange for labor: “It scorns the tumult of the city; it does not 
hear the shouts of the driver” (39:7).  The wild ass will not enter into mutually-beneficial 
agreements with the human community.  It will not render its services for payment.  It 
would rather live as it wants to live, whatever hardships such a life may entail, than bind 
itself to a life of servitude in exchange for more reliable food and shelter.  Yet, despite this, 
the wild ass is not an outsider.  Rather, it enjoys its freedom on the steppe which God has 
given it for its home (39:6). 
This point is made with even more force with regard to the wild ox which will not 
“harrow the valleys after you” (39:10b) or “bring your grain to the threshing floor” 
(39:12b).  “Is the wild ox willing to serve you? Will it spend the night at your crib?” 
(39:9), God asks.  Here, God makes the explicit claim that wild ox will not enter into an 
agreement with Job, exchanging its labor for the security which Job might offer, 
symbolized by the crib.  Like the outcasts of chapter 30, the wild ox and ass refuse to be 
civically engaged, refuse to work hard to earn their keep, refuse to participate in the 
economic systems of the human community.  Job’s condemnation of that group’s 
unwillingness to participate in the economics of the town is undermined by God’s praise of 
the wild ass and ox, both of which are described as shunning human society and disdaining 
 220
the economic agreements that Job sees as necessary to the maintenance of the world as it 
ought to be.   
 
The Economics of Leviathan 
 
When God turns to his description of Leviathan which culminates his speeches, he 
shows the limits of human power and perhaps even of divine power.  Neither humans nor 
gods can control Leviathan, the beast that cannot be conquered or captured.  In its supreme 
capacity to resist domestication, Leviathan is the wild ox writ large; whereas humans may 
try to domesticate the wild ox, Leviathan is completely beyond their reach.  Keller points 
out that  
Much has been made of the ludicrousness of the trope of Leviathan as a pet for 
giggling girls.  Little, however, has been said of its economics….Leviathan 
makes a mockery of the whaling industry.…[T]he windy vortex mocks the 
powers of global commercialization; it puts in question the assumption of the 
exploitability of the wild life of the world—the “subdue and have dominion” 
project.  (Keller 2003, 138) 155   
Keller’s focus is on humans’ inability to buy and sell what they cannot control, but there is 
an additional dimension to God’s depiction of Leviathan as it relates to economics.  As the 
wild ox writ large, Leviathan shares with that animal the refusal to participate in human 
industry.  It is not just that these animals cannot be domesticated because their 
characteristics make them unsuitable for the purpose.  Rather, it is that these animals refuse 
to enter into any kind of mutually beneficial agreement with humans.  
Humans may have no power to capture Leviathan and press it into service, but 
neither does Leviathan offer its services in exchange for security.  Leviathan will not 
“make a covenant with you and be taken as your servant” (41:4).156  Leviathan will not 
trade on its abilities, in the way that a sheepdog or a domestic ox is willing to trade, as in, 
“I’ll watch the sheep or pull the plow and in exchange you’ll feed me and give me 
somewhere to sleep.”  Leviathan will not be a status-symbol pet, taken to the park on a 
leash as a way of meeting women—“What a darling animal!  What is that—a Leviathan?  
What’s its name?  Flopsy?  How adorable!”—in exchange for room and board.  Keller is 
                                                 
155 Habel, too, argues that God’s speeches challenge the human mandate to dominate of Genesis 1:26-28.  He 
writes, “Reading these texts…side by side…enables us to hear God asking repeated questions that 
progressively narrow down the interpretive options; gradually all sense of domination evaporates and the 
dogmatic mandate is subverted” (Habel 2001, 184). 
156 As part of the ideal life Job will live after he has repented Eliphaz promises, “[You] shall not fear the wild 
animals of the earth.  For you shall be in league with the stones of the field, and the wild animals shall be at 
peace with you” (5:22b-23).  The word translated “in league” is tyrb, more frequently translated 
“covenant,” which is how it is translated in 41:4 with regard to Leviathan.  Eliphaz believes that the wild will 
make a covenant with the righteous man, but here God denies that such a thing is possible.  
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right that the “‘subdue and have dominion’ project” is called into question by the 
Leviathan pericope, but I think it is undermined more deeply than even she asserts.  
To “subdue and have dominion” requires a lot of hard work.  It means clearing 
land, plowing fields, planting, harvesting, processing, storing.  It means inventing 
machinery, building barns, domesticating animals.  It means earning your keep, not taking 
a hand-out from anybody.  The food that you eat is the food that you’ve labored to 
produce.  What Leviathan, as the culminating beast of the array described by God, 
represents is not only the failure of the “‘subdue and dominion’ project” with respect to the 
fact that it is impossible to subdue or have dominion over Leviathan, but the negation of 
the idea that one must earn one’s keep, that one must, in fact, participate in economics.  It 
is not just that humans cannot subdue Leviathan by force, but that Leviathan will not agree 
to being subdued.  It rejects whatever benefits such an agreement might bring.  It will not 
trade its freedom for insider status, and, for this, God praises it. 
 
The End of the Inside/Outside Designation of Order and Chaos 
   
 The group Job describes as a “senseless, disreputable brood” in chapter 30 shares 
characteristics with the animals God describes in his speeches.  Job describes these people 
as animals, scratching out a meager existence from the wilderness, eating roots instead of 
cultivated grains and huddling under bushes instead of sleeping in houses they have built.  
These are the people whom Job classes as true outsiders; they are as outside as it is 
possible to be.  Their outsideness is based on their refusal to enter into mutually-beneficial 
agreements with members of the community, whether economic or moral.  They will not 
do an honest day’s work for an honest wage, but loaf around, shiftless.  Neither will they 
gratefully accept Job’s charity, acknowledging him as morally superior in return for 
whatever help he offers.  What they steal—what makes the townspeople shout after them 
“as after a thief” (30:5b)—as long as they remain in town, is the town’s ability to function 
as a community of insiders.  The town holds together because of the agreements its 
members make with each other (and also with their God).  Their covenants define the 
space they inhabit as inner space and the space they do not inhabit as outer space. Without 
such agreements, the community fragments.  It is not an “us” inhabiting a “here” over 
against the “them, that, and there” of outside space, but simply a mixed group of people 
who happen to be in the same place but cannot define that place as in any way inside 
because there are no links between its people.  The community is created and maintained 
by its economic agreements.  Those who refuse to participate in these agreements are, by 
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definition, outsiders, and must be expelled if the community is to be a community of 
insiders.   
God, though, praises animals who refuse to enter into economic agreements with 
humans and who fail to earn their keep by cultivating the food they will eat.  He also 
praises animals who either abandon their parents, in the case of the deer (39:4), or who 
abandon their children, in the case of the ostrich (39:16).  In doing so, he also praises the 
group that Job has labeled “a senseless, disreputable brood.”  He does not invite these 
outsiders back into the town, but, rather, validates the outside space as valuable in its own 
right and the “lifestyle” of the outsiders as a viable way of living, perhaps more viable than 
that of the so-called insiders.  God’s praise of outsider animals and of wilderness breaks 
down the distinction between inside and outside, preventing inside from being considered 
the realm of order and outside being viewed as the realm of chaos.  Inside and outside 
become hopelessly confused—Is the wild ox inside or outside?  And what about the sea?—
and, with their boundaries so confused, inside and outside cease to exist as reliable 
designators of locations in which we can expect to find order or chaos.   
God’s speeches end with Leviathan, described as the supremely unsubduable beast.  
Leviathan is depicted as the supreme outsider.  It will not enter into economic agreements 
with humans, and there is no way for humans to capture it and force it to work for them.  
Keller argues that God’s depiction of Leviathan’s unconquerability marks the end of the 
human “‘subdue and have dominion’ project.”  The end of this project is concurrent with 
the dissolution of the boundary between inside and outside space.  If to be inside is to be 
within the human community, on land and among animals that have been subdued and 
over which humans now have dominion, then where Leviathan is there can be no inside 
space.  Faced with Leviathan, humans lose their ability to be insiders. 
In his speeches, God has dismantled the distinction between inside space and 
outside space.  He has negated the claim that inside is the domain of order and outside the 
domain of chaos.  He has denied the validity of the “‘subdue and have dominion’ project,” 
both in terms of its possibility and, in his praise of the “lazy” animals, its desirability.157  
Furthermore, God’s removal of the distinction between inside and outside as fixed 
locations of order and chaos serves as a refutation of the idea that there are such things in 
                                                 
157 I realize that animals are not humans.  It would be possible for God to describe the animals as not seeking 
to “subdue and have dominion” and for Job to still hold to his belief that humans ought to engage in that 
activity, given that the command was given specifically to humans and not to animals.  Yet, the fact that Job 
has described the members of the “senseless, disreputable brood” as animals, means that what God has to say 
about animals also applies to humans.  God praises animals in his speeches, and, by extension, praises those 
humans who are most like animals, namely the “senseless disreputable brood,” whose designation as animals 
has come about by way of their refusal to “subdue and have dominion.”  In this way, it can be seen that what 
God says about animals applies to humans, too. 
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the world as order and chaos.  The world as it ought to be and the world as it ought not to 
be do not exist over against each other in identifiable spheres.  Rather, there is only the 
world as it is, which is something quite different from either order or chaos.  Although it 
might be argued that if the world God presents as the world that exists is also the world as 
it ought to be, he is presenting a picture of order, without chaos there can be no order.  The 
one gives rise to the other.  If chaos is taken out of the picture, as it is when God denies 
that inside and outside are the locations of order and chaos respectively, then order also 
disappears.  Order is essentially a defensive designation, defined by its need to defend 
itself against the incursion of chaos.  In God’s speeches, there is no chaos that threatens to 
break through the defenses of the ordered world, causing order itself to dissolve.  God’s 
world is the world as it is: complex, changeable, and unbounded. 
 
Job Goes Back Inside 
 
In chapter four, I suggested that the resumption of the prose tale at the end of the 
book served as a fitting ending, as proof-in-action of the changeable and unpredictable 
world created by God.  God has ended his speech with a hymn to the supremely 
uncontrollable, and therefore unpredictable, Leviathan, and what subsequently happens to 
Job is something that God has not engineered and which he could not have predicted.  Job 
gets what God has told him the nature of the world will not allow him to get—the 
restoration of his fortunes—which seemingly serves to validate his good behavior and his 
having earned the wealth than now comes his way.  Yet, it is the nature of the world as 
described by God that makes Job’s restoration possible.  He seems to have earned what he 
gets, but in reality he has not earned it.  His fortunes change unpredictably because it is the 
nature of the world to change unpredictably.  The prose tale ending appears as a surprise, 
and, precisely because it is a surprise, it is apposite.   
Having read God’s speeches as I have read them in this chapter, however, the prose 
ending seems less appropriate.  Instead of validating what God has said, even though and 
precisely because it comes as a surprise to him, here the prose ending seems to invalidate 
the world as God has presented it.  God has erased the distinctions between inside and 
outside and denied the claim that inside is the realm of order and outside the realm of 
chaos, but, in the prose ending, Job goes back inside.  God has demonstrated that inside 
does not exist, that there is no such place.  Still, inside is undeniably where Job goes. 
The epilogue tells us, 
And the LORD restored the fortunes of Job when he had prayed for his friends; 
and the LORD gave Job twice as much as he had before. Then there came to 
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him all his brothers and sisters and all who had known him before, and they ate 
bread with him in his house; they showed him sympathy and comforted him 
for all the evil that the LORD had brought upon him; and each of them gave 
him a piece of money and a gold ring.  The LORD blessed the latter days of 
Job more than the beginning; and he had fourteen thousand sheep, six thousand 
camels, a thousand yoke of oxen, and a thousand donkeys. He also had seven 
sons and three daughters….After this Job lived one hundred and forty years, 
and saw his children, and his children’s children, four generations.  (42:10-13, 
16) 
This ending is absolutely at odds with everything God has been at pains to show Job 
throughout his discourse on the animals.  Job’s restoration comes in exchange for his 
having prayed for his friends, as God has asked him to do.  That is to say, Job is shown to 
be righteous when he does God’s bidding, and the evidence of his righteousness results in 
his being immediately ushered inside.  Job goes back into his house, that symbol of 
insideness, and is met there by his community, which gathers around him and affirms that 
he is one of them by sharing a meal with him.  As a way of comforting him for the wrongs 
God has done him, they give him money and jewelry, as if in payment for his suffering, a 
kind of fine imposed for their having colluded with God to treat him as an outsider when 
he should have remained an insider.  God, too, pays up, and the contents of the settlement 
are detailed in verses 12-13.  Scholars often notice that no servants are included in the list 
of what Job gets as part of his restoration, an interesting detail given the fact that in the 
prologue his wealth includes “very many servants” (1:3).  Few, however, comment on the 
much more interesting fact that God, who has just dazzled Job with his cavalcade of 
undomesticated wildlife, praising the wild animals for their refusal to be anything but wild, 
now gives Job a bevy of domesticated animals.158  God repays Job for his righteousness 
with the currency of dominion.  The thousand yoke of oxen and the thousand donkeys 
stand out particularly, in that God has just finished describing the unwillingness of the wild 
ox and wild ass to serve humans.  The term “yoke of oxen” (dmc) employed here itself 
designates oxen who are bound to human service, and contrasts with God’s claim that the 
wild ox cannot be tied “in the furrow with ropes” and will not “harrow the valleys after 
you” (39:10).   
The contrast between the world of the wild animals described by God and the 
world of the epilogue is furthered by its description of Job’s family life.  The community 
that surrounds Job, joining him in his house and eating with him there, is referred to as 
                                                 
158 Brown is the only scholar I have read who makes note of this detail, writing, “Job’s status as patriarch 
seems only heightened with his property doubled, including his draft animals (42:12; cf. 1:3).  His beasts of 
burden are the counterparts to the animals of the wild; but their appropriate domain is Job’s domicile, not the 
rugged mountains or bare heights.  Their place remains with Job, servile and at home within Job’s 
reestablished familial kingdom” (Brown 1996, 378). 
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Job’s “brothers and sisters” (42:11).  They are his relations, bound to him by the covenant 
of blood.  The epilogue goes on to describe Job’s children, “seven sons and three 
daughters” who are given to him by God as part of his restoration.  The enigmatic detail 
that he gave his daughters an inheritance along with their brothers can be variously 
interpreted.  On the one hand, the inheritance may be seen as serving to give the daughters 
independence from Job and from male control, providing them with the resources to be 
real characters in and of themselves.  Giving his daughters an inheritance, Job may be 
emulating God’s behavior as depicted in the whirlwind speeches; there, God is the one 
who sets his creatures free and provides them with the resources with which to cope with 
their freedom.  On the other hand, however, the giving of the inheritance may be seen as 
cementing Job’s familial bonds through mutual obligation.  Job pays his sons and 
daughters, and, in turn, they stay close to home, so that he can see “his children, and his 
children’s children, four generations” (42:16) until he finally dies “old and full of days” 
(42:17).  The information given in the epilogue about the cohesion of Job’s family (with 
the exception of his wife who is, for whatever reason, not mentioned, and whose absence 
may sound a dissonant note), can be contrasted with God’s description of the deer and the 
ostrich which shirk their parent-child obligations and which, nevertheless, are shown as 
recipients of God’s life-giving rewards. 
 Just as God’s whirlwind speeches can be seen as a direct answer to Job’s claims 
about inside and outside and their relation to order and chaos, an answer that refutes what 
Job assumes to be true, so the epilogue can be read as a direct refutation of what God has 
claimed about inside and outside and their lack of real existence.  God says that there is no 
such place as inside to be contrasted with outside, but, in the epilogue, Job definitely goes 
inside.  He surrounds himself with family who are bound to him and to whom he is bound 
by treaties of economic exchange.  He inhabits the space of righteousness and reaps its 
rewards.  Additionally, the space in which he finds himself is the subdued space of the 
“‘subdue and have dominion’ project,” as is evidenced by Job’s possession of 
domesticated animals over which he has dominion.  The epilogue reconstructs the 
boundaries between the inside space of human community and the outer space of 
wilderness, while at the same time affirming the “‘subdue and have dominion’ project.”   
What is to be made of this?  Is the epilogue intended to make us forget everything 
we have heard God say?  Is it, because it appears last, the last word on the subject of inside 
and outside as related to order and chaos?  Does the discussion conclude with the claim 
that inside is most definitely the location of order, while outside is incontrovertibly the 
location of chaos, a claim that we, as readers, are meant to take as decisive?  In addition, is 
God’s revelation that, in truth, chaos and order are empty, nonexistent concepts when 
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faced with the actuality of what the world is, shown to be false by the events of the 
epilogue?  I don’t know.  So much depends upon the epilogue, but what the epilogue 
means is not obvious.
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CONCLUSION: 
HOW DOES IT END? 
 
The Last Word Matters 
 
 The Book of Job ends with the prose epilogue, meaning that the prose tale, literally, 
has the last word in the book.  Does it, then, represent the last word on the subjects 
discussed in the book?  Is what  the epilogue says somehow definitive?  In some ways, it 
must be.  Endings are always definitive, even open-ended endings, which project their 
open-endedness back on what has come before.  In claiming that the epilogue matters, I am 
disagreeing with those who view the epilogue as an inconsequential addition to the book.  
Actually, “inconsequential” is the wrong word in this context.  Those who view the 
epilogue as an addition may see it as irrelevant or misleading, but they cannot view it as 
inconsequential, even if they claim to.  Coming last, the epilogue is profoundly 
consequential.  Demonstrating this, Curtis, who believes that the epilogue is an editorial 
addition, writes, 
The most important purpose of the prose…is that of deliberately misleading 
the reader as to the actual content of Job’s final and decisive rejection of God.  
Once the prose ending had been appended with its explicit statement of divine 
approval for Job...a reader would always tend to read the difficult closing 
speech of Job in light of God’s acceptance of Job’s words.  (Curtis 1979, 510) 
These are strong words.  For Curtis, the epilogue is subterfuge, an effective rewriting of 
the meaning of the entire book.  Curtis insists that Job, and not the epilogue, speaks the last 
true word of the book, and what Job says (Curtis says) is, “Therefore I feel loathing 
contempt and revulsion [toward you, O God]; and I am sorry for frail man” (Ibid., 505). 
 There is almost a note of panic in Curtis’s assessment of the epilogue.  He is 
reacting towards if as if it is a kind of Iago, maliciously deceiving everyone with its lies—
lies which will be believed if they are not condemned with enough force.  Others react less 
stridently to the epilogue, while still disparaging its claims.  Crenshaw states quite matter-
of-factly, “The epilogue…can be dispensed with altogether, since the poem ends 
appropriately with Job’s acquisition of first hand knowledge about God by means of the 
divine self-manifestation for which Job risked everything” (Crenshaw 1982, 100).  For 
Crenshaw, the epilogue adds nothing, so it may as well be “dispensed with altogether,” 
lopped off so that the book ends where it ought to end.  Even here, though, 
“inconsequential” is the wrong designation for the epilogue, even though Crenshaw’s 
interpretation might seem imply that the word is appropriate.  If the epilogue is 
inconsequential, why bother getting rid of it?  It is not because the epilogue doesn’t matter 
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that it should be “dispensed with altogether,” but because it distracts from the true meaning 
of the book, which, for Crenshaw is given in God’s speeches and Job’s acceptance of the 
world God has presented.  Despite their difference in tone, both Curtis and Crenshaw want 
to knock off the epilogue, and, in so doing, restore the true meaning of the book.  
Moshe Greenberg points out that the epilogue has been variously received.  He 
writes, “Critics have deemed this conclusion, yielding as it does to the instinct of natural 
justice, anticlimactic and a vulgar capitulation to convention; the common reader, on the 
other hand, has found this righting of a terribly disturbed balance wholly appropriate” 
(Greenberg 1987, 300).  This is just to say that it matters how the book ends.  Curtis and 
Crenshaw both contend that the book really ends elsewhere.  The epilogue should not have 
the last word, because it is not the last word.  The last word has already been spoken.  Yet, 
Greenberg’s observation highlights the fact that where one believes the book really ends 
depends on what one expects (or wants or needs) from the book.  Greenberg’s claims are 
shared by Douglas Lawrie, who argues that what critics class as the “real” Book of Job, 
and what they excise as secondary is “profoundly influenced by individual opinions about 
the meaning and value of the particular sections” (Lawrie 2001, 136).  Those who expect 
(or want or need) God to have the last word, end the book with God’s speeches.  Those 
who expect Job to speak last, end the book with Job’s last words.  Those who expect a 
happy ending in which things are returned to “normal” (as normalcy is defined by the 
prologue) accept that the epilogue is the appropriate ending of the book. 
 
The Ambiguity of the Potential Alternative Endings 
 
Because the last word matters, because it is never merely inconsequential, Curtis 
and Crenshaw (among others) offer alternative endings.  Both locate the real end of the 
book around God’s speeches and Job’s response, Crenshaw focusing on God’s words and 
Curtis on Job’s.  What those words mean, however—and how they, therefore, end the 
book—is less than clear.  Job’s final words are notoriously ambiguous, and Curtis’s 
interpretation is far from universally shared.  Job’s last words, Newsom claims, are 
“irresolvably ambiguous and therefore a puzzling response.  No matter how hard we listen, 
we cannot be sure of exactly what Job has said” (Newsom 1993, 136). 159  Robertson 
                                                 
159 There are several difficulties which translators and interpreters face.  The first arises from Job’s use of the 
verb s)m, which usually takes a direct object, without a direct object.  s)m can be translated “refuse” or 
“reject,” which is fairly straightforward, but the question arises as to the quality of Job’s refusal or rejection 
and as to its object.  What does Job refuse or reject and why?  The NRSV’s translation “I despise myself,” 
assumes that the object of s)m is Job himself, an assumption which draws some support from the second 
half of the verse, but which is, nevertheless, not conclusive.  The second difficulty in translating the verse has 
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contends that Job’s repentance is wholly ironic, given to pacify a blustery and overbearing 
God who has been unable to answer Job’s pressing questions about life and suffering, and 
has instead attempted to cover up this inability by asking a series of questions of his own, 
questions which are irrelevant to the discussion at hand (Robertson 1973, 463).  Other 
interpreters, by contrast, read Job’s repentance as wholly sincere, arguing that he views his 
inability to answer God’s questions as proof that his own questions were grounded in a 
view of the world which was limited.  Having seen God and heard him speak, and having 
been presented with a world that is bigger than he had previously imagined, Job’s 
questions about his suffering fade from his concern; they are no longer relevant.  In 
support of this position, Greenberg writes,  
[Job] confesses his ignorance and his presumptuousness in speaking of matters 
beyond his knowledge.  Now that he has not merely ‘heard of’ God—that is, 
known of him by tradition—but also ‘seen’ him—that is, gained direct 
cognition of his nature—he rejects what he formerly maintained….Lowly 
creature that he is, he has yet been granted understanding of the inscrutability 
of God; this has liberated him from the false expectations raised by the old 
covenant concept, so misleading to him and his interlocutors.  (Greenberg 
1987, 299) 
Newsom, taking up yet another position, argues that Job’s response is deliberately 
ambiguous.  Its lack of clarity provides him with a Bakhtinian “loophole,” which allows 
him to reinterpret the encounter with God again and again and allows the reader to do the 
same (Newsom 2003, 29).  What do God’s speeches mean?  They do not mean anything 
finally, once-and-for-all, but mean different things depending on when they are read or 
recalled. 
Disparity also exists in the interpretation of God’s speeches.  Brenner points out 
that “God’s answer to Job…is, at best, enigmatic.  It seems to raise problems instead of 
solving them” (Brenner 1989, 129), and Edward Greenstein comments that “The 
whirlwind speeches, more than any other section of the book, appear in the diverse 
literature written about them like a readerly Rorschach test” (Greenstein 1999, 302).  That 
is to say, how the speeches are interpreted depends as much on the reader as on what the 
text says.  Janzen advances a similar opinion, spelling it out in more detail, as he writes, 
Interpreters not only will but must divine the meaning of the speeches, the 
response, and the book as a whole in the context of their own reading of 
                                                                                                                                                   
to do with the meaning of ytmxn, which can mean “I regret,” “I am sorry,” or even “I am comforted,” as 
well as “I repent.”  (See A Concise Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon, 234.)  The third difficulty is the meaning 
of rp)w rp(, “dust and ashes.”  What does Job mean when he says he repents (or regrets or is sorry or is 
comforted) in (or on or over; the Hebrew is l() dust and ashes?  Does he mean that he is literally sitting in 
dust and ashes?  Or is he making some reference to his mortality?  And if he is, is he saying that he regrets 
the limitations of being mortal, for they will not allow him to challenge God as God deserves to be 
challenged?  Or is he saying that he accepts that, because he is a human being, he has no right to challenge 
God?  Or does he mean something else entirely? 
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existence.  The diversity of interpretations matches the diversity which is 
displayed in our respective interpretations of existence.  All positions, nihilist 
and absurdist no less than affirming and covenanting, are irreducibly 
confessional.  (Janzen 1985, 228) 
Lopping off the epilogue, therefore, does not result in a clarification of the meaning of the 
book.  To end with God’s speeches or Job’s response is perhaps more climactic, but it is 
not clearer.  It might be argued, of course, that, if ambiguity is the name of the game, the 
epilogue spoils the effect by tying up all loose ends and slapping a definitive ending on 
what would, otherwise, have been open-ended.  As I have shown, however, the epilogue, 
despite its “happily-ever-after” style, which seems to neatly wrap up the story, is itself 
capable of being variously interpreted. 
  
(Re) Reading the Epilogue 
 
In this thesis, I have read the epilogue in several different ways.  I began by reading 
it, as part of Job’s daydream, as detailing the outcome of a situation in which God’s hand 
is forced by Job.  I argued that, having been trapped into the bet with hassatan, a bet from 
which Job stood to benefit and of which Job is the true winner, God rewards Job because 
Job has proved himself better than God.  Job has remained loyal to God, while God has 
been disloyal to Job, and must, therefore, pay for his disloyalty.  It is not so much that Job 
is rewarded in the epilogue, as that God is punished.  Then, in my fourth chapter I 
suggested that the epilogue might be alternatively understood as a situation in which both 
Job and God come out winners—Job, because he is restored, and God, because the world 
of his creation is shown to be a real world, full of the uncontrollable unpredictability of the 
real.  In his speeches, God has described a world that is characterized by change and 
surprise, and the epilogue shows that the world is functioning as it ought to function, even 
as it takes on characteristics that God has said it does not possess.  Finally, in my last 
chapter, I proposed yet another reading of the epilogue, arguing that the epilogue 
reconstructs the boundaries between the inside space of the human community and the 
outer space of wilderness which have just been deconstructed by God in his speeches.  
Something different is happening here than what I suggested in chapter four.  It is not just 
that God is pleasantly surprised by a world which exhibits changeability, having intended 
to create such a world.  Instead, in its reassertion of the existence of inside space and 
outside space and, by extension, of chaos and order, this third version of the epilogue 
denies God—at least the God who has spoken from the whirlwind—the power to create the 
world. 
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In this reading, the events of the epilogue show that God cannot reliably say what 
the world is like. God has sided with the wild animals and has invited Job, too, to be wild, 
but, in the epilogue, Job says, “No thanks, not interested,” and immures himself within the 
boundaries of his town, the walls of his house, the bosom of his family.  As God describes 
the world in his speeches, there is no inside space specially dedicated to order, but Job, a 
human being, claims that such a space does exist and proceeds to inhabit it, creating it even 
as he does so.  Ingeniously, he appropriates God’s support for his creation of inside space, 
claiming that it is God who has put him where he is and given him what he has, the marks 
of insider status.  As has been seen in the whirlwind speeches, however, God’s gifts cannot 
be understood as marks of insider status or as rewards for righteousness which confer 
insider status, as they are given to all and sundry.  In the epilogue, though, they are 
interpreted as marks of insider status, and Job identifies himself as an insider among 
insiders, the consummate insider within the bounds of town and community once again. 
 
Who Makes the World? 
 
What is really at stake in the epilogue is the question of who makes the world.  
Throughout the book, Job and his friends have argued over what the world is like, even as 
they have agreed on how the world ought (and ought not) to be.  When God appears in the 
whirlwind, he upsets Job’s and his friends’ conceptions of chaos and order, showing Job a 
world that both is and ought to be wildly different from what he and his friends have 
claimed.  God brings home to Job the fact that he, God, and not Job is the creator of the 
world, asking Job, “Where were you when I laid the foundation of the earth?” (38:4) and 
“Will you even put me in the wrong? Will you condemn me that you may be justified?” 
(40:8).  That is, Job is not only not the creator, but was not even present when the world 
was made to know how it was done.  Job’s insistence on his vision of the way the world 
ought to be requires the condemnation of God’s workmanship in making the world as it is. 
Of course, Job has never expressed any doubt that God is the creator, leading some 
interpreters to claim that God is making the wrong point, failing to tell Job anything he 
does not already know.  This, though, could hardly be further from the truth.  Job may 
have always known that God was the world’s creator, but the world which he believed God 
to have created was a particular kind of world, a world very different from the world God 
shows him from the whirlwind.  “As you already know, I made the world,” God says to 
Job. “But what you don’t know is what kind of world I made.  It’s not the world you think 
I made, and if you insist that your idea of the world is the world I ought to have made, then 
you’re denying me, putting me in the wrong.”   
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“I am the creator of the world,” says God from the whirlwind, “and this is what the 
world is like.”  The question is whether or not Job accepts this pronouncement and what he 
does with his newly-given knowledge.  Does he say, “Yes, I accept your world and reject 
my old ideas about order and chaos,” and proceed to live in the world that God has shown 
him?  Or does he say, “I reject the picture of the world that you have shown me.  It may be 
the world that you have created, but it is not the world as it ought to be,” and proceed to 
live in a world of his own making?   
Interestingly, however Job is understood to respond, commentators of all stripes are 
unhappy with the story’s conclusion.  If Job rejects God’s world, the epilogue, in which 
Job finds himself, once again, on good terms with God, diverts attention from what Job has 
just said, overtly contradicting it.  On the other hand, if Job is seen as accepting God’s 
world, problems arise when Job does not move into the world God shows him from the 
whirlwind.  Job never joins the animals on an equal footing, having given up all claims to 
the “‘subdue and have dominion’ project,” and having accepted that the world is 
changeable beyond his control.  Brown explains this discrepancy by asserting that God 
never intended Job to inhabit the wilderness world of the whirlwind.  He writes, “It is 
crucial that Job does not remain in the wilderness, meditating upon God’s awesome 
beneficence in creation….Just as he was thrown into the margins of life, where the 
periphery suddenly replaced the center, Job is now thrown back into the community with a 
new sense of purpose and moral vision” (Brown 1996, 114).  As Brown sees it, Job accepts 
God’s depiction of the world, but he lives in that world by reentering his community, by 
being willing to reengage despite the unpredictable changeability of the world as he now 
knows it to be.  For Brown, then, the epilogue represents the fulfillment of what has come 
before in God’s speeches and Job’s response, and not its undoing.  Perhaps this is so, but I 
am not convinced.  The world of the epilogue is too different from the world God has 
shown Job.  It smacks of rejection, not of acceptance.  Yet, at the same time, for those who 
claim that Job rejects God’s version of the world, the epilogue seems too much like 
acceptance. 
 Are we, then, hopelessly mired in ambiguity, unable to determine what the 
epilogue means?  Perhaps.  But before accepting that this is the case, I want to return to the 
question of who makes the world as it is answered by the epilogue.  If the God of the 
whirlwind has made the world that appears in the epilogue, he can only have made it, it 
seems to me, by means of creating a changeable world that is capable of surprising him.  
The world that appears in the epilogue is not the world God shows Job from the whirlwind.  
Instead, it is clearly the world Job has insisted ought to exist, the world he has described in 
chapter 29.  Given the close resemblance between the world of the epilogue and Job’s 
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ordered world of chapter 29, it seems more likely that it is Job who makes the world with 
which the book ends.  Having been shown the world as God has made it, Job realizes that 
the world he has been calling God to uphold throughout the book is not God’s world, but 
Job’s own.  If anyone is going to make the world as Job believes it ought to be, Job 
realizes that he must be the one.  Perhaps there is a way in which God’s stress on himself 
as the creator of the world backfires.  Although Job has always taken it for granted that 
God is the creator, God’s self-proclamation as creator highlights the fact that the world is a 
made artifact, and, as a made artifact can be remade by other makers.160  God’s challenge 
to Job to “Deck yourself with majesty and dignity; clothe yourself with glory and splendor.  
Pour out the overflowings of your anger, and look on all who are proud, and abase them” 
(40:10-11) signals God’s belief that Job is incapable of making the world as he believes it 
should be.  Job is incapable of abasing the proud and of grinding the wicked into the dust, 
and is, therefore, incapable of making a world in which the wicked receive their just 
deserts at each and every turn.   
 Yet, in the epilogue, Job does make a world.  Perhaps this world does not quite 
attain his standard of perfection, but it comes close.  Job is central, the future is 
predictable, and he is located inside the city walls.  Although Job may be incapable of 
punishing the wicked as he believes they ought to be punished, it is significant that the 
wicked do not figure in the world of the epilogue.  The only being designated as wicked in 
the epilogue is God (42:11).  Job’s friends and family acknowledge that God has acted 
wickedly, and they reverse the effect of God’s actions by comforting Job and giving him 
money and jewelry.  Additionally, the God who appeared to Job in the whirlwind is left 
outside the city walls, in the howling wilderness where he belongs.  The only God let in is 
the one who seconds the restorative activities of Job’s family and friends, who does, in 
effect, what Job wants him to do.  So, although God may be right that Job is not capable of 
abasing all the proud, Job does, somehow, construct a world from which the proud and 
wicked are absent, and, foremost among these, is the God of the whirlwind. 
 In the end, then, does the Book of Job proclaim that the last word about order and 
chaos, about how the world ought and ought not to be, belongs to Job?  The epilogue does 
give us Job’s world, and the epilogue has the last word in the book.  If this is the case, 
though, what about that mire of ambiguity alluded to earlier?  Was it simply a mirage that 
has now evaporated?  No.  It’s still there.  Job’s world does have the last word, but it is 
Job’s world that has  something of the mirage about it.  It disappeared before and could 
disappear again.  Is the whirlwind world, therefore more real?  Not entirely, for it, too, is 
                                                 
160 This possibility is suggested by Scarry’s work on the nature of the world as made artifact in The Body in 
Pain.   
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capable of disappearing, which is what has happened at the end of the book.  In the end, it 
seems, both God and Job make the world, both determine what order and chaos are like, 
but neither determines it once and for all. 
 I have claimed that so much of the interpretation of the book depends upon the 
epilogue, and I think this is true.  The last word matters.  But, as has been seen, what that 
last word says is uncertain or, at least, only temporarily certain.  Noting the ambiguity 
inherent in the epilogue David Penchansky writes, “Job returns to quiet and trustful piety 
in the epilogue, but by following the center, the epilogue introduces many ironic and 
disharmonic elements….Job therefore disperses into many stories, each occupying the 
same 42 chapters” (Penchansky 1990, 49).  We do not read the Book of Job, but a Book of 
Job.  If this is the case, it might be argued that we, the readers, are the ones who make the 
world of the book.  We are the ones who decide which world holds sway, which world has 
the last word.  Yet, I do not think that this is entirely correct.  The book is tricksier than 
that.  The moment I choose between one of the options it presents, it throws up objections.  
If I choose Job’s static, simple, inside world as the domain of order, God’s complex, 
changeable, whirlwind world rises up and undermines my certainty, and the same happens 
if I choose the whirlwind world over the world of the epilogue.  Whether or not Newsom is 
correct that, in his response to God, Job is intentionally ambiguous so as to create a 
loophole for himself, she is certainly right that the book ends “by thwarting all attempts to 
harmonize the various elements of the book….The apparent monologic resolution in an 
illusion, and the conversation is projected beyond the bounds of the book” (Newsom 1996, 
298).  The idea that Job creates a loophole for himself makes it seem as if he is choosing 
the more comfortable option; he would rather not be pinned down, and so keeps his 
options open.  It seems to me, though, that the loophole is an uncomfortable space.  If 
Job’s answer is ambiguous, perhaps it is because he does not know how to answer, and not 
because he wants to keep his options open.  There is a way in which the ambiguity of his 
answer signals his recognition that he inhabits an uncertain, unpredictable world, which is, 
in fact, the world as God as described it from the whirlwind.  In this way, Job answers God 
even as he withholds his answer!—but then he goes on to inhabit another sort of world 
altogether.   
Here, though, I am being drawn back into the vortex of the book’s ending, 
reweighing the options it presents, when I am trying to bring my discussion of Job to an 
end.  This is the problem with the loophole.  It sucks you in, and won’t let you out.  The 
reader does not control the book by deciding what it means for herself.  Rather, it’s the 
book that controls the reader by preventing her from knowing, once and for all, what its 
vision of order is.  It engenders a discussion that it is impossible to conclude, no matter 
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how much we would like to stop talking.  Yet, perhaps this emphasis on continuing 
discussion is misguided.  As helpful as Bakhtinian analysis is for understanding the book, 
perhaps it leaves us in the wrong place—always talking with no possibility of ever arriving 
at any conclusion.  The book, after all, does not end with discussion, but with action.  Job 
chooses a world and inhabits it.  Perhaps the best response to the book’s presentation of 
multiple visions of what the world ought to be like is to do the same, not as a way of 
closing down the possibilities the book has raised but of trying them out.   
 236
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Allen, James P.   
1997 “From Coffin Texts Spell 335=Book of the Dead Spell 17 (1:10).”  In The 
Context of Scripture.  Edited by W. Hallo and K. L. Younger, Jr.  Page 15.  
Leiden, New York, and Koln: Brill. 
 
Alonso-Schökel, Luis 
1983 “God’s Answer to Job.”  In Job and the Silence of God.  Edited by C. 
Duquoc and C. Floristán.  Pages 45-51.  New York: Seabury Press. 
 
Alter, Robert 
1985 The Art of Biblical Poetry.  New York: Basic Books. 
 
Anderson, Bernhard W.   
1987 Creation Versus Chaos.  Philadelphia: Fortress. 
 
Ash, Christopher 
2004 Out of the Storm: Grappling with God in the Book of Job.  Leicester: Inter-
Varsity Press. 
 
Batto, Bernard F.   
1992 Slaying the Dragon: Mythmaking in the Biblical Tradition.  Louisville: 
Westminster/John Knox. 
 
Bailey, Lloyd R., Sr.   
1979 Biblical Perspectives on Death.  Philadelphia: Fortress. 
 
Balentine, Samuel E.  
1999 “Who Will be Job's Redeemer?”  Perspectives in Religious Studies 26 no 3: 
269-289. 
 
Bakhtin, Mikhail.   
1981 The Dialogic Imagination.  Edited by M. Holquist.  Translated by C. 
Emerson and M. Holquist.  Austin and London: University of Texas Press, 
1981.  Quoted in C. Keller, Face of the Deep (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2003): 140. 
 
1984a Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics.  Edited and Translated by C. Emerson.  
Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press. 
 
1984b Rabelais and his World.  Translated by H. Iswolsky.  Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press. 
 
Brenner, Athalya 
1981 “God’s Answer to Job.”  Vetus Testamentum 31 no 2 : 129-37. 
 
Brown, William P.   
1996 Character in Crisis.  Grand Rapids: Eerdmans. 
 
1999 The Ethos of the Cosmos: The Genesis of Moral Imagination in the Bible.  
Grand Rapids: Eerdmans. 
 237
 
Brueggemann, Walter 
1978 The Land.  London: SPCK. 
 
1997 Theology of the Old Testament.  Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress. 
 
Cassuto, Umberto 
1975 Biblical and Oriental Studies, vol. 2.  Translated by I. Abrahams.  
Jerusalem: The Magnes Press. 
 
Childs, Brevard S.  
1979 Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture.  London: SCM Press. 
 
Clifford, Richard J.   
1994 Creation Accounts in the Ancient Near East and in the Bible.  Washington, 
D. C.: The Catholic Biblical Association of America. 
 
Clines, David J. A.  
1989 Job 1-20.  Word Biblical Commentary 17.  Dallas: Word Books. 
 
1990 “Deconstructing the Book of Job.”  In What Does Eve do to Help? and 
Other Readerly Questions to the Old Testament.  Pages 106-123.  Sheffield: 
JSOT Press. 
 
1994 “Why is there a Book of Job and What Does it do to You if You Read it?” 
   In The Book of Job.  Edited by W. A. M. Beuken.  Pages 1-20.  Louvain: 
Leuven University Press. 
 
1998a “False Naivety in the Prologue to Job.”  In On the Way to the Postmodern, 
vol. 2.  Pages 735-44.  Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press. 
 
1998b “Quarter Days Gone: Job 24 and the Absence of God.”  In God in the Fray: 
A Tribute to Walter Brueggemann.  Edited by T. Linafelt and T. K. Beal.  
Pages 242-58.  Minneapolis: Fortress Press. 
 
2006 Job 21-37.  Word Biblical Commentary 18A.  Nashville: Thomas Nelson. 
 
Clines, David J. A., ed. 
1993 The Dictionary of Classical Hebrew, vol. 1.  Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix 
Press. 
 
2007 The Dictionary of Classical Hebrew, vol. 6.  Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix 
Press. 
 
Cohn, Norman 
1993 Cosmos, Chaos and the World to Come: The Ancient Roots of Apocalyptic 
Faith.  New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 
 
Cohn, Robert L.   
1981 The Shape of Sacred Space: Four Biblical Studies.  California: Scholars 
Press. 
 
Couroyer, B.  
 238
1975  “Qui Est Béhémoth?”  Revue Biblique 82: 418-443. 
 
Cox, Dermot 
1978 The Triumph of Impotence: Job and the Tradition of the Absurd.  Rome: 
Universita Gregoriana Editrice. 
 
Crenshaw, James L.   
1977 “In Search of Divine Presence.”  Review & Expositor 74 no 3: 353-69. 
 
1982 Old Testament Wisdom: An Introduction.  London: SCM Press. 
 
1983 A Whirlpool of Torment: Israelite Traditions of God as an Oppressive 
Presence.  Philadelphia: Fortress. 
 
1989 “Job.”  In The HarperCollins Study Bible.  Pages 749-96.  New York: 
HarperCollins. 
 
Cross, Frank Moore   
1976 “The ‘Olden Gods’ in Ancient Near Eastern Creation Myths.”  In Magnalia 
Dei: The Mighty Acts of God: Essays on the Bible and Archaeology in 
Memory of G. Ernest Wright.  Edited by F. M. Cross, W. E. Lemke, and P. 
D. Miller, Jr.  Pages 329-38.  New York: Doubleday. 
 
Curtis, John Briggs 
1979 “On Job’s Response to Yahweh.” Journal of Biblical Literature 98 no 4: 
497-511. 
 
Davis, Ellen F. 
1992 “Job and Jacob: The Integrity of Faith.” In Reading Between Texts.  Edited 
by D. N. Fewell.  Pages 203-224.  Louisville: Westminster/John Knox.  
 
Day, John 
1985 God’s Conflict with the Dragon and the Sea: Echoes of a Canaanite Myth 
in the Old Testament.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
2002 Yahweh and the Gods and Goddesses of Canaan.  Sheffield: Sheffield 
Academic Press. 
 
Day, Peggy L.   
1988 An Adversary in Heaven.  Atlanta: Scholars Press. 
 
de Vaux, Roland 
1961 Ancient Israel: Its Life and Institutions.  Translated by J. McHugh.  
London: Darton, Longman & Todd. 
 
Dhorme, Edouard 
1967 A Commentary on the Book of Job.  Translated by H. Knight.  London: 
Thomas Nelson and Sons. 
 
Douglas, Mary 
1966 Purity and Danger.  Great Britain: Penguin Books. 
 
Driver, Samuel Rolles and Gray, George Buchanan 
 239
1921 The Book of Job.  Edinburgh: T&T Clark. 
 
Eliade, Mircea 
1961 The Sacred and the Profane.  Translated by W. R. Trask.  New York: 
Harper & Row. 
 
Emerson, Caryl 
1984 “Editor’s Preface.”  In M. Bakhtin, The Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics. 
Edited and Translated by C. Emerson.  Pages xxix-xliii.  Minneapolis and 
London: University of Minnesota Press. 
 
Ewing, Ward B. 
1976 Job: A Vision of God.  New York: The Seabury Press. 
 
Fishbane, Michael 
1971  “Jeremiah IV 23-26 and Job III 3-13: A Recovered Use of the 
Creation Pattern.”  Vetus Testamentum 21 no 2: 151-67. 
 
Fontaine, Carole 
1987 “Folktale Structure in Job.”  In Directions in Biblical Hebrew Poetry.  
Edited by E. R. Follis.  Pages 205-232.  Sheffield: JSOT Press. 
 
1992 “Wounded Hero on a Shaman’s Quest.”  In The Voice from the Whirlwind.  
Edited by L. Perdue and W. C. Gilpin.  Pages 70-85.  Nashville: Abingdon. 
 
Fox, Michael V.  
1981 “Job 38 and God’s Rhetoric.” Semeia 19: 53-61. 
 
Fretheim, Terence E.  
1987 “Nature’s Praise of God in the Psalms.”  Ex Auditu 3: 16-30.  Quoted in R. 
Simkins, Creator and Creation: Nature in the Worldview of Ancient Israel 
(Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1994): 130. 
 
1999 “God in the Book of Job.”  Currents in Theology and Mission 26 no 2: 85-
93. 
 
Frick, Frank S.   
1977 The City in Ancient Israel.  Missoula: Scholars Press. 
 
Fyall, Robert S.   
2002 Now My Eyes have seen You: Images of Creation and Evil in the Book of 
Job.  Downers Grove: Inter Varsity Press. 
 
Gammie, John G.  
1978 “Behemoth and Leviathan: On the Didactic and Theological Significance of 
Job 40:15-41:26.”  In Israelite Wisdom: Theological and Literary Essays in 
Honor of Samuel Terrien.  Edited by J. G. Gammie et al.  Pages 217-31.  
New York: Scholars Press. 
 
Gaster, Theodor H.   
1969 Myth, Legend, and Custom in the Old Testament.  New York and Evanston: 
Harper & Row. 
 
 240
Geller, Stephen A.   
1987 “‘Where is Wisdom?’: A Literary Study of Job 28 in its Settings.”  In 
Judaic Perspectives on Ancient Israel.  Edited by J. Neusner, B. Levine, 
and E. Frerichs.  Pages 155-188.  Philadelphia: Fortress. 
 
Girard, René 
1987 Job: The Victim of his People.  Translated by Y. Freccero.  Stanford: 
Stanford University Press. 
 
Good, Edwin 
1990 In Turns of Tempest. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 
Gordis, Robert 
1965 The Book of God and Man.  Chicago and London: University of Chicago 
Press. 
 
1978 The Book of Job: Commentary, New Translation and Special Studies.  New 
York: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America. 
 
Gordon, Cyrus H. 
1966 “Leviathan: Symbol of Evil.”  In Biblical Motifs: Origins and 
Transformations.  Edited by A. Altmann.  Pages 1-9.  Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 
 
Greenberg, Moshe 
1987 “Job.” In The Literary Guide to the Bible.  Edited by R. Alter and F. 
Kermode.  Pages 283-304.  London: Collins. 
 
Greenstein, Edward L.  
1999 “In Job’s Face/Facing Job.”  In The Labour of Reading: Desire, Alienation, 
and Biblical Interpretation.  Edited by F. C. Black, R. Boer and E. Runions.  
Pages 301-17.  Atlanta: SBL. 
 
Gunkel, Hermann.   
2006 Creation and Chaos in the Primeval Era and the Eschaton: A Religio-
Historical Study of Genesis 1 and Revelation 12.  Translated by K. W. 
Whitney Jr.  Grand Rapids and Cambridge: Eerdmans. 
 
Gutierrez, Gustavo 
1987 On Job: God-Talk and the Suffering of the Innocent.  Translated by M. J. 
O’Connell.  Maryknoll: Orbis Books. 
 
Habel, Norman C. 
1977 Only the Jackal is My Friend’ On Friends and Redeemers in Job,” 
Interpretation 31 no 3: 227-236. 
 
1983 “Of Things Beyond Me: Wisdom in the Book of Job.” Currents in Theology 
and Mission 10 no 3: 142-154. 
 
1985 The Book of Job, A Commentary.  London: SCM Press. 
 
2001 “‘Is the Wild Ox Willing to Serve You?’ Challenging the Mandate to 
 241
Dominate.”  In The Earth Story in Wisdom Traditions.  Edited by N. C. 
Habel and S. Wurst.  Pages 179-189.  Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press. 
 
Hamilton, Mark 
2007  “Elite Lives: Job 29-31 and Traditional Authority.”  Journal for the Study of 
the Old Testament 32 no 1: 69-89. 
 
Hanson, Anthony and Miriam 
1953 The Book of Job: Introduction and Commentary.  London: SCM Press. 
 
Harding, James E. 
2005 “A Spirit of Deception in Job 4:15?  Interpretive Indeterminacy and 
Eliphaz’s Vision.” Biblical Interpretation 13 no 2: 137-166. 
 
Hartley, John E.   
1988 The Book of Job.  Grand Rapids: Eerdmans. 
 
Holder, Ian 
1990 The Domestication of Europe.  Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Basil 
Blackwell. 
 
Holladay, William L. 
1988 A Concise Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon.  Grand Rapids and Leiden: 
Eerdmans and E. J. Brill. 
 
Horne, Milton 
2005  “From Ethics to Aesthetics: The Animals in Job 38:39-39:30.”  Review & 
Expositor 102 no 1: 127-42. 
 
Jacobsen, Thorkild 
1976 The Treasures of Darkness.  New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press. 
 
Jacobsen, Thorkild and Nielsen, Kirsten 
1992  “Cursing the Day.”  Scandinavian Journal of the Old Testament 6 no 2: 
187-204. 
 
Janzen, J. Gerald 
1985 Job.  Interpretation.  Atlanta: John Knox Press. 
 
1989 “Another Look at God's Watch Over Job (7:12).”  Journal of Biblical 
Literature 108 no 1: 109-114. 
 
1994 “On the Moral Nature of God's Power: Yahweh and the Sea in Job and 
Deutero-Isaiah.”  Catholic Biblical Quarterly 56 no 3: 458-78. 
 
Jung, Carl G.   
1954 Answer to Job.  Translated by R. F. C. Hull.  London and New York: 
Routledge. 
 
Keller, Catherine 
2003 Face of the Deep: A Theology of Becoming.  London and New York: 
Routledge. 
 242
 
Kelley, Page H 
1971 “Speeches of the Three Friends.” Review & Expositor 68 no 4: 479-485. 
 
Kinet, Dirk 
1983 “The Ambiguity of the Concepts of God and Satan in the Book of Job.”  In 
Job and the Silence of God.  Edited by C. Duquoc and C. Floristán.  Pages 
30-35.  New York: Seabury Press. 
 
Lawrie, Douglas 
2001 “How Critical is it to be Historically Critical?  The Case of the Composition 
of the Book of Job.” Journal of Northwest Semitic Languages 27 no 1: 121-
146. 
 
Leal, Robert Barry 
2005 “Negativity Towards Wilderness in the Biblical Record.”  Ecotheology 10 
no 3: 364-381. 
 
Linafelt, Tod 
1996 “The Undecidability of Krb in the Prologue to Job and Beyond.”  Biblical 
Interpretation 4 no 2: 154-72. 
 
Lo, Alison 
2003 Job 28 as Rhetoric: An Analysis of Job 28 in the Context of Job 22-31.  
Leiden and Boston: Brill. 
 
Loewenstamm, Samuel E. 
1980 Comparative Studies in Biblical and Ancient Oriental Literatures.  
Germany: Verlag Butzon & Bercker Kevalaer and Neukirchener Verlab 
Neukirchen-Vluyn. 
 
Louth, Andrew 
2003 The Wilderness of God.  London: Darton, Longman and Todd. 
 
Lynch, Thomas. 
 1998 “Art History, Chicago.”  In Still Life in Milford.  London: Cape Poetry. 
 
McCarthy, Dennis J. 
1967 “‘Creation’ Motifs in Ancient Hebrew Poetry.”  Catholic Biblical Quarterly 
29 no 3: 87-100. 
 
Melchert, Charles  
1997 “The Book of Job: Education Through and By Diversity.”  Religious 
Education 92 no 1: 9-23. 
 
Mettinger, Tryggve N. D.  
1997 “The Enigma of Job: The Deconstruction of God in Intertextual 
Perspective.”  Journal of Northwest Semitic Languages  23 no 2: 1-19. 
 
Miles, Jack 
1995 God: A Biography.  London: Simon & Schuster. 
 
Mitchell, Christopher W. 
 243
1987 The Meaning of BRK “To Bless” in the Old Testament.  SBL Dissertation 
Series 95.  Atlanta: Scholars Press. 
 
Mitchell, Stephen 
1989 The Book of Job.  London: Kyle Cathie Limited. 
 
Morson, Gary Saul 
1994 Narrative and Freedom: The Shadows of Time.  New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press. 
 
Murphy, Roland E.   
1999 The Book of Job: A Short Reading.  New York/Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press. 
 
2002 “The Last Truth About God.”  Review & Expositor 99 no 4: 581-87. 
 
Nash, Roderick 
1982 Wilderness and the American Mind, 3rd Edition.  New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press. 
 
Nemo, Philippe 
1998 Job and the Excess of Evil.  Translated by M. Kigel.  Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press. 
 
Newsom, Carol A. 
1993 “Cultural Politics and the Reading of Job.”  Biblical Interpretation 1 no 2: 
119-138. 
 
1994 “The Moral Sense of Nature: Ethics in the Light of God’s Speech to Job.”  
Princeton Seminary Bulletin 15 no 1: 9-27. 
 
1996 “Bakhtin, the Bible, and Dialogic Truth.”  Journal of Religion 76: 290-306. 
 
1999 “Job and His Friends: A Conflict of Moral Imaginations.”  Interpretation 53 
no 3: 239-253. 
 
2003 The Book of Job: A Contest of Moral Imaginations.  New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
2007 “Re-considering Job.”  Currents in Biblical Research 5 no 2: 155-182. 
 
Niditch, Susan 
1985 Chaos to Cosmos: Studies in Biblical Patterns of Creation.  Chico: Scholars 
Press. 
 
O’Connor, Daniel 
1985 “The Futility of Myth-Making in Theodicy: Job 38-41.”  Proceedings of the 
Irish Biblical Association 9: 81-99. 
 
O’Connor, Donal 
1995 Job: his wife, his friends, and his God.  Dublin: The Columba Press. 
 
Otzen, Benedikt 
 244
1980 “The Use of Myth in Genesis.”  In Myths in the Old Testament.  By B. 
Otzen, H. Gottlieb, and K. Jeppesen.  Translated by F. Cryer.  London: 
SCM Press. 
 
Penchansky, David 
1990 The Betrayal of God: Ideological Conflict in Job.  Louisville: Westminster/ 
John Knox Press. 
 
Perdue, Leo G. 
1991 Wisdom in Revolt: Metaphorical Theology in the Book of Job.  Sheffield: 
The Almond Press. 
 
Pfaelzer, Jean 
1981 “The Impact of Political Theory on Narrative Structures.”  In America as 
Utopia.  Edited by K. M. Roemer.  Pages 117-132.  New York: Burt 
Franklin and Co. 
 
Pope, Marvin H. 
1965 Job.  New York: Doubleday. 
 
Pyper, Hugh S. 
2005 An Unsuitable Book: The Bible as Scandalous Text.  Sheffield: Sheffield 
Phoenix Press. 
 
Reynierse, James H. 
1975 “A Behavioristic Analysis of the Book of Job.”  Journal of Psychology and 
Theology 3 no 2: 75-81. 
 
Rimmon-Kenan, Shlomith 
1983 Narrative Fiction: Contemporary Poetics.  London and New York: 
Routledge. 
 
Robertson, David 
1973 “The Book of Job: A Literary Study.”  Soundings 56: 446-69. 
 
 
Roemer, Kenneth M. 
1981 “Defining America as Utopia.”  In America as Utopia.  Edited by K. M. 
Roemer.  Pages 1-15.  New York: Burt Franklin and Co. 
  
Rowold, Henry 
1978 “Yahweh’s Challenge to Rival: The Form and Function of the Yahweh-
Speeches in Job 38-39.”  Catholic Biblical Quarterly 47 no 2: 199-211. 
 
Rowley, H. H. 
 1985 Job.  Great Britain: Thomas Nelson and Sons. 
 
Scarry, Elaine 
1985 The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World.  New York and 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Seitz, Christopher R. 
 245
1989 “Job: Full-Structure, Movement, and Interpretation.”  Interpretation 43 no 
1: 5-17. 
 
Sendak, Maurice 
1957 Very Far Away.  New York: Harper & Brothers. 
 
Simkins, Ronald 
1994 Creator and Creation: Nature in the Worldview of Ancient Israel.  Peabody, 
MA: Hendrickson. 
 
Speiser, E.A. trans. 
1955 “Akkadian Myths and Epics: The Creation Epic.”  ANET.  Pages 60-72  
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Talmon, Shemaryahu 
1966 “The ‘Desert Motif’ in the Bible and in Qumran Literature.”  In Biblical 
Motifs: Origins and Transformations.  Philip W. Lown Institute of 
Advanced Judaic Studies, Brandeis University.  Edited by A. Altmann.  
Pages 31-63.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press.   
 
Terrien, Samuel 
1954 “The Book of Job.”  In The Interpreter’s Bible vol. 3.  Pages 877-1198.  
New York and Nashville: Abingdon Press. 
 
1957 Job: Poet of Existence.  Indianapolis and New York: The Bobbs-Merrill 
Company. 
 
1971  “The Yahweh Speeches and Job’s Response.”  Review & Expositor 68: 
497-509. 
 
Tolstoy, Leo 
1954 Anna Karenin.  Translated by R. Edmonds.  Great Britain: Penguin Books. 
 
Tromp, Nicholas J. 
1969 Primitive Conceptions of Death and the Nether World in the Old Testament.  
Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute. 
 
Tsevat, Matitiahu 
1980 The Meaning of the Book of Job and Other Studies.  New York: Ktav 
Publishing House. 
 
Tsumura, David Toshio 
1989 The Earth and the Waters in Genesis 1 and 2: A Linguistic Investigation.  
Sheffield: JSOT Press. 
 
Tur-Sinai, Naphtali 
1957 The Book of Job.  Jerusalem: Kiryath Sepher Ltd. 
 
Van Wolde, Ellen 
2003 “Wisdom, Who Can Find It? A Non-Cognitive and Cognitive Study of Job 
28:1-11.”  In Job 28: Cognition in Context.  Edited by E. Van Wolde.  
Pages 1-35.  Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2003. 
 
 246
Vawter, Bruce 
1983 Job & Jonah: Questioning the Hidden God.  New York: Paulist Press. 
 
Vonnegut, Kurt 
1973 Breakfast of Champions.  New York: Dell Publishing. 
 
Watson, Rebecca S. 
2005 Chaos Uncreated: A Reassessment of the Theme of “Chaos” in the Hebrew 
Bible.  Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter. 
 
Weiss, Meir 
1983 The Story of Job’s Beginning, Job 1-2: A Literary Analysis.  Jerusalem: The 
Magnes Press. 
 
Westermann, Claus 
1981 The Structure of the Book of Job.  Translated by C. A. Muenchow.  
Philadelphia: Fortress. 
 
Whedbee, William 
1977 “The Comedy of Job.”  Semeia 7:1-39. 
 
Whybray, Norman 
1998 Job.  Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press. 
 
Williams, James G. 
1971 “‘You have not Spoken Truth of Me’ Mystery and Irony in Job.”  Zeitschrift 
für die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft 83 no 2: 231-53. 
 
Wright, David P. 
1987 The Disposal of Impurity: Elimination Rites in the Bible and in Hittite and 
Mesopotamian Literature.  Atlanta: Scholars Press. 
 
Zuckerman, Bruce 
1991 Job the Silent: A Study in Historical Counterpoint.  NY and Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
